Thinking like a scientist: Innateness as a case study

Animal Emotions and Consciousness: Researchers' Perceptions, Biases, and Prospects for Future Progress

Do animals have emotions? Scientists and philosophers have long struggled with this question, with debates ranging from whether animals experience an "internal world" to whether we are capable of studying it. Recently, theoretical, and methodological advances have rekindled this debate, yet, it is unclear where the scientific consensus on these topics lies today. To address this gap, we administered a survey of professional animal behavior researchers to assess perceptions regarding (1) the taxonomic distribution of emotions and consciousness in non-human animals, (2) respondents' confidence in this assessment, and (3) attitudes towards potential for progress and possible pitfalls when addressing these questions. In general, animal behavior researchers (n=100) ascribed emotionality and consciousness to a broad swath of the animal taxa, including non-human primates, other mammals, birds, and cephalopods, with varying degrees of confidence. There was a strong positive relationship between how likely a respondent was to attribute emotions to a given taxa and their confidence in that assessment, with respondents assuming an absence of emotions and consciousness when they were unsure. In addition, respondents' assessments were shaped by several traits (e.g., advanced cognitive abilities, consciousness) that they also admitted were not necessary for an animal to experience emotions. Ultimately, a large majority of researchers were optimistic that tools either currently exist or will exist in the future to rigorously address these questions (>85%) and that animal behavior, as a field, should do more to encourage emotions research (71%). We discuss implications of our findings for publication bias, ethical considerations, and identify an emergent consensus for the need of a functional definition of emotions to facilitate future work.

Biology, Society, or Choice: How Do Non-Experts Interpret Explanations of Behaviour?

Explanations for human behaviour can be framed in many different ways, from the social-structural context to the individual motivation down to the neurobiological implementation. We know comparatively little about how people interpret these explanatory framings, and what they infer when one kind of explanation rather than another is made salient. In four experiments, UK general-population volunteers read vignettes describing the same behaviour, but providing explanations framed in different ways. In Study 1, we found that participants grouped explanations into 'biological', 'psychological' and 'sociocultural' clusters. Explanations with different framings were often seen as incompatible with one another, especially when one belonged to the 'biological' cluster and the other did not. In Study 2, we found that exposure to a particular explanatory framing triggered inferences beyond the information given. Specifically, psychological explanations led participants to assume the behaviour was malleable, and biological framings led them to assume it was not. In Studies 3A and 3B, we found that the choice of explanatory framing can affect people's assumptions about effective interventions. For example, presenting a biological explanation increased people's conviction that interventions like drugs would be effective, and decreased their conviction that psychological or socio-political interventions would be effective. These results illuminate the intuitive psychology of explanations, and also potential pitfalls in scientific communication. Framing an explanation in a particular way will often generate inferences in the audience-about what other factors are not causally important, how easy it is to change the behaviour, and what kinds of remedies are worth considering-that the communicator may not have anticipated and might not intend.

The truth about lying

The standard view in social science and philosophy is that lying does not require the liar's assertion to be false, only that the liar believes it to be false. We conducted three experiments to test whether lying requires falsity. Overall, the results suggest that it does. We discuss some implications for social scientists working on social judgments, research on lie detection, and public moral discourse.