What can What–When–Where (WWW) binding tasks tell us about young children's episodic foresight? Theory and two experiments

Episodic-like memory is preserved with age in cuttlefish

Episodic memory, remembering past experiences based on unique what–where–when components, declines during ageing in humans, as does episodic-like memory in non-human mammals. By contrast, semantic memory, remembering learnt knowledge without recalling unique what–where–when features, remains relatively intact with advancing age. The age-related decline in episodic memory likely stems from the deteriorating function of the hippocampus in the brain. Whether episodic memory can deteriorate with age in species that lack a hippocampus is unknown. Cuttlefish are molluscs that lack a hippocampus. We test both semantic-like and episodic-like memory in sub-adults and aged-adults nearing senescence (n = 6 per cohort). In the semantic-like memory task, cuttlefish had to learn that the location of a food resource was dependent on the time of day. Performance, measured as proportion of correct trials, was comparable across age groups. In the episodic-like memory task, cuttlefish had to solve a foraging task by retrieving what–where–when information about a past event with unique spatio-temporal features. In this task, performance was comparable across age groups; however, aged-adults reached the success criterion (8/10 correct choices in consecutive trials) significantly faster than sub-adults. Contrary to other animals, episodic-like memory is preserved in aged cuttlefish, suggesting that memory deterioration is delayed in this species.

Children with ASD Show Impaired Item-Space Recollection, But Preserved Item-Color Recollection

Although individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) have been often shown to display similar memory performance on semantic memory tasks compared to typically developing (TD) children, there is ongoing debate about whether and how their ability to remember specific past events (i.e., episodic memory) is impaired. We assessed a sample of 62 children with ASD and 72 TD children, ranging in age between 8 and 12 years on 2 memory tasks. Participants encoded a series of images and their association with either where they appeared on the screen (item-space association task) or with the color of an image's border (item-color association task). Children with ASD showed worse memory in the item-space association task compared to their TD peers, but comparable memory for the item-color association task. These differences persisted when age, intellectual quotient, and general item recognition memory were accounted for statistically. We interpret these results in light of evidence for specific deficits along the dorsal stream affecting processing of spatiotemporal information in ASD. Autism Res 2020, 13: 1985-1997. © 2020 International Society for Autism Research and Wiley Periodicals LLC LAY SUMMARY: Episodic memory requires the ability to bind contextual details (such as color, location, etc.) to an item or event in order to remember the past with specific detail. Here, we compared children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and typically developing (TD) children on tasks examining episodic memory. Children with ASD recalled more poorly previously seen items and their associated space-related details, but they performed comparably to TD children on color details. We discuss the possible mechanisms that contribute to worse spatial processing/recall in ASD.

The medial prefrontal cortex - hippocampus circuit that integrates information of object, place and time to construct episodic memory in rodents: Behavioral, anatomical and neurochemical properties

Rats and mice have been demonstrated to show episodic-like memory, a prototype of episodic memory, as defined by an integrated memory of the experience of an object or event, in a particular place and time. Such memory can be assessed via the use of spontaneous object exploration paradigms, variably designed to measure memory for object, place, temporal order and object-location inter-relationships. We review the methodological properties of these tests, the neurobiology about time and discuss the evidence for the involvement of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), entorhinal cortex (EC) and hippocampus, with respect to their anatomy, neurotransmitter systems and functional circuits. The systematic analysis suggests that a specific circuit between the mPFC, lateral EC and hippocampus encodes the information for event, place and time of occurrence into the complex episodic-like memory, as a top-down regulation from the mPFC onto the hippocampus. This circuit can be distinguished from the neuronal component memory systems for processing the individual information of object, time and place.

Reflections on the spoon test

In this paper, we shall use Tulving's seminal empirical and theoretical research including the 'Spoon Test' to explore memory and mental time travel and its origins and role in planning for the future. We will review the comparative research on future planning and episodic foresight in pre-verbal children and non-verbal animals to explore how this may be manifest as wordless thoughts.

Thinking in and about time: A dual systems perspective on temporal cognition

We outline a dual systems approach to temporal cognition, which distinguishes between two cognitive systems for dealing with how things unfold over time – a temporal updating system and a temporal reasoning system – of which the former is both phylogenetically and ontogenetically more primitive than the latter, and which are at work alongside each other in adult human cognition. We describe the main features of each of the two systems, the types of behavior the more primitive temporal updating system can support, and the respects in which it is more limited than the temporal reasoning system. We then use the distinction between the two systems to interpret findings in comparative and developmental psychology, arguing that animals operate only with a temporal updating system and that children start out doing so too, before gradually becoming capable of thinking and reasoning about time. After this, we turn to adult human cognition and suggest that our account can also shed light on a specific feature of humans’ everyday thinking about time that has been the subject of debate in the philosophy of time, which consists in a tendency to think about the nature of time itself in a way that appears ultimately self-contradictory. We conclude by considering the topic of intertemporal choice, and argue that drawing the distinction between temporal updating and temporal reasoning is also useful in the context of characterizing two distinct mechanisms for delaying gratification.

The cognitive bases of the development of past and future episodic cognition in preschoolers

The aim of this study was to use a minimalist framework to examine the joint development of past and future episodic cognition and their underlying cognitive abilities in 3- to 5-year-old Turkish preschoolers. Participants engaged in two main tasks, a what-where-when (www) task to measure episodic memory and a future prediction task to measure episodic future thinking. Three additional tasks were used for predicting children's performance in the two main tasks: a temporal language task, an executive function task, and a spatial working memory task. Results indicated that past and future episodic tasks were significantly correlated with each other even after controlling for age. Hierarchical multiple regressions showed that, after controlling for age, the www task was predicted by executive functions, possibly supporting binding of episodic information and by linguistic abilities. The future prediction task was predicted by linguistic abilities alone, underlining the importance of language for episodic past and future thinking.

Dissociating memory traces and scenario construction in mental time travel

There has been a persistent debate about how to define episodic memory and whether it is a uniquely human capacity. On the one hand, many animal cognition studies employ content-based criteria, such as the what-where-when criterion, and argue that nonhuman animals possess episodic memory. On the other hand, many human cognition studies emphasize the subjective experience during retrieval as an essential property of episodic memory and the distinctly human foresight it purportedly enables. We propose that both perspectives may examine distinct but complementary aspects of episodic memory by drawing a conceptual distinction between episodic memory traces and mental time travel. Episodic memory traces are sequential mnemonic representations of particular, personally experienced episodes. Mental time travel draws on these traces, but requires other components to construct scenarios and embed them into larger narratives. Various nonhuman animals may store episodic memory traces, and yet it is possible that only humans are able to construct and reflect on narratives of their lives - and flexibly compare alternative scenarios of the remote future.

A Time and Place for Everything: Developmental Differences in the Building Blocks of Episodic Memory

This research investigated whether episodic memory development can be explained by improvements in relational binding processes, involved in forming novel associations between events and the context in which they occurred. Memory for item-space, item-time, and item-item relations was assessed in an ethnically diverse sample of 151 children aged 7-11 years and 28 young adults. Item-space memory reached adult performance by 9½ years, whereas item-time and item-item memory improved into adulthood. In path analysis, item-space, but not item-time best explained item-item memory. Across age groups, relational binding related to source memory and performance on standardized memory assessments. In conclusion, relational binding development depends on relation type, but relational binding overall supports episodic memory development.

Effects of age on a real-world What-Where-When memory task

Many cognitive abilities decline with aging, making it difficult to detect pathological changes against a background of natural changes in cognition. Most of the tests to assess cognitive decline are artificial tasks that have little resemblance to the problems faced by people in everyday life. This means both that people may have little practice doing such tasks (potentially contributing to the decline in performance) and that the tasks may not be good predictors of real-world cognitive problems. In this study, we test the performance of young people (18–25 years) and older people (60+-year-olds) on a novel, more ecologically valid test of episodic memory: the real-world What-Where-When (WWW) memory test. We also compare them on a battery of other cognitive tests, including working memory, psychomotor speed, executive function, and episodic memory. Older people show the expected age-related declines on the test battery. In the WWW memory task, older people were more likely to fail to remember any WWW combination than younger people were, although they did not significantly differ in their overall WWW score due to some older people performing as well as or better than most younger people. WWW memory performance was significantly predicted by other measures of episodic memory, such as the single-trial learning and long-term retention in the Rey Auditory Verbal Learning task and Combined Object Location Memory in the Object Relocation task. Self-reported memory complaints also predicted performance on the WWW task. These findings confirm that our real-world WWW memory task is a valid measure of episodic memory, with high ecological validity, which may be useful as a predictor of everyday memory abilities. The task will require a bit more development to improve its sensitivity to cognitive declines in aging and to potentially distinguish between mentally healthy older adults and those with early signs of cognitive pathologies.

The six blind men and the elephant: Are episodic memory tasks tests of different things or different tests of the same thing?

•

Many different episodic memory tests were compared in the same sample of 3–6 year-old children.

•

Age-independent correlation was low, suggesting that these tests should not be treated as equivalent.

•

A single principal component best explained variance in the dataset.

•

These test should not be used in parallel, but should be adapted as a battery.

The development of episodic memory in children has been of interest to researchers for more than a century. Current behavioral tests that have been developed to assess episodic memory differ substantially in their surface features. Therefore, it is possible that these tests are assessing different memory processes. In this study, 106 children aged 3 to 6 years were tested on four putative tests of episodic memory. Covariation in performance was investigated in order to address two conflicting hypotheses: (a) that the high level of difference between the tests will result in little covariation in performance despite their being designed to assess the same ability and (b) that the conceptual similarity of these tasks will lead to high levels of covariation despite surface differences. The results indicated a gradual improvement with age on all tests. Performances on many of the tests were related, but not after controlling for age. A principal component analysis found that a single principal component was able to satisfactorily fit the observed data. This principal component produced a marginally stronger correlation with age than any test alone. As such, it might be concluded that different tests of episodic memory are too different to be used in parallel. Nevertheless, if used together, these tests may offer a robust assessment of episodic memory as a complex multifaceted process.

Brief report: episodic foresight in autism spectrum disorder

Episodic foresight (EpF) or, the ability to imagine the future and use such imagination to guide our actions, is an important aspect of cognition that has not yet been explored in children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). This is despite its proposed links with theory of mind (ToM) and executive function (EF), two areas found to be impaired in ASD. Twenty-five children with ASD (M = 5 years, 10 months; 22 male) and 25 mental-age-matched typically developing children (M = 4 years, 10 months; 22 male) completed a series of EpF, ToM, and EF tasks. Significant group differences were detected on several EpF tasks suggesting that children with ASD show impairments in thinking about their future selves.

Ways of thinking: from crows to children and back again

This article reviews some of the recent work on the remarkable cognitive capacities of food-caching corvids. The focus will be on their ability to think about other minds and other times, and tool-using tests of physical problem solving. Research on developmental cognition suggests that young children do not pass similar tests until they are at least four years of age in the case of the social cognition experiments, and eight years of age in the case of the tasks that tap into physical cognition. This developmental trajectory seems surprising. Intuitively, one might have thought that the social and planning tasks required more complex forms of cognitive process, namely Mental Time Travel and Theory of Mind. Perhaps the fact that children pass these tasks earlier than the physical problem-solving tasks is a reflection of cultural influences. Future research will hope to identify these cognitive milestones by starting to develop tasks that might go some way towards understanding the mechanisms underlying these abilities in both children and corvids, to explore similarities and differences in their ways of thinking.

Two rooms, two representations? Episodic-like memory in toddlers and preschoolers

Episodic memory involves binding together what-where-when associations. In three experiments, we tested the development of memory for such contextual associations in a naturalistic setting. Children searched for toys in two rooms with two different experimenters; each room contained two identical sets of four containers, but arranged differently. A distinct toy was hidden in a distinct container in each room. In Experiment 1, which involved children between 15 and 26 months who were prompted with a very explicit cue (a part of the hidden toy), we found a marked shift in performance with age: while 15- to 20-month-olds concentrated their searches on the two containers that sometimes contained toys, they did not distinguish between them according to context, but 21-26-month-olds did. However, surprisingly, without toy cues, even the youngest children showed a fragile ability to disambiguate the two containers by room context. In Experiment 2, we tested 34- to 40-month-olds and 64- to 72-month-olds without toy cues. The 5-year-olds were nearly perfect, and the 3-year-olds showed a significant preference for the correct container given only the context. In Experiment 3, we filled in the age range, and also investigated the effects of the use of labels (i.e. names of experimenters and rooms) and of familiarization time, in groups of 34- to 40-month-olds, 42- to 48-month-olds, and 50- to 56-month-olds. Neither labels nor familiarization time had an effect. Across experiments, there was regular age-related improvement in context-based memory. Overall, the results suggest that children's episodic memory may undergo an early qualitative change, yet to be precisely characterized, and that continuing increments in the use of contextual cues occur throughout the preschool period. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DkwEFw0UEz4&list=PLwxXcOKHPC0llAPVcJyW4EtzlA934A2Rz&index=1.