Can unconscious knowledge allow control in sequence learning?

Unconscious knowledge of rewards guides instrumental behaviors via conscious judgments

The demonstration that unconscious learning supports instrumental behaviors (i.e., choosing the stimuli that lead to rewards) is central for the tenet that unconscious cognition sustains human adaptation. Recent studies, using reliable subliminal conditioning paradigms and improved awareness measurements have found evidence against unconscious knowledge sustaining accurate instrumental responses. The present preregistered study proposes a paradigm, in which unconscious processing is stimulated not by subliminally exposing the predictive (conditioned) stimuli, but by employing predictive regularities that are complex and difficult to detect consciously. Participants (N = 211) were exposed to letter strings that, unknown to them, were built from two complex artificial grammars: a "rewarded" or a "non-rewarded" grammar. On each trial, participants memorized a string, and subsequently had to discriminate the memorized string from a distractor. Correct discriminations were rewarded only when the identified string followed the rewarded grammar, but not when it followed the non-rewarded grammar. In a subsequent test phase, participants were presented with new strings from the rewarded and from the unrewarded grammar. Their task was now to directly choose the strings from the rewarded grammar, in order to collect more rewards. A trial-by-trial awareness measure revealed that participants accurately choose novel strings from the rewarded grammar when they had no conscious knowledge of the grammar. The awareness measure also showed that participants were accurate only when the unconsciously learned grammar led to conscious judgments. The present study shows that unconscious knowledge can guide instrumental responses, but only to the extent it supports conscious judgments.

Implicit and explicit learning of socio-emotional information in a dynamic interaction with a virtual avatar

Implicit learning (IL) deals with the non-conscious acquisition of structural regularities from the environment. IL is often deemed essential for acquiring regularities followed by social stimuli (e.g., other persons' behavior), hence is hypothesized to play a role in typical social functioning. However, our understanding of how this process might operate in social contexts is limited for two main reasons. First, while IL is highly sensitive to the characteristics of the surface stimuli upon which it operates, most IL studies have used surface stimuli with limited social validity (e.g., letters, symbols, etc.). Second, while the social environment is dynamic (i.e., our behaviors and reactions influence those of our social partners and vice-versa), the bulk of IL research employed noninteractive paradigms. Using a novel task, we examine whether IL is involved in the acquisition of regularities from a dynamic interaction with a realistic real-life-like agent. Participants (N = 115) interacted with a cinematic avatar that displayed different facial expressions. Their task was to regulate the avatar's expression to a specified level. Unbeknownst to them, an equation mediated the relationship between their responses and the avatar's expressions. Learning occurred in the task, as participants gradually increased their ability to bring the avatar in the target state. Subjective measures of awareness revealed that participants acquired both implicit and explicit knowledge from the task. This is the first study to show that IL operates in interactive situations upon socially relevant surface stimuli, facilitating future investigations of the role that IL plays in (a)typical social functioning.

Implicit learning of regularities followed by realistic body movements in virtual reality

The existence of implicit (unconscious) learning has been demonstrated in several laboratory paradigms. Researchers have also suggested that it plays a role in complex real-life human activities. For instance, in social situations, we may follow unconscious behaviour scripts or intuitively anticipate the reaction of familiar persons based on nonconscious cues. Still, it is difficult to make inferences about the involvement of implicit learning in realistic contexts, given that this phenomenon has been demonstrated, almost exclusively, using simple artificial stimuli (e.g., learning structured patterns of letters). In addition, recent analyses show that the amount of unconscious knowledge learned in these tasks has been overestimated by random measurement error. To overcome these limitations, we adapted the artificial grammar learning (AGL) task, and exposed participants (N = 93), in virtual reality, to a realistic agent that executed combinations of boxing punches. Unknown to participants, the combinations were structured by a complex artificial grammar. In a subsequent test phase, participants accurately discriminated novel grammatical from nongrammatical combinations, showing they had acquired the grammar. For measuring awareness, we used trial-by-trial subjective scales, and an analytical method that accounts for the possible overestimation of unconscious knowledge due to regression to the mean. These methods conjointly showed strong evidence for implicit and for explicit learning. The present study is the first to show that humans can implicitly learn, in VR, knowledge regarding realistic body movements, and, further, that implicit knowledge extracted in AGL is robust when accounting for its possible inflation by random measurement error.

Manipulating the Rapid Consolidation Periods in a Learning Task Affects General Skills More than Statistical Learning and Changes the Dynamics of Learning

Memory consolidation processes have traditionally been investigated from the perspective of hours or days. However, recent developments in memory research have shown that memory consolidation processes could occur even within seconds, possibly because of the neural replay of just practiced memory traces during short breaks. Here, we investigate this rapid form of consolidation during statistical learning. We aim to answer (1) whether this rapid consolidation occurs in implicit statistical learning and general skill learning, and (2) whether the duration of rest periods affects these two learning types differently. Human participants performed a widely used statistical learning task-the alternating serial reaction time (ASRT) task-that enables us to measure implicit statistical and general skill learning separately. The ASRT task consisted of 25 learning blocks with a rest period between the blocks. In a between-subjects design, the length of the rest periods was fixed at 15 or 30 s, or the participants could control the length themselves. We found that the duration of rest periods does not affect the amount of statistical knowledge acquired but does change the dynamics of learning. Shorter rest periods led to better learning during the learning blocks, whereas longer rest periods promoted learning also in the between-block rest periods, possibly because of the higher amount of replay. Moreover, we found weaker general skill learning in the self-paced group than in the fixed rest period groups. These results suggest that distinct learning processes are differently affected by the duration of short rest periods.

Do temporal factors affect whether our performance accurately reflects our underlying knowledge? The effects of stimulus presentation rates on the performance versus competence dissociation

Ample evidence shows that the momentary performance can dissociate from the underlying knowledge (competence). Under what circumstances such dissociation occurs, however, remains unclear. Here we tested how temporal factors, and more specifically, the elapsed time between subsequent events affects the dissociation between performance and competence by systematically manipulating the stimulus presentation rates during and after learning. Participants completed a probabilistic sequence learning task with a fast (120 msec) or a slow (850 msec) response-to-stimulus-interval (RSI) during the Learning phase and they were tested with both RSIs 24 h later (Testing phase). We also tested whether they gained explicit knowledge about the sequence or their knowledge remained implicit. Our results revealed higher reaction time learning scores when tested with the fast RSI, irrespective of the RSI during learning, suggesting that faster presentation rates can help better express the acquired knowledge, leading to increased performance measures. For accuracy, participants showed higher learning scores when tested with the same presentation rate as the one that they encountered during learning. The acquired knowledge remained implicit in both groups, suggesting that the observed findings were not confounded by differences in awareness gained in the two groups. Overall, our study highlights that the momentary performance does not always accurately reflect the underlying knowledge, and temporal factors seem to influence this dissociation. Our findings have theoretical, methodological, and translational implications that likely extend beyond learning and memory to other functions and domains as well, including aspects of decision-making, perception, theory of mind, and language.

Expressing unconscious general knowledge using Chevreul's pendulum

Can unconscious knowledge be elicited by ideomotor action when the knowledge fails to be elicited by verbal reports? Using an Ouija board, previous research found ideomotor action produced substantial accuracy for general knowledge questions previously rated as pure "guesses," and for which later verbal reports produced accuracy close to chance. We replicated the procedure substituting Chevreul's pendulum rather than an Ouija board. We found that questions whose answer was previously rated as a guess, were answered equally well and at about chance levels by ideomotor action and verbal responses. Thus, one cannot presume that ideomotor action rather than verbal report will allow greater knowledge to be expressed in any particular context, including therefore the hypnotherapy one. An ideomotor action may elicit only conscious knowledge. Further research is recommended to clarify this important issue.

Dynamic development of intuitions and explicit knowledge during implicit learning

Implicit learning refers to learning without conscious awareness of the content acquired. Theoretical frameworks of human cognition suggest that intuitions develop based on incomplete perceptions of regularity during implicit learning and, in turn, lead to the development of more explicit, consciously-accessible knowledge. Surprisingly, however, this putative information processing pathway (i.e., implicit learning ➔ intuition ➔ explicit knowledge) has yet to be empirically demonstrated. The present study investigated the relationship between implicit learning, intuitions, and explicit knowledge using a modified Serial Reaction Time Task. Results indicate that intuitions of implicitly-learned patterns emerge prior to the development of explicit knowledge. Moreover, intuition timing and accuracy were significantly associated with accuracy of explicit reports. We did not, however, find that stronger implicit learners developed more accurate intuitions. Our findings suggest a crucial role of intuition in the formation of explicit knowledge from implicit learning.

Cautious or causal? Key implicit sequence learning paradigms should not be overlooked when assessing the role of DLPFC (Commentary on Prutean et al.)

The role of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) in implicit sequence/statistical learning has received considerable attention in recent cognitive neuroscience research. Studies have used non-invasive brain stimulation methods to test whether the DLPFC plays a role in the incidental acquisition and expression of implicit sequence learning. In a recent study, Prutean et al. has concluded that stimulating the left or the right DLPFC might not affect the expression of implicit sequence learning measured by the Serial Reaction Time (SRT) task. The authors speculated that the previous results revealing improved implicit sequence learning following DLPFC stimulation might have been found because explicit awareness accumulated with the use of Alternating Serial Reaction Time (ASRT) task. Our response presents solid evidence that the ASRT task measures implicit sequence learning that remains unconscious both at the judgment and structural level. Therefore, contrary to the conclusion of Prutean et al., we argue that the DLPFC could have a crucial effect on implicit sequence learning that may be task-dependent. We suggest that future research should focus on the specific cognitive processes that may be differentially involved in the SRT versus ASRT tasks, and test what the role of the DLPFC is in those specific cognitive processes.

The gradual subjective consciousness fluctuation in implicit sequence learning and its relevant brain activity

Existing studies have investigated gradual subjective consciousnesses, guess, intuition, fluency, rule, and memory, and their fluctuation behavioral characteristics in implicit learning, but they did not investigate or elucidate the underlying brain mechanisms. Therefore, the current study asked participants to report subjective consciousnesses in each trial of inclusion and exclusion tasks after implicit sequence learning and used the eyes-closed and eyes-opened resting-states' fMRI to examine the relevant brain areas of the five gradual subjective consciousnesses and their fluctuation. The results showed that: (1) There were many relevant resting-state brain areas of the five gradual subjective consciousnesses to reveal their brain mechanisms. In the eyes-closed and eyes-opened resting states, as the participants' consciousness level was gradually increasing from guess to intuition, to fluency, to rule, and to memory, the positively-relevant brain areas correspondingly changed from somatic motor to a mixture of somatic motor, consciousness, emotion feeling, and implicit learning; and then to a mixture of visual, somatic motor, and consciousness; and then to a mixture of visual, somatic motor, and consciousness; and then to a mixture of visual, somatic motor, and consciousness. The negatively-relevant brain areas correspondingly changed from a mixture of visual, consciousness, somatic sensory, and implicit learning to a mixture of visual, somatic motor, somatic sensory, and other consciousness; and then to memory; and then to a mixture of other somatic motors; and then to a mixture of other consciousness and other somatic motors. However, in the amplitude of low frequency fluctuations (ALFFs)-difference, the relative directions of the guess and intuition were almost opposite to those in the eyes-closed and eyes-opened resting states. But the relative directions of the fluency, rule, and memory were consistent with those in the eyes-closed and eyes-opened resting states. (2) There were significant gradual subjective consciousness fluctuations, including the gradual subjective consciousness fluctuation-all M and SD. There were many relevant resting-state brain areas of gradual subjective consciousness fluctuations to reveal their brain mechanisms. The gradual subjective consciousness fluctuation M was positively related to Calcarine_R, Lingual_R, Lingual_R, Temporal_Pole_Mid_L, ParaHippocampal_L, Vermis_1_2, and Vermis_7; but was negatively related to Calcarine_R. The gradual subjective consciousness fluctuation-all SD was positively related to Parietal_Inf_L, Thalamus_L, Temporal_Mid_L, Vermis_9, Parietal_Inf_L, and Thalamus_L and Thalamus_R; but was negatively related to Rolandic_Oper_R, Rolandic_Oper_R, Insula_L, Insula_R, Cingulum_Post_L, and Temporal_Mid_L. The detailed function of the relevant brain areas of consciousness fluctuations needs further investigation. (3) ALFFs in eyes-closed and eyes-opened resting states and their ALFFs-difference could differently predict the five gradual subjective consciousnesses and their fluctuations, indicating that using the two resting states was necessary, and the ALFFs-difference was a new quantitative sensitivity index of the gradual subjective consciousnesses and their fluctuations.

The ecological validity of MET was favourable in sitting implicit sequence learning consciousness by eyes closed and eyes open resting states fMRI

The current study made participants sit to complete both the implicit sequence learning and the inclusion/exclusion tasks with the latter just after the former, and used eyes-closed and eyes-open resting states fMRI and their difference to test the ecological validity of the mutually exclusive theory (MET) in implicit-sequence-learning consciousness. (1) The behavioral and neuroimaging data did not support the process dissociation procedure, but did fit well with the MET. The correct inclusion-task response and the incorrect exclusion-task response were mutually exclusive with each other. The relevant brain areas of the two responses were either different or opposite in the eyes-closed and eyes-open resting-states and their difference. (2) ALFFs in eyes-closed and eyes-open resting-states and their difference were diversely related to the four MET knowledge in implicit sequence learning. The relevant brain areas of the four MET knowledge in the eyes-closed and eyes-open resting-state were the cerebral cortex responsible for vision, attention, cognitive control and consciousness, which could be called the upper consciousness network, and there were more relevant brain areas in the eyes-open resting-state than in the eye-closed resting-state.The relevant brain areas in ALFFs-difference were the subcortical nucleus responsible for sensory awareness, memory and implicit sequence learning, which could be called the lower consciousness network. ALFFs-difference could predict the four MET knowledge as a quantitative transition sensitivity index from internal feeling to external stimulus. (3) The relevant resting-state brain areas of the four MET knowledge were either different (for most brain areas, if some brain areas were related to one MET knowledge, they were not related to the other three MET knowledge) or opposite (for some brain areas, if some brain areas were positively related to one MET knowledge, they were negatively related to other MET knowledge). With the participants' control/consciousness level increasing from no-acquisition to controllable knowledge step by step, the positively relevant resting-state brain areas of the four MET knowledge changed from some consciousness network and the motor network, to some consciousness network and the implicit learning network, and then to some consciousness network; and the negatively relevant resting-state brain areas of the four MET knowledge changed from some consciousness network and visual perception network, to some consciousness network, then to some consciousness network and the motor network, and then to some consciousness network, the implicit learning network, and the motor network. In conclusion, the current study found the ecological validity of the MET was good in sitting posture and eyes-closed and eyes-open resting-states, ALFFs in eyes-closed and eyes-open resting-states and their difference could predict the four MET knowledge diversely, and the four MET knowledge had different or opposite relevant resting-state brain areas.

A Dual Simple Recurrent Network Model for Chunking and Abstract Processes in Sequence Learning

Although many studies have provided evidence that abstract knowledge can be acquired in artificial grammar learning, it remains unclear how abstract knowledge can be attained in sequence learning. To address this issue, we proposed a dual simple recurrent network (DSRN) model that includes a surface SRN encoding and predicting the surface properties of stimuli and an abstract SRN encoding and predicting the abstract properties of stimuli. The results of Simulations 1 and 2 showed that the DSRN model can account for learning effects in the serial reaction time (SRT) task under different conditions, and the manipulation of the contribution weight of each SRN accounted for the contribution of conscious and unconscious processes in inclusion and exclusion tests in previous studies. The results of human performance in Simulation 3 provided further evidence that people can implicitly learn both chunking and abstract knowledge in sequence learning, and the results of Simulation 3 confirmed that the DSRN model can account for how people implicitly acquire the two types of knowledge in sequence learning. These findings extend the learning ability of the SRN model and help understand how different types of knowledge can be acquired implicitly in sequence learning.

Divided attention does not affect the acquisition and consolidation of transitional probabilities

Statistical learning facilitates the efficient processing and prediction of environmental events and contributes to the acquisition of automatic behaviors. Whereas a minimal level of attention seems to be required for learning to occur, it is still unclear how acquisition and consolidation of statistical knowledge are affected when attention is divided during learning. To test the effect of divided attention on statistical learning and consolidation, ninety-six healthy young adults performed the Alternating Serial Reaction Time task in which they incidentally acquired second-order transitional probabilities. Half of the participants completed the task with a concurrent secondary intentional sequence learning task that was applied to the same stimulus stream. The other half of the participants performed the task without any attention manipulation. Performance was retested after a 12-h post-learning offline period. Half of each group slept during the delay, while the other half had normal daily activity, enabling us to test the effect of delay activity (sleep vs. wake) on the consolidation of statistical knowledge. Divided attention had no effect on statistical learning: The acquisition of second-order transitional probabilities was comparable with and without the secondary task. Consolidation was neither affected by divided attention: Statistical knowledge was similarly retained over the 12-h delay, irrespective of the delay activity. Our findings can contribute to a better understanding of the role of attentional processes in and the robustness of visuomotor statistical learning and consolidation.

Testing the Process Dissociation Procedure by Behavioral and Neuroimaging Data: The Establishment of the Mutually Exclusive Theory and the Improved PDP

The process dissociation procedure (PDP) of implicit sequence learning states that the correct inclusion-task response contains the incorrect exclusion-task response. However, there has been no research to test the hypothesis. The current study used a single variable (Stimulus Onset Asynchrony SOA: 850 ms vs. 1350 ms) between-subjects design, with pre-task resting-state fMRI, to test and improve the classical PDP to the mutually exclusive theory (MET). (1) Behavioral data and neuroimaging data demonstrated that the classical PDP has not been validated. In the SOA = 850 ms group, the correct inclusion-task response was at chance, but the incorrect exclusion-task response occurred greater than chance. In the SOA = 850 ms group, the two responses were not correlated, but in the SOA = 1,350 ms group and putting the two groups together, the two responses were in contrast to each other. In each group, brain areas whose amplitude of low frequency fluctuations (ALFFs) in the resting-state related to the two responses were either completely different or opposite to one another. However, the results were perfectly consistent with the MET proposed by the present study which suggests that the correct inclusion-task response is equal to the correct exclusion-task response is equal to C + A₁, and the incorrect exclusion-task response is equal to A₂. C denotes the controlled response and A₁ and A₂ denote two different automatic responses. (2) The improved PDP was proposed to categorize the 12 kinds of triplets as delineating four knowledge types, namely non-acquisition of knowledge, uncontrollable knowledge, half-controllable knowledge, and controllable knowledge with the MET. ALFFs in the resting-state could predict the four knowledge types of the improved PDP among two groups. The participants’ control of the four knowledge types (degree of consciousness) gradually improved. Correspondingly, the brain areas in the resting-state positively related to the four knowledge types, gradually changed from the sensory and motor network to the somatic sensorimotor network, and then to the implicit learning network, and then to the consciousness network. The brain areas in the resting-state negatively related to the four knowledge types gradually changed from the consciousness network to the sensory and motor network. As SOA increased, the brain areas associated with almost all the four knowledge types changed. (3) The inhomogeneous hypothesis of the MET is best suited to interpret behavioral and neuroimaging data; it states that the same components among the four knowledge types are not homogeneous, and the same knowledge types are not homogeneous between the two SOA groups.

Distinguishing the role of conscious and unconscious knowledge in evaluative conditioning

Evaluative conditioning (EC) refers to a change in liking of a conditioned stimulus (CS) subsequent to its repeated pairing with a valent stimulus (US). Two studies that bring new light on the highly debated question of the role of awareness in EC were conducted. We developed an innovative method motivated by higher order and integration theories of consciousness to distinguish between the role of conscious and unconscious knowledge about the pairings. On each trial of the awareness test, participants had to indicate the valence of the US associated with a given CS and to make a 'structural knowledge attribution' by reporting the basis of their response. Valence identification accuracy was used to evaluate knowledge while the knowledge attribution was used to measure the conscious status of knowledge. Memory attribution indicated conscious knowledge about the pairings while feeling-based and random attributions indicated unconscious knowledge. A meta-analysis of the two studies revealed that valence identification accuracy was above chance level for memory and feeling-based attributions but not for the random attribution. EC was found in the three attributions. While EC effect size was medium for the memory attribution it was small for feeling-based and random attributions. Moreover, Experiment 2 included a delayed test. EC was still present 24 h after the conditioning took place. The results obtained for memory and feeling-based attributions suggest that both conscious and unconscious knowledge may underlie EC. The results obtained for random attribution suggest that EC may also occur without any knowledge of US valence.

Speed or Accuracy Instructions During Skill Learning do not Affect the Acquired Knowledge

A crucial question in skill learning research is how instruction affects the performance or the underlying representations. Little is known about the effects of instructions on one critical aspect of skill learning, namely, picking-up statistical regularities. More specifically, the present study tests how prelearning speed or accuracy instructions affect the acquisition of non-adjacent second-order dependencies. We trained 2 groups of participants on an implicit probabilistic sequence learning task: one group focused on being fast and the other on being accurate. As expected, we detected a strong instruction effect: accuracy instruction resulted in a nearly errorless performance, and speed instruction caused short reaction times (RTs). Despite the differences in the average RTs and accuracy scores, we found a similar level of statistical learning performance in the training phase. After the training phase, we tested the 2 groups under the same instruction (focusing on both speed and accuracy), and they showed comparable performance, suggesting a similar level of underlying statistical representations. Our findings support that skill learning can result in robust representations, and they highlight that this form of knowledge may appear with almost errorless performance. Moreover, multiple sessions with different instructions enabled the separation of competence from performance.

Tracking the implicit acquisition of nonadjacent transitional probabilities by ERPs

The implicit acquisition of complex probabilistic regularities has been found to be crucial in numerous automatized cognitive abilities, including language processing and associative learning. However, it has not been completely elucidated how the implicit extraction of second-order nonadjacent transitional probabilities is reflected by neurophysiological processes. Therefore, this study investigated the sensitivity of event-related brain potentials (ERPs) to these probabilistic regularities embedded in a sequence of visual stimuli without providing explicit information on the structure of the stimulus stream. Healthy young adults (N = 32) performed a four-choice RT task that included a sequential regularity between nonadjacent trials yielding a complex transitional probability structure. ERPs were measured relative to both stimulus and response onset. RTs indicated the rapid acquisition of the sequential regularity and the transitional probabilities. The acquisition process was also tracked by the stimulus-locked and response-locked P3 component: The P3 peak was larger for the sequence than for the random stimuli, while the late P3 was larger for less probable than for more probable short-range relations among the random stimuli. According to the RT and P3 effects, sensitivity to the sequential regularity is assumed to be supported by the initial sensitivity to the transitional probabilities. These results suggest that stimulus-response contingencies on the probabilistic regularities of the ongoing stimulus context are implicitly mapped and constantly revised. Overall, this study (1) highlights the role of predictive processes during implicit memory formation, and (2) delineates a potential to gain further insight into the dynamics of implicit acquisition processes.

Implicit sequence learning of chunking and abstract structures

The current study investigated whether people can simultaneously acquire knowledge about concrete chunks and abstract structures in implicit sequence learning; and whether the degree of abstraction determines the conscious status of the acquired knowledge. We adopted three types of stimuli in a serial reaction time task in three experiments. The RT results indicated that people could simultaneously acquire knowledge about concrete chunks and abstract structures of the temporal sequence. Generation performance revealed that ability to control was mainly based on abstract structures rather than concrete chunks. Moreover, ability to control was not generally accompanied with awareness of knowing or knowledge, as measured by confidence ratings and attribution tests, confirming that people could control the use of unconscious knowledge of abstract structures. The results present a challenge to computational models and theories of implicit learning.

Tonal Symmetry Induces Fluency and Sense of Well-Formedness

Fluency influences grammaticality judgments of visually presented strings in artificial grammar learning (AGL). Of many potential sources that engender fluency, symmetry is considered to be an important factor. However, symmetry may function differently for visual and auditory stimuli, which present computationally different problems. Thus, the current study aimed to examine whether objectively manipulating fluency by speeding up perception (i.e., manipulating the inter-stimulus interval, ISI, between each syllable of a string) influenced judgments of tonal strings; and thus how symmetry-based fluency might influence judgments. In Experiment 1, with only a test phase, participants were required to give their preference ratings of tonal strings as a measurement of fluency. In experiment 2, participants were instructed to make grammaticality judgments after being incidentally trained on tonal symmetry. Results of Experiment 1 showed that tonal strings with shorter ISI were liked more than those with longer ISI while such difference was not found between symmetric and asymmetric strings without training. Additionally, Experiment 2 found both main effects of symmetry and ISI as well as an interaction. In particular, only asymmetric strings were more likely to be judged as grammatical when they were presented at a shorter ISI. Taken together, participants were sensitive to the fluency induced by the manipulation of ISI and sensitive to symmetry only after training. In sum, we conclude that objective speed influenced grammaticality judgments, implicit learning of tonal symmetry resulted in enhanced fluency, and that fluency may serve as a basis for grammaticality judgments.

Impact of Response Stimulus Interval on Transfer of Non-local Dependent Rules in Implicit Learning: An ERP Investigation

In the literature on implicit learning, controversy exists regarding whether the knowledge obtained from implicit sequence learning consists of context-bound superficial features or context-free structural rules. To explore the nature of implicit knowledge, event related potentials (ERP) recordings of participants’ performances in a non-local dependent transfer task under two response-stimulus-interval (RSI) conditions (250 and 750 ms) were obtained. In the behavioral data, a transfer effect was found in the 750 ms RSI condition but not in the 250 ms RSI condition, suggesting that a long RSI is the basis for the occurrence of non-local dependent transfer, as which might have provided enough reaction time for participants to process and capture the implicit rule. Moreover, P300 amplitude was found to be sensitive to the impact of RSI on the training process (i.e., the longer RSI elicited higher P300 amplitudes), while variations in both N200 (i.e., a significant increase) and P300 amplitudes (i.e., a significant decrease) were found to be related to the presence of a transfer effect. Our results supported the claim that implicit learning can involve abstract rule knowledge acquisition under an appropriate RSI condition, and that amplitude variation in early ERP components (i.e., N200 and P300) can be useful indexes of non-local dependent learning and transfer effects.

The implicit learning of metrical and non-metrical rhythms in blind and sighted adults

Forming temporal expectancies plays a crucial role in our survival as it allows us to identify the occurrence of temporal deviants that might signal potential dangers. The dynamic attending theory suggests that temporal expectancies are formed more readily for rhythms that imply a beat (i.e., metrical rhythms) compared to those that do not (i.e., nonmetrical rhythms). Moreover, metrical frameworks can be used to detect temporal deviants. Although several studies have demonstrated that congenital or early blindness correlates with modality-specific neural changes that reflect compensatory mechanisms, few have examined whether blind individuals show a learning advantage for auditory rhythms and whether learning can occur unintentionally and without awareness, that is, implicitly. We compared blind to sighted controls in their ability to implicitly learn metrical and nonmetrical auditory rhythms. We reasoned that the loss of sight in blindness might lead to improved sensitivity to rhythms and predicted that the blind learn rhythms more readily than the sighted. We further hypothesized that metrical rhythms are learned more readily than nonmetrical rhythms. Results partially confirmed our predictions; the blind group learned nonmetrical rhythms more readily than the sighted group but the blind group learned metrical rhythms less readily than the sighted group. Only the sighted group learned metrical rhythms more readily than nonmetrical rhythms. The blind group demonstrated awareness of the nonmetrical rhythms while learning was implicit for all other conditions. Findings suggest that improved deviant-sensitivity might have provided the blind group a learning advantage for nonmetrical rhythms. Future research could explore the plastic changes that affect deviance-detection and stimulus-specific adaptation in blindness.

Statistical learning leads to persistent memory: Evidence for one-year consolidation

Statistical learning is a robust mechanism of the brain that enables the extraction of environmental patterns, which is crucial in perceptual and cognitive domains. However, the dynamical change of processes underlying long-term statistical memory formation has not been tested in an appropriately controlled design. Here we show that a memory trace acquired by statistical learning is resistant to inference as well as to forgetting after one year. Participants performed a statistical learning task and were retested one year later without further practice. The acquired statistical knowledge was resistant to interference, since after one year, participants showed similar memory performance on the previously practiced statistical structure after being tested with a new statistical structure. These results could be key to understand the stability of long-term statistical knowledge.

Measuring strategic control in implicit learning: how and why?

Several methods have been developed for measuring the extent to which implicitly learned knowledge can be applied in a strategic, flexible manner. Examples include generation exclusion tasks in Serial Reaction Time (SRT) learning (Goschke, 1998; Destrebecqz and Cleeremans, 2001) and 2-grammar classification tasks in Artificial Grammar Learning (AGL; Dienes et al., 1995; Norman et al., 2011). Strategic control has traditionally been used as a criterion for determining whether acquired knowledge is conscious or unconscious, or which properties of knowledge are consciously available. In this paper I first summarize existing methods that have been developed for measuring strategic control in the SRT and AGL tasks. I then address some methodological and theoretical questions. Methodological questions concern choice of task, whether the measurement reflects inhibitory control or task switching, and whether or not strategic control should be measured on a trial-by-trial basis. Theoretical questions concern the rationale for including measurement of strategic control, what form of knowledge is strategically controlled, and how strategic control can be combined with subjective awareness measures.

Dissociating conscious and unconscious learning with objective and subjective measures

According to functionalist theories, consciousness can be defined by the functions that it serves and by the way it contributes to cognition. For example, when trying to establish dissociations between conscious and unconscious knowledge, conscious representations would be identified by the fact that they allow cognitive control or successful identification or recollection, assessed by verbal reports or forced-choice tasks. Even though the functionalist approach has brought about important dissociation results concerning conscious and unconscious cognition, critics emphasize that it does not account for the qualitative properties of conscious experience. Phenomenal theories are precisely based on the notion that conscious representations are such that it feels like something to have these representations. Thus, one way to assess conscious knowledge is to ask people, after they have produced a forced-choice response, to identify their mental states through the use of subjective confidence ratings, in which they discriminate between a complete guess and a response based on some feeling of knowing. However, these 2 approaches are not mutually exclusive. In this article, we review a series of studies showing that the joint use of objective judgments about some external stimuli and about one's own subjective knowledge concerning these stimuli, provides new insights into the putative dissociation between conscious and unconscious knowledge in learning.

Who learns more? Cultural differences in implicit sequence learning

Background

It is well documented that East Asians differ from Westerners in conscious perception and attention. However, few studies have explored cultural differences in unconscious processes such as implicit learning.

Methodology/Principal Findings

The global-local Navon letters were adopted in the serial reaction time (SRT) task, during which Chinese and British participants were instructed to respond to global or local letters, to investigate whether culture influences what people acquire in implicit sequence learning. Our results showed that from the beginning British expressed a greater local bias in perception than Chinese, confirming a cultural difference in perception. Further, over extended exposure, the Chinese learned the target regularity better than the British when the targets were global, indicating a global advantage for Chinese in implicit learning. Moreover, Chinese participants acquired greater unconscious knowledge of an irrelevant regularity than British participants, indicating that the Chinese were more sensitive to contextual regularities than the British.

Conclusions/Significance

The results suggest that cultural biases can profoundly influence both what people consciously perceive and unconsciously learn.

Subliminal understanding of negation: unconscious control by subliminal processing of word pairs

A series of five experiments investigated the extent of subliminal processing of negation. Participants were presented with a subliminal instruction to either pick or not pick an accompanying noun, followed by a choice of two nouns. By employing subjective measures to determine individual thresholds of subliminal priming, the results of these studies indicated that participants were able to identify the correct noun of the pair--even when the correct noun was specified by negation. Furthermore, using a grey-scale contrast method of masking, Experiment 5 confirmed that these priming effects were evidenced in the absence of partial awareness, and without the effect being attributed to the retrieval of stimulus-response links established during conscious rehearsal.

Explicit feedback maintains implicit knowledge

The role of feedback was investigated with respect to conscious and unconscious knowledge acquired during artificial grammar learning (AGL). After incidental learning of training sequences, participants classified further sequences in terms of grammaticality and reported their decision strategy with or without explicit veridical feedback. Sequences that disobeyed the learning structure conformed to an alternative structure. Feedback led to an increase in the amount of reported conscious knowledge of structure (derived rules and recollections) but did not increase its accuracy. Conversely, feedback maintained the accuracy of unconscious knowledge of structure (intuition or familiarity-based responses) which otherwise degraded. Results support a dual-process account of AGL. They suggest that implicit learning of the to-be-rejected structure at test contaminates familiarity-based classifications whereas feedback allows competing familiarity signals to be contextualised, which is incompatible with theories that consider familiarity context-insensitive.

Unconscious learning processes: mental integration of verbal and pictorial instructional materials

This review aims to provide an insight into human learning processes by examining the role of cognitive and emotional unconscious processing in mentally integrating visual and verbal instructional materials. Reviewed literature shows that conscious mental integration does not happen all the time, nor does it necessarily result in optimal learning. Students of all ages and levels of experience cannot always have conscious awareness, control, and the intention to learn or promptly and continually organize perceptual, cognitive, and emotional processes of learning. This review suggests considering the role of unconscious learning processes to enhance the understanding of how students form or activate mental associations between verbal and pictorial information. The understanding would assist in presenting students with spatially-integrated verbal and pictorial instructional materials as a way of facilitating mental integration and improving teaching and learning performance.

Unconscious learning processes: mental integration of verbal and pictorial instructional materials

This review aims to provide an insight into human learning processes by examining the role of cognitive and emotional unconscious processing in mentally integrating visual and verbal instructional materials. Reviewed literature shows that conscious mental integration does not happen all the time, nor does it necessarily result in optimal learning. Students of all ages and levels of experience cannot always have conscious awareness, control, and the intention to learn or promptly and continually organize perceptual, cognitive, and emotional processes of learning. This review suggests considering the role of unconscious learning processes to enhance the understanding of how students form or activate mental associations between verbal and pictorial information. The understanding would assist in presenting students with spatially-integrated verbal and pictorial instructional materials as a way of facilitating mental integration and improving teaching and learning performance.

Negative affect reduces performance in implicit sequence learning

Background

It is well documented that positive rather than negative moods encourage integrative processing of conscious information. However, the extent to which implicit or unconscious learning can be influenced by affective states remains unclear.

Methodology/Principal Findings

A Serial Reaction Time (SRT) task with sequence structures requiring integration over past trials was adopted to examine the effect of affective states on implicit learning. Music was used to induce and maintain positive and negative affective states. The present study showed that participants in negative rather than positive states learned less of the regularity. Moreover, the knowledge was shown by a Bayesian analysis to be largely unconscious as participants were poor at recognizing the regularity.

Conclusions/Significance

The results demonstrated that negative rather than positive affect inhibited implicit learning of complex structures. Our findings help to understand the effects of affective states on unconscious or implicit processing.

Implicit learning of recursive context-free grammars

Context-free grammars are fundamental for the description of linguistic syntax. However, most artificial grammar learning experiments have explored learning of simpler finite-state grammars, while studies exploring context-free grammars have not assessed awareness and implicitness. This paper explores the implicit learning of context-free grammars employing features of hierarchical organization, recursive embedding and long-distance dependencies. The grammars also featured the distinction between left- and right-branching structures, as well as between centre- and tail-embedding, both distinctions found in natural languages. People acquired unconscious knowledge of relations between grammatical classes even for dependencies over long distances, in ways that went beyond learning simpler relations (e.g. n-grams) between individual words. The structural distinctions drawn from linguistics also proved important as performance was greater for tail-embedding than centre-embedding structures. The results suggest the plausibility of implicit learning of complex context-free structures, which model some features of natural languages. They support the relevance of artificial grammar learning for probing mechanisms of language learning and challenge existing theories and computational models of implicit learning.

Social intuition as a form of implicit learning: Sequences of body movements are learned less explicitly than letter sequences

In the current paper, we first evaluate the suitability of traditional serial reaction time (SRT) and artificial grammar learning (AGL) experiments for measuring implicit learning of social signals. We then report the results of a novel sequence learning task which combines aspects of the SRT and AGL paradigms to meet our suggested criteria for how implicit learning experiments can be adapted to increase their relevance to situations of social intuition. The sequences followed standard finite-state grammars. Sequence learning and consciousness of acquired knowledge were compared between 2 groups of 24 participants viewing either sequences of individually presented letters or sequences of body-posture pictures, which were described as series of yoga movements. Participants in both conditions showed above-chance classification accuracy, indicating that sequence learning had occurred in both stimulus conditions. This shows that sequence learning can still be found when learning procedures reflect the characteristics of social intuition. Rule awareness was measured using trial-by-trial evaluation of decision strategy (Dienes & Scott, 2005; Scott & Dienes, 2008). For letters, sequence classification was best on trials where participants reported responding on the basis of explicit rules or memory, indicating some explicit learning in this condition. For body-posture, classification was not above chance on these types of trial, but instead showed a trend to be best on those trials where participants reported that their responses were based on intuition, familiarity, or random choice, suggesting that learning was more implicit. Results therefore indicate that the use of traditional stimuli in research on sequence learning might underestimate the extent to which learning is implicit in domains such as social learning, contributing to ongoing debate about levels of conscious awareness in implicit learning.

Measuring strategic control in artificial grammar learning

In response to concerns with existing procedures for measuring strategic control over implicit knowledge in artificial grammar learning (AGL), we introduce a more stringent measurement procedure. After two separate training blocks which each consisted of letter strings derived from a different grammar, participants either judged the grammaticality of novel letter strings with respect to only one of these two grammars (pure-block condition), or had the target grammar varying randomly from trial to trial (novel mixed-block condition) which required a higher degree of conscious flexible control. Random variation in the colour and font of letters was introduced to disguise the nature of the rule and reduce explicit learning. Strategic control was observed both in the pure-block and mixed-block conditions, and even among participants who did not realise the rule was based on letter identity. This indicated detailed strategic control in the absence of explicit learning.

The distinction between intuition and guessing in the SRT task generation: a reply to Norman and Price

We (Fu, Dienes, & Fu, 2010) investigated the extent to which people could generate sequences of responses based on knowledge acquired from the Serial Reaction Time task, depending on whether it felt subjectively like the response was based on pure guessing, intuition, conscious rules or memories. Norman and Price (2010) argued that in the context of our task, intuition responses were the same as guessing responses. In reply, we argue that not only do subjects apparently claim to be experiencing different phenomenologies when saying intuition versus guess, but also intuition and guess responses are associated with different behaviors. We found that people could control the knowledge when generating responses felt to be based on intuition but not those felt to be pure guessing. We present further evidence here that triplets associated with intuition but not guessing were also processed fluently.