Why do doctored images distort memory?

Deepfake false memories

Machine-learning has enabled the creation of "deepfake videos"; highly-realistic footage that features a person saying or doing something they never did. In recent years, this technology has become more widespread and various apps now allow an average social-media user to create a deepfake video which can be shared online. There are concerns about how this may distort memory for public events, but to date no evidence to support this. Across two experiments, we presented participants (N = 682) with fake news stories in the format of text, text with a photograph or text with a deepfake video. Though participants rated the deepfake videos as convincing, dangerous, and unethical, and some participants did report false memories after viewing deepfakes, the deepfake video format did not consistently increase false memory rates relative to the text-only or text-with-photograph conditions. Further research is needed, but the current findings suggest that while deepfake videos can distort memory for public events, they may not always be more effective than simple misleading text.

Framing the past (and future): Effects of generic photos on autobiographical judgments

Do the images we see every day influence how we remember our lives? Research on this matter often concerns how entire memories of events can be created or shaped through the use of doctored photographs of personal (Wade et al., Psychonomic bulletin & review, 9 (3), 597-603, 2002) and public events (Sacchi et al., Applied Cognitive Psychology, 21 (8), 1005-1022, 2007). Although this paradigm has yielded insights into false memory production, it may underestimate the extent to which photographs can bias or distort memory in a subtler manner (i.e., without the use of doctored photographs or suggestion). In Experiments 1 (N = 95) and 2 (N = 186) of the present study, we examined whether the mere presence of generic images, typical of stock photography, could influence aspects of our memories. Given the parallel between autobiographical remembering and forecasting (Berntsen & Bohn, Memory & Cognition, 38(3), 265-278, 2010), we also examined (Experiment 3: N=204) how such images would influence future autobiographical judgments. Specifically, three experiments investigated whether photographs would bias autobiographical judgments for either quantitative (e.g., How many movies have you seen in the past year?) or affective (e.g., How enjoyable do you think your next date will be?) aspects of events in everyday life. We found that photographs reliably influenced judgments related to quantitative aspects of autobiographical events. Moreover, though less robustly, there was an indication that these photos could bias our affective construal of such events as well. Overall, we conclude that the mere presence of generic photographs may exert an influence on the way we think about our lives to an extent previously under-recognized.

Picture (im)perfect: Illusions of recognition memory produced by photographs at test

Photographs have been found to affect a variety of psychological judgments. For example, nonprobative but semantically related photographs may increase beliefs in the truth of general knowledge statements (Newman, Garry, Bernstein, Kantner, & Lindsay, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 19(5), 969-974, 2012; Newman et al., Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 41(5), 1337-1348, 2015). Photographs can also create illusions of memory (Cardwell, Henkel, Garry, Newman, & Foster, Memory & Cognition, 44(6), 883-896, 2016; Henkel, Applied Cognitive Psychology, 25(1), 78-86, 2011; Henkel & Carbuto, 2008). A candidate mechanism for these effects is that a photograph increases the fluency with which a statement or an event is processed. The present study was conducted to determine whether photos at test can induce illusions of recognition memory and to test the viability of a conceptual fluency explanation of these effects. The results of the present study suggest that photographs enhance the fluency of related words (Experiment 1), that false memories can be produced by the mere presence of a related photo on a recognition memory test for words (Experiments 2 & 3), and that these effects appear to be limited to conceptually based recognition tests (Experiments 4 & 5). The results support the notion that photograph-based illusions of memory stem from the ability of related photographs to increase the speed and ease of conceptual processing.

On the persuadability of memory: Is changing people's memories no more than changing their minds?

The observation of parallels between the memory distortion and persuasion literatures leads, quite logically, to the appealing notion that people can be 'persuaded' to change their memories. Indeed, numerous studies show that memory can be influenced and distorted by a variety of persuasive tactics, and the theoretical accounts commonly used by researchers to explain episodic and autobiographical memory distortion phenomena can generally predict and explain these persuasion effects. Yet, despite these empirical and theoretical overlaps, explicit reference to persuasion and attitude-change research in the memory distortion literature is surprisingly rare. In this paper, we argue that stronger theoretical foundations are needed to draw the memory distortion and persuasion literatures together in a productive direction. We reason that theoretical approaches to remembering that distinguish (false) beliefs in the occurrence of events from (false) memories of those events - compatible with a source monitoring approach - would be beneficial to this end. Such approaches, we argue, would provide a stronger platform to use persuasion findings to enhance the psychological understanding of memory distortion.

Disowned recollections: denying true experiences undermines belief in occurrence but not judgments of remembering

Recent research findings have illustrated that false memories induced in the laboratory can be dissociated from the beliefs that the events had in fact occurred. In this study we assessed whether this dissociability is a quality peculiar to false memory, or whether it represents a general characteristic of autobiographical memory. To this end we examined whether people can be induced to stop believing in memories for true experiences. Participants observed and performed simple actions, and were later falsely informed that they had not performed some of them--that false memories for these actions had been implanted through the use of fabricated evidence. Before and after receiving this misinformation, participants rated their belief in and memory of performing those actions, other actions that they had also performed, and actions that they had not performed. Whereas the misinformation substantially undermined participants' beliefs in the specific performed actions about which they had been misinformed, it had little effect on their endorsement of remembering those actions. The misinformation thus boosted the proportion of occasions in which participants rated their memories as stronger than their beliefs, and it weakened the correlation between belief and memory ratings. Thus, this study provides the first experimental demonstration of non-believed memories of true experiences. We discuss our findings with reference to the small literature concerning the use of socially-communicated misinformation to undermine event memories, and with reference to the structure of autobiographical memory.

Seeing photos makes us read between the lines: The influence of photos on memory for inferences

Three studies examined how photos accompanying stories could contribute to people drawing inferences about outcomes from the stories and subsequently claiming that they had read what had actually only been inferred. Subjects read short stories designed to induce inferences about their conclusions (e.g., “Sabrina dropped the delicate vase” invites the inference that the vase broke) accompanied by a photo depicting the likely conclusion (the broken vase), a photo depicting a detail of the story but not the conclusion (the vase before it was dropped), or no photo. Results showed that seeing photographs consistent with inferred conclusions led people to falsely claim that they read those conclusions. Photo-boosted inferences were held with high confidence and were robust over time. Falsely recalled inferences were sometimes accompanied by false claims to have seen a photo depicting the inferred events when another photo or no photo had actually be seen. These findings support the source monitoring framework's prediction that people can mistakenly attribute their internally generated inferences about what occurred to externally derived sources when they have photographic “evidence” consistent with the inferred conclusions.

Creating non-believed memories for recent autobiographical events

A recent study showed that many people spontaneously report vivid memories of events that they do not believe to have occurred [1]. In the present experiment we tested for the first time whether, after powerful false memories have been created, debriefing might leave behind nonbelieved memories for the fake events. In Session 1 participants imitated simple actions, and in Session 2 they saw doctored video-recordings containing clips that falsely suggested they had performed additional (fake) actions. As in earlier studies, this procedure created powerful false memories. In Session 3, participants were debriefed and told that specific actions in the video were not truly performed. Beliefs and memories for all critical actions were tested before and after the debriefing. Results showed that debriefing undermined participants' beliefs in fake actions, but left behind residual memory-like content. These results indicate that debriefing can leave behind vivid false memories which are no longer believed, and thus we demonstrate for the first time that the memory of an event can be experimentally dissociated from the belief in the event's occurrence. These results also confirm that belief in and memory for an event can be independently-occurring constructs.