Young Children's Judgments and Reasoning about Prosocial Acts: Impermissible, Suberogatory, Obligatory, or Supererogatory?

Importance of Friendship and Minimal Group Membership in 4-6-Year-olds' and 9-12-Year-olds' Sharing Behavior in China

Strategies for favoring close others, such as friends and in-group members, benefit individuals and society. Although younger and older children apply these sharing strategies, how they integrate these relationships remain understudied. Friendship and group membership sometimes conflict (e.g. a friend from another, even a rival group), driving the question of how children behave in such situations. To address this question, this preregistered study recruited 121 4-6-year-olds and 94 9-12-year-olds from a middle-class community in China. A 2 (friend vs. stranger) by 2 (in vs. out-group) between-subjects design was applied per age group. Participants were asked to share seven objects with a recipient, who was either a stranger, or a previously nominated friend and from an in- or out-group (manipulated in the Minimal Group Paradigm). The results showed that children in both age groups shared more with friends than with strangers. However, only 4-6-year-olds shared more resources with in-group members than with out-group ones. Moreover, 4-6-year-olds did not distinguish between an out-group friend and an in-group stranger, while 9-12-year-olds shared more with an out-group friend relative to an ingroup stranger, indicating that friendship outweighs minimal group membership only among 9-12-year-olds. Furthermore, there was an interaction between age and minimal group membership, implying a decrease in the minimal group effect between 4-6-year-olds and 9-12-year-olds. Accordingly, the implications of friendship and minimal group effects, and their relative influence on sharing during childhood are discussed.

Within your rights: Dissociating wrongness and permissibility in moral judgement

Are we ever morally permitted to do what is morally wrong? It seems intuitive that we are, but evidence for dissociations among judgement of permissibility and wrongness is relatively scarce. Across four experiments (N = 1438), we show that people judge that some behaviours can be morally wrong and permissible. The dissociations arise because these judgements track different morally relevant aspects of everyday moral encounters. Judgements of individual rights predicted permissibility but not wrongness, while character assessment predicted wrongness but not permissibility. These findings suggest a picture in which moral evaluation is granular enough to express reasoning about different types of normative considerations, notably the possibility that people can exercise their rights in morally problematic ways.

Evaluative Deflation, Social Expectations, and the Zone of Moral Indifference

Acts that are considered undesirable standardly violate our expectations. In contrast, acts that count as morally desirable can either meet our expectations or exceed them. The zone in which an act can be morally desirable yet not exceed our expectations is what we call the zone of moral indifference, and it has so far been neglected. In this paper, we show that people can use positive terms in a deflated manner to refer to actions in the zone of moral indifference, whereas negative terms cannot be so interpreted.

Children perpetuate competence-based inequality when they help peers

Exchanges of help between children are common and often have positive consequences. But not all help is equally beneficial, for example because some help does not provide an opportunity to practice and develop skills. Here I examine whether young children might perpetuate competence-based inequality by providing incompetent peers with less opportunity to practice and improve their skills compared to competent peers. Study 1 (N = 253, 6-9 years) shows that young children understand not all help is equally beneficial: Children think that peers who receive empowerment (hints) vs. non-empowerment (correct answers) help can learn more. Study 2 (N = 80) and 3 (N = 41) then assessed children's (7-9 years) actual helping behavior in a lab-based experiment. Through a cover story, participants were introduced to two unknown, same-age children whom they later overheard were either good or not good at solving puzzles (Study 2) or math (Study 3). Subsequently, participants got to help both of them with a puzzle-quiz (Study 2) or a math-quiz (Study 3) by providing either empowerment or non-empowerment when they asked for help. Across both studies, children were more likely to provide empowerment help to competent peers, and non-empowerment help to incompetent peers. This work suggests that when young children perceive differences in competence (e.g., based on stereotypes), they contribute to maintaining the status quo by providing the most vulnerable students, that would profit the most from improving their skills, less opportunity to do so.

What We Do When We Define Morality (And Why We Need to Do It)

All psychological research on morality relies on definitions of morality. Yet the various definitions often go unstated. When unstated definitions diverge, theoretical disagreements become intractable, as theories that purport to explain "morality" actually talk about very different things. This article argues for the importance of defining morality and considers four common ways of doing so: The linguistic, the functionalist, the evaluating, and the normative. Each has encountered difficulties. To surmount those difficulties, I propose a technical, psychological, empirical, and distinctive definition of morality: obligatory concerns with others' welfare, rights, fairness, and justice, as well as the reasoning, judgment, emotions, and actions that spring from those concerns. By articulating workable definitions of morality, psychologists can communicate more clearly across paradigms, separate definitional from empirical disagreements, and jointly advance the field of moral psychology.

Going above and beyond? Early reasoning about which moral acts are best

Philosophers and theologians have long distinguished between acts a good person is obliged to do, and those that are supererogatory-going above and beyond what is required. Across three studies (N = 796), we discovered a striking developmental difference in intuitions about such acts: while adults view supererogatory actions as morally better than obligatory actions, children view fulfilling obligations as morally better. This difference did not stem from differing views of what is obligatory-children agreed that supererogatory acts were not required. And this difference remained even when the very same actions were framed as either supererogatory or obligatory. These findings suggest that the intuition that supererogatory acts are especially morally good might be late-emerging and culturally specific.

When it's not easy to do the right thing: Developmental changes in understanding cost drive evaluations of moral praiseworthiness

Recent work identified a shift in judgments of moral praiseworthiness that occurs late in development: adults recognize the virtue of moral actions that involve resolving an inner conflict between moral desires and selfish desires. Children, in contrast, praise agents who do the right thing in the absence of inner conflict. This finding stands in contrast with other work showing that children incorporate notions of cost and effort into their social reasoning. Using a modified version of Starmans and Bloom's (2016) vignettes, we show that understanding the virtue of costly moral action precedes understanding the virtue of resolving inner conflict. In two studies (N = 192 children, range = 4.00-9.95 years; and N = 193 adults), we contrasted a character who paid a personal cost (psychological in Study 1, physical in Study 2) to perform a moral action with another who acted morally without paying a cost. We found a developmental progression; 8- and 9-year-old children and adults recognized the praiseworthiness of moral actions that are psychologically or physically costly. Six- and 7-year-old children only recognized the praiseworthiness of moral actions that are physically costly, but not actions that are psychologically costly. Moreover, neither adults nor children inferred that paying a cost to act morally required having a moral desire or resolving inner conflict. These results suggest that both adults and children conceptualize obligation as a direct motivational force on actions. They further suggest that costly choice-a hallmark of moral agency-is implicated in judgments of praiseworthiness early in development.

Parent–child conversations about refugee newcomers are associated with children’s refugee-specific prosociality

We examined Canadian host-society children’s prosociality (i.e., emotions and behaviors that reflect care for the welfare of others) toward refugee newcomer peers and the role of parental socialization (i.e., frequency of parent-child conversations about refugee newcomers) in children’s refugee-specific prosociality. The sample included 168 children (ages 6, 9, and 12 years; 51% girls; 58% European ethnicity) and their primary caregivers. We interviewed children to assess their ethical guilt-related emotions (based on emotions and reasoning) in response to a hypothetical vignette depicting prosocial omission involving a refugee newcomer peer or a non-refugee peer (between-subjects manipulation). A donation task was used to assess prosocial behavior wherein children were given the opportunity to donate chocolate coins to a refugee newcomer peer. Parents reported on how often they typically engage in conversations with their children about refugees and about inclusion. Children experienced similar intensities of ethical guilt-related emotions in the refugee compared with the nonrefugee condition, and donations to refugees increased across age groups. Furthermore, children whose parents engaged them in more frequent conversations about refugees expressed stronger ethical guilt-related emotions toward refugee peers (but not toward host-society peers), and donated more to a refugee peer. No significant associations between conversations about inclusion more broadly and refugee-specific prosociality were found. Encouraging parents to have conversations with their children that focus on the experiences of refugees may be important for fostering kindness between refugees and host-society children. Ultimately, these findings may contribute to initiatives that focus on promoting the inclusion of refugee newcomers in their postmigratory societies.

Young children show negative emotions after failing to help others

Self-conscious emotions, such as guilt and shame, motivate the adherence to social norms, including to norms for prosociality. The relevance of an observing audience to the expression of negative self-conscious emotions remains poorly understood. Here, in two studies, we investigated the influence of being observed on 4- to 5-year-old children's (N = 161) emotional response after failing to help someone in need and after failing to complete their own goal. As an index of children's emotional response, we recorded the change in children's upper body posture using a motion depth sensor imaging camera. Failing to help others lowered children's upper body posture regardless of whether children were observed by an audience or not. Children's emotional response was similar when they failed to help and when they failed to complete their own goal. In Study 2, 5-year-olds showed a greater decrease in upper body posture than 4-year-olds. Our findings suggest that being observed is not a necessary condition for young children to express a negative self-conscious emotion after failing to help or after failing to complete their own goal. We conclude that 5-year-olds, more so that 4-year-olds, show negative emotions when they fail to adhere to social norms for prosociality.

Preschoolers agree to and enforce prosocial, but not selfish, sharing norms

Young children act prosocially in many contexts but are somewhat selfish when it comes to sharing their resources in individual decision-making situations (e.g., the dictator game). But when deciding collectively, would they make it a binding rule for themselves and others to act selfishly in a resource sharing context? Here we used a novel "group dictator game" in a norm creation paradigm to investigate whether 3- and 5-year-olds (N = 48) would agree to and enforce a selfish or prosocial sharing norm. Children from a Western cultural background were paired with two puppets at a time. Each group member had an endowment of four stickers and faced a photograph of a recipient. In the prosocial norm condition a proposer puppet suggested to share half of one's endowment, whereas in the selfish norm condition another proposer suggested to share nothing. The protagonist puppet then either followed or violated the suggested norm. We found that 5-year-olds (but not 3-year-olds) rejected selfish proposals more often than prosocial proposals. Importantly, older (but not younger) preschoolers also enforced the prosocial (but not the selfish) norm by protesting normatively and intervening when the protagonist acted selfishly (and thus violated the norm). These results indicate that a collective decision-making context may enhance preschoolers' prosociality and that moral considerations on the content of a proposed sharing rule influence preschoolers' creation and enforcement of such nonarbitrary norms.