Stepping off the pendulum: Why only an action-based approach can transcend the nativist–empiricist debate

From action to ethics: A process-relational approach to prosocial development

Explaining how children first become active prosocial and then later moral agents requires, we argue, beginning with action and interaction with others. We take a process-relational perspective and draw on developmental systems theory in arguing that infants cannot be born knowing about prosociality or morality or anything else. Instead, they are born with emerging abilities to act and react. Their biological embodiment links them to their environment and creates the social environment in which they develop. A clear distinction between biological and social levels cannot be made in the context of ongoing development because they are thoroughly interwoven in a bidirectional system in which they mutually create each other. We focus on infants' emerging ability to interact and develop within a human developmental system, and prosociality and morality emerge at the level of interaction. Caring is a constitutive aspect of the forms of experience in which infants are embedded in the process of becoming persons. Infants are immersed in a world of mutual responsiveness within caring relationships that are infused with concern, interest, and enjoyment. In such a developmental system, infants become persons when they are treated as persons.

Toward Synergizing Educational Research and Movement Sciences: a Dialogue on Learning as Developing Perception for Action

What could possibly be a meaningful conversation between educational researchers and movement scientists? Curiously, they have much in common. Both groups of researchers increasingly (1) appreciate the human capacity to enact perceptually guided movement as an overarching psychological model of thinking, problem-solving, and learning; (2) theorize the development of perceptual structures, including actual and imaginary percepts, as a key epistemic vehicle for solving motor-control problems; and (3) promote a view of abstract thinking as movement-grounded and movement-oriented perceptual dynamics. Probing toward theoretical synergy between these traditionally disparate fields of research, the present article is built as an interdisciplinary conversation between two researchers—of mathematics education and movement science, respectively—who become aware of their intellectual alignment, garner new insights and inspirations from each other’s work, and speculate on implications of this concordance for their fields. Future exploration into the unity of movement and cognition could enrich dialogue between manifold disciplines, with the overall goal of clarifying, developing, and integrating an interdisciplinary common foundation and framework for the benefit of education.

Conceptualizations of Knowledge in Structuring Approaches to Moral Development: A Process-Relational Approach

Like other aspects of child development, views of the nature and development of morality depend on philosophical assumptions or worldviews presupposed by researchers. We analyze assumptions regarding knowledge linked to two contrasting worldviews: Cartesian-split-mechanistic and process-relational. We examine the implications of these worldviews for approaches to moral development, including relations between morality and social outcomes, and the concepts of information, meaning, interaction and computation. It is crucial to understand how researchers view these interrelated concepts in order to understand approaches to moral development. Within the Cartesian-split-mechanistic worldview, knowledge is viewed as representation and meaning is mechanistic and fixed. Both nativism and empiricism are based in this worldview, differing in whether the source of representations is assumed to be primarily internal or external. Morality is assumed to pre-exist, either in the genome or the culture. We discuss problems with these conceptions and endorse the process-relational paradigm, according to which knowledge is constructed through interaction, and morality begins in activity as a process of coordinating perspectives, rather than the application of fixed rules. The contrast is between beginning with the mind or beginning with social activity in explaining the mind.

The Development of Giving in Forms of Object Exchange: Exploring the Roots of Communication and Morality in Early Interaction around Objects

Giving is an act of great social importance across cultures, with communicative as well as moral dimensions because it is linked to sharing and fairness. We critically evaluate various explanations for how this social process develops in infancy and take a process-relational approach, using naturalistic observations to illustrate forms of interaction involving the exchange of objects and possible developmental trajectories for the emergence of different forms of giving. Based on our data, we propose that the object becomes a pivot point for interaction, and through the process of such interaction the social actions of showing and giving emerge and take on diverse social meanings within the relations between infants and caregivers.

Is young children's helping affected by helpees' need? Preschoolers, but not infants selectively help needy others

Infants and toddlers engage in instrumental helping, that is, help others in achieving an action-based goal. The underlying psychological mechanisms are unclear and hotly debated. The present study examined whether young children's helping is affected by others' need. To this end, 1.5- and 3.5-year-old children (n = 101) were simultaneously confronted with a needy and a non-needy other in a variety of helping tasks. The results show that the 3.5-year-old, but not the 1.5-year-old children preferentially helped the needy person. This suggests developmental changes in the psychological mechanisms underlying early instrumental helping. The results are explained by a developmental account according to which helping only gradually becomes an other-oriented and need-based behavior in the first years of life.

Encodingism is not just a bad metaphor

Brette's criticism of the coding metaphor focuses on its presence in neurosciences. We argue that this problematic view, which we call "encodingism," is pernicious in any model of cognition that adopts it. We discuss some of the more specific problems it begets and then elaborate on Brette's action-based alternative to the coding framework.

Making sense of movement in embodied design for mathematics learning

Embodiment perspectives from the cognitive sciences offer a rethinking of the role of sensorimotor activity in human learning, knowing, and reasoning. Educational researchers have been evaluating whether and how these perspectives might inform the theory and practice of STEM instruction. Some of these researchers have created technological systems, where students solve sensorimotor interaction problems as cognitive entry into curricular content. However, the field has yet to agree on a conceptually coherent and empirically validated design framework, inspired by embodiment perspectives, for developing these instructional resources. A stumbling block toward such consensus, we propose, is an implicit disagreement among educational researchers on the relation between physical movement and conceptual learning. This hypothesized disagreement could explain the contrasting choices we witness among current designs for learning with respect to instructional methodology for cultivating new physical actions – whereas some researchers use an approach of direct instruction, such as explicit teaching of gestures, others use an indirect approach, where students must discover effective movements to solve a task. Prior to comparing these approaches, it may help first to clarify key constructs. In this theoretical essay we draw on embodiment and systems literature as well as findings from our design research so as to offer the following taxonomy that may facilitate discourse about movement in STEM learning: (1) distal movement is the technologically extended effect of physical movement on the environment; (2) proximal movement is the physical movements themselves; and (3) sensorimotor schemes are the routinized patterns of cognitive activity that become enacted through proximal movement by orienting on so-called attentional anchors. Attentional anchors are goal-oriented phenomenological objects or enactive perceptions (“sensori-”) that organize proximal movement to effect distal movement (“-motor”). All three facets of movement must be considered in analyzing embodied learning processes. We demonstrate that indirect movement instruction enables students to develop new sensorimotor schemes including attentional anchors as idiosyncratic solutions to physical interaction problems. These schemes are, by necessity, grounded in students’ own agentive relation to the world while also grounding target content such as mathematical notions.

Embodiment and Human Development

We are recognizing increasingly that the study of cognitive, social, and emotional processes must account for their embodiment in living, acting beings. The related field of embodied cognition (EC) has coalesced around dissatisfaction with the lack of attention to the body in cognitive science. For developmental scientists, the emphasis in the literature on adult EC on the role of the body in cognition may not seem particularly novel, given that bodily action was central to Piaget's theory of cognitive development. However, as the influence of the Piagetian account waned, developmental notions of embodiment were shelved in favor of mechanical computational approaches. In this article, I argue that by reconsidering embodiment, we can address a key issue with computational accounts: how meaning is constructed by the developing person. I also suggest that the process-relational approach to developmental systems can provide a system of concepts for framing a fully embodied, integrative developmental science.

The Study of Process and the Nature of Explanation in Developmental Science

The question of “how” occupies center stage in the explanatory efforts of developmental science and establishes the study of process as the field's defining mission. In line with this mission, recent decades have witnessed a new wave of focus on taking seriously issues of time, variability, and context in the study of development. For many in the field, however, fully espousing a process orientation for developmental science requires an abandonment of the structural explanation in which the field is historically steeped—for example, the organizational sequencing and directionality established in the “grand theories” of classic developmental accounts. Metatheoretically, the idea that a process orientation actively conflicts with a structural orientation rests on the conceptual conflation of different kinds of structural explanation. Such conceptual conflation, in turn, derives from the adoption of an ontological framework that reduces all explanation to mechanistic antecedent–consequent relations. The purpose of this article is to frame developmental science's pursuit of the question of “how” within the broader context of metatheoretical division that characterizes the field's approach to explanation itself.

Beyond different levels: embodiment and the developmental system

The value of studying a phenomenon at multiple levels of analysis is often emphasized in psychology, but a lack of clarity about the nature of levels and the relations among them remains an impediment to progress. The suggestion here is that an approach combining the tenets of embodiment with the construct of the developmental system provides a way forward. Embodiment opposes the splitting off and elevation of a level of mechanisms that has characterized much of cognitive science. In contrast, a constructivist embodied approach places a level of mechanisms in the context of a formal or systems level of analysis, with developmental process framing the interpenetrating relations between levels. Such an approach stems from a relational worldview that opposes conceptual splits and posits that levels of structure and process comprise an indissociable complementarity. The combination of embodiment and developmental systems within a relational worldview is discussed and elaborated through outlining the integrative approach of relational developmental systems, which has been proposed as a scientific paradigm within which formulations of the interrelations among brain, body, and mind can be advanced.

Definitions and Developmental Processes in Research on Infant Morality

Key terms in research on moral development also exist in everyday language. Tafreshi and her colleagues (2014) propose that researchers should use terms in ways consistent with their usage by non-researchers. This commentary questions this claim, and argues for the importance of providing clear and explicit definitions of terms such as "morality" and "innate," of showing caution when attributing evaluations and judgments to infants, and of considering developmental processes preceding and succeeding the abilities demonstrated using looking-time and related measures. Progress is unlikely to result from conceptual analysis alone. However, conceptual clarity will make it easier to see what theories agree and disagree about as well as how opposing claims can be tested empirically.

The role of distancing in Werner and Kaplan’s account of symbol formation and beyond

The concept of distancing or polarization plays a central role in Werner and Kaplan’s account of symbol formation. It refers to the process of progressive differentiation and hierarchic integration of the four components constitutive of symbolic activity: addressor, addressee, symbolic vehicle and referent. Specifically, Werner and Kaplan suggest that distancing takes place between person and referent, between person and symbolic vehicle, between symbolic vehicle and referent and between addressor and addressee. We describe the theoretical context and different aspects of the distancing process. Furthermore, we argue that the distancing process identifies central prerequisites of symbolic activity that are largely ignored by contemporary developmental theories. We demonstrate the different aspects of the distancing process in several domains of symbolic development, including words, gestural development and pretend play. Finally, we compare Werner and Kaplan’s concept of distancing to ideas of distancing developed in recent developmental theories.

A mature second-person neuroscience needs a first-person (plural) developmental foundation

Schilbach et al.'s model assumes that the ability to "experience" minds is already present in human infants and therefore falls foul of the very intellectualist problems it attempts to avoid. We propose an alternative relational, action-based account, which attempts to grasp how the individual's construction of knowledge develops within interactions.

Non-enzymatic glycation of human fibrillin-1

Non-enzymatic glycation of proteins is one of the key mechanisms in the pathogenesis of diabetic complications and may be significant in the age-related changes of tissues. We isolated and investigated the in vitro glycation of human aortic fibrillin-1. Fibrillin-1 was prepared from thoracic aortas of 9 accident victims distributed in three age groups. The purity of isolated fibrillin-1 was proved. It was glycated by incubating with different glucose concentrations in 0.2 M phosphate buffer, pH 7.4, for 30 days, at 37 degrees C. The degree of early products of glycation was measured by two colorimetric methods, i.e. nitroblue tetrazolium and 2-thiobarbituric acid. Advanced glycation end products (AGEs) were determined by fluorescence measurement. The highest level of early products of glycation was found on day 2 after the beginning of incubation for the fibrillin-1 isolated from the youngest group. Fluorescence in the age groups, as an index of advanced glycation, consistently increased between days 6 and 24. The fibrillin-1 isolated from the youngest group had the highest capacity to form fructosamine and AGEs under glycation in vitro. The capacity of glycation of the 'oldest' fibrillin did not increase significantly during the incubation. Investigation of the properties of glycated fibrillin-1 will help to understand the importance of this long-lived protein to age-related changes in tissues and for diabetic complications.