Effects of “Framing” on measures of risk tolerance: Financial planners are not immune

Opposing associations between sedentary time and decision-making competence in young adults revealed by functional connectivity in the dorsal attention network

How daily physical activity and sedentary time relate to human judgement and functional connectivity (FC) patterns that support them remains underexplored. We investigated the relationships between accelerometer-measured moderate-to-vigorous physical activity (MVPA) and sedentary time to decision-making competence (DMC) in young adults using a comprehensive Adult-Decision Making Competence battery. We applied graph theory measures of global and local efficiency to test the mediating effects of FC in cognitively salient brain networks (fronto-parietal; dorsal attention, DAN; ventral attention; and default mode), assessed from the resting-state fMRI. Sedentary time was related to lower susceptibility to a framing bias. However, once global and local efficiency of the DAN were considered we observed (1) higher susceptibility to framing with more sedentary time, mediated through lower local and global efficiency in the DAN, and (2) lower susceptibility to framing with more sedentary time. MVPA was not related to DMC or graph theory measures. These results suggest that remaining sedentary may reduce neurofunctional readiness for top-down control and decrease engagement of deliberate thought, required to ignore irrelevant aspects of a problem. The positive effect suggests that the relationship between sedentary time and DMC may be moderated by unmeasured factors such as the type of sedentary behavior.

The consumer-citizen duality: Ten reasons why citizens prefer safety and drivers desire speed

Cost-benefit analyses for transportation projects usually value impacts on safety and travel time through experiments in which consumers of mobility ('drivers') choose between routes which differ in safety and travel time. This approach has been criticized for failing to consider that private choices may not fully reflect citizens' preferences over public goods and means, a concept known as the consumer-citizen duality. Recent empirical evidence has established that individuals do indeed assign comparatively more value to safety in their role as citizens than in their role as drivers. Our study aims to provide explanations for this finding by presenting four stated choice experiments in which respondents were asked to make choices, both as citizens and as drivers, between routes that differed in travel time and safety. Subsequently, respondents were asked to provide reasons for their choices. We identify five cognitive and five normative explanations. The cognitive explanations suggest that individuals make diverging choices because their perceptions of accident risk differ between the two roles. Drivers will assign a relatively low value to mitigating accident risk because they believe that: (1) such risks are trivial on an individual level; (2) their personal risk is lower than the average risk; (3) their personal risk is controllable; (4) they would not be able to distinguish relative safety levels in real life; and (5) their choices for others are more risk-averse than choices for themselves and, unlike citizens, they are not explicitly evaluating risky choices for others. The normative explanations involve that individuals believe that the government should assign more value to safety compared to individual drivers because: (6) as citizen they are more prone to base their choices on social norms which prescribe risk-averse behaviour in this context; (7) governments have a duty of care concerning the safety of the transportation network; (8) drivers have a relatively high degree of responsibility to reduce their own travel times; (9) governments should account for drivers' tendencies to choose faster routes by building safer ones; and (10) governments should ensure the safety of the road network because this allows drivers to choose the fastest route without being concerned about the impact of their route choice on accident risk.

Increasing Vaccination: Putting Psychological Science Into Action

Vaccination is one of the great achievements of the 20th century, yet persistent public-health problems include inadequate, delayed, and unstable vaccination uptake. Psychology offers three general propositions for understanding and intervening to increase uptake where vaccines are available and affordable. The first proposition is that thoughts and feelings can motivate getting vaccinated. Hundreds of studies have shown that risk beliefs and anticipated regret about infectious disease correlate reliably with getting vaccinated; low confidence in vaccine effectiveness and concern about safety correlate reliably with not getting vaccinated. We were surprised to find that few randomized trials have successfully changed what people think and feel about vaccines, and those few that succeeded were minimally effective in increasing uptake. The second proposition is that social processes can motivate getting vaccinated. Substantial research has shown that social norms are associated with vaccination, but few interventions examined whether normative messages increase vaccination uptake. Many experimental studies have relied on hypothetical scenarios to demonstrate that altruism and free riding (i.e., taking advantage of the protection provided by others) can affect intended behavior, but few randomized trials have tested strategies to change social processes to increase vaccination uptake. The third proposition is that interventions can facilitate vaccination directly by leveraging, but not trying to change, what people think and feel. These interventions are by far the most plentiful and effective in the literature. To increase vaccine uptake, these interventions build on existing favorable intentions by facilitating action (through reminders, prompts, and primes) and reducing barriers (through logistics and healthy defaults); these interventions also shape behavior (through incentives, sanctions, and requirements). Although identification of principles for changing thoughts and feelings to motivate vaccination is a work in progress, psychological principles can now inform the design of systems and policies to directly facilitate action.

Moral judgments of risky choices: A moral echoing effect

Two experiments examined moral judgments about a decision-maker’s choices when he chose a sure-thing, 400 out of 600 people will be saved, or a risk, a two-thirds probability to save everyone and a one-thirds probability to save no-one. The results establish a moral echoing effect — a tendency to credit a decision-maker with a good outcome when the decision-maker made the typical choices of the sure-thing in a gain frame or the risk in a loss frame, and to discredit the decision-maker when there is a bad outcome and the decision-maker made the atypical choices of a risk in a gain frame or a sure-thing in a loss frame. The moral echoing effect is established in Experiment 1 (n=207) in which participants supposed the outcome would turn well or badly, and it is replicated in Experiment 2 (n=173) in which they knew it had turned out well or badly, for judgments of moral responsibility and blame or praise. The effect does not occur for judgments of cause, control, counterfactual alternatives, or emotions.

Financial Surrogate Decision Making: Lessons from Applied Experimental Philosophy

An estimated 1 in 4 elderly Americans need a surrogate to make decisions at least once in their lives. With an aging population, that number is almost certainly going to increase. This paper focuses on financial surrogate decision making. To illustrate some of the empirical and moral implications associated with financial surrogate decision making, two experiments suggest that default choice settings can predictably influence some surrogate financial decision making. Experiment 1 suggested that when making hypothetical financial decisions, surrogates tended to stay with default settings (OR = 4.37, 95% CI 1.52, 12.48). Experiment 2 replicated and extended this finding suggesting that in a different context (OR = 2.27, 95% CI 1.1, 4.65). Experiment 2 also suggested that those who were more numerate were less likely to be influenced by default settings than the less numerate, but only when the decision is whether to "opt in" (p = .05). These data highlight the importance of a recent debate about "nudging." Defaults are common methods to nudge people to make desirable choices while allowing the liberty to choose otherwise. Some of the ethics of using default settings to nudge surrogate decision makers are discussed.

I can take the risk, but you should be safe: Self-other differences in situations involving physical safety

Prior research on self-other differences involving risk have found that individuals make riskier decisions for others than for the self in situations where risk taking is valued. We expand this research by examining whether the direction of self-other differences reverses when risk aversion is valued, as predicted by social values theory (Stone & Allgaier, 2008). Two studies tested for self-other differences in physical safety scenarios, a domain where risk aversion is valued. In Study 1, participants read physical safety and romantic relationship scenarios and selected what they would decide for themselves, what they would decide for a friend, or what they would predict their friend would decide. In Study 2, participants read public health scenarios and either decided or predicted for themselves and for a friend. In keeping with social values theory, participants made more risk-averse decisions for others than for themselves in situations where risk aversion is valued (physical safety scenarios) but more risk-taking decisions for others than for themselves in situations where risk taking is valued (relationship scenarios). Further, we show that these self-other differences in decision making do not arise from incorrectly predicting others’ behaviors, as participants predicted that others’ decisions regarding physical safety scenarios would be either similar (Experiment 1) or more risk taking (Experiment 2) than their own decisions.

On avoiding framing effects in experienced decision makers

The present study aimed to (a) demonstrate the effect of positive–negative framing on experienced criminal justice decision makers, (b) examine the debiasing effect of visually structured risk messages, and (c) investigate whether risk perceptions mediate the debiasing effect of visual aids on decision making. In two phases, 60 senior police officers estimated the accuracy of a counterterrorism technique in identifying whether a known terror suspect poses an imminent danger and decided whether they would recommend the technique to policy makers. Officers also rated their confidence in this recommendation. When information about the effectiveness of the counterterrorism technique was presented in a numerical format, officers' perceptions of accuracy and recommendation decisions were susceptible to the framing effect: The technique was perceived to be more accurate and was more likely to be recommended when its effectiveness was presented in a positive than in a negative frame. However, when the information was represented visually using icon arrays, there were no such framing effects. Finally, perceptions of accuracy mediated the debiasing effect of visual aids on recommendation decisions. We offer potential explanations for the debiasing effect of visual aids and implications for communicating risk to experienced, professional decision makers.

Decision-making heuristics and biases across the life span

We outline a contextual and motivational model of judgment and decision-making (JDM) biases across the life span. Our model focuses on abilities and skills that correspond to deliberative, experiential, and affective decision-making processes. We review research that addresses links between JDM biases and these processes as represented by individual differences in specific abilities and skills (e.g., fluid and crystallized intelligence, executive functioning, emotion regulation, personality traits). We focus on two JDM biases-the sunk-cost fallacy (SCF) and the framing effect. We trace the developmental trajectory of each bias from preschool through middle childhood, adolescence, early adulthood, and later adulthood. We conclude that life-span developmental trajectories differ depending on the bias investigated. Existing research suggests relative stability in the framing effect across the life span and decreases in the SCF with age, including in later life. We highlight directions for future research on JDM biases across the life span, emphasizing the need for process-oriented research and research that increases our understanding of JDM biases in people's everyday lives.

A re-examination of the effect of contextual group size on people’s attitude to risk

Using Kahneman and Tversky’s life-death decision paradigm, Wang and colleagues (e.g., Wang & Johnston, 1995; Wang, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 2008; Wang et al., 2001) have shown two characteristic phenomena regarding people’s attitude to risk when the contextual group size is manipulated. In both positive and negative frames, people tend to take greater risks in life-death decisions as the contextual group size becomes smaller; this risk-seeking attitude is greater when framed positively than negatively. (This second characteristic often leads to the disappearance of the framing effect in small group contexts comprising of 6 or 60 people.) Their results could shed new light on the effect of contextual group size on people’s risk choice. However these results are usually observed in laboratory experiments with university student samples. This study aims to examine the external validity of these results through different ways of experimentation and with a different sample base. The first characteristic was replicated in both a face-to-face interview with a randomly selected sample of the Japanese general public, and a web-based experiment with a non-student sample, but not the second.

Framing effects in younger and older adults

A growing literature on decision making in older adults suggests that they are more likely to use heuristic processing than are younger adults. We assessed this tendency in the context of a framing effect, a decision-making phenomenon whereby the language used to describe options greatly influences the decision maker's choice. We compared decision making under a standard ("heuristic") condition and also under a "justification" condition known to reduce reliance on heuristics. In the standard condition, older adults were more susceptible than younger adults to framing but the two groups did not differ when participants were asked to provide a justification. Thus, although older adults may spontaneously rely more on heuristic processing than younger adults, they can be induced to take a more systematic approach to decision making.

The Effects of Framing, Reflection, Probability, and Payoff on Risk Preference in Choice Tasks

A meta-analysis of Asian-disease-like studies is presented to identify the factors which determine risk preference. First the confoundings between probability levels, payoffs, and framing conditions are clarified in a task analysis. Then the role of framing, reflection, probability, type, and size of payoff is evaluated in a meta-analysis. It is shown that bidirectional framing effects exist for gains and for losses. Presenting outcomes as gains tends to induce risk aversion, while presenting outcomes as losses tends to induce risk seeking. Risk preference is also shown to depend on the size of the payoffs, on the probability levels, and on the type of good at stake (money/property vs human lives). In general, higher payoffs lead to increasing risk aversion. Higher probabilities lead to increasing risk aversion for gains and to increasing risk seeking for losses. These findings are confirmed by a subsequent empirical test. Shortcomings of existing formal theories, such as prospect theory, cumulative prospect theory, venture theory, and Markowitz's utility theory, are identified. It is shown that it is not probabilities or payoffs, but the framing condition, which explains most variance. These findings are interpreted as showing that no linear combination of formally relevant predictors is sufficient to capture the essence of the framing phenomenon. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.

All Frames Are Not Created Equal: A Typology and Critical Analysis of Framing Effects

Accentuate the positive or accentuate the negative? The literature has been mixed as to how the alternative framing of information in positive or negative terms affects judgments and decisions. We argue that this is because different studies have employed different operational definitions of framing and thus have tapped different underlying processes. We develop a typology to distinguish between three different kinds of valence framing effects. First we discuss the standard risky choice framing effect introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) to illustrate how valence affects willingness to take a risk. Then we discuss attribute framing, which affects the evaluation of object or event characteristics, and goal framing, which affects the persuasiveness of a communication. We describe the distinctions, provide a number of examples of each type, and discuss likely theoretical mechanisms underlying each type of framing effect. Our typology helps explain and resolve apparent confusions in the literature, ties together studies with common underlying mechanisms, and serves as a guide to future research and theory development. We conclude that a broader perspective, focused on the cognitive and motivational consequences of valence-based encoding, opens the door to a deeper understanding of the causes and consequences of framing effects. Copyright 1998 Academic Press.

The Influence of Framing on Risky Decisions: A Meta-analysis

In framing studies, logically equivalent choice situations are differently described and the resulting preferences are studied. A meta-analysis of framing effects is presented for risky choice problems which are framed either as gains or as losses. This evaluates the finding that highlighting the positive aspects of formally identical problems does lead to risk aversion and that highlighting their equivalent negative aspects does lead to risk seeking. Based on a data pool of 136 empirical papers that reported framing experiments with nearly 30,000 participants, we calculated 230 effect sizes. Results show that the overall framing effect between conditions is of small to moderate size and that profound differences exist between research designs. Potentially relevant characteristics were coded for each study. The most important characteristics were whether framing is manipulated by changing reference points or by manipulating outcome salience, and response mode (choice vs. rating/judgment). Further important characteristics were whether options differ qualitatively or quantitatively in risk, whether there is one or multiple risky events, whether framing is manipulated by gain/loss or by task-responsive wording, whether dependent variables are measured between- or within- subjects, and problem domains. Sample (students vs. target populations) and unit of analysis (individual vs. group) was not influential. It is concluded that framing is a reliable phenomenon, but that outcome salience manipulations, which constitute a considerable amount of work, have to be distinguished from reference point manipulations and that procedural features of experimental settings have a considerable effect on effect sizes in framing experiments. Copyright 1998 Academic Press.