Bioregulators as prototypic nontraditional threat agents

Dual-use nano-neurotechnology

The chemical and biological nonproliferation regime stands at a watershed moment, when failure seems a real possibility. After the unsuccessful outcome of the 2016 Eighth Review Conference, the future of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention is uncertain. As the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) approaches its Fourth Review Conference in 2018, it has almost completed removing the huge stocks of chemical weapons, but it now faces the difficult organizational task of moving its focus to preventing the reemergence of chemical weapons at a time when the international security situation appears to be increasingly more difficult and dangerous. In this article, we assess the current and near-term state (5-10 years) and impact of three related areas of science and technology that could be of dual-use concern: targeted delivery of agents to the central nervous system (CNS), particularly by means of nanotechnology; direct impact of nanomaterials on synaptic functions in the CNS; and neuronal circuits in the brain that might be targeted by those with hostile intent. We attempt to assess the implications of our findings, particularly for the consideration of the problem of state-level interest in so-called nonlethal incapacitating chemical agents for law enforcement at the CWC Review Conference in 2018, but also more generally for the longer-term future of the chemical and biological nonproliferation regime.

Preparing for Nontraditional Biothreats

Biological threats consist of traditional, emerging, enhanced, and advanced threats, but current biodefense approaches focus almost entirely on a subset of traditional threats. There is an urgent need to develop a comprehensive, rational, and systematic plan to address and mitigate the broader risk space. Myriad possible strategies exist, but an ideal strategy will extend beyond a list of agents. This article proposes a functionality-based approach based on systematic identification of key functional elements, essentially focusing on mechanisms of what constitutes a threat: The key threat element is addressed directly instead of extensive characterization of ancillary details. Examples might include a potent toxin, long-term environmental stability, or a specific protein causing morbidity/mortality. By identifying the critical components leading to disease, limited time, efforts, and resources can be focused to address the greatest risks. Further, as future threats will likely contain critical aspects of known agents, this approach will potentially address a large area of uncharacterized risk space. Thus, focused research can buy down a large area of risk space while still addressing traditional threats and mission needs. Application of this strategy will move the field away from agent-based lists toward a more comprehensive hazard analysis and will position biodefense and health communities to prepare for the threats of the future.