Pathways to cognitive design

Why Evolutionary Psychology Should Abandon Modularity

A debate surrounding modularity-the notion that the mind may be exclusively composed of distinct systems or modules-has held philosophers and psychologists captive for nearly 40 years. Concern about this thesis-which has come to be known as the massive modularity debate-serves as the primary grounds for skepticism of evolutionary psychology's claims about the mind. In this article we argue that the entirety of this debate, and the very notion of massive modularity itself, is ill-posed and confused. In particular, it is based on a confusion about the level of analysis (or reduction) at which one is approaching the mind. Here we provide a framework for clarifying at what level of analysis one is approaching the mind and explain how a systemic failure to distinguish between different levels of analysis has led to profound misunderstandings of not only evolutionary psychology but also of the entire cognitivist enterprise of approaching the mind at the level of the mechanism. We furthermore suggest that confusions between different levels of analysis are endemic throughout the psychological sciences-extending well beyond issues of modularity and evolutionary psychology. Therefore, researchers in all areas should take preventive measures to avoid this confusion in the future.

Learning blossoms: Caregiver-infant interactions in an outdoor garden setting

Plants provide unique opportunities for learning by engaging all human senses. Recent laboratory studies have shown that infants use a combination of behavioural avoidance and social learning strategies to safely learn about plant properties from adults. Here we investigate how infants and their caregivers interact with plants in an outdoor garden as a first step towards examining the operation of these social learning processes in naturalistic settings. We focus on two specific aspects of spontaneous infant-caregiver interactions with plants: olfactory and touch behaviours. Additionally, we look at whether infants' and caregivers' prior knowledge of the plants in our study influences infants' behaviour. Our results showed a multifaceted connection between infants' and caregivers' previous experience with the plants and their olfactory and touch behaviours. First, infants tended to touch and smell the plants after their caregivers did, and this appeared to be independent of whether infants had seen the plant before. Second, infants systematically engaged in some of the same types of olfactory and touch behaviours their caregiver displayed towards plants. Finally, infants whose caregivers were given more information about the plants in the study showed fewer touch behaviours, but no difference in olfactory behaviours. These findings bolster the previous laboratory studies of plant learning early in life, highlighting the importance of olfactory behaviours, and underscoring the benefits of using ecological observations to explore unique aspects of human development.

The multidimensional nature of food neophobia

People vary in their willingness to try new foods. This variation, which is most frequently measured using the Food Neophobia Scale (FNS; Pliner & Hobden, 1992), has been interpreted as unidimensional. In four studies (N's = 210, 306, 160, and 161), we 1) demonstrate that food neophobia varies across meat and plant dimensions, 2) explore the validity of a measure of meat and plant neophobia, and 3) test whether these food neophobia dimensions predict decisions to eat a novel food item (i.e., a snack bar that contains insects). Mixed-effects model across the four studies indicated that the two dimensions differentially relate to a number of variables, including disgust sensitivity, animal empathy, and masculinity. Women scored higher on meat neophobia than men, but the sexes did not differ on plant neophobia. Only meat neophobia uniquely predicted eating a novel insect-based snack bar. Overall, these results extend knowledge regarding orientations toward novel foods.

Selection, adaptation, inheritance and design in human culture: the view from the Price equation

For decades, parts of the literature on human culture have been gripped by an analogy: culture changes in a way that is substantially isomorphic to genetic evolution. This leads to a number of sub-claims: that design-like properties in cultural traditions should be explained in a parallel way to the design-like features of organisms, namely with reference to selection; that culture is a system of inheritance; and that cultural evolutionary processes can produce adaptation in the genetic sense. The Price equation provides a minimal description of any evolutionary system, and a method for identifying the action of selection. As such, it helps clarify some of these claims about culture conceptually. Looking closely through the lens of the Price equation, the differences between genes and culture come into sharp relief. Culture is only a system of inheritance metaphorically, or as an idealization, and the idealization may lead us to overlook causally important features of how cultural influence works. Design-like properties in cultural systems may owe more to transmission biases than to cultural selection. Where culture enhances genetic fitness, it is ambiguous whether what is doing the work is cultural transmission, or just the genetically evolved properties of the mind. I conclude that there are costs to trying to press culture into a template based on Darwinian evolution, even if one broadens the definition of 'Darwinian'. This article is part of the theme issue 'Fifty years of the Price equation'.