Monitoring and meta-metacognition in the own-race bias

An own-race bias in the categorisation and recall of associative information

ABSTRACTPeople tend to better remember same-race faces relative to other-race faces (an "own-race" bias). We examined whether the own-race bias extends to associative memory, particularly in the identification and recall of information paired with faces. In Experiment 1, we presented white participants with own- and other-race faces which either appeared alone or accompanied by a label indicating whether the face was a "criminal" or a "victim". Results revealed an own-race facial recognition advantage regardless of the presence of associative information. In Experiment 2, we again paired same- and other-race faces with either "criminal" or "victim" labels, but rather than a recognition test, participants were asked to identify whether each face had been presented as a criminal or a victim. White criminals were better categorised than Black criminals, but race did not influence the categorisation of victims. In Experiment 3, white participants were presented with same- and other-race faces and asked to remember where the person was from, their occupation, and a crime they committed. Results revealed a recall advantage for the associative information paired with same-race faces. Collectively, these findings suggest that the own-race bias extends to the categorisation and recall of information in associative memory.

The (limited) effect of emotional arousal in the regulation of accuracy in eyewitness memory

Witnesses encoding a crime are likely to feel negative emotions with high arousal, e.g., anxiety or fear. Negative emotions improve memory for central information and impair memory for peripheral information. In this study we explored the effects of emotional arousal and type of information in the regulation of accuracy. The regulation of accuracy allows participants to maximize accuracy, for example, by deciding on the number of alternatives in their response (the plurality option). Participants were induced with high-and low-arousal negative emotions and then shown a slideshow of a crime. Afterwards, they answered questions about central and peripheral contents of the event. Questions followed the basic plurality option procedure. First, participants selected one alternative (single answer); second, they selected three alternatives (plural answer); and, finally, they decided on reporting either the single or the plural answer. Results showed successful manipulation of arousal, and that the regulation of accuracy led to a greater increase in accuracy for peripheral than for central information, but no differences depending on the level of arousal. We also identified two factors that increased accuracy in the plurality option: the ability to discard answers with low chances of being correct and the addition of answers with higher chances of being correct. Either one, or both, can increase witness accuracy.

Different answers to different audiences: effects of social context on the accuracy-informativeness trade-off

Research on conversational exchanges shows that people attempt to optimise their responses' relevance when they definitely know the correct answer (e.g., "What time is it?"). However, such certainty is often unavailable while speakers may still be under social pressure to provide an answer. We investigated how social context influences the informativeness level when answering questions under uncertainty. In three experiments, participants answered difficult general-knowledge questions placed in different social contexts (formal vs. informal). Participants generated their answers, then they were presented with a given context, and decided on the number of alternative responses they wanted to provide (single, with one alternative vs. plural, with several alternatives) and whether the answer should be reported or withheld (report option). Participants reported more answers in the informal context. In the formal context, single answers were preferred, and they were more frequently reported. We conclude that social context influences the level of informativeness in a conversation, affecting achievable accuracy. Our results also show the joint influence of the confidence and the social context on willingness to share information.

Are regulatory strategies necessary in the regulation of accuracy? The effect of direct-access answers

Previous studies have shown that, when people asked to retrieve something from memory have the chance to regulate memory accuracy, the accuracy of their final report increases. Such regulation of accuracy can be made through one of several strategies: the report option, the grain-size option, or the plurality option. However, sometimes an answer can be directly accessed and reported without resorting to such strategies. The direct-access answers are expected to be fast, have high accuracy, and be rated with high probabilities of being correct. Thus, direct-access answers alone could explain the increase of accuracy that has been considered the outcome of regulatory strategies. If so, regulatory strategies may not be needed to explain the previous results. In two experiments, we disentangled the effects of direct-access answers and regulatory strategies in the increase of accuracy. We identified a subset of direct-access answers, and then examined the regulation of accuracy with the plurality option when they were removed. Participants answered questions with six (Exp. 1) or five (Exp. 2) alternatives. Their task was, first, to select as many alternatives as they wanted and, second, to select only two or four alternatives. The results showed that the direct-access answer affected the regulation of accuracy and made it easier. However, the results also showed that regulatory strategies, in this case the plurality option, are needed to explain why the accuracy of final report increases after successful regulation. This research highlighted the relevance of taking direct-access answers into account in the study of the regulation of accuracy.

Comparative difficulty and the strategic regulation of accuracy: the impact of test-list context on monitoring and meta-metacognition

A growing body of research has shown that context manipulations can have little or no impact on accuracy performance, yet still significantly influence metacognitive performance. For example, participants in a test-list context paradigm study one list of words with a medium levels-of-processing task and a second word list with either a shallow or deep task: Recognition for medium words does not differ across conditions, however medium words are significantly more likely to be labeled as "remembered" (vs. merely familiar) if they had been studied with a shallow word list (Bodner & Lindsay, 2003). The goal of the current studies was to extend the test-list context paradigm to strategic regulation (report/withhold recognition test), and broaden it to incorporate different types of stimuli (i.e., face stimuli in place of a medium word list). The paradigm also was modified to include separate answer (studied/new) confidence and decision (report/withhold) confidence ratings at test. Results showed that context did not impact recognition accuracy for faces across the context conditions, however participants were more likely to report (i.e., volunteer) their face responses if they had studied the shallow word list. The results also demonstrated a difference between answer confidence and decision confidence, and the pattern of this difference depended on whether responses were reported or withheld (Experiment 1). Overall, the data are presented as support for the functional account of memory, which views memory states as inferential and attributional rather than static categories.

No pain no gain: The positive impact of punishment on the strategic regulation of accuracy

Previous studies have shown that punishing people through a large penalty for volunteering incorrect information typically leads them to withhold more information (metacognitive response bias), but it does not appear to influence their ability to distinguish between their own correct and incorrect answers (metacognitive accuracy discrimination). The goal of the current study was to demonstrate that punishing people for volunteering incorrect information-versus rewarding volunteering correct information-produces more effective metacognitive accuracy discrimination. All participants completed three different general-knowledge tests: a reward test (high points for correct volunteered answers), a baseline test (equal points/penalties for volunteered correct/incorrect answers) and a punishment test (high penalty for incorrect volunteered answers). Participants were significantly better at distinguishing between their own correct and incorrect answers on the punishment than reward test, which has implications for situations requiring effective accuracy monitoring.