The self-consistency effect seen on the Dot Perspective Task is a product of domain-general attention cueing, not automatic perspective taking

Comparing self-other distinction across motor, cognitive and affective domains

The self-other distinction (SOD) is a process by which humans disentangle self from other-related mental representations. This online study investigated two unresolved questions: (i) whether partially the same processes underpin SOD for motor, cognitive and affective representations, and (ii) whether SOD overlaps with domain-general cognitive control processes. Participants (N = 243) performed three SOD tasks (motor: automatic imitation inhibition (AIT); cognitive: visual perspective-taking (VPT); affective: emotional egocentricity bias (av-EEB) tasks) and two cognitive control tasks (Stroop and stop-signal reaction time (SSRT) tasks). Correlation analyses showed no associations among the motor, cognitive and affective SOD indexes. Similarly, distinct SOD clusters emerged in the hierarchical clustering dendrogram, indicating clear separations among SODs. However, the results of multidimensional scaling suggested a tendency towards two clusters, as evidenced by the proximity of AIT and VPT indexes in relation to EEB indexes. AIT spatial laterality and Stroop domain-general cognitive control confounded AIT and VPT indexes, albeit slightly differently depending on the analysis method used. SSRT showed neither associations with SODs nor with other domain-general indexes. These findings underscore the complexity of SOD processes and have notable implications for basic and applied research, e.g. in the domain of clinical disorders affected by deficiencies in SOD.

Visual perspective taking neural processing in forensic cases with high density EEG

This EEG study aims at dissecting the differences in the activation of neural generators between borderline personality disorder patients with court-ordered measures (BDL-COM) and healthy controls in visual perspective taking. We focused on the distinction between mentalizing (Avatar) and non-mentalizing (Arrow) stimuli as well as self versus other-perspective in the dot perspective task (dPT) in a sample of 15 BDL-COM cases and 54 controls, all of male gender. BDL-COM patients showed a late and diffuse right hemisphere involvement of neural generators contrasting with the occipitofrontal topography observed in controls. For Avatars only and compared to controls, the adoption of Self perspective involved a lower EEG activity in the left inferior frontal, right middle temporal cortex and insula in BDL-COM patients prior to 80 ms post-stimulus. When taking the Other-perspective, BDL-COM patients also showed a lower activation of superior frontal, right inferior temporal and fusiform cortex within the same time frame. The beta oscillation power was significantly lower in BDL-COM patients than controls between 400 and 1300 ms post stimulus in the Avatar-Other condition. These results indicate that BDL-COM patients display both altered topography of EEG activation patterns and reduced abilities to mobilize beta oscillations during the treatment of mentalistic stimuli in dPT.

I prefer what you can see: The role of visual perspective-taking on the gaze-liking effect

Individuals' gaze on an object usually leads others to prefer that object, which is called the gaze-liking effect. However, it is still unclear whether this effect is driven by social factors (i.e., visual perspective-taking) or the domain-general processing (i.e., attention cueing). This research explored the mechanism of the gaze-liking effect by manipulating the objects' visibility to an avatar in six online one-shot experiments. The results showed that participants' affective evaluation for the object was modulated by the avatar's visual perspective. Specifically, the visible object to the avatar received a higher rating of liking degree. However, when the avatar was replaced with a non-social stimulus, the experimental effect was absent. Furthermore, the gaze-liking effect was robust while controlling for confounding factors such as the distance between the object and the avatar or type of stimuli. These findings provided convincing evidence that the gaze-liking effect involves a process of the other's visual experience and is not merely a by-product of the gaze-cueing effect.

Neural correlates involved in perspective-taking in early childhood

Learning to consider another person's perspective is pivotal in early social development. Still, little is known about the neural underpinnings involved in perspective-taking in early childhood. In this EEG study, we examined 4-year-old children's brain activity during a live, social interaction that involved perspective-taking. Children were asked to pass one of two toys to another person. To decide which toy to pass, they had to consider either their partner's perspective (perspective-taking) or visual features unrelated to their partner's perspective (control). We analyzed power changes in midfrontal and temporal-parietal EEG channels. The results indicated that children showed higher power around 7 Hz at right temporal-parietal channels for perspective-taking compared to control trials. This power difference was positively correlated with children's perspective-taking performance, specifically for trials in which they needed to pass the toy their partner could not see. A similar power difference at right temporal-parietal channels was seen when comparing perspective-taking trials where children's visual access mismatched rather than matched that of their partner. No differences were detected for midfrontal channels. In sum, we identified distinct neural activity as 4-year-olds considered another person's perspective in a live interaction; this activity converges with neural findings of adults' social processing network.

Increased interference from conflicting perspectives and gender differences: A longitudinal study during adolescence

Adolescents need to develop adequate perspective-taking skills to successfully navigate their increasingly complex social environments. This study investigated adolescents' development of the cognitive processes of egocentric and altercentric interference that influence perspective-taking abilities. Using the Dot Perspective Task, participants' (N = 803; 50.9% female) egocentric and altercentric interference was measured during 3 consecutive years from 12 to 14 years of age. Linear mixed model analyses showed that whereas overall task performance improved over time, egocentric and altercentric interference increased over time. These results suggest that perspective taking develops at slower rates when there are conflicting perspectives than in situations with no conflict. Moreover, we found that girls showed less egocentric interference than boys. This result provides task-based evidence that supports previous findings of higher self-reported perspective taking in adolescent girls than in adolescent boys.

The Projective Consciousness Model: Projective Geometry at the Core of Consciousness and the Integration of Perception, Imagination, Motivation, Emotion, Social Cognition and Action

Consciousness has been described as acting as a global workspace that integrates perception, imagination, emotion and action programming for adaptive decision making. The mechanisms of this workspace and their relationships to the phenomenology of consciousness need to be further specified. Much research in this area has focused on the neural correlates of consciousness, but, arguably, computational modeling can better be used toward this aim. According to the Projective Consciousness Model (PCM), consciousness is structured as a viewpoint-organized, internal space, relying on 3D projective geometry and governed by the action of the Projective Group as part of a process of active inference. The geometry induces a group-structured subjective perspective on an encoded world model, enabling adaptive perspective taking in agents. Here, we review and discuss the PCM. We emphasize the role of projective mechanisms in perception and the appraisal of affective and epistemic values as tied to the motivation of action, under an optimization process of Free Energy minimization, or more generally stochastic optimal control. We discuss how these mechanisms enable us to model and simulate group-structured drives in the context of social cognition and to understand the mechanisms underpinning empathy, emotion expression and regulation, and approach-avoidance behaviors. We review previous results, drawing on applications in robotics and virtual humans. We briefly discuss future axes of research relating to applications of the model to simulation- and model-based behavioral science, geometrically structured artificial neural networks, the relevance of the approach for explainable AI and human-machine interactions, and the study of the neural correlates of consciousness.

No signs of automatic perspective-taking or its modulation by joint attention in toddlers using an object retrieval task

It is currently debated whether simple forms of social perspective-taking that are in place by late infancy are performed automatically. We conducted two experiments (N = 124) to test whether 3-year-olds show automatic perspective-taking during object searches, and whether automatic perspective-taking is facilitated by joint attention. Children were asked to retrieve an object immediately after it was moved from one (L1) to another (L2) location within a container, e.g. a sandbox. In Experiment 1, a between-subjects design was used, with children being randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions: one in which child and other jointly attended to the object in L1 (joint attention condition); one in which the other was present but unengaged with the child when the object was placed in L1 (other present condition) and a baseline condition in which only the child was present (no other condition). Automatic perspective-taking should manifest in biased searches toward L1 in the other present and joint attention conditions, but not in the no other condition. No automatic perspective-taking was observed in either experiment, regardless of whether the other person left and remained absent (Experiment 1) or returned after the object was relocated (Experiment 2). The findings contribute to a growing body of empirical data that questions the existence of automatic perspective-taking.

Impaired grouping of ambient facial images in autism

Ambient facial images depict individuals from a variety of viewing angles, with a range of poses and expressions, under different lighting conditions. Exposure to ambient images is thought to help observers form robust representations of the individuals depicted. Previous results suggest that autistic people may derive less benefit from exposure to this exemplar variation than non-autistic people. To date, however, it remains unclear why. One possibility is that autistic individuals possess atypical perceptual learning mechanisms. Alternatively, however, the learning mechanisms may be intact, but receive low-quality perceptual input from face encoding processes. To examine this second possibility, we investigated whether autistic people are less able to group ambient images of unfamiliar individuals based on their identity. Participants were asked to identify which of four ambient images depicted an oddball identity. Each trial assessed the grouping of different facial identities, thereby preventing face learning across trials. As such, the task assessed participants’ ability to group ambient images of unfamiliar people. In two experiments we found that matched non-autistic controls correctly identified the oddball identities more often than our autistic participants. These results imply that poor face learning from variation by autistic individuals may well be attributable to low-quality perceptual input, not aberrant learning mechanisms.