Coding choices affect the analyses of a false belief measure

The roles of language and executive function in Mandarin-speaking children's theory of mind development

Introduction

Research has indicated that language and executive function relate closely to first-order false belief reasoning, yet their roles in second-order false belief reasoning are under-explored, and their interplay in theory of mind development remains obscure.

Methods

This study assessed 160 Mandarin-speaking preschoolers' and early primary schoolers' language, executive function, and theory of mind abilities to examine the unique roles and interplay of language and executive function in first-order and second-order false belief reasoning.

Results

Results showed that language significantly uniquely predicted the children's first-order as well as second-order false belief reasoning when controlling for the effects of age and executive function. Although executive function significantly predicted first-order FB reasoning when controlling for age, it was no longer a significant predictor of first-order FB reasoning when language was included in the model. However, executive function played a significant unique role in second-order FB reasoning when controlling for the effects of age and language.

Discussion

The current findings suggest that language plays a greater role than executive function in Mandarin-speaking children's theory of mind development and the contributors to theory of mind development vary in different levels of false belief reasoning.

Growing out of your own mind: Reexamining the development of the self-other difference in the unexpected contents task

The unexpected contents task is a well-established measure for studying young children's developing theory of mind. The task measures whether children understand that others have a false belief about a deceptive container and whether children can track the representational change in their own beliefs about the container's contents. Performance on both questions improves between the ages of 3 and 4. A previous meta-analysis (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001) found little evidence for a difference in children's responses on these questions, but did not investigate the weak effect size that was reported for the interaction between age and question type. The two meta-analyses reported here update the literature review, and find a more robust interaction between question type and age. Three-year-olds showed better performance on questions about their own representational change than others' false belief, while older children showed the reverse pattern. A mega-analysis of a sample of over 1200 children between the ages of 36-60 months then showed the same result. This response pattern requires novel theoretical interpretations, which include reframing the development of children's understanding of false belief.

How Children Learn From Others: An Analysis of Selective Word Learning

One way children are remarkable learners is that they learn from others. Critically, children are selective when assessing from whom to learn, particularly in the domain of word learning. We conducted an analysis of children's selective word learning, reviewing 63 papers on 6,525 participants. Children's ability to engage in selective word learning appeared to be present in the youngest samples surveyed. Their more metacognitive understanding that epistemic competence indicates reliability or that others are good sources of knowledge has more of a developmental trajectory. We also found that various methodological factors used to assess children influence performance. We conclude with a synthesis of theoretical accounts of how children learn from others.

The link between parental mental state talk and children's lying: An indirect effect via false belief understanding

Past research shows that parental mental state talk (MST) is closely associated with children's theory-of-mind (ToM) understanding. The current study extends previous work by investigating whether parental MST is also associated with children's ToM in action (i.e., lying). A total of 90 Singaporean 3- to 5-year-olds participated in this study with their parents. Parental MST was measured using a storytelling task with a wordless picture book. Mediation analysis revealed an indirect effect: Children's ToM understanding served as a mediator in the path between parental MST and children's lying, whereas there was no significant direct effect of parental MST on children's lying. This study is the first to focus on the relation between parental MST and ToM in an applied setting. Our findings suggest that parental MST can help children to develop sociocognitive skills, which in turn can help children to gain the insight that lying may be used as a strategy for personal gain.

False-belief reasoning from 3 to 92 years of age

False-belief reasoning, defined as the ability to reason about another person’s beliefs and appreciate that beliefs can differ from reality, is an important aspect of perspective taking. We tested 266 individuals, at various ages ranging from 3 to 92 years, on a continuous measure of false-belief reasoning (the Sandbox task). All age groups had difficulty suppressing their own knowledge when estimating what a naïve person knew. After controlling for task-specific memory, our results showed similar false-belief reasoning abilities across the preschool years and from older childhood to younger adulthood, followed by a small reduction in this ability from younger to older adulthood. These results highlight the relative similarity in false-belief reasoning abilities at different developmental periods across the lifespan.