Clustering of group A streptococcal infections on a burns unit: important lessons in outbreak management

A report on the first outbreak of emm89 group A streptococcus invasive infections in a burns unit in Tunisia

Four group A streptococcus (GAS) bacteraemia occurred in a small burn unit within 2 weeks. The GAS patient isolates, characterized as emm89, shared the same PFGE pulsotype with two other strains isolated 2 months later. The outbreak investigation revealed that a nurse was the most likely source of GAS transmission, as she was confirmed to carry the same outbreak strain in her throat and had direct and regular contact with the six outbreak patients in the unit. The outbreak was controlled after the nurse had undergone eradication treatment. This report highlights the emergence of the emm89 clone and its capacity to elicit invasive GAS outbreaks.

Nursing Home Outbreak of Invasive Group A Streptococcal Infections Caused by 2 Distinct Strains

Objective.

To identify factors contributing to a cluster of deaths from invasive group A streptococcus (GAS) infection in a nursing home facility and to prevent additional cases.

Design.

Outbreak investigation.

Setting.

A 146-bed nursing home facility in northern Nevada.

Methods.

We defined a case as the isolation of GAS from a normally sterile site in a resident of nursing home A. To identify case patients, we reviewed resident records from nursing home A, the local hospital, and the hospital laboratory. We obtained oropharyngeal and skin lesion swabs from staff and residents to assess GAS colonization and performed emm typing on available isolates. To identify potential risk factors for transmission, we performed a cohort study and investigated concurrent illness among residents and surveyed staff regarding infection control practices.

Results.

Six residents met the case patient definition; 3 (50%) of them died. Among invasive GAS isolates available for analysis, 2 distinct strains were identified: emm11 (3 isolates) and emm89 (2 isolates). The rate of GAS carriage was 6% among residents and 4% among staff; carriage isolates were emm89 (8 isolates), emm11 (2 isolates), and emm1 (1 isolate). Concurrently, 35 (24%) of the residents developed a respiratory illness of unknown etiology; 41% of these persons died. Twenty-one (30%) of the surveyed employees did not always wash their hands before patient contacts, and 27 (38%) did not always wash their hands between patient contacts.

Conclusions.

Concurrent respiratory illness likely contributed to an outbreak of invasive GAS infection from 2 strains in a highly susceptible population. This outbreak highlights the importance of appropriate infection control measures, including respiratory hygiene practices, in nursing home facilities.

An Outbreak of Severe Group A Streptococcus Infections Associated with Podiatric Application of a Biologic Dermal Substitute

OBJECTIVE

To describe an outbreak of severe Group A Streptococcus (GAS) infections that appeared to be associated with use of a biologic dermal substitute on foot wounds

DESIGN

Retrospective cohort study of cases and similar uninfected patients

SETTING/PATIENTS

Patients attending the podiatry clinic at a Veterans Affairs Medical Center between July 2011 and November 2011 INTERVENTIONS: Microbiology laboratory data were reviewed for the calendar year, a case definition was established and use of the biologic dermal substitute was discontinued. Staff were cultured to identify potentially colonized employees. A case-cohort study was designed to investigate risk factors for disease. Emm typing and pulsed field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) were performed to identify strain similarity.

RESULTS

In 10 months, 14 cases were identified, and 4 of these patients died. All strains were emm type 28 and were identical according to PFGE. Discontinuation of biologic dermal substitute use halted the outbreak. A prior stroke was more common in the case cohort vs uninfected patient cohorts. The number of patients attending the clinic on 13 probable transmission days was significantly higher than on nontransmission days. We identified 2 patients who were present in the clinic on all but 1 probable transmission day. Surveillance cultures of podiatry clinic staff and cultures of the same lot of retained graft material were negative.

CONCLUSIONS

A carrier was not identified, and we believe the outbreak was associated with inter-patient transmission likely due to lapses in infection control techniques. No additional cases have been identified in >3 years following the resumption of dermal substitute use in May 2012.

Hospital-acquired invasive group a streptococcal infections in Ontario, Canada, 1992-2000

BACKGROUND

A significant proportion of invasive group A streptococcal infections are hospital acquired. No large, prospective studies have characterized this subgroup of cases and evaluated the risk of transmission in hospitals.

METHODS

We conducted prospective, population-based surveillance of invasive group A streptococcal infections in Ontario, Canada, from 1992 to 2000. Epidemiologic and microbiologic investigations were conducted to identify cross-transmission.

RESULTS

We identified 291 hospital-acquired cases (12.4%) among 2351 cases of invasive group A streptococcal disease. Hospital-acquired invasive group A streptococcal infections are heterogeneous, including surgical site (96 cases), postpartum (86 cases), and nonsurgical, nonobstetrical infections (109 cases). Surgical site infections affected 1 of 100,000 surgical procedures and involved all organ systems. Postpartum infections occurred at a rate of 0.7 cases per 10,000 live births and exhibited an excellent prognosis. Nonsurgical, nonobstetrical infections encompassed a broad range of infectious syndromes (case-fatality rate, 37%). Nine percent of cases were associated with in-hospital transmission. Transmission occurred from 3 of 142 patients with community-acquired cases of necrotizing fasciitis requiring intensive care unit (ICU) admission, compared with 1 of 367 patients with community-acquired cases without necrotizing fasciitis admitted to the ICU and 1 of 1551 patients with other cases (P<.001). Fifteen outbreaks were identified; 9 (60%) involved only 2 cases. Hospital staff were infected in 1 of 15 outbreaks, but colonized staff were identified in 6 (60%) of 10 investigations in which staff were screened.

CONCLUSIONS

Presentation of hospital-associated invasive group A streptococcal infections is diverse. Cross-transmission is common; illness occurs in patients but rarely in staff. Isolation of new cases of necrotizing fasciitis and intervention after a single nosocomial case may also prevent transmission.

Guideline for Prevention of Surgical Site Infection, 1999. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Hospital Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The "Guideline for Prevention of Surgical Site Infection, 1999" presents the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)'s recommendations for the prevention of surgical site infections (SSIs), formerly called surgical wound infections. This two-part guideline updates and replaces previous guidelines.1,2 Part I, "Surgical Site Infection: An Overview," describes the epidemiology, definitions, microbiology, pathogenesis, and surveillance of SSIs. Included is a detailed discussion of the pre-, intra-, and postoperative issues relevant to SSI genesis. Part II, "Recommendations for Prevention of Surgical Site Infection," represents the consensus of the Hospital Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC) regarding strategies for the prevention of SSIs.3 Whenever possible, the recommendations in Part II are based on data from well-designed scientific studies. However, there are a limited number of studies that clearly validate risk factors and prevention measures for SSI. By necessity, available studies have often been conducted in narrowly defined patient populations or for specific kinds of operations, making generalization of their findings to all specialties and types of operations potentially problematic. This is especially true regarding the implementation of SSI prevention measures. Finally, some of the infection control practices routinely used by surgical teams cannot be rigorously studied for ethical or logistical reasons (e.g., wearing vs not wearing gloves). Thus, some of the recommendations in Part II are based on a strong theoretical rationale and suggestive evidence in the absence of confirmatory scientific knowledge.It has been estimated that approximately 75% of all operations in the United States will be performed in "ambulatory," "same-day," or "outpatient" operating rooms by the turn of the century.4 In recommending various SSI prevention methods, this document makes no distinction between surgical care delivered in such settings and that provided in conventional inpatient operating rooms. This document is primarily intended for use by surgeons, operating room nurses, postoperative inpatient and clinic nurses, infection control professionals, anesthesiologists, healthcare epidemiologists, and other personnel directly responsible for the prevention of nosocomial infections. This document does not: Specifically address issues unique to burns, trauma, transplant procedures, or transmission of bloodborne pathogens from healthcare worker to patient, nor does it specifically address details of SSI prevention in pediatric surgical practice. It has been recently shown in a multicenter study of pediatric surgical patients that characteristics related to the operations are more important than those related to the physiologic status of the patients.5 In general, all SSI prevention measures effective in adult surgical care are indicated in pediatric surgical care. Specifically address procedures performed outside of the operating room (e.g., endoscopic procedures), nor does it provide guidance for infection prevention for invasive procedures such as cardiac catheterization or interventional radiology. Nonetheless, it is likely that many SSI prevention strategies also could be applied or adapted to reduce infectious complications associated with these procedures. Specifically recommend SSI prevention methods unique to minimally invasive operations (i.e., laparoscopic surgery). Available SSI surveillance data indicate that laparoscopic operations generally have a lower or comparable SSI risk when contrasted to open operations.6-11 SSI prevention measures applicable in open operations (e.g., open cholecystectomy) are indicated for their laparoscopic counterparts (e.g., laparoscopic cholecystectomy). Recommend specific antiseptic agents for patient preoperative skin preparations or for healthcare worker hand/forearm antisepsis. Hospitals should choose from products recommended for these activitie

Guideline for prevention of surgical site infection, 1999. Hospital Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee

The “Guideline for Prevention of Surgical Site Infection, 1999” presents the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)'s recommendations for the prevention of surgical site infections (SSIs), formerly called surgical wound infections. This two-part guideline updates and replaces previous guidelines.

Part I, “Surgical Site Infection: An Overview,” describes the epidemiology, definitions, microbiology, pathogenesis, and surveillance of SSIs. Included is a detailed discussion of the pre-, intra-, and postoperative issues relevant to SSI genesis.

Outbreak of scarlet fever at a hospital day care centre: analysis of strain relatedness with phenotypic and genotypic characteristics

An outbreak of scarlet fever involving 12 children occurred at a hospital day care centre from February to March 1996. Twenty-five throat isolates of Streptococcus pyogenes (GAS, group A streptococcus) available from 24 children, including 10 children with scarlet fever and 14 asymptomatic carriers, and one asymptomatic staff member were studied for the presence of genes encoding streptococcal pyrogenic exotoxin types A (speA), B (speB), and C (speC) and for protease activity. Antimicrobial susceptibilities using the E-test, cluster analysis by cellular fatty acid composition and random amplified polymorphic DNA (RAPD) patterns by means of arbitrarily-primed polymerase chain reaction (APPCR) of the isolates were performed to investigate the outbreak. Only one isolate from an asymptomatic child possessed the speA gene. All isolates possessed the speB gene and 24 (96%) isolates were positive for the speC gene. There was no difference in protease activity between isolates from children with scarlet fever and from asymptomatic carriers. Thirteen isolates (10 recovered from children with scarlet fever, two from asymptomatic children, and one from the staff member) were considered to be the same strain according to the identical antimicrobial susceptibility profile and RAPD patterns and were also considered to be similar by cluster analysis of fatty acid composition. These findings suggest that the outbreak was caused by a unique clone of GAS. We conclude that RAPD typing and cluster analysis by cellular fatty acids composition both provide a powerful tool for epidemiological investigation of GAS infections.

Outbreak of group A streptococci in a burn center: use of pheno- and genotypic procedures for strain tracking

In a burn center, an outbreak of group A streptococci (GAS) colonizations involving 13 patients and two staff members occurred. Adverse events due to GAS, loss of skin graft after initial take (secondary loss) and partial take, occurred in patients who underwent surgery before the colonization was detected. GAS isolates from nine patients and one staff member were stored and subsequently pheno- and genotyped by T serotyping, gas chromatography, M genotyping, and random amplified polymorphic DNA typing. The outbreak was caused by two types of GAS, identified as T4/28-M48 and T13-M77 by T serotyping and M genotyping. Random amplified polymorphic DNA typing and gas chromatography distinguished both clusters accurately. One subcluster indicated by gas chromatography could be linked to the acquisition of GAS from a roommate. The T13-M77 cluster was characterized by rapid spread through the center compared with the T4/28-M48 cluster. One patient contracted the T13-M77 strain while in protective isolation, indicating a role for staff members in the transmission. Our standard GAS control policy, consisting of twice weekly screening of all burned patients and immediate isolation and treatment, proved efficacious in preventing further spread of GAS. Reporting by staff members of signs and symptoms compatible with GAS infection was reenforced.