Dissociating intuitive physics from intuitive psychology: Evidence from Williams syndrome

Cicchetti's organizational-developmental perspective of Down syndrome: Contributions to the emergence of developmental psychopathology and the study of persons with neurodevelopmental conditions

Dante Cicchetti's earliest work, his studies of social-emotional development in infants and children with Down syndrome, set the stage for the emergence of the larger field of developmental psychopathology. By applying basic developmental principles, methodologies, and questions to the study of persons with Down syndrome, Dante took on the challenge of searching for patterns in atypical development. In doing so, he extended traditional developmental theory and introduced a more "liberal" approach that both continues to guide developmentally based research with persons with neurodevelopmental conditions (NDCs), including Down syndrome. We highlight five themes from Dante's work: (1) appreciating the importance of developmental level; (2) prioritizing the organization of development; (3) examining whether developmental factors work similarly in those with known genetic conditions; (4) rethinking narratives about ways of being; and (5) examining the influence of multiple levels of the environment on the individual's functioning. We highlight ways that these essential lessons anticipated present-day research with persons with a variety of NDCs, including Down syndrome, other genetic syndromes associated with intellectual disability, and autism. We conclude with visions to the future for research with these populations as well as for the field of developmental psychopathology more generally.

A dedicated mental resource for intuitive physics

Countless decisions and actions in daily life draw on a mental model of the physical structure and dynamics of the world - from stepping carefully around a patch of slippery pavement to stacking delicate produce in a shopping basket. People can make fast and accurate inferences about how physical interactions will unfold, but it remains unclear whether we do so by applying a general set of physical principles across scenarios, or instead by reasoning about the physics of individual scenarios in an ad-hoc fashion. Here, we hypothesized that humans possess a dedicated and flexible mental resource for physical inference, and we tested for such a resource using a battery of fine-tuned tasks to capture individual differences in performance. Despite varying scene contents across tasks, we found that performance was highly correlated among them and well-explained by a unitary intuitive physics resource, distinct from other facets of cognition such as spatial reasoning and working memory.

Making sense of domain specificity

The notion of domain specificity plays a central role in some of the most important debates in cognitive science. Yet, despite the widespread reliance on domain specificity in recent theorizing in cognitive science, this notion remains elusive. Critics have claimed that the notion of domain specificity can't bear the theoretical weight that has been put on it and that it should be abandoned. Even its most steadfast proponents have highlighted puzzles and tensions that arise once one tries to go beyond an initial intuitive sketch of what domain specificity involves. In this paper, we address these concerns head on by developing an account of what it means for a cognitive mechanism to be domain specific that overcomes the obstacles that have made domain specificity seem so problematic. We then apply this understanding of domain specificity to one of the key debates that it has figured prominently in-the rationalism-empiricism debate concerning the origins of cognitive traits-and introduce several related theoretical notions that work alongside domain specificity in helping to clarify what makes a view more (or less) rationalist. This example illustrates how the notion of domain specificity can, and should, continue to play a central role in ongoing debates in cognitive science.

Biology, Society, or Choice: How Do Non-Experts Interpret Explanations of Behaviour?

Explanations for human behaviour can be framed in many different ways, from the social-structural context to the individual motivation down to the neurobiological implementation. We know comparatively little about how people interpret these explanatory framings, and what they infer when one kind of explanation rather than another is made salient. In four experiments, UK general-population volunteers read vignettes describing the same behaviour, but providing explanations framed in different ways. In Study 1, we found that participants grouped explanations into 'biological', 'psychological' and 'sociocultural' clusters. Explanations with different framings were often seen as incompatible with one another, especially when one belonged to the 'biological' cluster and the other did not. In Study 2, we found that exposure to a particular explanatory framing triggered inferences beyond the information given. Specifically, psychological explanations led participants to assume the behaviour was malleable, and biological framings led them to assume it was not. In Studies 3A and 3B, we found that the choice of explanatory framing can affect people's assumptions about effective interventions. For example, presenting a biological explanation increased people's conviction that interventions like drugs would be effective, and decreased their conviction that psychological or socio-political interventions would be effective. These results illuminate the intuitive psychology of explanations, and also potential pitfalls in scientific communication. Framing an explanation in a particular way will often generate inferences in the audience-about what other factors are not causally important, how easy it is to change the behaviour, and what kinds of remedies are worth considering-that the communicator may not have anticipated and might not intend.

Physical understanding in neurodegenerative diseases

This quantitative review gives an overview of physical understanding (i.e., the ability to represent and use the laws of physics to interact with the physical world) impairments in Alzheimer's disease (AD), semantic dementia (SD), and corticobasal syndrome (CBS), as assessed mainly with mechanical problem-solving and tool use tests. This review shows that: (1) SD patients have apraxia of tool use because of semantic tool knowledge deficits, but normal performance in tests of physical understanding; (2) AD and CBS patients show impaired performance in mechanical problem-solving tests, probably not because of intrinsic deficits of physical understanding, but rather because of additional cognitive (AD) or motor impairments (CBS); (3) As a result, the performance in mechanical problem-solving tests is not a good predictor of familiar tool use in dementia; (4) Actual deficits of physical understanding are probably observed only in late stages of neurodegenerative diseases, and associated with functional loss.

When it all falls down: the relationship between intuitive physics and spatial cognition

Our intuitive understanding of physical dynamics is crucial in daily life. When we fill a coffee cup, stack items in a refrigerator, or navigate around a slippery patch of ice, we draw on our intuitions about how physical interactions will unfold. What mental machinery underlies our ability to form such inferences? Numerous aspects of cognition must contribute - for example, spatial thinking, temporal prediction, and working memory, to name a few. Is intuitive physics merely the sum of its parts - a collection of these and other related abilities that we apply to physical scenarios as we would to other tasks? Or does physical reasoning rest on something extra - a devoted set of mental resources that takes information from other cognitive systems as inputs? Here, we take a key step in addressing this question by relating individual differences on a physical prediction task to performance on spatial tasks, which may be most likely to account for intuitive physics abilities given the fundamentally spatial nature of physical interactions. To what degree can physical prediction performance be disentangled from spatial thinking? We tested 100 online participants in an “Unstable Towers” task and measures of spatial cognition and working memory. We found a positive relationship between intuitive physics and spatial skills, but there were substantial, reliable individual differences in physical prediction ability that could not be accounted for by spatial measures or working memory. Our findings point toward the separability of intuitive physics from spatial cognition.

Dissociable spatial memory systems revealed by typical and atypical human development

Rodent lesion studies have revealed the existence of two causally dissociable spatial memory systems, localized to the hippocampus and striatum that are preferentially sensitive to environmental boundaries and landmark objects, respectively. Here we test whether these two memory systems are causally dissociable in humans by examining boundary- and landmark-based memory in typical and atypical development. Adults with Williams syndrome (WS)-a developmental disorder with known hippocampal abnormalities-and typical children and adults, performed a navigation task that involved learning locations relative to a boundary or a landmark object. We found that boundary-based memory was severely impaired in WS compared to typically-developing mental-age matched (MA) children and chronological-age matched (CA) adults, whereas landmark-based memory was similar in all groups. Furthermore, landmark-based memory matured earlier in typical development than boundary-based memory, consistent with the idea that the WS cognitive phenotype arises from developmental arrest of late maturing cognitive systems. Together, these findings provide causal and developmental evidence for dissociable spatial memory systems in humans.