The contribution of argument knowledge to the comprehension and critical evaluation of argumentative text

Measuring university students' ability to recognize argument structures and fallacies

Theory

Argumentation is crucial for all academic disciplines. Nevertheless, a lack of argumentation skills among students is evident. Two core aspects of argumentation are the recognition of argument structures (e.g., backing up claims with premises, according to the Toulmin model) and the recognition of fallacies. As both aspects may be related to content knowledge, students studying different subjects might exhibit different argumentation skills depending on whether the content is drawn from their own or from a foreign subject. Therefore, we developed an instrument to measure the recognition of both argument structures and fallacies among the groups of preservice teachers and business economics students in both their respective domains (pedagogy and economics), and a neutral domain (sustainability). For the recognition of fallacies, we distinguished between congruent and incongruent fallacies. In congruent fallacies, the two aspects of argument quality, i.e., deductive validity and inductive strength, provide converging evidence against high argument quality. In incongruent fallacies, these two aspects diverge. Based on dual process theories, we expected to observe differences in the recognition of congruent and incongruent fallacies.

Aims

We investigated whether these two abilities are domain-specific and whether the recognition of fallacies depends on the congruence of two aspects of argument quality.

Methods

267 preservice teachers and 56 business economics students participated in the study. For the recognition of argument structures, participants assigned the five statements constituting one argument to the corresponding component according to the Toulmin model. For the recognition of fallacies, we created arguments and incorporated a common fallacy into some of them: formal fallacy, overgeneralization, irrelevance, or circularity. Participants rated whether the argument was cogent or not, which was followed by a brief justification.

Results

Domain specificity could not be found for either of both abilities. For the recognition of fallacies, two dimensions were found: a congruent dimension (formal fallacies and overgeneralizations) and an incongruent dimension (irrelevance and circularity).

Discussion

The instrument measures the recognition of both argument structures and fallacies in these two groups across domains. The recognition of fallacies differs depending on whether the deductive validity and the inductive strength of the argument are equally indicative of argument quality or not.

Learning about informal fallacies and the detection of fake news: An experimental intervention

The philosophical concept of informal fallacies-arguments that fail to provide sufficient support for a claim-is introduced and connected to the topic of fake news detection. We assumed that the ability to identify informal fallacies can be trained and that this ability enables individuals to better distinguish between fake news and real news. We tested these assumptions in a two-group between-participants experiment (N = 116). The two groups participated in a 30-minute-long text-based learning intervention: either about informal fallacies or about fake news. Learning about informal fallacies enhanced participants' ability to identify fallacious arguments one week later. Furthermore, the ability to identify fallacious arguments was associated with a better discernment between real news and fake news. Participants in the informal fallacy intervention group and the fake news intervention group performed equally well on the news discernment task. The contribution of (identifying) informal fallacies for research and practice is discussed.