Repetition priming results in sensitivity attenuation

The implicit sense of agency is not a perceptual effect but is a judgment effect

The sense of agency (SoA) is characterized as the sense of being the causal agent of one's own actions, and it is measured in two forms: explicit and implicit. In the explicit SoA experiments, the participants explicitly report whether they have a sense of control over their actions or whether they or somebody else is the causal agent of seen actions; the implicit SoA experiments study how do participants' agentive or voluntary actions modify perceptual processes (like time, vision, tactility, and audition) without directly asking the participants to explicitly think about their causal agency or sense of control. However, recent implicit SoA literature reported contradictory findings of the relationship between implicit SoA reports and agency states. Thus, I argue that the purported implicit SoA reports are not agency-driven perceptual effects per se but are judgment effects, by showing that (a) the typical operationalizations in implicit SoA domain lead to perceptual uncertainty on the part of the participants, (b) under uncertainty, participants' implicit SoA reports are due to heuristic judgments which are independent of agency states, and (c) under perceptual certainty, the typical implicit SoA reports might not have occurred at all. Thus, I conclude that the instances of implicit SoA are judgments (or response biases)-under uncertainty-rather than perceptual effects.

External (Versus Internal) Facial Features Contribute Most to Repetition Priming in Facial Recognition: ERP Evidence

Previous event-related potential (ERP) research demonstrated four successive ERP components in the repetition priming of human face recognition: P100, N170, N250r, and N400. While these components correspond, respectively, to the four stages proposed by the interactive activation and competition (IAC) model, there has been no emphasis in past research on how internal and external facial features affect repetition priming and the sensitivity of these ERP components to item interval. This study was designed to address these issues. We used faces of celebrities as targets, including completely familiar faces, familiar internal feature faces, and familiar external feature faces. We displayed a target face either immediately following its prime (immediate repetition) or after a delay with interference from a presentation of two other faces (delayed repetition). ERP differences at P100 and N170 were nearly statistically non-significant; familiar faces and familiar external feature faces were associated with reliable ERP signals of N250r and N400 in the immediate repetition condition. For delayed repetition, however, N250r and N400 signals were only preserved for the familiar external feature faces. The differences of these ERP components suggest that, compared with internal facial features, external features of a previously presented face contribute more to brain-based facial repetition priming, particularly during the last two stages of the IAC model.

Neural adaptation and cognitive inflexibility in repeated problem-solving behaviors

Repeated stimulus processing is often associated with a reduction in neural activity, known as neural adaptation. Therefore, people are more sensitive to novelty detection but likely lose flexibility in subsequent novelty processing after detection. To demonstrate the dynamic changes in neural adaption in repeated problem-solving behaviors and test its negative influence on subsequent nonrepetitive problem-solving behaviors, we adopted a Chinese character decomposition task in this fMRI study. Participants were asked to repeatedly perform 3-5 practice problems that could be solved by the same loose chunk decomposition (LCD) solution followed by a test problem that could be solved by a tight chunk decomposition (TCD) solution in the enhanced-set condition. The practice problem gradually elicited lower percent signal changes within the cuneus, superior parietal lobule (SPL), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) in serial positions -1, -2 and -3 of a set, implying that neural adaptation occurred in repeated practice. Both the test problem and the practice problem that following it recruited greater activation of the SPL and IFG in the enhanced-set condition than in the base-set condition when the practice problem and test problem alternately appeared, implying that the task switching cost from a more dominant task to a less dominant task and vice versa was increased after neural adaptation occurred. In other words, repeatedly solving a set of similar problems with the same solution likely leads to neural adaptation and cognitive inflexibility, which in turn have an undifferentiated impact on task switching. This finding expands existing knowledge about the neurocognitive mechanism underlying the formation of the mental set and sheds light on the influence of neural adaptation on subsequent processing.

Attentional gain is modulated by probabilistic feature expectations in a spatial cueing task: ERP evidence

Several theoretical and empirical studies suggest that attention and perceptual expectations influence perception in an interactive manner, whereby attentional gain is enhanced for predicted stimuli. The current study assessed whether attention and perceptual expectations interface when they are fully orthogonal, i.e., each of them relates to different stimulus features. We used a spatial cueing task with block-wise spatial attention cues that directed attention to either left or right visual field, in which Gabor gratings of either predicted (more likely) or unpredicted (less likely) orientation were presented. The lateralised posterior N1pc component was additively influenced by attention and perceptual expectations. Bayesian analysis showed no reliable evidence for the interactive effect of attention and expectations on the N1pc amplitude. However, attention and perceptual expectations interactively influenced the frontally distributed anterior N1 component (N1a). The attention effect (i.e., enhanced N1a amplitude in the attended compared to the unattended condition) was observed only for the gratings of predicted orientation, but not in the unpredicted condition. These findings suggest that attention and perceptual expectations interactively influence visual processing within 200 ms after stimulus onset and such joint influence may lead to enhanced endogenous attentional control in the dorsal fronto-parietal attention network.

Bridging prediction and attention in current research on perception and action

Prediction and attention are fundamental brain functions in the service of perception and action. Theories on prediction relate to neural (mental) models inferring about (present or future) sensory or action-related information, whereas theories of attention are about the control of information flow underlying perception and action. Both concepts are related and not always clearly distinguishable. The special issue includes current research on prediction and attention in various subfields of perception and action. It especially considers interactions between predictive and attentive processes, which constitute a newly emerging and highly interesting field of research. As outlined in this editorial, the contributions in this special issue allow specifying as well as bridging concepts on prediction and attention. The joint consideration of prediction and attention also reveals common functional principles of perception and action.