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McManus RM, Mesick CC, Rutchick AM. Distributing Blame Among Multiple Entities When Autonomous Technologies Cause Harm. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 2024:1461672241238303. [PMID: 38613365 DOI: 10.1177/01461672241238303] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 04/14/2024]
Abstract
As autonomous technology emerges, new variations in old questions arise. When autonomous technologies cause harm, who is to blame? The current studies compare reactions toward harms caused by human-controlled vehicles (HCVs) or human soldiers (HSs) to identical harms by autonomous vehicles (AVs) or autonomous robot soldiers. Drivers of HCVs, or HSs, were blamed more than mere users of AVs or HSs who outsourced their duties to ARSs. However, as human drivers/soldiers became less involved in (or were unaware of the preprogramming that led to) the harm, blame was redirected toward other entities (i.e., manufacturers and the tech company's executives), showing the opposite pattern as human drivers/soldiers. Results were robust to how blame was measured (i.e., degrees of blame versus apportionment of total blame). Overall, this research furthers the blame literature, raising questions about why, how (much), and to whom blame is assigned when multiple agents are potentially culpable.
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Margoni F, Geipel J, Hadjichristidis C, Bakiaj R, Surian L. Age-Related Differences in Moral Judgment: The Role of Probability Judgments. Cogn Sci 2023; 47:e13345. [PMID: 37718470 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.13345] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/17/2022] [Revised: 07/25/2023] [Accepted: 09/06/2023] [Indexed: 09/19/2023]
Abstract
Research suggests that moral evaluations change during adulthood. Older adults (75+) tend to judge accidentally harmful acts more severely than younger adults do, and this age-related difference is in part due to the greater negligence older adults attribute to the accidental harmdoers. Across two studies (N = 254), we find support for this claim and report the novel discovery that older adults' increased attribution of negligence, in turn, is associated with a higher perceived likelihood that the accident would occur. We propose that, because older adults perceive accidents as more likely than younger adults do, they condemn the agents and their actions more and even infer that the agents' omission to exercise due care is intentional. These findings refine our understanding of the cognitive processes underpinning moral judgment in older adulthood and highlight the role of subjective probability judgments in negligence attribution.
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Affiliation(s)
- Francesco Margoni
- Department of Psychology, University of Oslo
- Department of Social Studies, University of Stavanger
| | - Janet Geipel
- Department of Management, The University of Exeter
- Department of Psychology, The University of Chicago
| | - Constantinos Hadjichristidis
- Department of Economics and Management, University of Trento
- Centre for Decision Research, Leeds University Business School, University of Leeds
| | - Richard Bakiaj
- Department of Psychology and Cognitive Science, University of Trento
| | - Luca Surian
- Department of Psychology and Cognitive Science, University of Trento
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Margoni F, Cho I, Gutchess A. Intent-Based Moral Judgment in Old Age. J Gerontol B Psychol Sci Soc Sci 2023; 78:1136-1141. [PMID: 35973063 PMCID: PMC10292836 DOI: 10.1093/geronb/gbac114] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/28/2022] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
OBJECTIVES Recent studies support the idea of an intent-to-outcome shift in moral judgments with age. We further assessed whether a reduced reliance on intentions is associated with aging in a preregistered study with 73 younger (20-41 years) and 79 older (70-84 years) adults, group-matched on education level. METHOD Participants were presented with a set of moral cases to evaluate, created by varying orthogonally the valence (neutral, negative) of the information regarding the agent's intentions and the action's outcomes. RESULTS The two age groups did not differ in the extent they relied on intentions in moral judgment. DISCUSSION These results suggest that an intent-to-outcome shift might not be found in all aging populations, challenging prevailing theories suggesting that aging is necessarily associated with a reduced reliance on intentions.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Isu Cho
- Department of Psychology, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA, USA
| | - Angela Gutchess
- Department of Psychology, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA, USA
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Nobes G, Panagiotaki G, Martin JW. Moral luck and the roles of outcome and negligence in moral judgments. JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2023. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2023.104456] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/12/2023]
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Kneer M, Skoczeń I. Outcome effects, moral luck and the hindsight bias. Cognition 2023; 232:105258. [PMID: 36516666 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105258] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/15/2021] [Revised: 08/03/2022] [Accepted: 08/16/2022] [Indexed: 12/14/2022]
Abstract
In a series of ten preregistered experiments (N = 2043), we investigate the effect of outcome valence on judgments of probability, negligence, and culpability - a phenomenon sometimes labelled moral (and legal) luck. We found that harmful outcomes, when contrasted with neutral outcomes, lead to an increased perceived probability of harm ex post, and consequently, to a greater attribution of negligence and culpability. Rather than simply postulating hindsight bias (as is common), we employ a variety of empirical means to demonstrate that the outcome-driven asymmetry across perceived probabilities constitutes a systematic cognitive distortion. We then explore three distinct strategies to alleviate the hindsight bias and its downstream effects on mens rea and culpability ascriptions. Not all strategies are successful, but some prove very promising. They should, we argue, be considered in criminal jurisprudence, where distortions due to the hindsight bias are likely considerable and deeply disconcerting.
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Affiliation(s)
- Markus Kneer
- Department of Philosophy, University of Zurich, 8008 Zurich, Switzerland.
| | - Izabela Skoczeń
- Department of Philosophy, University of Zurich, 8008 Zurich, Switzerland; Faculty of Law and Administration, Jagiellonian Centre for Law, Language and Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland
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Age-related differences in Default Mode Network resting-state functional connectivity but not gray matter volume relate to sacrificial moral decision-making and working memory performance. Neuropsychologia 2022; 177:108399. [PMID: 36332697 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2022.108399] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/21/2022] [Revised: 10/17/2022] [Accepted: 10/18/2022] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
Abstract
Older adults make fewer utilitarian decisions than younger adults during sacrificial moral dilemmas, which are associated with age-related reductions in Default Mode Network resting-state functional connectivity. Decreases on tasks associated with fluid cognitive abilities, such as working memory capacity, are also associated with age-related Default Mode Network changes. Regions within this network demonstrate some of the greatest age-related gray matter atrophy. Age-related changes in structure and function of the Default Mode Network may be associated with poorer working memory capacity and reduced utilitarian moral decision-making. Alternatively, recent theories suggest that age-related changes to Default Mode Network function may be adaptive in the context of tasks that include socioemotional components. As such, reduced within-network resting-state functional connectivity of the Default Mode Network may be associated with differential outcomes in moral decision-making for younger and older adults. In the present study, there were no age-related differences in working memory capacity. Older adults were less likely than younger adults to indicate the utilitarian option when trials involved Instrumental harm. Generally, increased within-network resting-state functional connectivity of the Default Mode Network was associated with better working memory performance in both groups, and reduced bias to endorse the utilitarian option during Incidental dilemmas compared to Instrumental dilemmas in younger adults. Older adults with similar moral decision-making behavior to younger adults demonstrated increased coupling between Default Mode Network and Salience Network regions. These findings suggest that Default Mode Network functional integrity may be differentially associated with age-related changes to working memory capacity and sacrificial moral decision-making.
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Schwartz F, Djeriouat H, Trémolière B. EXPRESS: Judging accidental harm: reasoning style modulates the weight of intention and harm severity. Q J Exp Psychol (Hove) 2022; 75:2366-2381. [PMID: 35285342 DOI: 10.1177/17470218221089964] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Abstract
When judging a perpetrator who harmed someone accidentally, humans rely on distinct information pertaining to the perpetrator and victim. The present study investigates how reasoning style modulates the contribution of the victim's harm and the perpetrator's intention to third-party judgment of accidental harm. In two pre-registered online experiments, we simultaneously manipulated harm severity and the perpetrator's intention. Participants completed reasoning measures as well as a moral judgment task consisting of short narratives which depicted the interaction between a perpetrator and a victim. In experiment 1, we manipulated the perpetrator's intent to harm (accidental vs. intentional harm) and the victim's harm (mild vs. severe harm). In experiment 2, we aimed to manipulate intent in accidental harm scenarios exclusively, using positive or neutral intents and manipulating harm severity (mild vs. severe harm). As expected, intent and harm severity moderated participants' moral judgment of acceptability, punishment and blame. Most importantly, in both experiments, the perpetrator's intent not only interacted with outcome severity but also polarized moral judgments in participants with a more deliberative reasoning style. While moral judgments of more intuitive reasoners were less sensitive to intent, more deliberative reasoners were more forgiving of accidental harm, especially following mild harm. These findings extend previous studies by showing that reasoning style interacts with intent and harm severity to shape moral judgment of accidents.
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Affiliation(s)
- Flora Schwartz
- UNIV. NIMES, F-30021 Nîmes Cedex 1, France 52858.,University of Toulouse, CLLE-Lab, France
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Nobes G, Martin JW. They should have known better: The roles of negligence and outcome in moral judgements of accidental actions. Br J Psychol 2021; 113:370-395. [PMID: 34719018 DOI: 10.1111/bjop.12536] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/30/2021] [Accepted: 09/27/2021] [Indexed: 12/01/2022]
Abstract
Two experiments were conducted to investigate the relative influence of agents' negligence and their actions' unintended outcomes on moral judgements. In Study 1, 343 participants were asked in an online questionnaire about a driver whose level of negligence, and the severity of the outcome, were varied systematically. Each judged how much punishment and blame the driver deserved, and rated her negligence, causal responsibility, and intentionality. In Study 2, 341 participants completed the same questionnaire, and also judged the driver's wrongness and the outcome's severity. In both studies, judgements were strongly influenced by negligence; blame was also affected by causal responsibility, and wrongness by intention, but the relatively slight outcome effect on blame and wrongness was largely mediated by negligence. In contrast, both negligence and outcome had substantial effects on punishment judgements; most participants assigned high levels of punishment when, and only when, the outcome was negative and the agent was negligent. These findings shed light on the intriguing phenomenon of moral luck, and indicate that it applies more to punishment judgements than to blame and wrongness. They also indicate that when no negligence information is provided in the description of accidents (as in many previous studies), participants often attribute negligence to agents and judge them accordingly. It seems that the effect of outcome on moral judgements has often been overestimated by researchers, and that of negligence underestimated.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gavin Nobes
- School of Psychology, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK
| | - Justin W Martin
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Boston College, Boston, Massachusetts, USA
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Gönültaş S, Richardson CB, Mulvey KL. But they weren't being careful! Role of theory of mind in moral judgments about victim and transgressor negligence. J Exp Child Psychol 2021; 212:105234. [PMID: 34325352 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2021.105234] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/08/2021] [Revised: 06/25/2021] [Accepted: 06/26/2021] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
Abstract
Previous research showed that children are influenced not only by intentions and outcomes but also by transgressor negligence in their moral judgments. The current study investigated the role of transgressor and victim negligence on children's moral judgments. Children's false-belief theory of mind understanding (FBU ToM) was examined as a possible factor that might shape moral judgments in contexts involving negligence. Children (N = 117, Mage = 5.41 years, range = 3-8) were presented with two stories involving property damage and physical harm where negligence was manipulated and with a series of questions assessing moral judgments regarding act acceptability of the transgressor and victim, punishment, and assessments of alternative actions. FBU ToM was measured with a false-content task. Children with higher FBU ToM were more likely to consider both transgressor and victim negligence in their moral judgments across different transgressions. The findings have implications for how social cognitive abilities interact with transgressor and victim negligence in moral decisions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Seçil Gönültaş
- Department of Psychology, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC 27695, USA.
| | - Cameron B Richardson
- Clearinghouse for Military Family Readiness, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802, USA
| | - Kelly Lynn Mulvey
- Department of Psychology, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC 27695, USA
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Martin JW, Buon M, Cushman F. The Effect of Cognitive Load on Intent-Based Moral Judgment. Cogn Sci 2021; 45:e12965. [PMID: 33873240 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12965] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/14/2020] [Revised: 02/12/2021] [Accepted: 02/22/2021] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
When making a moral judgment, people largely care about two factors: Who did it (causal responsibility), and did they intend to (intention)? Since Piaget's seminal studies, we have known that as children mature, they gradually place greater emphasis on intention, and less on mere bad outcomes, when making moral judgments. Today, we know that this developmental shift has several signature properties. Recently, it has been shown that when adults make moral judgments under cognitive load, they exhibit a pattern similar to young children; that is, their judgments become notably more outcome based. Here, we show that all of the same signature properties that accompany the outcome-to-intent shift in childhood characterize the "intent-to-outcome" shift obtained under cognitive load in adults. These findings hold important implications for current theories of moral judgment.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Marine Buon
- Department of Psychology, Paul Valéry University
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Margoni F, Geipel J, Hadjichristidis C, Surian L. Inequity aversion in old age: An outcome bias in older adults’ socio-economic decisions. COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 2021. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cogdev.2021.101016] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
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12
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Judging accidental harm: Due care and foreseeability of side effects. CURRENT PSYCHOLOGY 2021. [DOI: 10.1007/s12144-020-01334-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/22/2022]
Abstract
AbstractBoth in philosophy and in cognitive psychology, models of moral judgment posit that individuals take into account both agents’ intentions and actions’ outcomes. The present research focused on a third crucial piece of information, agents’ negligence. In Study 1, participants judged the moral wrongness and punishability of agents’ actions that resulted in negative side effects. In the scenarios, we orthogonally manipulated whether the agent acted with or without due care and whether she had or did not have information to foresee the negative side effects of her actions. Participants judged careless agents more condemnable than careful agents, especially when negative side effects could have been easily foreseen. In Study 2, we manipulated due care in acting in cases where the agent’s primary intention was to bring about a certain outcome without knowing that such outcome would actually be harmful. Here information about the foreseeability of negative outcomes was not provided, and participants judged actions performed with care more wrong and punishable than actions performed without care. This suggests that sometimes acting carefully and nevertheless causing harm may constitute evidence of the presence of negative intentions in the agents or evidence of the fact that agents indeed could have foreseen the negative effects of their actions. Together, these findings indicate that carefulness in acting and foreseeability are highly intertwined in moral judgment, and highlight the need to improve existing processing models of moral judgment to account for people’s evaluation of agents and actions whenever negligence can be attributed.
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Abstract
Research on morality has increased rapidly over the past 10 years. At the center of this research are moral judgments-evaluative judgments that a perceiver makes in response to a moral norm violation. But there is substantial diversity in what has been called moral judgment. This article offers a framework that distinguishes, theoretically and empirically, four classes of moral judgment: evaluations, norm judgments, moral wrongness judgments, and blame judgments. These judgments differ in their typical objects, the information they process, their speed, and their social functions. The framework presented here organizes the extensive literature and provides fresh perspectives on measurement, the nature of moral intuitions, the status of moral dumbfounding, and the prospects of dual-process models of moral judgment. It also identifies omitted questions and sets the stage for a broader theory of moral judgment, which the coming decades may bring forth.
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Affiliation(s)
- Bertram F Malle
- Department of Cognitive, Linguistic, and Psychological Sciences, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island 02912, USA;
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Mulvey KL, Gönültaş S, Richardson CB. Who Is to Blame? Children's and Adults' Moral Judgments Regarding Victim and Transgressor Negligence. Cogn Sci 2020; 44:e12833. [DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12833] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/16/2019] [Revised: 02/10/2020] [Accepted: 02/28/2020] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
Affiliation(s)
| | - Seçil Gönültaş
- Department of Psychology North Carolina State University
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