Cooperative behaviour and cooperative breeding: What constitutes an explanation?

The ecology of cooperative breeding behaviour

Ecology is a fundamental driving force for the evolutionary transition from solitary living to breeding cooperatively in groups. However, the fact that both benign and harsh, as well as stable and fluctuating, environments can favour the evolution of cooperative breeding behaviour constitutes a paradox of environmental quality and sociality. Here, we propose a new model - the dual benefits framework - for resolving this paradox. Our framework distinguishes between two categories of grouping benefits - resource defence benefits that derive from group-defended critical resources and collective action benefits that result from social cooperation among group members - and uses insider-outsider conflict theory to simultaneously consider the interests of current group members (insiders) and potential joiners (outsiders) in determining optimal group size. We argue that the different grouping benefits realised from resource defence and collective action profoundly affect insider-outsider conflict resolution, resulting in predictable differences in the per capita productivity, stable group size, kin structure and stability of the social group. We also suggest that different types of environmental variation (spatial vs. temporal) select for societies that form because of the different grouping benefits, thus helping to resolve the paradox of why cooperative breeding evolves in such different types of environments.

Genetic consequences of group living in Mongolian gerbils

Social behavior can shape the local population genetic structure of mammals. Group living can increase pairwise genetic relatedness of mammals at a local level but differentiate the genetic structure at a population level through offspring philopatry and nonrandom mating. Our study aimed to test the hypothesis that social groups of Mongolian gerbils (Meriones unguiculatus) would consist of genetically related individuals due to offspring philopatry and would have distinct genetic structures because of restricted gene flow among social groups and nonrandom mating. We genotyped 327 wild gerbils, live captured from 28 social groups in Inner Mongolia, China, using nine microsatellite loci. The within-group pairwise genetic relatedness coefficient averaged 0.28 ± 0.14 (standard deviation), whereas the average pairwise genetic relatedness coefficient of the whole gerbil population was 0.0 ± 0.2. Additionally, the value of the global F statistic (F(st)) was 0.21, suggesting a substantial genetic differentiation among social groups of Mongolian gerbils. The Bayesian clustering divided the 327 gerbils into 23 distinct genetic clusters. Therefore, our results show that high within-group genetic relatedness and among-group genetic differentiation are the genetic consequences of group living in social mammals because of restricted gene flow, female philopatry, and nonrandom mating within social groups.

On the further integration of cooperative breeding and cooperation theory

We present a synopsis about the commentaries to the target article "Integrating cooperative breeding into theoretical concepts of cooperation", in which we attempted to integrate general mechanisms to explain cooperative behaviour among unrelated individuals with classic concepts to explain helping behaviour in cooperative breeders that do not invoke kin-based benefits. Here we (1) summarize the positions of the commentators concerning the main issues we raised in the target article and discuss important criticisms and extensions. (2) We relate our target article to some recent reviews on the evolution of cooperation and, (3) clarify how we use terminology with regard to cooperation and cooperative behaviour. (4) We discuss several aspects that were raised with respect to cooperative interactions including by-product mutualism, generalised reciprocity and multi-level selection and, (5) examine the alternatives to our classification scheme as proposed by some commentaries. (6) Finally, we highlight several aspects that might hinder the application of game theoretical mechanisms of cooperation in cooperatively breeding systems. Although there is broad agreement that cooperative breeding theory should be integrated within the more general concepts of cooperation, there is some debate about how this may be achieved. We conclude that the contributions in this special issue provide a fruitful first step and ample suggestions for future directions with regard to a more unified framework of cooperation in cooperative breeders.