"Making it explicit" makes a difference: evidence for a dissociation of spontaneous and intentional level 1 perspective taking in high-functioning autism

Mentalizing and narrative coherence in autistic adults: Cerebellar sequencing and prediction

BYLEMANS, T., et al. Mentalizing and narrative coherence in autistic adults: Cerebellar sequencing and prediction. NEUROSCI BIOBEHAV REV, 2022. - This review focuses on autistic adults and serves 4 purposes: (1) providing an overview of their difficulties regarding mentalizing (understanding others' mental states) and narrative coherence (structured storytelling), (2) highlighting the relations between both skills by examining behavioral observations and shared neural substrates, (3) providing an integrated perspective regarding novel diagnostic tools and support services, and (4) raising awareness of adult autism. We suggest that mentalizing and narrative coherence are related at the behavioral level and neural level. In addition to the traditional mentalizing network, the cerebellum probably serves as an important hub in shared cerebral networks implicated in mentalizing and narrative coherence. Future autism research and support services should tackle new questions within a framework of social cerebellar (dys)functioning.

Autistic Adults Show Similar Performance and Sensitivity to Social Cues on a Visual Perspective Taking Task as Non-autistic Adults

Autistic and non-autistic adults completed a visual perspective taking (VPT) task, reporting an object’s location from an actor’s perspective, or their own. On half the trials the actor looked at and reached for the object, and on half did not. Accuracy and reaction time were measured. In Experiment 1, both groups (N = 34, mean age = 24 years) responded slower when reporting the actor’s perspective, with no group differences in this effect. Experiment 2 included “other” VPT trials only. Both groups (N = 30, mean age = 25 years) showed sensitivity to the actor’s behaviour, more accurately reporting his perspective when he acted upon the object. No group differences were observed. In contrast to developmental studies, these experiments suggest similar VPT abilities in autistic and non-autistic adults.

EXPRESS: Is Implicit Level-2 Visual perspective taking embodied? Spontaneous perceptual simulation of others' perspectives is not impaired by motor restriction

Visual perspective taking may rely on the ability to mentally rotate one's own body into that of another. Here we test whether participants' ability to make active body movements plays a causal role in visual perspective taking. We utilized our recent task that measures whether participants spontaneously represent another's visual perspective in a (quasi-)perceptual format that can drive own perceptual decision making. Participants reported whether alphanumeric characters, presented in different orientations, are shown in their normal or mirror-inverted form (e.g., "R" vs. "Я"). Between trials, we manipulated whether another person was sitting either left or right of the character and whether participants' movement was restricted with a chin rest or they could move freely. As in our previous research, participants spontaneously took the visual perspective of the other person, recognizing rotated letters more rapidly when they appeared upright to the other person in the scene, compared to when they faced away from that person, and these effects increased with age but were (weakly) negatively related to Schizotypy and not to autistic traits or social skills. Restricting participants' ability to make active body movements did not influence these effects. The results therefore rule out that active physical movement plays a causal role in computing another's visual perspective, either to create alignment between own and other's perspective or to trigger perspective-taking processes. The postural adjustments people sometimes make when making judgements from another's perspective may instead be a bodily consequence of mentally transforming one's actual to an imagined position in space.

Try to see it my way - Examining the relationship between visual perspective taking and theory of mind in frontotemporal dementia

The behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) is characterised by pronounced alterations in social functioning, including the understanding of others' thoughts and feelings via theory of mind. The emergence of such impairments in other social disorders such as autism and schizophrenia is suggested to reflect an inability to imagine the other person's visual perspective of the world. To our knowledge, relationships between visual perspective taking and theory of mind have not previously been explored in bvFTD. Here, we sought to examine the capacity for visual perspective taking and theory of mind in bvFTD, and to establish their inter-relationships and underlying neural correlates. Fifteen bvFTD patients and 15 healthy Controls completed a comprehensive battery of perspective taking measures, comprising Level 1 ('what') and Level 2 ('how') visual perspective taking tasks, a cartoon task capturing theory of mind, and a questionnaire assessing subjective perspective taking in daily life. Compared with Controls, bvFTD patients displayed significant impairments across all perspective taking measures. These perspective taking impairments, however, were not correlated with one another in bvFTD. Region-of-interest voxel-based morphometry analyses suggested distinct neural correlates for visual perspective taking (inferior frontal gyrus) versus theory of mind (medial prefrontal cortex, precuneus), which appeared to partially overlap with those implicated in subjective perspective taking (inferior frontal gyrus, precuneus, temporoparietal junction). Despite pervasive impairments in all aspects of perspective taking in bvFTD, these did not appear to relate to one another at the behavioural or neural level in our study. Future large-scale studies manipulating discrete aspects of the tasks will help to clarify the neurocognitive mechanisms of, and relationships between, visual perspective taking and theory of mind in bvFTD, along with their real-world implications.

The Transdiagnostic Relevance of Self-Other Distinction to Psychiatry Spans Emotional, Cognitive and Motor Domains

Self-other distinction refers to the ability to distinguish between our own and other people's physical and mental states (actions, perceptions, emotions etc.). Both the right temporo-parietal junction and brain areas associated with the human mirror neuron system are likely to critically influence self-other distinction, given their respective contributions to theory of mind and embodied empathy. The degree of appropriate self-other distinction will vary according to the exact social situation, and how helpful it is to feel into, or remain detached from, another person's mental state. Indeed, the emotional resonance that we can share with others affords the gift of empathy, but over-sharing may pose a downside, leading to a range of difficulties from personal distress to paranoia, and perhaps even motor tics and compulsions. The aim of this perspective paper is to consider how evidence from behavioral and neurophysiological studies supports a role for problems with self-other distinction in a range of psychiatric symptoms spanning the emotional, cognitive and motor domains. The various signs and symptoms associated with problematic self-other distinction comprise both maladaptive and adaptive (compensatory) responses to dysfunction within a common underlying neuropsychological mechanism, compelling the adoption of more holistic transdiagnostic therapeutic approaches within Psychiatry.

Preserved Perspective Taking in Free Indirect Discourse in Autism Spectrum Disorder

Perspective taking has been proposed to be impaired in persons with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), especially when implicit processing is required. In narrative texts, language perception and interpretation is fundamentally guided by taking the perspective of a narrator. We studied perspective taking in the linguistic domain of so-called Free Indirect Discourse (FID), during which certain text segments have to be interpreted as the thoughts or utterances of a protagonist without explicitly being marked as thought or speech representations of that protagonist (as in direct or indirect discourse). Crucially, the correct interpretation of text segments as FID depends on the ability to detect which of the protagonists "stands out" against the others and is therefore identifiable as implicit thinker or speaker. This so-called "prominence" status of a protagonist is based on linguistic properties (e.g., grammatical function, referential expression), in other words, the perspective is "hidden" and has to be inferred from the text material. In order to test whether this implicit perspective taking ability that is required for the interpretation of FID is preserved in persons with ASD, we presented short texts with three sentences to adults with and without ASD. In the last sentence, the perspective was switched either to the more or the less prominent of two protagonists. Participants were asked to rate the texts regarding their naturalness. Both diagnostic groups rated sentences with FID anchored to the less prominent protagonist as less natural than sentences with FID anchored to the more prominent protagonist. Our results that the high-level perspective taking ability in written language that is required for the interpretation of FID is well preserved in persons with ASD supports the conclusion that language skills are highly elaborated in ASD so that even the challenging attribution of utterances to protagonists is possible if they are only implicitly given. We discuss the implications in the context of claims of impaired perspective taking in ASD as well as with regard to the underlying processing of FID.

Phase-IIa randomized, double-blind, sham-controlled, parallel group trial on anodal transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) over the left and right tempo-parietal junction in autism spectrum disorder-StimAT: study protocol for a clinical trial

Background

Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is characterized by impaired social communication and interaction, and stereotyped, repetitive behaviour and sensory interests. To date, there is no effective medication that can improve social communication and interaction in ASD, and effect sizes of behaviour-based psychotherapy remain in the low to medium range. Consequently, there is a clear need for new treatment options. ASD is associated with altered activation and connectivity patterns in brain areas which process social information. Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) is a technique that applies a weak electrical current to the brain in order to modulate neural excitability and alter connectivity. Combined with specific cognitive tasks, it allows to facilitate and consolidate the respective training effects. Therefore, application of tDCS in brain areas relevant to social cognition in combination with a specific cognitive training is a promising treatment approach for ASD.

Methods

A phase-IIa pilot randomized, double-blind, sham-controlled, parallel-group clinical study is presented, which aims at investigating if 10 days of 20-min multi-channel tDCS stimulation of the bilateral tempo-parietal junction (TPJ) at 2.0 mA in combination with a computer-based cognitive training on perspective taking, intention and emotion understanding, can improve social cognitive abilities in children and adolescents with ASD. The main objectives are to describe the change in parent-rated social responsiveness from baseline (within 1 week before first stimulation) to post-intervention (within 7 days after last stimulation) and to monitor safety and tolerability of the intervention. Secondary objectives include the evaluation of change in parent-rated social responsiveness at follow-up (4 weeks after end of intervention), change in other ASD core symptoms and psychopathology, social cognitive abilities and neural functioning post-intervention and at follow-up in order to explore underlying neural and cognitive mechanisms.

Discussion

If shown, positive results regarding change in parent-rated social cognition and favourable safety and tolerability of the intervention will confirm tDCS as a promising treatment for ASD core-symptoms. This may be a first step in establishing a new and cost-efficient intervention for individuals with ASD.

Trial registration

The trial is registered with the German Clinical Trials Register (DRKS), DRKS00014732. Registered on 15 August 2018.

Protocol version

This study protocol refers to protocol version 1.2 from 24 May 2019.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s13063-021-05172-1.

Perspective taking as virtual navigation? Perceptual simulation of what others see reflects their location in space but not their gaze

Other peoples' (imagined) visual perspectives are represented perceptually in a similar way to our own, and can drive bottom-up processes in the same way as own perceptual input (Ward, Ganis, & Bach, 2019). Here we test directly whether visual perspective taking is driven by where another person is looking, or whether these perceptual simulations represent their position in space more generally. Across two experiments, we asked participants to identify whether alphanumeric characters, presented at one of eight possible orientations away from upright, were presented normally, or in their mirror-inverted form (e.g. "R" vs. "Я"). In some scenes, a person would appear sitting to the left or the right of the participant. We manipulated either between-trials (Experiment 1) or between-subjects (Experiment 2), the gaze-direction of the inserted person, such that they either (1) looked towards the to-be-judged item, (2) averted their gaze away from the participant, or (3) gazed out towards the participant (Exp. 2 only). In the absence of another person, we replicated the well-established mental rotation effect, where recognition of items becomes slower the more items are oriented away from upright (e.g. Shepard and Meltzer, 1971). Crucially, in both experiments and in all conditions, this response pattern changed when another person was inserted into the scene. People spontaneously took the perspective of the other person and made faster judgements about the presented items in their presence if the characters were oriented towards upright to them. The gaze direction of this other person did not influence these effects. We propose that visual perspective taking is therefore a general spatial-navigational ability, allowing us to calculate more easily how a scene would (in principle) look from another position in space, and that such calculations reflect the spatial location of another person, but not their gaze.

Reduced spontaneous perspective taking in schizophrenia

Judgments about another person's visual perspective are impaired when the self-perspective is inconsistent with the other-perspective. This is a robust finding in healthy samples as well as in schizophrenia (SZ). Studies show evidence for the existence of a reverse effect, where an inconsistent other-perspective impairs the self-perspective. Such spontaneous perspective taking processes are not yet explored in SZ. In the current fMRI experiment, 24 healthy and 24 schizophrenic participants performed a visual perspective taking task in the scanner. Either a social or a non-social stimulus was presented and their visual perspectives were consistent or inconsistent with the self-perspective of the participant. We replicated previous findings showing that healthy participants show increased reaction times when the human avatar's perspective is inconsistent to the self-perspective. Patients with SZ, however, did not show this effect, neither in the social nor in the non-social condition. BOLD responses revealed similar patterns in occipital areas and group differences were identified in the middle occipital gyrus. These findings suggest that patients with SZ are less likely to spontaneously compute the visual perspectives of others.

Taking Familiar Others' Perspectives to Regulate Our Own Emotion: An Event-Related Potential Study

Current research on emotion regulation has mainly focused on Gross’s cognitive strategies for regulating negative emotion; however, little attention has been paid to whether social cognitive processes can be used to regulate both positive and negative emotions. We considered perspective-taking as an aspect of social cognition, and investigated whether it would affect one’s own emotional response. The present study used a block paradigm and event-related potential (ERP) technology to explore this question. A 3 (perspective: self vs. pessimistic familiar other vs. optimistic familiar other) × 3 (valence: positive vs. neutral vs. negative) within-group design was employed. Thirty-six college students participated and considered their own or target others’ feelings about pictures with different valences. Results showed that positive emotional responses were more neutral under a pessimistic familiar other perspective, and more positive under an optimistic familiar other perspective, and vice versa for negative emotional responses. In ERP results, compared with a self-perspective, taking familiar others’ perspectives elicited reductions in P3 (370–410 ms) and LPP (400–800 ms) difference waves. These findings suggested that taking a pessimistic or optimistic familiar other perspective affects emotion regulation by changing later processing of emotional information.

How attention gates social interactions

Social interactions are at the core of social life. However, humans selectively choose their exchange partners and do not engage in all available opportunities for social encounters. In this review, we argue that attentional systems play an important role in guiding the selection of social interactions. Supported by both classic and emerging literature, we identify and characterize the three core processes-perception, interpretation, and evaluation-that interact with attentional systems to modulate selective responses to social environments. Perceptual processes facilitate attentional prioritization of social cues. Interpretative processes link attention with understanding of cues' social meanings and agents' mental states. Evaluative processes determine the perceived value of the source of social information. The interplay between attention and these three routes of processing places attention in a powerful role to manage the selection of the vast amount of social information that individuals encounter on a daily basis and, in turn, gate the selection of social interactions.

Sensitivity to Social Contingency in Adults with High-Functioning Autism during Computer-Mediated Embodied Interaction

Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) can be understood as a social interaction disorder. This makes the emerging "second-person approach" to social cognition a more promising framework for studying ASD than classical approaches focusing on mindreading capacities in detached, observer-based arrangements. According to the second-person approach, embodied, perceptual, and embedded or interactive capabilities are also required for understanding others, and these are hypothesized to be compromised in ASD. We therefore recorded the dynamics of real-time sensorimotor interaction in pairs of control participants and participants with High-Functioning Autism (HFA), using the minimalistic human-computer interface paradigm known as "perceptual crossing" (PC). We investigated whether HFA is associated with impaired detection of social contingency, i.e., a reduced sensitivity to the other's responsiveness to one's own behavior. Surprisingly, our analysis reveals that, at least under the conditions of this highly simplified, computer-mediated, embodied form of social interaction, people with HFA perform equally well as controls. This finding supports the increasing use of virtual reality interfaces for helping people with ASD to better compensate for their social disabilities. Further dynamical analyses are necessary for a better understanding of the mechanisms that are leading to the somewhat surprising results here obtained.

Implicit Mentalising during Level-1 Visual Perspective-Taking Indicated by Dissociation with Attention Orienting

Experiments demonstrating level-1 visual perspective-taking have been interpreted as providing important evidence for 'implicit mentalising'-the ability to track simple mental states in a fast and efficient manner. However, this interpretation has been contested by a rival 'submentalising' account that proposes that these experiments can be explained by the general purpose mechanisms responsible for attentional orienting. Here, we aim to discriminate between these competing accounts by examining whether a gaze aversion manipulation expected to enhance attention orienting would have similar effects on both perspective-taking and attention orienting tasks. Gaze aversion was operationalised by manipulating head position relative to torso of the avatar figures employed in two experiments (gaze-averted vs. gaze-maintained). Experiment 1 used a Posner cueing task to establish that gaze aversion enhanced attention orienting cued by these avatars. Using the avatar task, Experiment 2 revealed level-1 visual perspective-taking effects of equivalent magnitude for gaze-averted and gaze-maintained conditions. These results indicate that gaze aversion moderated attention orienting but not perspective-taking. This dissociation in performance favours implicit mentalising by casting doubt on the submentalising account. It further constrains theorising by implying that attention orienting is not integral to the system permitting the relatively automatic tracking of mental states.

'Spontaneous' visual perspective-taking mediated by attention orienting that is voluntary and not reflexive

Experiments revealing 'spontaneous' visual perspective-taking are conventionally interpreted as demonstrating that adults have the capacity to track simple mental states in a fast and efficient manner ('implicit mentalising'). A rival account suggests that these experiments can be explained by the general purpose mechanisms responsible for reflexive attentional orienting. Here, we report two experiments designed to distinguish between these competing accounts. In Experiment 1, we assessed whether reflexive attention orienting was sufficient to yield findings interpreted as spontaneous perspective-taking in the 'avatar task' when the protocol was adapted so that participants were unaware that they were taking part in a perspective-taking experiment. Results revealed no evidence for perspective-taking. In Experiment 2, we employed a Posner paradigm to investigate the attentional orienting properties of the avatar stimuli. This revealed cue-validity effects only for longer stimulus onset asynchronies, which indicates a voluntary rather than reflexive shift in spatial attention. Taken together, these findings suggest that attentional orienting does indeed contribute to performance in the Samson et al. avatar task. However, attention orienting appears to be voluntary rather than reflexive, indicating that the perspective-taking phenomenon measured may be less spontaneous than first reported.

Dissociating processes underlying level-1 visual perspective taking in adults

Although reasoning about other people's mental states has typically been thought to require effortful deliberation, evidence from indirect measures suggests that people may implicitly track others' perspectives, spontaneously calculating what they see and know. We used a process-dissociation approach to investigate the unique contributions of automatic and controlled processes to level-1 visual perspective taking in adults. In Experiment 1, imposing time pressure reduced the ability to exert control over one's responses, but it left automatic processing of a target's perspective unchanged. In Experiment 2, automatic processing of a target's perspective was greater when the target was a human avatar versus a non-social entity, whereas controlled processing was relatively unaffected by the specific target. Our findings highlight the utility of a process-dissociation approach for increasing theoretical precision and generating new questions about the nature of perspective taking.

Autism in Action: Reduced Bodily Connectedness during Social Interactions?

Autism is a lifelong disorder, defined by deficits in social interactions and flexibility. To date, diagnostic markers for autism primarily include limitations in social behavior and cognition. However, such tests have often shown to be inadequate for individuals with autism who are either more cognitively able or intellectually disabled. The assessment of the social limitations of autism would benefit from new tests that capture the dynamics of social initiative and reciprocity in interaction processes, and that are not dependent on intellectual or verbal skills. New entry points for the development of such assessments may be found in ‘bodily connectedness’, the attunement of bodily movement between two individuals. In typical development, bodily connectedness is related to psychological connectedness, including social skills and relation quality. Limitations in bodily connectedness could be a central mechanism underlying the social impairment in autism. While bodily connectedness can be minutely assessed with advanced techniques, our understanding of these skills in autism is limited. This Perspective provides examples of how the potential relation between bodily connectedness and specific characteristics of autism can be examined using methods from the coordination dynamics approach. Uncovering this relation is particularly important for developing sensitive tools to assess the tendency to initiate social interactions and the dynamics of mutual adjustments during social interactions, as current assessments are not suited to grasp ongoing dynamics and reciprocity in behavior. The outcomes of such research may yield valuable openings for the development of diagnostic markers for autism that can be applied across the lifespan.

The effect of alcohol dependence on automatic visuo-spatial perspective taking

BACKGROUND

Alcoholism is associated with cognitive deficits that affect social functioning. Previous research has shown that alcoholism is associated with deficits in conscious, deliberate social processing. However, little is known about whether alcoholism also affects rapid, spontaneous processing. We therefore investigated the extent to which alcoholism affects the ability to spontaneously adopt the viewpoint of another in a visuo-spatial perspective taking (VSPT) task.

METHODS

VSPT was measured in participants responding to a dot probe presented for 35ms alongside neutral faces, fearful faces and baseline stimuli (rectangles).

RESULTS

Non alcohol dependent participants showed the standard reaction time cost to fearful faces, but not neutral faces relative to baseline. However, Alcohol dependent (AD) participants showed a reaction time cost to both fearful and neutral faces.

CONCLUSIONS

AD participants are not impaired in their ability to automatically adopt the perspective of another. However, unlike non-AD participants, they show automatic perspective taking to both neutral and fearful faces.

Differential Patterns of Dysconnectivity in Mirror Neuron and Mentalizing Networks in Schizophrenia

Impairments of social cognition are well documented in patients with schizophrenia (SCZ), but the neural basis remains poorly understood. In light of evidence that suggests that the "mirror neuron system" (MNS) and the "mentalizing network" (MENT) are key substrates of intersubjectivity and joint action, it has been suggested that dysfunction of these neural networks may underlie social difficulties in SCZ patients. Additionally, MNS and MENT might be associated differently with positive vs negative symptoms, given prior social cognitive and symptom associations. We assessed resting state functional connectivity (RSFC) in meta-analytically defined MNS and MENT networks in this patient group. Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans were obtained from 116 patients and 133 age-, gender- and movement-matched healthy controls (HC) at 5 different MRI sites. Network connectivity was analyzed for group differences and correlations with clinical symptoms. Results demonstrated decreased connectivity within the MNS and also the MENT in patients compared to controls. Notably, dysconnectivity of the MNS was related to symptom severity, while no such relationship was observed for the MENT. In sum, these findings demonstrate that differential patterns of dysconnectivity exist in SCZ patients, which may contribute differently to the interpersonal difficulties commonly observed in the disorder.

Brain asymmetry in the white matter making and globularity

Recent studies from the field of language genetics and evolutionary anthropology have put forward the hypothesis that the emergence of our species-specific brain is to be understood not in terms of size, but in light of developmental changes that gave rise to a more globular braincase configuration after the split from Neanderthals-Denisovans. On the grounds that (i) white matter myelination is delayed relative to other brain structures and, in humans, is protracted compared with other primates and that (ii) neural connectivity is linked genetically to our brain/skull morphology and language-ready brain, I argue that one significant evolutionary change in Homo sapiens' lineage is the interhemispheric connectivity mediated by the Corpus Callosum. The size, myelination and fiber caliber of the Corpus Callosum present an anterior-to-posterior increase, in a way that inter-hemispheric connectivity is more prominent in the sensory motor areas, whereas "high- order" areas are more intra-hemispherically connected. Building on evidence from language-processing studies that account for this asymmetry ('lateralization') in terms of brain rhythms, I present an evo-devo hypothesis according to which the myelination of the Corpus Callosum, Brain Asymmetry, and Globularity are conjectured to make up the angles of a co-evolutionary triangle that gave rise to our language-ready brain.

Conceptual issues in autism spectrum disorders

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

To provide an update on recent studies concerning social cognition in autism spectrum disorders (ASDs), to compare different theoretical approaches used to interpret empirical data, and to highlight a number of conceptual issues.

RECENT FINDINGS

In regard to social cognition in ASDs, there is an emerging emphasis on early-onset and prolonged sensory-motor problems. Such sensory-motor problems may fit with the theories of social cognition that emphasize the importance of embodied interaction rather than deficits in mindreading, or they may reflect more general aspects of developmental disorders.

SUMMARY

Different theoretical frameworks offer alternative perspectives on the central characteristics in ASDs and motivate different ways of conceptualizing diagnosis and intervention. Theory-of-mind approaches continue to appeal to false-belief paradigms, and debate continues about the performance of individuals with autism. Likewise, there is continuing debate and renewed skepticism about the role of simulation and deficits in the mirror system in ASDs. Growing evidence concerning sensory-motor problems, specifically disrupted patterns in re-entrant (afferent and proprioceptive) sensory feedback across the autistic spectrum, may not only provide support for more embodied interactive approaches, but also suggests that a single approach is unlikely able to explain all social cognition problems in autism. A pluralist approach understands ASDs as involving a variant range of cascading disrupted processes.

"Put Myself Into Your Place": Embodied Simulation and Perspective Taking in Autism Spectrum Disorders

Embodied cognition theories hold that cognitive processes are grounded in bodily states. Embodied processes in autism spectrum disorders (ASD) have classically been investigated in studies on imitation. Several observations suggested that unlike typical individuals who are able of copying the model's actions from the model's position, individuals with ASD tend to reenact the model's actions from their own egocentric perspective. Here, we performed two behavioral experiments to directly test the ability of ASD individuals to adopt another person's point of view. In Experiment 1, participants had to explicitly judge the left/right location of a target object in a scene from their own or the actor's point of view (visual perspective taking task). In Experiment 2, participants had to perform left/right judgments on front-facing or back-facing human body images (own body transformation task). Both tasks can be solved by mentally simulating one's own body motion to imagine oneself transforming into the position of another person (embodied simulation strategy), or by resorting to visual/spatial processes, such as mental object rotation (nonembodied strategy). Results of both experiments showed that individual with ASD solved the tasks mainly relying on a nonembodied strategy, whereas typical controls adopted an embodied strategy. Moreover, in the visual perspective taking task ASD participants had more difficulties than controls in inhibiting other-perspective when directed to keep one's own point of view. These findings suggested that, in social cognitive tasks, individuals with ASD do not resort to embodied simulation and have difficulties in cognitive control over self- and other-perspective.

Referential gaze and word learning in adults with autism

While typically developing children can use referential gaze to guide their word learning, those with autism spectrum disorder are often described to have problems with that. However, some researchers assume that the ability to follow gaze to select the correct referent can develop in autism later compared to typically developing individuals. To test this assumption, we compared the performance of adults with and without autism on a word learning task while recording their gaze behavior using an eye tracker. Results showed that both groups mostly chose the correct referent, but less so for the autism spectrum disorder group when the distractor’s saliency was increased, suggesting that the ability to learn novel words by referring to gaze develops in autism spectrum disorder, but not fully, relative to their typically developing peers.

Altercentric intrusions from multiple perspectives: beyond dyads

Recent findings suggest that in dyadic contexts observers rapidly and involuntarily process the visual perspective of others and cannot easily resist interference from their viewpoint. To investigate whether spontaneous perspective taking extends beyond dyads, we employed a novel visual perspective task that required participants to select between multiple competing perspectives. Participants were asked to judge their own perspective or the visual perspective of one or two avatars who either looked at the same objects or looked at different objects. Results indicate that when a single avatar was present in the room, participants processed the irrelevant perspective even when it interfered with participants’ explicit judgments about the relevant perspective. A similar interference effect was observed when two avatars looked at the same discs, but not when they looked at different discs. Indeed, when the two avatars looked at different discs, the interference from the irrelevant perspective was significantly reduced. This is the first evidence that the number and orientation of agents modulate spontaneous perspective taking in non-dyadic contexts: observers may efficiently compute another’s perspective, but in presence of more individuals holding discrepant perspectives, they may not spontaneously track multiple viewpoints. These findings are discussed in relation to the hypothesis that perspective calculation occurs in an effortless and automatic manner.

The effects of context processing on social cognition impairments in adults with Asperger's syndrome

Social cognition—the basis of all communicative and otherwise interpersonal relationships—is embedded in specific contextual circumstances which shape intrinsic meanings. This domain is compromised in the autism spectrum disorders (ASDs), including Asperger's syndrome (AS) (DSM-V). However, the few available reports of social cognition skills in adults with AS have largely neglected the effects of contextual factors. Moreover, previous studies on this population have also failed to simultaneously (a) assess multiple social cognition domains, (b) examine executive functions, (c) follow strict sample selection criteria, and (d) acknowledge the cognitive heterogeneity typical of the disorder. The study presently reviewed (Baez et al., 2012), addressed all these aspects in order to establish the basis of social cognition deficits in adult AS patients. Specifically, we assessed the performance of AS adults in multiple social cognition tasks with different context-processing requirements. The results suggest that social cognition deficits in AS imply a reduced ability to implicitly encode and integrate contextual cues needed to access social meaning. Nevertheless, the patients' performance was normal when explicit social information was presented or when the situation could be navigated with abstract rules. Here, we review the results of our study and other relevant data, and discuss their implications for the diagnosis and treatment of AS and other neuropsychiatric conditions (e.g., schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, frontotemporal dementia). Finally, we analyze previous results in the light of a current neurocognitive model of social-context processing.