A tale of two theories: parent–offspring conflict and reproductive skew

Kin Blackmail as a Coercive Route to Altruism

AbstractThe evolution of altruism (helping a recipient at personal cost) often involves conflicts of interest. Recipients frequently prefer greater altruism than actors are prepared to provide. Coercion by recipients normally involves limiting an actor's options. Here, we consider the possibility of a coercive recipient limiting its own options. Forty years ago, Amotz Zahavi suggested that nesting birds may be "blackmailed" into increased parental care if offspring threaten to harm themselves (and therefore jeopardize the direct fitness of their parents). In a simple kin selection model, we expand blackmail to indirect fitness and highlight that blackmail can occur between any kin to drive reproductive division of labor. In principle, a recipient may place its own fitness at risk (brinkmanship), imposing sanctions on a relative's indirect fitness if the relative fails to cooperate. To use its own survival or reproduction as leverage in a sequential game, a recipient must increase the extent to which its existing fitness depends on the actor's behavior and therefore credibly commit to a cost if the actor does not comply. As it requires opportunities for commitment, kin blackmail can arise only under stringent conditions, but existing kin blackmailers may pass unnoticed because of their strategic success.

Diminishing returns drive altruists to help extended family

Altruism between close relatives can be easily explained. However, paradoxes arise when organisms divert altruism towards more distantly related recipients. In some social insects, workers drift extensively between colonies and help raise less related foreign brood, seemingly reducing inclusive fitness. Since being highlighted by W. D. Hamilton, three hypotheses (bet hedging, indirect reciprocity and diminishing returns to cooperation) have been proposed for this surprising behaviour. Here, using inclusive fitness theory, we show that bet hedging and indirect reciprocity could only drive cooperative drifting under improbable conditions. However, diminishing returns to cooperation create a simple context in which sharing workers is adaptive. Using a longitudinal dataset comprising over a quarter of a million nest cell observations, we quantify cooperative payoffs in the Neotropical wasp Polistes canadensis, for which drifting occurs at high levels. As the worker-to-brood ratio rises in a worker's home colony, the predicted marginal benefit of a worker for expected colony productivity diminishes. Helping related colonies can allow effort to be focused on related brood that are more in need of care. Finally, we use simulations to show that cooperative drifting evolves under diminishing returns when dispersal is local, allowing altruists to focus their efforts on related recipients. Our results indicate the power of nonlinear fitness effects to shape social organization, and suggest that models of eusocial evolution should be extended to include neglected social interactions within colony networks.

Power and punishment influence negotiations over parental care

Asymmetries in power (the ability to influence the outcome of conflict) are ubiquitous in social interactions because interacting individuals are rarely identical. It is well documented that asymmetries in power influence the outcome of reproductive conflict in social groups. Yet power asymmetries have received little attention in the context of negotiations between caring parents, which is surprising given that parents are often markedly different in size. Here we built on an existing negotiation model to examine how power and punishment influence negotiations over care. We incorporated power asymmetry by allowing the more-powerful parent, rank 1, to inflict punishment on the less-powerful parent, rank 2. We then determined when punishment will be favored by selection and how it would affect the negotiated behavioral response of each parent. We found that with power and punishment, a reduction in one parent’s effort results in partial compensation by the other parent. However, the degree of compensation is asymmetric: the rank 2 compensates more than the rank 1. As a result, the fitness of rank 1 increases and the fitness of rank 2 decreases, relative to the original negotiation model. Furthermore, because power and punishment enable one parent to extract greater effort from the other, offspring can do better, that is, receive more total effort, when there is power and punishment involved in negotiations over care. These results reveal how power and punishment alter the outcome of conflict between parents and affect offspring, providing insights into the evolutionary consequences of exerting power in negotiations.

Reproductive control via the threat of eviction in the clown anemonefish

In social groups, high reproductive skew is predicted to arise when the reproductive output of a group is limited, and dominant individuals can suppress subordinate reproductive efforts. Reproductive suppression is often assumed to occur via overt aggression or the threat of eviction. It is unclear, however, whether the threat of eviction alone is sufficient to induce reproductive restraint by subordinates. Here, we test two assumptions of the restraint model of reproductive skew by investigating whether resource limitation generates reproductive competition and whether the threat of eviction leads to reproductive restraint in the clown anemonefish Amphiprion percula First, we use a feeding experiment to test whether reproduction is resource limited, which would create an incentive for the dominant pair to suppress subordinate reproduction. We show that the number of eggs laid increased in the population over the study period, but the per cent increase in fed groups was more than twice that in unfed groups (205% and 78%, respectively). Second, we use an eviction experiment to test whether the dominant pair evicts mature subordinates, which would create an incentive for the subordinates to forgo reproduction. We show that mature subordinates are seven times more likely to be evicted than immature subordinates of the same size. In summary, we provide experimental support for the assumptions of the restraint model by showing that resource limitation creates reproductive competition and a credible threat of eviction helps explain why subordinates forego reproduction. Transactional models of reproductive skew may apply well to this and other simple systems.

Stable eusociality via maternal manipulation when resistance is costless

In many eusocial species, queens use pheromones to influence offspring to express worker phenotypes. Although evidence suggests that queen pheromones are honest signals of the queen's reproductive health, here I show that queen's honest signalling can result from ancestral maternal manipulation. I develop a mathematical model to study the coevolution of maternal manipulation, offspring resistance to manipulation and maternal resource allocation. I assume that (i) maternal manipulation causes offspring to be workers against offspring's interests; (ii) offspring can resist at no direct cost, as is thought to be the case with pheromonal manipulation; and (iii) the mother chooses how much resource to allocate to fertility and maternal care. In the coevolution of these traits, I find that maternal care decreases, thereby increasing the benefit that offspring obtain from help, which in the long run eliminates selection for resistance. Consequently, ancestral maternal manipulation yields stable eusociality despite costless resistance. Additionally, ancestral manipulation in the long run becomes honest signalling that induces offspring to help. These results indicate that both eusociality and its commonly associated queen honest signalling can be likely to originate from ancestral manipulation.

Parent-offspring conflict and the genetic trade-offs shaping parental investment

The genetic conflict between parents and their offspring is a cornerstone of kin selection theory and the gene-centred view of evolution, but whether it actually occurs in natural systems remains an open question. Conflict operates only if parenting is driven by genetic trade-offs between offspring performance and the parent's ability to raise additional offspring, and its expression critically depends on the shape of these trade-offs. Here we investigate the occurrence and nature of genetic conflict in an insect with maternal care, the earwig Forficula auricularia. Specifically, we test for a direct response to experimental selection on female future reproduction and correlated responses in current offspring survival, developmental rate and growth. The results demonstrate genetic trade-offs that differ in shape before and after hatching. Our study not only provides direct evidence for parent–offspring conflict but also highlights that conflict is not inevitable and critically depends on the genetic trade-offs shaping parental investment.

Sexual reproduction introduces genetic conflict between family members, but direct empirical evidence is lacking. Here, the authors show, in an insect with maternal care, that genetic trade-offs that differ in shape across offspring stages affect the scope for parent–offspring conflict.

The past, present and future of reproductive skew theory and experiments

A major evolutionary question is how reproductive sharing arises in cooperatively breeding species despite the inherent reproductive conflicts in social groups. Reproductive skew theory offers one potential solution: each group member gains or is allotted inclusive fitness equal to or exceeding their expectation from reproducing on their own. Unfortunately, a multitude of skew models with conflicting predictions has led to confusion in both testing and evaluating skew theory. The confusion arises partly because one set of models (the 'transactional' type) answer the ultimate evolutionary question of what ranges of reproductive skew can yield fitness-enhancing solutions for all group members. The second set of models ('compromise') give an evolutionarily proximate, game-theoretic evolutionarily stable state (ESS) solution that determines reproductive shares based on relative competitive abilities. However, several predictions arising from compromise models require a linear payoff to increased competition and do not hold with non-linear payoffs. Given that for most species it may be very difficult or impossible to determine the true relationship between effort devoted to competition and reproductive share gained, compromise models are much less predictive than previously appreciated. Almost all skew models make one quantitative prediction (e.g. realized skew must fall within ranges predicted by transactional models), and two qualitative predictions (e.g. variation in relatedness or competitive ability across groups affects skew). A thorough review of the data finds that these three predictions are relatively rarely supported. As a general rule, therefore, the evolution of cooperative breeding appears not to be dependent on the ability of group members to monitor relatedness or competitive ability in order to adjust their behaviour dynamically to gain reproductive share. Although reproductive skew theory fails to predict within-group dynamics consistently, it does better at predicting quantitative differences in skew across populations or species. This suggests that kin selection can play a significant role in the evolution of sociality. To advance our understanding of reproductive skew will require focusing on a broader array of factors, such as the frequency of mistaken identity, delayed fitness payoffs, and selection pressures arising from across-group competition. We furthermore suggest a novel approach to investigate the sharing of reproduction that focuses on the underlying genetics of skew. A quantitative genetics approach allows the partitioning of variance in reproductive share itself or that of traits closely associated with skew into genetic and non-genetic sources. Thus, we can determine the heritability of reproductive share and infer whether it actually is the focus of natural selection. We view the 'animal model' as the most promising empirical method where the genetics of reproductive share can be directly analyzed in wild populations. In the quest to assess whether skew theory can provide a framework for understanding the evolution of sociality, quantitative genetics will be a central tool in future research.

Parental care, cost of reproduction and reproductive skew: a general costly young model

Understanding the mechanisms by which animals resolve conflicts of interest is the key to understanding the basis of cooperation in social species. Conflict over reproductive portioning is the critical type of conflict among cooperative breeders. The costly young model represents an important, but underappreciated, idea about how an individual's intrinsic condition and cost of reproduction should affect the resolution of conflict over the distribution of reproduction within a cooperatively breeding group. However, dominant control in various forms and fixed parental care (offspring fitness dependent solely on total brood size) are assumed in previous versions of costly young models. Here, we develop a general costly young model by relaxing the restrictive assumptions of existing models. Our results show that (1) when the complete-control assumption is relaxed, the costly young model behaves very differently from the original model, and (2) when the fixed parental care assumption is relaxed, the costly young-costly care model displays similar predictions to the tug-of-war model, although the underlying mechanisms causing these similar patterns are different. These results, we believe, help simplify the seemingly divergent predictions of different reproductive skew models and highlight the importance of studying the group members' intrinsic conditions, costs of producing young, and costs of parental care for understanding breeding conflict resolution in cooperatively breeding animals.

The role of threats in animal cooperation

In human societies, social behaviour is strongly influenced by threats of punishment, even though the threats themselves rarely need to be exercised. Recent experimental evidence suggests that similar hidden threats can promote cooperation and limit within-group selfishness in some animal systems. In other animals, however, threats appear to be ineffective. Here I review theoretical and empirical studies that help to understand the evolutionary causes of these contrasting patterns, and identify three factors-impact, accuracy and perception-that together determine the effectiveness of threats to induce cooperation.

Reproductive control via eviction (but not the threat of eviction) in banded mongooses

Considerable research has focused on understanding variation in reproductive skew in cooperative animal societies, but the pace of theoretical development has far outstripped empirical testing of the models. One major class of model suggests that dominant individuals can use the threat of eviction to deter subordinate reproduction (the ‘restraint’ model), but this idea remains untested. Here, we use long-term behavioural and genetic data to test the assumptions of the restraint model in banded mongooses (Mungos mungo), a species in which subordinates breed regularly and evictions are common. We found that dominant females suffer reproductive costs when subordinates breed, and respond to these costs by evicting breeding subordinates from the group en masse, in agreement with the assumptions of the model. We found no evidence, however, that subordinate females exercise reproductive restraint to avoid being evicted in the first place. This means that the pattern of reproduction is not the result of a reproductive ‘transaction’ to avert the threat of eviction. We present a simple game theoretical analysis that suggests that eviction threats may often be ineffective to induce pre-emptive restraint among multiple subordinates and predicts that threats of eviction (or departure) will be much more effective in dyadic relationships and linear hierarchies. Transactional models may be more applicable to these systems. Greater focus on testing the assumptions rather than predictions of skew models can lead to a better understanding of how animals control each other's reproduction, and the extent to which behaviour is shaped by overt acts versus hidden threats.

How threats influence the evolutionary resolution of within-group conflict

Most examples of cooperation in nature share a common feature: individuals can interact to produce a productivity benefit or fitness surplus, but there is conflict over how these gains are shared. A central question is how threats to exercise outside options influence the resolution of conflict within such cooperative associations. Here we show how a simple principle from economic bargaining theory, the outside option principle, can help to solve this problem in biological systems. According to this principle, outside options will affect the resolution of conflict only when the payoff of taking up these options exceeds the payoffs individuals can obtain from bargaining or negotiating within the group; otherwise, threats to exercise outside options are not credible and are therefore irrelevant. We show that previous attempts to incorporate outside options in synthetic models of reproductive conflict fail to distinguish between credible and incredible threats, and then we use the outside option principle to develop credible synthetic models in two contexts: reproductive skew and biparental care. A striking prediction of our analysis is that outside options are least relevant to the resolution of conflict in cooperative groups of kin and are most relevant in transient associations or interactions among nonrelatives. Our analysis shows a way to link the resolution of within-group conflict to the environmental setting in which it occurs, and it illuminates the role of threats in the evolution of social behavior.

Starving the competition: a proximate cause of reproductive skew in burying beetles (Nicrophorus vespilloides)

Proximate mechanisms underlying reproductive skew are obscure in many animals that breed communally. Here, we address causes of reproductive skew in brood-parasitic associations of burying beetles (Nicrophorus vespilloides). Male and female burying beetles feed and defend their larvae on buried carcasses. When several females locate the same small carcass, they engage in violent physical altercations. The subordinate then acts as an intraspecific brood parasite, laying eggs, but not providing care. The dominant female largely monopolizes access to the carcass; she alone provides parental care and her share of the brood is much larger than the subordinate's. On larger carcasses, subordinates have greater access to the carcass than on small ones, and reproductive skew is reduced. Differential fecundity, ovicide and larvicide have been suggested as causes of skew on small carcasses. Here, we report the results of the experiments pertaining to the first two of these potential mechanisms. Ovicide did not significantly contribute to reproductive skew on small carcasses, but differential fecundity did. Fecundity differences were due to dominance status, not body size per se. Fecundity differences disappeared when supplemental food was available, suggesting that reduced access to the carcass limits fecundity by causing nutritional deficiencies. Supplemental food prevented such nutritional deficiencies and allowed subordinates to produce as many eggs as dominants. Apparently, aggressive behaviour by dominants functions in the context of reproductive competition, limiting subordinate reproduction by preventing food intake on the carcass.

Morning sickness: adaptive cause or nonadaptive consequence of embryo viability?

"Morning sickness" is the common term for nausea and vomiting in early human pregnancy (NVP). Recent interest in why NVP occurs-that is, in the evolutionary costs and benefits of NVP-has spurred the development of two alternative hypotheses. The "prophylaxis," or "maternal and embryonic protection," hypothesis suggests that NVP serves a beneficial function by expelling foods that may contain harmful toxins and microorganisms and triggering aversions to such foods throughout pregnancy. The alternative "by-product" hypothesis suggests that NVP is a nonfunctional by-product of conflict--over resource allocation--between the pregnant woman and the embryo. The critical predictions of the prophylaxis hypothesis have been developed and tested, whereas the by-product hypothesis has not been subjected to similar scrutiny. To address this gap, we developed a graphical model and used it to derive predictions from the by-product hypothesis under two different assumptions, namely, that NVP is either (i) a by-product of current conflict between a pregnant woman and an embryo or (ii) a by-product of honest signals of viability produced by the embryo. Neither version of the by-product hypothesis is fully consistent with available data. By contrast, the timing of NVP, its variation among societies, and associated patterns of food cravings and aversions are consistent with the prophylaxis hypothesis.

Escalated conflict in a social hierarchy

Animals that live in cooperative societies form hierarchies in which dominant individuals reap disproportionate benefits from group cooperation. The stability of these societies requires subordinates to accept their inferior status rather than engage in escalated conflict with dominants over rank. Applying the logic of animal contests to these cases predicts that escalated conflict is more likely where subordinates are reproductively suppressed, where group productivity is high, relatedness is low, and where subordinates are relatively strong. We tested these four predictions in the field on co-foundress associations of the paper wasp Polistes dominulus by inducing contests over dominance rank experimentally. Subordinates with lower levels of ovarian development, and those in larger, more productive groups, were more likely to escalate in conflict with their dominant, as predicted. Neither genetic relatedness nor relative body size had significant effects on the probability of escalation. The original dominant emerged as the winner in all except one escalated contest. The results provide the first evidence that reproductive suppression of subordinates increases the threat of escalated conflict, and hence that reproductive sharing can promote stability of the dominant-subordinate relationship.

TUG-OF-WAR HAS NO BORDERS: IT IS THE MISSING MODEL IN REPRODUCTIVE SKEW THEORY

Cooperative breeding often results in unequal reproduction between dominant and subordinate group members. Transactional skew models attempt to predict how unequal reproduction can be before the groups themselves become unstable. A number of variants of transactional models have been developed, with a key difference being whether reproduction is controlled by one party or contested by all. It is shown here that ESS solutions for all situations of contested control over reproduction are given by the original tug-of-war model (TOW). Several interesting results follow. First, TOW can escalate enough to destabilize some types of groups. Particularly vulnerable are those that have low relatedness and gain little from cooperative breeding relative to solitary reproduction. Second, TOW can drastically reduce group productivity and especially the inclusive fitness of dominant individuals. Third, these results contrast strongly with those from variants of TOW models that include concessions to maintain group stability. Such models are shown to be special cases of the general and simpler TOW framework, and to have assumptions that may be biologically suspect. Finally, the overall analysis suggests that there is no mechanism within existing TOW framework that will prevent a costly struggle for reproductive control. Because social species rarely exhibit the high levels of aggression predicted by TOW models, alternative evolutionary mechanisms are considered that can limit conflict and produce more mutually beneficial outcomes. The further development of alternative models to predict patterns of reproductive skew are highly recommended.