Gifts to Physicians From Industry: The Debate Evolves

Reflexive control in emergency medicine

Emergency physicians (EPs) navigate high-pressure environments, making rapid decisions amidst ambiguity. Their choices are informed by a complex interplay of experience, information, and external forces. While cognitive shortcuts (heuristics) expedite assessments, there are multiple ways they can be subtly manipulated, potentially leading to reflexive control: external actors steering EPs' decisions for their own benefit. Pharmaceutical companies, device manufacturers, and media narratives are among the numerous factors that influence the EPs' information landscape. Using tactics such as selective data dissemination, framing, and financial incentives, these actors can exploit pre-existing cognitive biases like anchoring, confirmation, and availability. This creates fertile ground for reflexive control, where EPs may believe they are acting independently while unknowingly serving the goals of external influencers. The consequences of manipulated decision making can be severe: misdiagnoses, inappropriate treatments, and increased healthcare costs. Ethical dilemmas arise when external pressures conflict with patient well-being. Recognizing these dangers empowers EPs to resist reflexive control through (1) critical thinking: examining information for potential biases and prioritizing evidence-based practices, (2) continuous education: learning about cognitive biases and mitigation strategies, and (3) institutional policies: implementing regulations to reduce external influence and to promote transparency. This vulnerability of emergency medicine decision making highlights the need for awareness, education, and robust ethical frameworks. Understanding reflexive control techniques is crucial for safeguarding patient care and promoting independent, ethical decision making in emergency medicine.

Industry payments and physicians prescriptions: Effect of a payment restriction policy

The pharmaceutical industry spends billions of dollars every year for marketing its products to US health care providers. This study investigates the association between industry marketing payments and physicians' prescription in New York and Massachusetts, and examines the effect of the Massachusetts payment restriction policy on this association in comparison with the New York State that has no payment restriction policy. Three panel data models (fixed effects regression (FE), first difference regression (FD), and first difference with lagged independent variable (LFD)) were used to establish the association accounting for unobserved confounders and reverse causality. The main indicator is the total amount of industry payments for meals, drug samples, consulting fees, etc. (excluding research funding, and ownership). Dependent variables are a) yearly days' supply of Medicare Part D prescriptions, b) yearly costs of prescribed prescriptions. Secular time trends, as well as differences between the two states were controlled in all models. All three panel models showed significant positive association between industry payments and physician prescriptions. Particularly, these models show that in the base year (2014), a 1% increase in the annual industry payments was associated with (0.01%-0.04%) increase in days' supply of medication, and (0.01%-0.05%) increase in prescription costs for NYS providers. Moreover, FE and FD models show that compared to NYS physicians, the association of industry payments with days' supply and costs of Medicare Part D prescriptions was (0.01%-0.02%) smaller for MA physicians. Because of the smaller sample size and lower power, the LFD model did not detect a significant difference between the NYS and MA providers. The findings of this study provide additional evidence that industry payments are associated with increases in the volume and cost of Medicare prescriptions. Moreover, these findings provide preliminary evidence that payment restriction policies negatively moderate this association, which calls for further research.

Industry Payments in Colon and Rectal Surgery: A Cross-Sectional Analysis of Open Payments Data

BACKGROUND

The Physician Payments Sunshine Act of 2010 mandated publication of all financial relationships between companies and physicians on the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services' Open Payments Data to elucidate potential conflicts of interest. This study seeks to illuminate the financial relationships that the pharmaceutical, medical device, biologics, and medical supply industries maintained with colon and rectal surgeons across the United States from 2014 to 2018.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

We extracted and analyzed all colon and rectal surgeon data from the Open Payments Data for 2014-2018 using Microsoft Excel 2018 and JMP PRO 13.2.0 (SAS Institute). We calculated descriptive statistics and displayed prominent trends in the data.

RESULTS

From 2014 to 2018, totals of $26,841,274 in general payments and $7,492,822 in research payments were made to 1935 and 150 colorectal surgeons, respectively. Intuitive Surgical, Inc paid the most money in general payments every year, ranging from 39.0% to 58.8% of the total payment amount. Intuitive Surgical, Inc's product, da Vinci Surgical System, had the greatest number of payments, totaling 21,191 general payments. The year with the highest amount paid for research was 2017, in which a total of $2,810,558 was paid to colorectal surgeons.

CONCLUSIONS

Companies across industries paid millions of dollars to colorectal surgeons from 2014 to 2018. However, further research is required to determine the causal effects of these surgeons' financial relationships with the industry on research, prescription, and technology adoption practices.

Conflicts of Interest in Emergency Medicine

Conflicts of interest (COIs) are common in the practice of emergency medicine and may be present in the areas of clinical practice, relations with industry, expert witness testimony, medical education, research, and organizations. A COI occurs when there is dissonance between a primary interest and another interest. The concept of professionalism in medicine places the patient as the primary interest in any interaction with a physician. We contend that patient welfare is the ultimate interest in the entire enterprise of medicine. Recognition and management of potential, real, and perceived COIs is essential to the ethical practice of emergency medicine. This paper discusses how to recognize, address, and manage them.

Implicit Cognition and Gifts: How Does social Psychology help Us Think Differently about Medical Practice?

This article takes the following two assumptions for granted: first, that gifts influence physicians and, second, that the influences gifts have on physicians may be harmful for patients. These assumptions are common in the applied ethics literature, and they prompt an obvious practical question, namely, what is the best way to mitigate the negative effects? We examine the negative effects of gift giving in depth, considering how the influence occurs, and we assert that the ethical debate surrounding gift-giving practices must be reoriented. Our main claim is that the failure of recent policies addressing gift giving can be traced to a misunderstanding of what psychological mechanisms are most likely to underpin physicians' biased behavior as a result of interaction with the medical industry. The problem with gift giving is largely not a matter of malicious or consciously self-interested behavior, but of well-intentioned actions on the part of physicians that are nonetheless perniciously infected by the presence of the medical industry. Substantiating this claim will involve elaboration on two points. First, we will retrace the history of policies regarding gift giving between the medical profession and the medical industry and highlight how most policies assume a rationalistic view of moral agency. Reliance on this view of agency is best illustrated by past attempts to address gift giving in terms of conflicts of interest. Second, we will introduce and motivate an alternate view of moral agency emerging from recent literature in social psychology on implicit social cognition. We will show that proper consideration of implicit social cognition paints a picture of human psychology at odds with the rationalistic model assumed in discussions of COIs. With these two pieces on the table we will be able to show that, without fully appreciating the social-psychological mechanisms (both cognitive and affective) of implicit cognition, policy-makers are likely to overlook significant aspects of how gifts influence doctors.