Effects of response sequence length on motor programming: a chronometric analysis

C-SMB 2.0: Integrating over 25 years of motor sequencing research with the Discrete Sequence Production task

An exhaustive review is reported of over 25 years of research with the Discrete Sequence Production (DSP) task as reported in well over 100 articles. In line with the increasing call for theory development, this culminates into proposing the second version of the Cognitive framework of Sequential Motor Behavior (C-SMB 2.0), which brings together known models from cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and motor learning. This processing framework accounts for the many different behavioral results obtained with the DSP task and unveils important properties of the cognitive system. C-SMB 2.0 assumes that a versatile central processor (CP) develops multimodal, central-symbolic representations of short motor segments by repeatedly storing the elements of these segments in short-term memory (STM). Independently, the repeated processing by modality-specific perceptual and motor processors (PPs and MPs) and by the CP when executing sequences gradually associates successively used representations at each processing level. The high dependency of these representations on active context information allows for the rapid serial activation of the sequence elements as well as for the executive control of tasks as a whole. Speculations are eventually offered as to how the various cognitive processes could plausibly find their neural underpinnings within the intricate networks of the brain.

Hand preference for the visual and auditory modalities in humans

The sensory dominance effect refers to the phenomenon that one sensory modality more frequently receives preferential processing (and eventually dominates consciousness and behavior) over and above other modalities. On the other hand, hand dominance is an innate aspect of the human motor system. To investigate how the sensory dominance effect interacts with hand dominance, we applied the adapted Colavita paradigm and recruited a large cohort of healthy right-handed participants (n = 119). While the visual dominance effect in bimodal trials was observed for the whole group (n = 119), about half of the right-handers (48%) showed a visual preference, i.e., their dominant hand effect manifested in responding to the visual stimuli. By contrast, 39% of the right-handers exhibited an auditory preference, i.e., the dominant hand effect occurred for the auditory responses. The remaining participants (13%) did not show any dominant hand preference for either visual or auditory responses. For the first time, the current behavioral data revealed that human beings possess a characteristic and persistent preferential link between different sensory modalities and the dominant vs. non-dominant hand. Whenever this preferential link between the sensory and the motor system was adopted, one dominance effect peaks upon the other dominance effect's best performance.

Relative performance of the two hands in simple and choice reaction time tasks

There is evidence that the left hemisphere is more competent for motor control than the right hemisphere. This study investigated whether this hemispheric asymmetry is expressed in the latency/duration of sequential responses performed by the left and/or right hands. Thirty-two right-handed young adults (16 males, 16 females; 18-25 years old) were tested in a simple or choice reaction time task. They responded to a left and/or right visual target by moving their left and/or right middle fingers between two keys on each side of the midline. Right hand reaction time did not differ from left hand reaction time. Submovement times were longer for the right hand than the left hand when the response was bilateral. Pause times were shorter for the right hand than the left hand, both when the responses were unilateral or bilateral. Reaction time results indicate that the putatively more efficient response preparation by the left hemisphere motor mechanisms is not expressed behaviorally. Submovement time and pause time results indicate that the putatively more efficient response execution by the left hemisphere motor mechanisms is expressed behaviorally. In the case of the submovements, the less efficient motor control of the left hand would be compensated by a more intense attention to this hand.

Barking up the wrong free: readiness potentials reflect processes independent of conscious will

In the early 1980s, Libet found that a readiness potential (RP) over central scalp locations begins on average several hundred milliseconds before the reported time of awareness of willing to move (W). Haggard and Eimer Exp Brain Res 126(1):128-133, (1999) later found no correlation between the timing of the RP and W, suggesting that the RP does not reflect processes causal of W. However, they did find a positive correlation between the onset of the lateralized readiness potential (LRP) and W, suggesting that the LRP might reflect processes causal of W. Here, we report a failure to replicate Haggard and Eimer's LRP finding with a larger group of participants and several variations of their analytical method. Although we did find a between-subject correlation in just one of 12 related analyses of the LRP, we crucially found no within-subject covariation between LRP onset and W. These results suggest that the RP and LRP reflect processes independent of will and consciousness. This conclusion has significant implications for our understanding of the neural basis of motor action and potentially for arguments about free will and the causal role of consciousness.

Brain preparation before a voluntary action: evidence against unconscious movement initiation

Benjamin Libet has argued that electrophysiological signs of cortical movement preparation are present before people report having made a conscious decision to move, and that these signs constitute evidence that voluntary movements are initiated unconsciously. This controversial conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the electrophysiological signs recorded by Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl (1983) are associated only with preparation for movement. We tested that assumption by comparing the electrophysiological signs before a decision to move with signs present before a decision not to move. There was no evidence of stronger electrophysiological signs before a decision to move than before a decision not to move, so these signs clearly are not specific to movement preparation. We conclude that Libet's results do not provide evidence that voluntary movements are initiated unconsciously.