Mental rehearsal in great apes (Pan troglodytes and Pongo pygmaeus) and children

Mental Rehearsal Improves Passing Skill and Stress Resilience in Rugby Players

PURPOSE

Mental rehearsal is commonly employed, with positive visualization proposed to enhance complex skill performance. Additionally, video stimulus has been associated with enhanced kinesthetic sensations and rapid hormone fluctuations that may contribute to enhancing mental rehearsal and the conscious and unconscious emotional state for skill execution. Here, we assessed the impact of a 15-minute mental rehearsal intervention on rugby-specific tasks and the associated hormone profile.

METHODS

Professional rugby players (N = 10) volunteered for a randomized crossover study. They completed three 15-minute preparatory phases (positive or negative video-guided mental rehearsal or self-directed mental rehearsal alone) prior to an exercise stressor and rugby-specific passing task. Salivary testosterone and cortisol were monitored to assess stress responses.

RESULTS

Performance during the rugby passing task was improved following the positive video condition (91% [7.4%]) compared to the negative video (79% [6.0%]; ES: 1.22 ± 0.75) and self-visualization (86% [5.8%]; ES: 0.58 ± 0.75), with a significant correlation observed between passing performance and salivary testosterone (r = .47 ± .34, P = .0087). Positive video imagery prior to an exercise stressor also significantly enhanced physiological stress resilience (r = .39 ± .36, P = .0352).

CONCLUSIONS

This pilot study demonstrates that mental rehearsal was enhanced by appropriate, context-specific video presentation. We propose that the interaction between sex steroids, the adrenal axis, and subsequent conscious and unconscious behaviors may be relevant to competitive rugby. Specifically, we suggest that relatively elevated free testosterone imparts a degree of stress resilience, which may lead to enhanced expression of competitive behaviors and provide an enhanced state for rugby skill execution.

Four errors and a fallacy: pitfalls for the unwary in comparative brain analyses

Comparative analyses are the backbone of evolutionary analysis. However, their record in producing a consensus has not always been good. This is especially true of attempts to understand the factors responsible for the evolution of large brains, which have been embroiled in an increasingly polarised debate over the past three decades. We argue that most of these disputes arise from a number of conceptual errors and associated logical fallacies that are the result of a failure to adopt a biological systems-based approach to hypothesis-testing. We identify four principal classes of error: a failure to heed Tinbergen's Four Questions when testing biological hypotheses, misapplying Dobzhansky's Dictum when testing hypotheses of evolutionary adaptation, poorly chosen behavioural proxies for underlying hypotheses, and the use of inappropriate statistical methods. In the interests of progress, we urge a more careful and considered approach to comparative analyses, and the adoption of a broader, rather than a narrower, taxonomic perspective.

The origins of cognitive flexibility in chimpanzees

Cognitive flexibility is a core component of executive function, a suite of cognitive capacities that enables individuals to update their behavior in dynamic environments. Human executive functions are proposed to be enhanced compared to other species, but this inference is based primarily on neuroanatomical studies. To address this, we examined the nature and origins of cognitive flexibility in chimpanzees, our closest living relatives. Across three studies, we examined different components of cognitive flexibility using reversal learning tasks where individuals first learned one contingency and then had to shift responses when contingencies flipped. In Study 1, we tested n = 82 chimpanzees ranging from juvenility to adulthood on a spatial reversal task, to characterize the development of basic shifting skills. In Study 2, we tested how n = 24 chimpanzees use spatial versus arbitrary perceptual information to shift, a proposed difference between human and nonhuman cognition. In Study 3, we tested n = 40 chimpanzees on a probabilistic reversal task. We found an extended developmental trajectory for basic shifting and shifting in response to probabilistic feedback-chimpanzees did not reach mature performance until late in ontogeny. Additionally, females were faster to shift than males were. We also found that chimpanzees were much more successful when using spatial versus perceptual cues, and highly perseverative when faced with probabilistic versus consistent outcomes. These results identify both core features of chimpanzee cognitive flexibility that are shared with humans, as well as constraints on chimpanzee cognitive flexibility that may represent evolutionary changes in human cognitive development.

Time Does Not Help Orangutans Pongo abelii Solve Physical Problems

Many questions in animal intelligence and cognition research are challenging. One challenge is to identify mechanisms underlying reasoning in experiments. Here, we provide a way to design such tests in non-human animals. We know from research in skill acquisition in humans that reasoning and thinking can take time because some problems are processed in multiple steps before a solution is reached (e.g., during mental arithmetics). If animals are able to learn through similar processes their decision making can be time consuming, and most importantly improve if more time to process information is allowed. We tested if performance of two Sumatran orangutans (Pongo abelii) increased in a two-choice experiment when they were allowed extra time before making their decisions, compared to when they were forced to decide immediately. We found that the performance of the orangutans did not depend on the time they were allowed to process the information before making their decisions. This methodology provides a potential avenue for empirical tests of mechanisms underlying reasoning in non-human animals.

A word in the hand: action, gesture and mental representation in humans and non-human primates

The movements we make with our hands both reflect our mental processes and help to shape them. Our actions and gestures can affect our mental representations of actions and objects. In this paper, we explore the relationship between action, gesture and thought in both humans and non-human primates and discuss its role in the evolution of language. Human gesture (specifically representational gesture) may provide a unique link between action and mental representation. It is kinaesthetically close to action and is, at the same time, symbolic. Non-human primates use gesture frequently to communicate, and do so flexibly. However, their gestures mainly resemble incomplete actions and lack the representational elements that characterize much of human gesture. Differences in the mirror neuron system provide a potential explanation for non-human primates' lack of representational gestures; the monkey mirror system does not respond to representational gestures, while the human system does. In humans, gesture grounds mental representation in action, but there is no evidence for this link in other primates. We argue that gesture played an important role in the transition to symbolic thought and language in human evolution, following a cognitive leap that allowed gesture to incorporate representational elements.

What cognitive strategies do orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) use to solve a trial-unique puzzle-tube task incorporating multiple obstacles?

Apparently sophisticated behaviour during problem-solving is often the product of simple underlying mechanisms, such as associative learning or the use of procedural rules. These and other more parsimonious explanations need to be eliminated before higher-level cognitive processes such as causal reasoning or planning can be inferred. We presented three Bornean orangutans with 64 trial-unique configurations of a puzzle-tube to investigate whether they were able to consider multiple obstacles in two alternative paths, and subsequently choose the correct direction in which to move a reward in order to retrieve it. We were particularly interested in how subjects attempted to solve the task, namely which behavioural strategies they could have been using, as this is how we may begin to elucidate the cognitive mechanisms underpinning their choices. To explore this, we simulated performance outcomes across the 64 trials for various procedural rules and rule combinations that subjects may have been using based on the configuration of different obstacles. Two of the three subjects solved the task, suggesting that they were able to consider at least some of the obstacles in the puzzle-tube before executing action to retrieve the reward. This is impressive compared with the past performances of great apes on similar, arguably less complex tasks. Successful subjects may have been using a heuristic rule combination based on what they deemed to be the most relevant cue (the configuration of the puzzle-tube ends), which may be a cognitively economical strategy.

Is the Social Brain Theory Applicable to Human Individual Differences? Relationship between Sociability Personality Dimension and Brain Size

Our study intends to examine whether the social brain theory is applicable to human individual differences. According to the social brain theory primates have larger brains as it could be expected from their body sizes due to the adaptation to a more complex social life. Regarding humans there were few studies about the relationship between theory of mind and frontal and temporal brain lobes. We hypothesized that these brain lobes, as well as the whole cerebrum and neocortex are in connection with the Sociability personality dimension that is associated with individuals' social lives. Our findings support this hypothesis as Sociability correlated positively with the examined brain structures if we control the effects of body size differences and age. These results suggest that the social brain theory can be extended to human interindividual differences and they have some implications to personality psychology too.

How do keas (Nestor notabilis) solve artificial-fruit problems with multiple locks?

Keas, a species of parrots from New Zealand, are an interesting species for comparative studies of problem solving and cognition because they are known not only for efficient capacities for object manipulation but also for explorative and playful behaviors. To what extent are they efficient or explorative, and what cognitive abilities do they use? We examined how keas would solve several versions of artificial-fruit box problems having multiple locks. After training keas to remove a metal rod from over a Plexiglas lid that had to be opened, we exposed the birds to a variety of tasks having two or more locks. We also introduced a preview phase during which the keas had extended opportunity to look at the tasks before the experimenter allowed the birds to solve them, to examine whether the preview phase would facilitate the birds' performance on the tasks. In a large number of tests, the keas showed a strong trend to solve the tasks with no positive effect of previewing the tasks. When the tasks became complex, however, the keas corrected inappropriate responses more quickly when they had had chance to preview the problems than when they had not. The results suggest that the keas primarily used explorative strategies in solving the lock problems but might have obtained some information about the tasks before starting to solve them. This may reflect a good compromise of keas' trial-and-error tendency and their good cognitive ability that result from a selection pressure they have faced in their natural habitat.