1
|
Berke MD, Walter‐Terrill R, Jara‐Ettinger J, Scholl BJ. Flexible Goals Require that Inflexible Perceptual Systems Produce Veridical Representations: Implications for Realism as Revealed by Evolutionary Simulations. Cogn Sci 2022; 46:e13195. [DOI: 10.1111/cogs.13195] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/18/2021] [Revised: 08/03/2022] [Accepted: 08/05/2022] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
|
2
|
Dual counterstream architecture may support separation between vision and predictions. Conscious Cogn 2022; 103:103375. [DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2022.103375] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/19/2021] [Revised: 12/03/2021] [Accepted: 06/28/2022] [Indexed: 11/24/2022]
|
3
|
Marić M, Domijan D. A neurodynamic model of the interaction between color perception and color memory. Neural Netw 2020; 129:222-248. [PMID: 32615406 DOI: 10.1016/j.neunet.2020.06.008] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/15/2020] [Revised: 05/03/2020] [Accepted: 06/04/2020] [Indexed: 12/17/2022]
Abstract
The memory color effect and Spanish castle illusion have been taken as evidence of the cognitive penetrability of vision. In the same manner, the successful decoding of color-related brain signals in functional neuroimaging studies suggests the retrieval of memory colors associated with a perceived gray object. Here, we offer an alternative account of these findings based on the design principles of adaptive resonance theory (ART). In ART, conscious perception is a consequence of a resonant state. Resonance emerges in a recurrent cortical circuit when a bottom-up spatial pattern agrees with the top-down expectation. When they do not agree, a special control mechanism is activated that resets the network and clears off erroneous expectation, thus allowing the bottom-up activity to always dominate in perception. We developed a color ART circuit and evaluated its behavior in computer simulations. The model helps to explain how traces of erroneous expectations about incoming color are eventually removed from the color perception, although their transient effect may be visible in behavioral responses or in brain imaging. Our results suggest that the color ART circuit, as a predictive computational system, is almost never penetrable, because it is equipped with computational mechanisms designed to constrain the impact of the top-down predictions on ongoing perceptual processing.
Collapse
|
4
|
Brady WJ, Crockett MJ, Van Bavel JJ. The MAD Model of Moral Contagion: The Role of Motivation, Attention, and Design in the Spread of Moralized Content Online. PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2020; 15:978-1010. [DOI: 10.1177/1745691620917336] [Citation(s) in RCA: 81] [Impact Index Per Article: 20.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/20/2023]
Abstract
With more than 3 billion users, online social networks represent an important venue for moral and political discourse and have been used to organize political revolutions, influence elections, and raise awareness of social issues. These examples rely on a common process to be effective: the ability to engage users and spread moralized content through online networks. Here, we review evidence that expressions of moral emotion play an important role in the spread of moralized content (a phenomenon we call moral contagion). Next, we propose a psychological model called the motivation, attention, and design (MAD) model to explain moral contagion. The MAD model posits that people have group-identity-based motivations to share moral-emotional content, that such content is especially likely to capture our attention, and that the design of social-media platforms amplifies our natural motivational and cognitive tendencies to spread such content. We review each component of the model (as well as interactions between components) and raise several novel, testable hypotheses that can spark progress on the scientific investigation of civic engagement and activism, political polarization, propaganda and disinformation, and other moralized behaviors in the digital age.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
| | | | - Jay J. Van Bavel
- Department of Psychology, New York University
- Center for Neural Science, New York University
| |
Collapse
|
5
|
Gantman A, Devraj-Kizuk S, Mende-Siedlecki P, Van Bavel JJ, Mathewson KE. The time course of moral perception: an ERP investigation of the moral pop-out effect. Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci 2020; 15:235-246. [PMID: 32364227 PMCID: PMC7304512 DOI: 10.1093/scan/nsaa030] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/29/2019] [Revised: 01/27/2020] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Humans are highly attuned to perceptual cues about their values. A growing body of evidence suggests that people selectively attend to moral stimuli. However, it is unknown whether morality is prioritized early in perception or much later in cognitive processing. We use a combination of behavioral methods and electroencephalography to investigate how early in perception moral words are prioritized relative to non-moral words. The behavioral data replicate previous research indicating that people are more likely to correctly identify moral than non-moral words in a modified lexical decision task. The electroencephalography data reveal that words are distinguished from non-words as early as 200 ms after onset over frontal brain areas and moral words are distinguished from non-moral words 100 ms later over left-posterior cortex. Further analyses reveal that differences in brain activity to moral vs non-moral words cannot be explained by differences in arousal associated with the words. These results suggest that moral content might be prioritized in conscious awareness after an initial perceptual encoding but before subsequent memory processing or action preparation. This work offers a more precise theoretical framework for understanding how morality impacts vision and behavior.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Ana Gantman
- Department of Psychology, Brooklyn College (CUNY), Brooklyn, NY 11210, USA
| | | | - Peter Mende-Siedlecki
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716, USA
| | - Jay J Van Bavel
- Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY 10003, USA
| | - Kyle E Mathewson
- Department of Psychology, University of Alberta, Edmonton T6G 2R3, Canada
| |
Collapse
|
6
|
Smith ME, Loschky LC. The influence of sequential predictions on scene-gist recognition. J Vis 2020; 19:14. [PMID: 31622473 DOI: 10.1167/19.12.14] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
Past research suggests that recognizing scene gist, a viewer's holistic semantic representation of a scene acquired within a single eye fixation, involves purely feed-forward mechanisms. We investigated whether expectations can influence scene categorization. To do this, we embedded target scenes in more ecologically valid, first-person-viewpoint image sequences, along spatiotemporally connected routes (e.g., an office to a parking lot). We manipulated the sequences' spatiotemporal coherence by presenting them either coherently or in random order. Participants identified the category of one target scene in a 10-scene-image rapid serial visual presentation. Categorization accuracy was greater for targets in coherent sequences. Accuracy was also greater for targets with more visually similar primes. In Experiment 2, we investigated whether targets in coherent sequences were more predictable and whether predictable images were identified more accurately in Experiment 1 after accounting for the effect of prime-to-target visual similarity. To do this, we removed targets and had participants predict the category of the missing scene. Images were more accurately predicted in coherent sequences, and both image predictability and prime-to-target visual similarity independently contributed to performance in Experiment 1. To test whether prediction-based facilitation effects were solely due to response bias, participants performed a two-alternative forced-choice task in which they indicated whether the target was an intact or a phase-randomized scene. Critically, predictability of the target category was irrelevant to this task. Nevertheless, results showed that sensitivity, but not response bias, was greater for targets in coherent sequences. Predictions made prior to viewing a scene facilitate scene-gist recognition.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Maverick E Smith
- Department of Psychological Sciences, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, USA
| | - Lester C Loschky
- Department of Psychological Sciences, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, USA
| |
Collapse
|
7
|
Valenti J, Firestone C. Finding the “odd one out”: Memory color effects and the logic of appearance. Cognition 2019; 191:103934. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2019.04.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/05/2018] [Revised: 04/03/2019] [Accepted: 04/03/2019] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
|
8
|
Cai ZG, Wang R, Shen M, Speekenbrink M. Cross-dimensional magnitude interactions arise from memory interference. Cogn Psychol 2018; 106:21-42. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2018.08.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/09/2018] [Revised: 08/08/2018] [Accepted: 08/08/2018] [Indexed: 12/16/2022]
|
9
|
De Freitas J, Alvarez GA. Your visual system provides all the information you need to make moral judgments about generic visual events. Cognition 2018; 178:133-146. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2018.05.017] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/29/2017] [Revised: 05/21/2018] [Accepted: 05/22/2018] [Indexed: 10/14/2022]
|
10
|
Cecchi AS. Cognitive penetration of early vision in face perception. Conscious Cogn 2018; 63:254-266. [PMID: 29909046 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2018.06.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/09/2017] [Revised: 05/01/2018] [Accepted: 06/05/2018] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
Cognitive and affective penetration of perception refers to the influence that higher mental states such as beliefs and emotions have on perceptual systems. Psychological and neuroscientific studies appear to show that these states modulate the visual system at the visuomotor, attentional, and late levels of processing. However, empirical evidence showing that similar consequences occur in early stages of visual processing seems to be scarce. In this paper, I argue that psychological evidence does not seem to be either sufficient or necessary to argue in favour of or against the cognitive penetration of perception in either late or early vision. In order to do that we need to have recourse to brain imaging techniques. Thus, I introduce a neuroscientific study and argue that it seems to provide well-grounded evidence for the cognitive penetration of early vision in face perception. I also examine and reject alternative explanations to my conclusion.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Ariel S Cecchi
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, United Kingdom; Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom.
| |
Collapse
|
11
|
Crone DL, Bode S, Murawski C, Laham SM. The Socio-Moral Image Database (SMID): A novel stimulus set for the study of social, moral and affective processes. PLoS One 2018; 13:e0190954. [PMID: 29364985 PMCID: PMC5783374 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0190954] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/30/2017] [Accepted: 12/22/2017] [Indexed: 12/24/2022] Open
Abstract
A major obstacle for the design of rigorous, reproducible studies in moral psychology is the lack of suitable stimulus sets. Here, we present the Socio-Moral Image Database (SMID), the largest standardized moral stimulus set assembled to date, containing 2,941 freely available photographic images, representing a wide range of morally (and affectively) positive, negative and neutral content. The SMID was validated with over 820,525 individual judgments from 2,716 participants, with normative ratings currently available for all images on affective valence and arousal, moral wrongness, and relevance to each of the five moral values posited by Moral Foundations Theory. We present a thorough analysis of the SMID regarding (1) inter-rater consensus, (2) rating precision, and (3) breadth and variability of moral content. Additionally, we provide recommendations for use aimed at efficient study design and reproducibility, and outline planned extensions to the database. We anticipate that the SMID will serve as a useful resource for psychological, neuroscientific and computational (e.g., natural language processing or computer vision) investigations of social, moral and affective processes. The SMID images, along with associated normative data and additional resources are available at https://osf.io/2rqad/.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Damien L. Crone
- Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia
| | - Stefan Bode
- Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia
| | - Carsten Murawski
- Department of Finance, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia
| | - Simon M. Laham
- Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia
| |
Collapse
|
12
|
Brockhoff A, Huff M, Maurer A, Papenmeier F. Seeing the unseen? Illusory causal filling in FIFA referees, players, and novices. COGNITIVE RESEARCH-PRINCIPLES AND IMPLICATIONS 2017; 1:7. [PMID: 28180158 PMCID: PMC5256435 DOI: 10.1186/s41235-016-0008-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/08/2016] [Accepted: 07/27/2016] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
Humans often falsely report having seen a causal link between two dynamic scenes if the second scene depicts a valid logical consequence of the initial scene. As an example, a video clip shows someone kicking a ball including the ball flying. Even if the video clip omitted the moment of contact (i.e., the causal link), participants falsely report having seen this moment. In the current study, we explored the interplay of cognitive-perceptual expertise and event perception by measuring the false-alarm rates of three groups with differing interests in football (soccer in North America) (novices, players, and FIFA referees). We used the event-completion paradigm with video footage of a real football match, presenting either complete clips or incomplete clips (i.e., with the contact moment omitted). Either a causally linked scene or an incoherent scene followed a cut in the incomplete videos. Causally linked scenes induced false recognitions in all three groups: although the ball contact moment was not presented, participants indicated that they had seen the contact as frequently when it was absent as in the complete condition. In a second experiment, we asked the novices to detect the ball contact moment when it was either visible or not and when it was either followed by a causally or non-causally linked scene. Here, instead of presenting pictures of the clip, the participants were give a two-alternative forced-choice task: “Yes, contact was visible”, or “No, contact was not visible”. The results of Experiment 1 indicate that conceptual interpretations of simple events are independent of expertise: there were no top-down effects on perception. Participants in Experiment 2 detected the ball contact moment significantly more often correctly in the non-causal than in the causal conditions, indicating that the effect observed in Experiment 1 was not due to a possibly influential design (e.g., inducing a false memory for the presented pictures). The theoretical as well as the practical implications are discussed.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Alisa Brockhoff
- Department of Psychology, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Schleichstr. 4, Tübingen, 72076 Germany
| | - Markus Huff
- Department of Psychology, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Schleichstr. 4, Tübingen, 72076 Germany
| | - Annika Maurer
- Department of Psychology, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Schleichstr. 4, Tübingen, 72076 Germany
| | - Frank Papenmeier
- Department of Psychology, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Schleichstr. 4, Tübingen, 72076 Germany
| |
Collapse
|
13
|
Parzuchowski M, Bocian K, Gygax P. Sizing Up Objects: The Effect of Diminutive Forms on Positive Mood, Value, and Size Judgments. Front Psychol 2016; 7:1452. [PMID: 27721802 PMCID: PMC5033980 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01452] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/01/2016] [Accepted: 09/09/2016] [Indexed: 11/15/2022] Open
Abstract
Language (e.g., structure, morphology, and wording) can direct our attention toward the specific properties of an object, in turn influencing the mental representation of that same object. In this paper, we examined this idea by focusing on a particular linguistic form of diminution used in many languages (e.g., in Polish, Spanish, and Portuguese) to refer to an object as being “smaller.” Interestingly, although objects are usually considered “better” when they are bigger in size, objects described with linguistic diminution can also refer to those that are emotionally positive. Across three experiments conducted in Polish, we examined this lexical ambiguity in terms of mood (Experiment 1), subjective quality and monetary value (Experiment 2), and choice selection (Experiment 3). Overall, we found that people evaluate objects differently depending on the linguistic form (i.e., with or without diminution) with which they are described, and that it was related to the perceptual representation of these objects, and not their affective status. Objects described with diminution are evaluated as less satisfying and of lesser value and this effect is attributed to the way participants represent the objects (i.e., encoded and memorized). The generalizability of these effects is discussed.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Michał Parzuchowski
- Sopot Social Cognition Lab, SWPS University of Social Sciences and HumanitiesSopot, Poland; Department of Psychology, University of FribourgFribourg, Switzerland
| | - Konrad Bocian
- Sopot Social Cognition Lab, SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities Sopot, Poland
| | - Pascal Gygax
- Department of Psychology, University of Fribourg Fribourg, Switzerland
| |
Collapse
|
14
|
Jussim L, Crawford JT, Anglin SM, Stevens ST, Duarte JL. Interpretations and methods: Towards a more effectively self-correcting social psychology. JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2016. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2015.10.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 41] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
|
15
|
Jung E, Takahashi K, Watanabe K, de la Rosa S, Butz MV, Bülthoff HH, Meilinger T. The Influence of Human Body Orientation on Distance Judgments. Front Psychol 2016; 7:217. [PMID: 27014108 PMCID: PMC4784476 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00217] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/28/2015] [Accepted: 02/03/2016] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
People maintain larger distances to other peoples' front than to their back. We investigated if humans also judge another person as closer when viewing their front than their back. Participants watched animated virtual characters (avatars) and moved a virtual plane toward their location after the avatar was removed. In Experiment 1, participants judged avatars, which were facing them as closer and made quicker estimates than to avatars looking away. In Experiment 2, avatars were rotated in 30 degree steps around the vertical axis. Observers judged avatars roughly facing them (i.e., looking max. 60 degrees away) as closer than avatars roughly looking away. No particular effect was observed for avatars directly facing and also gazing at the observer. We conclude that body orientation was sufficient to generate the asymmetry. Sensitivity of the orientation effect to gaze and to interpersonal distance would have suggested involvement of social processing, but this was not observed. We discuss social and lower-level processing as potential reasons for the effect.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Edgard Jung
- Max Planck Institute for Biological CyberneticsTübingen, Germany; University of InnsbruckInnsbruck, Austria
| | - Kohske Takahashi
- Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology, The University of Tokyo Tokyo, Japan
| | - Katsumi Watanabe
- Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology, The University of TokyoTokyo, Japan; Waseda UniversityTokyo, Japan
| | | | | | - Heinrich H Bülthoff
- Max Planck Institute for Biological CyberneticsTübingen, Germany; Department of Brain and Cognitive Engineering, Korea UniversitySeoul, South Korea
| | - Tobias Meilinger
- Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics Tübingen, Germany
| |
Collapse
|
16
|
Firestone C, Scholl BJ. ‘Moral Perception’ Reflects Neither Morality Nor Perception. Trends Cogn Sci 2016; 20:75-76. [DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2015.10.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/16/2015] [Accepted: 10/22/2015] [Indexed: 10/22/2022]
|
17
|
See for Yourself: Perception Is Attuned to Morality. Trends Cogn Sci 2016; 20:76-77. [PMID: 26739539 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2015.12.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/01/2015] [Accepted: 12/02/2015] [Indexed: 11/23/2022]
|
18
|
Behavior is multiply determined, and perception has multiple components: The case of moral perception. Behav Brain Sci 2016; 39:e242. [PMID: 28355871 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x15002800] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
Abstract
We introduce two propositions for understanding top-down effects on perception. First, perception is not a unitary construct but is composed of multiple components. Second, behavior is multiply determined by cognitive processes. We call for a process-oriented research approach to perception and use our own research on moral perception as a "case study of case studies" to examine these issues.
Collapse
|
19
|
Abstract
The spectacularly varied responses to our target article raised big-picture questions about the nature of seeing and thinking, nitty-gritty experimental design details, and everything in between. We grapple with these issues, including the ready falsifiability of our view, neuroscientific theories that allow everything but demand nothing, cases where seeing and thinking conflict, mental imagery, the free press, an El Greco fallacy fallacy, hallucinogenic drugs, blue bananas, subatomic particles, Boeing 787s, and the racial identities of geometric shapes.
Collapse
|
20
|
Masrour F, Nirshberg G, Schon M, Leardi J, Barrett E. Revisiting the empirical case against perceptual modularity. Front Psychol 2015; 6:1676. [PMID: 26583001 PMCID: PMC4631808 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01676] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/08/2015] [Accepted: 10/19/2015] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Some theorists hold that the human perceptual system has a component that receives input only from units lower in the perceptual hierarchy. This thesis, that we shall here refer to as the encapsulation thesis, has been at the center of a continuing debate for the past few decades. Those who deny the encapsulation thesis often rely on the large body of psychological findings that allegedly suggest that perception is influenced by factors such as the beliefs, desires, goals, and the expectations of the perceiver. Proponents of the encapsulation thesis, however, often argue that, when correctly interpreted, these psychological findings are compatible with the thesis. In our view, the debate over the significance and the correct interpretation of these psychological findings has reached an impasse. We hold that this impasse is due to the methodological limitations over psychophysical experiments, and it is very unlikely that such experiments, on their own, could yield results that would settle the debate. After defending this claim, we argue that integrating data from cognitive neuroscience resolves the debate in favor of those who deny the encapsulation thesis.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Farid Masrour
- Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison , Madison, WI, USA
| | - Gregory Nirshberg
- Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison , Madison, WI, USA
| | - Michael Schon
- Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison , Madison, WI, USA
| | - Jason Leardi
- Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison , Madison, WI, USA
| | - Emily Barrett
- Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison , Madison, WI, USA
| |
Collapse
|
21
|
Abstract
AbstractWhat determines what we see? In contrast to the traditional “modular” understanding of perception, according to which visual processing is encapsulated from higher-level cognition, a tidal wave of recent research alleges that states such as beliefs, desires, emotions, motivations, intentions, and linguistic representations exert direct, top-down influences on what we see. There is a growing consensus that such effects are ubiquitous, and that the distinction between perception and cognition may itself be unsustainable. We argue otherwise: None of these hundreds of studies – either individually or collectively – provides compelling evidence for true top-down effects on perception, or “cognitive penetrability.” In particular, and despite their variety, we suggest that these studies all fall prey to only a handful of pitfalls. And whereas abstract theoretical challenges have failed to resolve this debate in the past, our presentation of these pitfalls is empirically anchored: In each case, we show not only how certain studies could be susceptible to the pitfall (in principle), but also how several alleged top-down effects actually are explained by the pitfall (in practice). Moreover, these pitfalls are perfectly general, with each applying to dozens of other top-down effects. We conclude by extracting the lessons provided by these pitfalls into a checklist that future work could use to convincingly demonstrate top-down effects on visual perception. The discovery of substantive top-down effects of cognition on perception would revolutionize our understanding of how the mind is organized; but without addressing these pitfalls, no such empirical report will license such exciting conclusions.
Collapse
|