Constraints on conventions: Resolving two puzzles of conventionality

What We Do When We Define Morality (And Why We Need to Do It)

All psychological research on morality relies on definitions of morality. Yet the various definitions often go unstated. When unstated definitions diverge, theoretical disagreements become intractable, as theories that purport to explain "morality" actually talk about very different things. This article argues for the importance of defining morality and considers four common ways of doing so: The linguistic, the functionalist, the evaluating, and the normative. Each has encountered difficulties. To surmount those difficulties, I propose a technical, psychological, empirical, and distinctive definition of morality: obligatory concerns with others' welfare, rights, fairness, and justice, as well as the reasoning, judgment, emotions, and actions that spring from those concerns. By articulating workable definitions of morality, psychologists can communicate more clearly across paradigms, separate definitional from empirical disagreements, and jointly advance the field of moral psychology.

Student and Teacher Views on Cheating in High School: Perceptions, Evaluations, and Decisions

Why do so many adolescents cheat despite judging that cheating is wrong? Two studies tested a new model of cheating in high school. In Study 1, 85 high schoolers in the Western U.S. reported their perceptions, evaluations, and motivations surrounding their own and hypothetical cheating. In Study 2, 83 teachers reported their views about cheating; we also analyzed course syllabi. About half of the adolescents reported unintentional cheating, and many judged their own cheating-but not hypothetical cheating-as acceptable. Decisions to cheat were responses to competing pressures, low value placed on the assignment, and other considerations. Study 2 revealed teacher-student disagreements about cheating, and minimal content about academic integrity in syllabi. The findings supported the proposed model of adolescent cheating.

Children across societies enforce conventional norms but in culturally variable ways

Individuals in all societies conform to their cultural group's conventional norms, from how to dress on certain occasions to how to play certain games. It is an open question, however, whether individuals in all societies actively enforce the group's conventional norms when others break them. We investigated third-party enforcement of conventional norms in 5- to 8-y-old children (n = 376) from eight diverse small-scale and large-scale societies. Children learned the rules for playing a new sorting game and then, observed a peer who was apparently breaking them. Across societies, observer children intervened frequently to correct their misguided peer (i.e., more frequently than when the peer was following the rules). However, both the magnitude and the style of interventions varied across societies. Detailed analyses of children's interactions revealed societal differences in children's verbal protest styles as well as in their use of actions, gestures, and nonverbal expressions to intervene. Observers' interventions predicted whether their peer adopted the observer's sorting rule. Enforcement of conventional norms appears to be an early emerging human universal that comes to be expressed in culturally variable ways.

Preschoolers learn new moral and conventional norms from direct experiences

By observing others, children can learn about different types of norms, including moral norms rooted in concerns for welfare and rights, and social conventions based on directives from authority figures or social consensus. Two experiments examined how preschoolers and adults constructed and applied knowledge about novel moral and conventional norms from their direct social experiences. Participants watched a video of a novel prohibited action that caused pain to a victim (moral conditions) or a sound from a box (conventional conditions). Next, they saw a transgressor puppet, who had either watched the video alongside participants or not, engage in the prohibited action. Preschoolers and adults rapidly constructed distinct moral and conventional evaluations about the novel actions. These distinctions were evident across several response modalities that have often been studied separately, including judgments, reasoning, and actions. However, children did not reliably track the puppet's knowledge of the novel norms. These studies provide experimental support for the idea that children and adults construct distinct moral and conventional norms from social experiences, which in turn guide judgments, reasoning, and behavior.

Preschoolers agree to and enforce prosocial, but not selfish, sharing norms

Young children act prosocially in many contexts but are somewhat selfish when it comes to sharing their resources in individual decision-making situations (e.g., the dictator game). But when deciding collectively, would they make it a binding rule for themselves and others to act selfishly in a resource sharing context? Here we used a novel "group dictator game" in a norm creation paradigm to investigate whether 3- and 5-year-olds (N = 48) would agree to and enforce a selfish or prosocial sharing norm. Children from a Western cultural background were paired with two puppets at a time. Each group member had an endowment of four stickers and faced a photograph of a recipient. In the prosocial norm condition a proposer puppet suggested to share half of one's endowment, whereas in the selfish norm condition another proposer suggested to share nothing. The protagonist puppet then either followed or violated the suggested norm. We found that 5-year-olds (but not 3-year-olds) rejected selfish proposals more often than prosocial proposals. Importantly, older (but not younger) preschoolers also enforced the prosocial (but not the selfish) norm by protesting normatively and intervening when the protagonist acted selfishly (and thus violated the norm). These results indicate that a collective decision-making context may enhance preschoolers' prosociality and that moral considerations on the content of a proposed sharing rule influence preschoolers' creation and enforcement of such nonarbitrary norms.

Moral Reasoning Enables Developmental and Societal Change

Moral reasoning is an essential part of how humans develop and a fundamental aspect of how human societies change over time. On a developmental timescale, reasoning about interpersonal disagreements and dilemmas spurs age-related changes in moral judgments from childhood to adulthood. When asked to distribute resources among others, even young children strive to balance competing concerns with equality, merit, and need. Over the course of development, reasoning and judgments about resource distribution and other moral issues become increasingly sophisticated. From childhood to adulthood, individuals not only evaluate acts as right or wrong but also take the extra steps to rectify inequalities, protest unfair norms, and resist stereotypic expectations about others. The development of moral reasoning also enables change on a societal timescale. Across centuries and communities, ordinary individuals have called for societal change based on moral concerns with welfare, rights, fairness, and justice. Individuals have effectively employed reasoning to identify and challenge injustices. In this article, we synthesize recent insights from developmental science about the roles of moral reasoning in developmental and societal change. In the concluding section, we turn to questions for future research on moral reasoning and change.

Young Children's Judgments and Reasoning about Prosocial Acts: Impermissible, Suberogatory, Obligatory, or Supererogatory?

In deciding when to help, individuals reason about whether prosocial acts are impermissible, suberogatory, obligatory, or supererogatory. This research examined judgments and reasoning about prosocial actions at three to five years of age, when explicit moral judgments and reasoning are emerging. Three-to five-year-olds (N = 52) were interviewed about prosocial actions that varied in costs/benefits to agents/recipients, agent-recipient relationship, and recipient goal valence. Children were also interviewed about their own prosocial acts. Adults (N = 56) were interviewed for comparison. Children commonly judged prosocial actions as obligatory. Overall, children were more likely than adults to say that agents should help. Children's judgments and reasoning reflected concerns with welfare as well as agent and recipient intent. The findings indicate that 3-to 5-year-olds make distinct moral judgments about prosocial actions, and that judgments and reasoning about prosocial acts subsequently undergo major developments.