Consciousness without cortex

An integrative view of the role of prefrontal cortex in consciousness

The involvement of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in consciousness is an ongoing focus of intense investigation. An important question is whether representations of conscious contents and experiences in the PFC are confounded by post-perceptual processes related to cognitive functions. Here, I review recent findings suggesting that neuronal representations of consciously perceived contents-in the absence of post-perceptual processes-can indeed be observed in the PFC. Slower ongoing fluctuations in the electrophysiological state of the PFC seem to control the stability and updates of these prefrontal representations of conscious awareness. In addition to conscious perception, the PFC has been shown to play a critical role in controlling the levels of consciousness as observed during anesthesia, while prefrontal lesions can result in severe loss of perceptual awareness. Together, the convergence of these processes in the PFC suggests its integrative role in consciousness and highlights the complex nature of consciousness itself.

Mental causation: an evolutionary perspective

The relationship between consciousness and individual agency is examined from a bottom-up evolutionary perspective, an approach somewhat different from other ways of dealing with the issue, but one relevant to the question of animal consciousness. Two ways are identified that would decouple the two, allowing consciousness of a limited kind to exist without agency: (1) reflex pathways that incorporate conscious sensations as an intrinsic component (InCs), and (2) reflexes that are consciously conditioned and dependent on synaptic plasticity but not memory (CCRs). Whether InCs and CCRs exist as more than hypothetical constructs is not clear, and InCs are in any case limited to theories where consciousness depends directly on EM field-based effects. Consciousness with agency, as we experience it, then belongs in a third category that allows for deliberate choice of alternative actions (DCs), where the key difference between this and CCR-level pathways is that DCs require access to explicit memory systems whereas CCRs do not. CCRs are nevertheless useful from a heuristic standpoint as a conceptual model for how conscious inputs could act to refine routine behaviors while allowing evolution to optimize phenomenal experience (i.e., qualia) in the absence of individual agency, a somewhat counterintuitive result. However, so long as CCRs are not a required precondition for the evolution of memory-dependent DC-level processes, the later could have evolved first. If so, the adaptive benefit of consciousness when it first evolved may be linked as much to the role it plays in encoding memories as to any other function. The possibility that CCRs are more than a theoretical construct, and have played a role in the evolution of consciousness, argues against theories of consciousness focussed exclusively on higher-order functions as the appropriate way to deal with consciousness as it first evolved, as it develops in the early postnatal period of life, or with the conscious experiences of animals other than ourselves. An evolutionary perspective also resolves the problem of free will, that it is best treated as a property of a species rather than the individuals belonging to that species whereas, in contrast, agency is an attribute of individuals.

Conscious Experience of Stimulus Presence and Absence Is Actively Encoded by Neurons in the Crow Brain

The emergence of consciousness from brain activity constitutes one of the great riddles in biology. It is commonly assumed that only the conscious perception of the presence of a stimulus elicits neuronal activation to signify a "neural correlate of consciousness," whereas the subjective experience of the absence of a stimulus is associated with a neuronal resting state. Here, we demonstrate that the two subjective states "stimulus present" and "stimulus absent" are represented by two specialized neuron populations in crows, corvid birds. We recorded single-neuron activity from the nidopallium caudolaterale of crows trained to report the presence or absence of images presented near the visual threshold. Because of the task design, neuronal activity tracking the conscious "present" versus "absent" percept was dissociated from that involved in planning a motor response. Distinct neuron populations signaled the subjective percepts of "present" and "absent" by increases in activation. The response selectivity of these two neuron populations was similar in strength and time course. This suggests a balanced code for subjective "presence" versus "absence" experiences, which might be beneficial when both conscious states need to be maintained active in the service of goal-directed behavior.

Why birds are smart

Many cognitive neuroscientists believe that both a large brain and an isocortex are crucial for complex cognition. Yet corvids and parrots possess non-cortical brains of just 1-25 g, and these birds exhibit cognitive abilities comparable with those of great apes such as chimpanzees, which have brains of about 400 g. This opinion explores how this cognitive equivalence is possible. We propose four features that may be required for complex cognition: a large number of associative pallial neurons, a prefrontal cortex (PFC)-like area, a dense dopaminergic innervation of association areas, and dynamic neurophysiological fundaments for working memory. These four neural features have convergently evolved and may therefore represent 'hard to replace' mechanisms enabling complex cognition.

Convergent Circuit Computation for Categorization in the Brains of Primates and Songbirds

Categorization is crucial for behavioral flexibility because it enables animals to group stimuli into meaningful classes that can easily be generalized to new circumstances. A most abstract quantitative category is set size, the number of elements in a set. This review explores how categorical number representations are realized by the operations of excitatory and inhibitory neurons in associative telencephalic microcircuits in primates and songbirds. Despite the independent evolution of the primate prefrontal cortex and the avian nidopallium caudolaterale, the neuronal computations of these associative pallial circuits show surprising correspondence. Comparing cellular functions in distantly related taxa can inform about the evolutionary principles of circuit computations for cognition in distinctly but convergently realized brain structures.

Categorical representation of abstract spatial magnitudes in the executive telencephalon of crows

The ability to group abstract continuous magnitudes into meaningful categories is cognitively demanding but key to intelligent behavior. To explore its neuronal mechanisms, we trained carrion crows to categorize lines of variable lengths into arbitrary "short" and "long" categories. Single-neuron activity in the nidopallium caudolaterale (NCL) of behaving crows reflected the learned length categories of visual stimuli. The length categories could be reliably decoded from neuronal population activity to predict the crows' conceptual decisions. NCL activity changed with learning when a crow was retrained with the same stimuli assigned to more categories with new boundaries ("short", "medium," and "long"). Categorical neuronal representations emerged dynamically so that sensory length information at the beginning of the trial was transformed into behaviorally relevant categorical representations shortly before the crows' decision making. Our data show malleable categorization capabilities for abstract spatial magnitudes mediated by the flexible networks of the crow NCL.

Executive Control of Sequence Behavior in Pigeons Involves Two Distinct Brain Regions

Executive functions arise from multiple regions of the brain acting in concert. To facilitate such cross-regional computations, the brain is organized into distinct executive networks, like the frontoparietal network. Despite similar cognitive abilities across many domains, little is known about such executive networks in birds. Recent advances in avian fMRI have shown a possible subset of regions, including the nidopallium caudolaterale (NCL) and the lateral part of medial intermediate nidopallium (NIML), that may contribute to complex cognition, forming an action control system of pigeons. We investigated the neuronal activity of NCL and NIML. Single-cell recordings were obtained during the execution of a complex sequential motor task that required executive control to stop executing one behavior and continue with a different one. We compared the neuronal activity of NIML to NCL and found that both regions fully processed the ongoing sequential execution of the task. Differences arose from how behavioral outcome was processed. Our results indicate that NCL takes on a role in evaluating outcome, while NIML is more tightly associated with ongoing sequential steps. Importantly, both regions seem to contribute to overall behavioral output as parts of a possible avian executive network, crucial for behavioral flexibility and decision-making.

In search for consciousness in animals: Using working memory and voluntary attention as behavioral indicators

Whether animals have subjective experiences about the content of their sensory input, i.e., whether they are aware of stimuli, is a notoriously difficult question to answer. If consciousness is present in animals, it must share fundamental characteristics with human awareness. Working memory and voluntary/endogenous attention are suggested as diagnostic features of conscious awareness. Behavioral evidence shows clear signatures of both working memory and voluntary attention as minimal criterium for sensory consciousness in mammals and birds. In contrast, reptiles and amphibians show no sign of either working memory or volitional attention. Surprisingly, some species of teleost fishes exhibit elementary working memory and voluntary attention effects suggestive of possibly rudimentary forms of subjective experience. With the potential exception of honeybees, evidence for conscious processing is lacking in invertebrates. These findings suggest that consciousness is not ubiquitous in the animal kingdom but also not exclusive to humans. The phylogenetic gap between animal taxa argues that evolution does not rely on specific neural substrates to endow distantly related species with basic forms of consciousness.

Brain-heart interactions in the neurobiology of consciousness

Recent experimental evidence on patients with disorders of consciousness revealed that observing brain-heart interactions helps to detect residual consciousness, even in patients with absence of behavioral signs of consciousness. Those findings support hypotheses suggesting that visceral activity is involved in the neurobiology of consciousness, and sum to the existing evidence in healthy participants in which the neural responses to heartbeats reveal perceptual and self-consciousness. More evidence obtained through mathematical modeling of physiological dynamics revealed that emotion processing is prompted by an initial modulation from ascending vagal inputs to the brain, followed by sustained bidirectional brain-heart interactions. Those findings support long-lasting hypotheses on the causal role of bodily activity in emotions, feelings, and potentially consciousness. In this paper, the theoretical landscape on the potential role of heartbeats in cognition and consciousness is reviewed, as well as the experimental evidence supporting these hypotheses. I advocate for methodological developments on the estimation of brain-heart interactions to uncover the role of cardiac inputs in the origin, levels, and contents of consciousness. The ongoing evidence depicts interactions further than the cortical responses evoked by each heartbeat, suggesting the potential presence of non-linear, complex, and bidirectional communication between brain and heartbeat dynamics. Further developments on methodologies to analyze brain-heart interactions may contribute to a better understanding of the physiological dynamics involved in homeostatic-allostatic control, cognitive functions, and consciousness.

Cell-type specific pallial circuits shape categorical tuning responses in the crow telencephalon

The nidopallium caudolaterale (NCL), an integration centre in the telencephalon of birds, plays a crucial role in representing and maintaining abstract categories and concepts. However, the computational principles allowing pallial microcircuits consisting of excitatory and inhibitory neurons to shape the tuning to abstract categories remain elusive. Here we identified the major pallial cell types, putative excitatory projection cells and inhibitory interneurons, by characterizing the waveforms of action potentials recorded in crows performing a cognitively demanding numerical categorization task. Both cell types showed clear differences in their capacity to encode categorical information. Nearby and functionally coupled putative projection neurons generally exhibited similar tuning, whereas putative interneurons showed mainly opposite tuning. The results favour feedforward mechanisms for the shaping of categorical tuning in microcircuits of the NCL. Our findings help to decipher the workings of pallial microcircuits in birds during complex cognition and to compare them vis-a-vis neocortical processes in mammals.

Neural recordings from the caudolateral nidopallium in crows during a numerosity task suggest there are two subsets of projection neurons and inhibitory interneurons involved in complex cognition.