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Tepe B, Karakulak A. Being Watched by God Versus a Third Person: Which Agent Lowers the Perceived Likelihood of Immoral Behaviors? SOCIAL COGNITION 2022. [DOI: 10.1521/soco.2022.40.4.336] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
Abstract
With three experimental studies using data from young adults living in a highly religious context, namely Turkey (N = 483), the current research examines how being watched by a third person versus God affects the perceived likelihood ratings of harmful versus impure immoral behaviors. We hypothesized that respondents would expect others to more strongly refrain from acting immorally when they believed they were being watched by God compared to a third person, and that this effect would be more pronounced for impure compared to harmful moral transgressions. The God condition was perceived as more effective than the third-person surveillance condition when immoral behaviors were harmful. However, for severe impure transgressions, neither surveillance condition was perceived as effective. We discuss our findings in light of contemporary morality research, outline the role of possible cultural and individual-level boundary conditions, and highlight the scientific and practical contributions of our research to the field.
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Affiliation(s)
- Beyza Tepe
- Department of Psychology, Bahcesehir University
| | - Arzu Karakulak
- Department of Psychology, Bahcesehir University and Istanbul Policy Center, Sabanci University
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What drives opposition to suicide? Two exploratory studies of normative
judgments. JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 2022. [DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009062] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/04/2023]
Abstract
Abstract
The act of suicide is commonly viewed as wrong in some sense, but it is
not clear why this is. Based on past empirical research and philosophical
theorizing, we test ten different explanations for why suicide is opposed on
normative grounds. Using a within-subjects design, Study 1 showed that seven
out of ten manipulations had significant effects on normative judgments of
suicide: time left to live, lack of close social relationships, a history of
prior immoral behavior, the manner in which the suicide is committed,
painful, incurable medical issues, impulsive decision-making, and the
actor’s own moral-religious background. However, in all cases, the act of
suicide was still considered wrong, overall. Using a between-subjects
design, Study 2 tested the combined effect of the seven significant
manipulations from Study 1. In combination, the seven manipulations
eliminated opposition to suicide, on average. Implications for moral
psychology and suicide prevention are discussed.
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Beal B. The nonmoral conditions of moral cognition. PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 2021. [DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2021.1942811] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/21/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Bree Beal
- Department of English, Clemson University, Clemson, SC, USA
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Beal B. What Are the Irreducible Basic Elements of Morality? A Critique of the Debate Over Monism and Pluralism in Moral Psychology. PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2019; 15:273-290. [DOI: 10.1177/1745691619867106] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/15/2022]
Abstract
The debate between monists and pluralists in moral psychology has been framed as an argument over the number of “irreducible basic elements” that can be used to describe the extent of the moral domain: Do all moral values ultimately reduce to one principle (i.e., monism), or are there multiple irreducibly distinct moral values (i.e., pluralism)? I critique the premise of this debate, arguing that the breadth of the moral domain cannot be adequately represented, understood, or explained in terms of moral values. Instead, an adequate account of moral psychology must explain moral phenomena in terms of more basic elements: ontological frames.
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Affiliation(s)
- Bree Beal
- Department of English, Clemson University
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