1
|
Schleihauf H, Zhang Z, Gomez A, Engelmann JM. From outcome to process: A developmental shift in judgments of good reasoning. Cognition 2023; 236:105425. [PMID: 36907114 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105425] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/24/2022] [Revised: 02/20/2023] [Accepted: 02/27/2023] [Indexed: 03/12/2023]
Abstract
What does it mean to reason well? One might argue that good reasoning means that the outcome of the reasoning process is correct: reaching the right belief. Alternatively, good reasoning might refer to the reasoning process itself: following the right epistemic procedures. In a preregistered study, we investigated children's (4-9-year-olds) and adults' judgments of reasoning in China and the US (N = 256). Participants of all age groups evaluated the outcome when the process was kept constant - they favored agents who reached correct over incorrect beliefs, and they evaluated the process when the outcome was kept constant - they preferred agents who formed their beliefs using valid over invalid procedures. Developmental changes emerged when we pitted outcome against process: young children weighed outcome more heavily than process; older children and adults showed the reverse preference. This pattern was constant across the two cultural contexts, with the switch from outcome to process happening earlier in development in China. These results suggest that children initially value what someone believes, but, with development, come to increasingly value how beliefs are formed.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Hanna Schleihauf
- Department of Developmental Psychology, Utrecht University, the Netherlands; Cognitive Ethology Laboratory, German Primate Center - Leibniz Institute for Primate Research, Göttingen, Germany; Leibniz ScienceCampus Primate Cognition, 37077 Göttingen, Germany.
| | - Zhen Zhang
- CAS Key Laboratory of Behavioral Science, Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China; Department of Psychology, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China
| | - Alissa Gomez
- Department of Psychology, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA
| | - Jan M Engelmann
- Social Origins Laboratory, Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA
| |
Collapse
|
2
|
Li L, Tomasello M. Disagreement, justification, and equitable moral judgments: A brief training study. J Exp Child Psychol 2022; 223:105494. [PMID: 35842960 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105494] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/07/2022] [Revised: 06/02/2022] [Accepted: 06/02/2022] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
Abstract
Although theorists agree that social interactions play a major role in moral development, previous research has not experimentally assessed how specific features of social interactions affect children's moral judgments and reasoning. The current study assessed two features: disagreement and justification. In a brief training phase, children aged 4-5.5 years (N = 129) discussed simple moral scenarios about issues of fairness (how to allocate things between individuals) with a puppet who, in a between-participants factorial design, either agreed or disagreed with the children's ideas and either asked or did not ask the children to justify their ideas. Children then responded to another set of moral scenarios in a test phase that was the same for all children. Children in the "agree and do not justify" baseline condition showed an inflexible equality bias (preferring only equal allocations regardless of context), but children who had experiences of disagreement or experiences of being asked to justify themselves shifted toward making equitable decisions based on common ground norms and values. Furthermore, false belief competence was related to children's decisions and justifications. These findings support the classic Piagetian hypothesis that social interactions are a catalyst of cognitive disequilibrium and moral development.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Leon Li
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA.
| | - Michael Tomasello
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA
| |
Collapse
|
3
|
Li L, Tucker A, Tomasello M. Young children judge defection less negatively when there’s a good justification. COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 2022. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cogdev.2022.101268] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
|
4
|
Vasil J. A New Look at Young Children's Referential Informativeness. PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2022; 18:624-648. [PMID: 36170548 DOI: 10.1177/17456916221112072] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/15/2022]
Abstract
In this article, I review experimental evidence for the dependence of 2- to 5-year-olds' linguistic referential informativeness on cues to common ground (CG) and propose a process model. Cues to CG provide evidence for CG, that is, for the shared knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes of interlocutors. The presence of cues to CG (e.g., unimpeded listener line of regard or prior mention) is shown to be associated with less informative reference (e.g., pronouns). In contrast, the absence of cues to CG (e.g., impeded listener line of regard or new mention) is shown to be associated with more informative reference (e.g., nouns). Informativeness is sensitive to linguistic before nonlinguistic cues to CG (i.e., 2.0 vs. 2.5 years old, respectively). Reference is cast as a process of active inference, a formulation of Bayesian belief-guided control in biological systems. Child speakers are hierarchical generative models that, characteristically, expect sensory evidence for the evolved, prior Bayesian belief that interlocutor mental states are aligned (i.e., that CG exists). Referential control emerges as an embodied tool to gather evidence for this prior belief. Bottom-up cues to CG elicited by action drive updates to beliefs about CG. In turn, beliefs about CG guide efficient referential control.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Jared Vasil
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University
| |
Collapse
|
5
|
Schleihauf H, Herrmann E, Fischer J, Engelmann JM. How children revise their beliefs in light of reasons. Child Dev 2022; 93:1072-1089. [PMID: 35383921 DOI: 10.1111/cdev.13758] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
We investigate how the ability to respond appropriately to reasons provided in discourse develops in young children. In Study 1 (N = 58, Germany, 26 girls), 4- and 5-, but not 3-year-old children, differentiated good from bad reasons. In Study 2 (N = 131, Germany, 64 girls), 4- and 5-year-old children considered both the strength of evidence for their initial belief and the quality of socially provided reasons for an alternative view when deciding whether to change their minds. Study 3 (N = 80, the United States, 42 girls, preregistered) shows that 4- and 5-year-old children also consider meta-reasons (reasons about reasons) in their belief revision. These results suggest that by age 4, children possess key critical thinking capacities for participating in public discourse.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Hanna Schleihauf
- Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California, USA.,Cognitive Ethology Laboratory, German Primate Center-Leibniz Institute for Primate Research, Göttingen, Germany.,Department for Primate Cognition, Georg-August-University Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany.,Leibniz ScienceCampus Primate Cognition, Göttingen, Germany
| | | | - Julia Fischer
- Cognitive Ethology Laboratory, German Primate Center-Leibniz Institute for Primate Research, Göttingen, Germany.,Department for Primate Cognition, Georg-August-University Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany.,Leibniz ScienceCampus Primate Cognition, Göttingen, Germany
| | - Jan M Engelmann
- Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California, USA
| |
Collapse
|
6
|
Children transition from simple associations to explicitly reasoned social learning strategies between age four and eight. Sci Rep 2022; 12:5045. [PMID: 35322165 PMCID: PMC8943005 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-022-09092-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/25/2021] [Accepted: 03/17/2022] [Indexed: 11/28/2022] Open
Abstract
To differentiate the use of simple associations from use of explicitly reasoned selective social learning, we can look for age-related changes in children’s behaviour that might signify a switch from one social learning strategy to the other. We presented 4- to 8-year-old children visiting a zoo in Scotland (N = 109) with a task in which the perceptual access of two informants was determined by the differing opacity of two screens of similar visual appearance during a hiding event. Initially success could be achieved by forming an association or inferring a rule based on salient visual (but causally irrelevant) cues. However, following a switch in the scenario, success required explicit reasoning about informants’ potential to provide valuable information based on their perceptual access. Following the switch, older children were more likely to select a knowledgeable informant. This suggests that some younger children who succeeded in the pre-switch trials had inferred rules or formed associations based on superficial, yet salient, visual cues, whereas older children made the link between perceptual access and the potential to inform. This late development and apparent cognitive challenge are consistent with proposals that such capacities are linked to the distinctiveness of human cumulative culture.
Collapse
|
7
|
The study of rational framing effects needs developmental psychology. Behav Brain Sci 2022; 45:e243. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x22000930] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
Abstract
Abstract
Experimental research is reviewed which suggests that rational framing effects influence young children's social activities according to a logic of interdependence. However, young children are unlikely to possess some of the elaborate cognitive skills argued in the Target Article to be prerequisite for rational framing effects. Understanding rational framing effects requires understanding their ontogenetic origins.
Collapse
|
8
|
Rakoczy H, Miosga N, Schultze T. Young children evaluate and follow others’ arguments when forming and revising beliefs. SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 2021. [DOI: 10.1111/sode.12533] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Hannes Rakoczy
- Department of Developmental Psychology University of Göttingen Göttingen Germany
| | - Nadja Miosga
- Department of Developmental Psychology University of Göttingen Göttingen Germany
| | - Thomas Schultze
- Department of Developmental Psychology University of Göttingen Göttingen Germany
| |
Collapse
|
9
|
Migdalek MJ, Rosemberg CR. SES Differences in Children's Argumentative Production. EUROPES JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY 2021; 16:193-209. [PMID: 33680178 PMCID: PMC7913017 DOI: 10.5964/ejop.v16i2.1665] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/21/2018] [Accepted: 05/27/2019] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
Abstract
Recent studies have examined the argumentative strategies used by young children in everyday situations as well as in experimental settings. However, differences in argumentative production as a function of Socio-Economic Status (SES) have been minimally explored. This study aims to analyze eventual differences regarding social group in the use of argumentative strategies and connectors marking causal and adversative relationships within these strategies. The corpus is 615 disputes occurred during play situations in the homes of 39 4-year old children living in Buenos Aires, Argentina: 453 of mid SES children and 162 of low SES. Argumentative strategies were codified using a system of inductively derived categories: a) the reiteration of the child’s point of view; b) the narration of previous experiences; c) the anticipation of courses of action; d) generalization; e) the description of the characteristics of an object, event or internal state; f) referencing authority; g) the mitigation of the point of view; h) providing an alternative proposal. Results show that in both social groups the use of an argumentative strategy to sustain the point of view predominates over merely stating the point of view. Additionally, we found significant differences in a) Reiteration strategy, with the low SES group showing a greater use of this strategy and b) Generalization and Description strategies, with the mid SES children employing these ones more frequently. Regarding the connectors, significant differences were only detected in the use of consecutive and adversative markers. The mid SES group showed a greater use of these particular connectors.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Maia J Migdalek
- National Council of Scientific and Technical Research, Buenos Aires, Argentina.,University of Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina
| | - Celia R Rosemberg
- National Council of Scientific and Technical Research, Buenos Aires, Argentina.,University of Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina
| |
Collapse
|
10
|
Collaborative reasoning in the context of group competition. PLoS One 2021; 16:e0246589. [PMID: 33544768 PMCID: PMC7864449 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0246589] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/10/2020] [Accepted: 01/22/2021] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
A key skill in collaborative problem-solving is to communicate and evaluate reasons for proposals to arrive at the decision benefiting all group members. Although it is well-documented that collaborative contexts facilitate young children's reasoning, less is known about whether competition with other groups contributes to children's collaborative reasoning. We investigated whether between-group competition facilitates children's within-group collaborative reasoning, regarding their production of reasons and their use of transacts, communicative acts that operate on one another's proposals and reasoning. We presented 5- and 7-year-old peer dyads with two collaborative problem-solving tasks (decorating a zoo and a dollhouse). In one task, children competed against another group (the competitive condition); whereas in the other task, they did not (non-competitive condition). Our results suggest that children's sensitivity to group competition as reflected in their reasoning changed depending on the task. When they decorated a house, they produced more transacts in the competitive condition than in the non-competitive condition; whereas when they decorated a zoo, this pattern was reversed. Thus, our results highlight that group competition did not influence children's collaborative reasoning consistently across different contexts.
Collapse
|
11
|
Abstract
Previous comparisons of language and morality have taken a cognitively internalist (i.e., within-minds) perspective. We take a socially externalist (i.e., between-minds) perspective, viewing both language and morality as forms of social action. During human evolution, social cognitive adaptations for cooperation evolved, including cooperative communication (social acts to mentally coordinate with others for common goals) and social normativity (social acts to regulate cooperative social relationships). As human cooperation scaled up in complexity, cooperative communication and social normativity scaled up as well, leading to the development of culturally elaborated forms of language and morality. Language facilitates all aspects of morality and is even necessary for certain aspects. Humans use language to (1) initiate, (2) preserve, (3) revise, and (4) act on morality in ways such as forming joint commitments, teaching norms, modifying social realities, and engaging in moral reason-giving.
Collapse
|
12
|
Mammen M, Köymen B, Tomasello M. Young children’s moral judgments depend on the social relationship between agents. COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 2021. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cogdev.2020.100973] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/24/2022]
|
13
|
|
14
|
Children’s developing understanding that even reliable sources need to verify their claims. COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 2020. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cogdev.2020.100871] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/18/2022]
|
15
|
Köymen B, Jurkat S, Tomasello M. Preschoolers refer to direct and indirect evidence in their collaborative reasoning. J Exp Child Psychol 2020; 193:104806. [PMID: 32014650 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2020.104806] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/07/2019] [Revised: 12/09/2019] [Accepted: 01/05/2020] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
Collaborative reasoning requires partners to evaluate options and the evidence for or against each option. We investigated whether preschoolers can explain why one option is best (direct reasons) and why the other option is not (indirect reasons), looking at both problems that have a correct answer and those that require choosing the better option. In Study 1, both age groups produced direct reasons equally frequently in both problems. However, 5-year-olds produced indirect reasons more often than 3-year-olds, especially when there was a correct answer. In Study 2 with a nonverbal task with a correct answer, 3-year-olds produced indirect reasons more often than in Study 1, although 5-year-olds' indirect reasons were more efficiently stated. These results demonstrate that even 3-year-olds, and even nonverbally, can point out to a partner a fact that constitutes a reason for them to arrive at a correct joint decision.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Bahar Köymen
- School of Health Sciences, University of Manchester, Manchester M13 9PL, UK.
| | - Solveig Jurkat
- Department of Psychology, University of Münster, 48149 Münster, Germany
| | - Michael Tomasello
- Department of Psychology & Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA; Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute of Evolutionary Anthropology, D-04103 Leipzig, Germany
| |
Collapse
|
16
|
Affiliation(s)
- Manuel Bohn
- Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology
- Stanford University
- Leipzig University
| | | |
Collapse
|
17
|
Köymen B, Tomasello M. Children's meta-talk in their collaborative decision making with peers. J Exp Child Psychol 2017; 166:549-566. [PMID: 29101796 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2017.09.018] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/04/2017] [Revised: 09/15/2017] [Accepted: 09/19/2017] [Indexed: 10/18/2022]
Abstract
In collaborative decision making, children must evaluate the evidence behind their respective claims and the rationality of their respective proposals with their partners. In the main study, 5- and 7-year-old peer dyads (N = 196) were presented with a novel animal. In the key condition, children in a dyad individually received conflicting information about what the animal needs (e.g., rocks vs. sand for food) from sources that differ in reliability (with first-hand vs. indirect evidence). Dyads in both age groups were able to reliably settle on the option with the best supporting evidence. Moreover, in making their decision, children, especially 7-year-olds, engaged in various kinds of meta-talk about the evidence and its validity. In a modified version of the key condition in Study 2, 3- and 5-year-olds (N = 120) interacted with a puppet who tried to convince children to change their minds by producing meta-talk. When the puppet insisted and produced meta-talk, 5-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, were more likely to change their minds if their information was unreliable. These results suggest that even preschoolers can engage in collaborative reasoning successfully, but the ability to reflect on the process by stepping back to jointly examine the evidence emerges only during the early school years.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Bahar Köymen
- University of Manchester, Manchester M13 9PL, UK.
| | - Michael Tomasello
- Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, 04103 Leipzig, Germany; Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA
| |
Collapse
|
18
|
Domberg A, Köymen B, Tomasello M. Children's reasoning with peers in cooperative and competitive contexts. BRITISH JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 2017; 36:64-77. [PMID: 28940379 DOI: 10.1111/bjdp.12213] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/13/2017] [Revised: 08/30/2017] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
We report two studies that demonstrate how five- and seven-year-olds adapt their production of arguments to either a cooperative or a competitive context. Two games elicited agreements from peer dyads about placing animals on either of two halves of a playing field owned by either child. Children had to produce arguments to justify these decisions. Played in a competitive context that encouraged placing animals on one's own half, children's arguments showed a bias that was the result of withholding known arguments. In a cooperative context, children produced not only more arguments, but also more 'two-sided' arguments. Also, seven-year-olds demonstrated a more frequent and strategic use of arguments that specifically refuted decisions that would favour their peers. The results suggest that cooperative contexts provide a more motivating context for children to produce arguments. Statement of contribution What is already known on this subject? Reasoning is a social skill that allows people to reach joint decisions. Preschoolers give reasons for their proposals in their peer conversations. By adolescence, children use sophisticated arguments (e.g., refutations and rebuttals). What the present study adds? Cooperation offers a more motivating context for children's argument production. Seven-year-olds are more strategic than five-year-olds in their reasoning with peers. Children's reasoning with others becomes more sophisticated after preschool years.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Andreas Domberg
- Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany.,School of Health Sciences, University of Manchester, UK
| | - Bahar Köymen
- School of Health Sciences, University of Manchester, UK
| | - Michael Tomasello
- Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany.,Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA
| |
Collapse
|
19
|
Castelain T, Bernard S, Mercier H. Evidence that Two-Year-Old Children are Sensitive to Information Presented in Arguments. INFANCY 2017. [DOI: 10.1111/infa.12202] [Citation(s) in RCA: 21] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Thomas Castelain
- Instituto de Investigaciones Psicológicas; Universidad de Costa Rica
| | | | - Hugo Mercier
- Institut des Sciences Cognitives - Marc Jeannerod; CNRS
| |
Collapse
|
20
|
Mercier H, Sudo M, Castelain T, Bernard S, Matsui T. Japanese preschoolers’ evaluation of circular and non-circular arguments. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 2017. [DOI: 10.1080/17405629.2017.1308250] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/19/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Hugo Mercier
- CNRS – Institut des Sciences Cognitives Marc Jeannerod, Université Lyon 1, Lyon, France
| | - Mioko Sudo
- Center for Research in International Education, Tokyo Gakugei University, Tokyo, Japan
| | - Thomas Castelain
- CNRS – Institut des Sciences Cognitives Marc Jeannerod, Université Lyon 1, Lyon, France
- Instituto de Investigaciones Psicológicas, Universidad de Costa Rica, San José, Costa Rica
| | - Stéphane Bernard
- Centre de Sciences Cognitives, Université de Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel, Switzerland
| | - Tomoko Matsui
- Center for Research in International Education, Tokyo Gakugei University, Tokyo, Japan
| |
Collapse
|
21
|
The Argumentative Theory: Predictions and Empirical Evidence. Trends Cogn Sci 2016; 20:689-700. [PMID: 27450708 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2016.07.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 65] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/26/2016] [Revised: 06/30/2016] [Accepted: 07/01/2016] [Indexed: 11/21/2022]
Abstract
The argumentative theory of reasoning suggests that the main function of reasoning is to exchange arguments with others. This theory explains key properties of reasoning. When reasoners produce arguments, they are biased and lazy, as can be expected if reasoning is a mechanism that aims at convincing others in interactive contexts. By contrast, reasoners are more objective and demanding when they evaluate arguments provided by others. This fundamental asymmetry between production and evaluation explains the effects of reasoning in different contexts: the more debate and conflict between opinions there is, the more argument evaluation prevails over argument production, resulting in better outcomes. Here I review how the argumentative theory of reasoning helps integrate a wide range of empirical findings in reasoning research.
Collapse
|