Acquisition of conscious and unconscious knowledge of semantic prosody

The role of exposure condition, awareness and item type in developing implicit and explicit knowledge of collocational rules

This study expands on previous SLA research by focusing on learning collocational rules. The study also explores the interaction between exposure conditions, awareness, and item-related variables in the context of collocation learning. Chinese learners of English were exposed to sentences from large corpora, featuring four target node verbs (replaced with pseudowords) and their respective noun collocates. There are two pairs of novel verbs with different L1-L2 congruencies in the experimental material. Participants were divided into incidental and intentional groups. The learning effectiveness was assessed through a plausibility judgment test (PJT), which included trained, new, and swapped items. Awareness of the underlying rules was measured using source attributions, retrospective verbal reports, and posttest thinking aloud. The results revealed that participants acquired both explicit and implicit knowledge of collocational rules. Rule-searching led to greater explicit knowledge but did not improve overall learning outcomes. Additionally, an interaction was observed among awareness, rule type, and test type. As the difficulty level increased in terms of L1-L2 congruency or item type, the importance of awareness in meeting the learning demands also increased.

Implicit learning of semantic preferences of English words by Chinese learners

The aim of the present study was to explore whether Chinese learners could implicitly learn the semantic preferences of novel English words. In training, participants learned four novel verbs and were exposed to a set of verb-noun phrases that included these new words. What the participants were not told was that the use of the verbs depended on the concreteness of the nouns (i.e., the semantic preference rule). In testing, participants were required to choose between two possible verbs (one of which violated the semantic preference rule) for nouns that never occurred in training. The results showed that participants acquired unconscious knowledge of semantic preferences under incidental learning conditions, as measured by verbal reports and structural knowledge attributions. Our results provide further evidence for implicit learning of semantic preferences, suggesting that implicit learning is an important mechanism in the acquisition of L2 collocations.

Implicit learning of symmetry of human movement and gray matter density: Evidence against pure domain general and pure domain specific theories of implicit learning

Theories of the neural basis of implicit learning postulated that specific regions were responsible for specific structures (e.g., supra-finite state) regardless of domain (e.g., vision, movement); others assumed that implicit learning was the adaptation that occurred within neural regions dealing with each domain. We explored whether people could implicitly learn to detect symmetry in biological motion, and if so, based on voxel-based morphometry (VBM), whether the learning was associated with language-related regions involved with supra-finite state grammars (such as symmetry) or motor-related regions. To explore the relevance of motor-related regions, we investigated brain structural changes in athletes compared with non-athletes and the advantage of athletes in implicit learning of action symmetry. Further, we examined whether motor imagery ability could account for the role of motor-related regions in this learning. Participants passively observed and memorized a number of biological motion sequences instantiating a symmetry rule and then judged new sequences as grammatical or not. Behaviorally, the implicit acquisition of symmetry could extend to process biological motion. Athletes showed superior classification accuracy and kinesthetic imagery ability, and gave more familiarity attributions. VBM results showed that athletes exhibited greater gray matter density in the right cerebellum, as well as the left lingual gyrus, the left precuneus, the left calcarine gyrus, and the right thalamus. Correlation analysis showed that the cerebellar gray matter density was positively associated with classification accuracy, which was mediated by kinesthetic imagery ability. Moreover, gray matter density of the left inferior frontal cortex was also positively associated with classification accuracy, indicating the involvement of regions related to symmetry learning across domains. The study provides initial evidence that implicit learning involves both adaptation within brain regions responsible for the specific domain as well as brain regions processing the same structure across domains, at least in a case of supra-finite state grammars.

Cross-cultural differences in implicit learning of chunks versus symmetries

Three experiments explore whether knowledge of grammars defining global versus local regularities has an advantage in implicit acquisition and whether this advantage is affected by cultural differences. Participants were asked to listen to and memorize a number of strings of 10 syllables instantiating an inversion (i.e. a global pattern); after the training phase, they were required to judge whether new strings were well formed. In Experiment 1, Western people implicitly acquired the inversion rule defined over the Chinese tones in a similar way as Chinese participants when alternative structures (specifically, chunking and repetition structures) were controlled. In Experiments 2 and 3, we directly pitted knowledge of the inversion (global) against chunk (local) knowledge, and found that Chinese participants had a striking global advantage in implicit learning, which was greater than that of Western participants. Taken together, we show for the first time cross-cultural differences in the type of regularities implicitly acquired.

Interacting Effects of Instructions and Presentation Rate on Visual Statistical Learning

The statistical regularities of a sequence of visual shapes can be learned incidentally. Arciuli et al. (2014) recently argued that intentional instructions only improve learning at slow presentation rates as they favor the use of explicit strategies. The aim of the present study was (1) to test this assumption directly by investigating how instructions (incidental vs. intentional) and presentation rate (fast vs. slow) affect the acquisition of knowledge and (2) to examine how these factors influence the conscious vs. unconscious nature of the knowledge acquired. To this aim, we exposed participants to four triplets of shapes, presented sequentially in a pseudo-random order, and assessed their degree of learning in a subsequent completion task that integrated confidence judgments. Supporting Arciuli et al.’s (2014) claim, participant performance only benefited from intentional instructions at slow presentation rates. Moreover, informing participants beforehand about the existence of statistical regularities increased their explicit knowledge of the sequences, an effect that was not modulated by presentation speed. These results support that, although visual statistical learning can take place incidentally and, to some extent, outside conscious awareness, factors such as presentation rate and prior knowledge can boost learning of these regularities, presumably by favoring the acquisition of explicit knowledge.

The neural basis of implicit learning of task-irrelevant Chinese tonal sequence

The present study sought to investigate the neural basis of implicit learning of task-irrelevant perceptual sequence. A novel SRT task, the serial syllable identification task (SSI task), was used in which the participants were asked to recognize which one of two Chinese syllables was presented. The tones of the syllables were irrelevant to the task but followed an underlying structured sequence. Participants were scanned while they performed the SSI task. Results showed that, at the behavioral level, faster RTs for the sequential material indicated that task-irrelevant sequence knowledge could be learned. In the subsequent prediction test of knowledge of the tonal cues using subjective measures, we found that the knowledge was obtained unconsciously. At the neural level, the left caudate, bilateral hippocampus and bilateral superior parietal lobule were engaged during the sequence condition relative to the random condition. Further analyses revealed that greater learning-related activation (relative to random) in the right caudate nucleus, bilateral hippocampus and left superior parietal lobule were found during the second half of the training phase compared with the first half. When people reported that they were guessing, the magnitude of the right hippocampus and left superior parietal lobule activations was positively related to the accuracy of prediction test, which was significantly better than chance. Together, the present results indicated that the caudate, hippocampus and superior parietal lobule played critical roles in the implicit perceptual sequence learning even when the perceptual features were task irrelevant.

Role of prior knowledge in implicit and explicit learning of artificial grammars

Artificial grammar learning (AGL) performance reflects both implicit and explicit processes and has typically been modeled without incorporating any influence from general world knowledge. Our research provides a systematic investigation of the implicit vs. explicit nature of general knowledge and its interaction with knowledge types investigated by past AGL research (i.e., rule- and similarity-based knowledge). In an AGL experiment, a general knowledge manipulation involved expectations being either congruent or incongruent with training stimulus structure. Inconsistent observations paradoxically led to an advantage in structural knowledge and in the use of general world knowledge in both explicit (conscious) and implicit (unconscious) cases (as assessed by subjective measures). The above findings were obtained under conditions of reduced processing time and impaired executive resources. Key findings from our work are that implicit AGL can clearly be affected by general knowledge, and implicit learning can be enhanced by the violation of expectations.

Altered resting functional connectivity of expressive language regions after speed reading training

A goal of interventions designed to increase reading speed is to reduce the practice of articulating words in an individual's thoughts, or subvocalization. This practice may require redundant cognitive resources, slow reading speed, and detract from efficient transfer of written words to semantic understanding. It is unclear, however, whether exercises designed to promote faster reading speed generalize to cognitive function beyond the reading task itself. To investigate this possibility, we measured resting state functional connectivity in classical language regions before and after a course of cognitive exercise designed to increase reading speed in 9 healthy adolescent female volunteers. We found significantly decreased correlation between left Broca area and right Broca homologue and between right Broca homologue and right Wernicke homologue in the resting state after the training period compared to before training. Differences in functional connectivity after training to left Broca area showed a spatial distribution reflecting decreased correlation to memory-associated brain regions and increased correlation to auditory regions, which might be consistent with a hypothesis that such training may decrease subvocalization associated with semantic memory function during the resting state.

The nature of the memory buffer in implicit learning: learning Chinese tonal symmetries

Previous research has established that people can implicitly learn chunks, which (in terms of formal language theory) do not require a memory buffer to process. The present study explores the implicit learning of nonlocal dependencies generated by higher than finite-state grammars, specifically, Chinese tonal retrogrades (i.e. centre embeddings generated from a context-free grammar) and inversions (i.e. cross-serial dependencies generated from a mildly context-sensitive grammar), which do require buffers (for example, last in-first out and first in-first out, respectively). People were asked to listen to and memorize artificial poetry instantiating one of the two grammars; after this training phase, people were informed of the existence of rules and asked to classify new poems, while providing attributions of the basis of their judgments. People acquired unconscious structural knowledge of both tonal retrogrades and inversions. Moreover, inversions were implicitly learnt more easily than retrogrades constraining the nature of the memory buffer in computational models of implicit learning.

Bidirectional transfer between metaphorical related domains in implicit learning of form-meaning connections

People can implicitly learn a connection between linguistic forms and meanings, for example between specific determiners (e.g. this, that…) and the type of nouns to which they apply. Li et al (2013) recently found that transfer of form-meaning connections from a concrete domain (height) to an abstract domain (power) was achieved in a metaphor-consistent way without awareness, showing that unconscious knowledge can be abstract and flexibly deployed. The current study aims to determine whether people transfer knowledge of form-meaning connections not only from a concrete domain to an abstract one, but also vice versa, consistent with metaphor representation being bi-directional. With a similar paradigm as used by Li et al, participants learnt form- meaning connections of different domains (concrete vs. abstract) and then were tested on two kinds of generalizations (same and different domain generalization). As predicted, transfer of form-meaning connections occurred bidirectionally when structural knowledge was unconscious. Moreover, the present study also revealed that more transfer occurred between metaphorically related domains when judgment knowledge was conscious (intuition) rather than unconscious (guess). Conscious and unconscious judgment knowledge may have different functional properties.

Explicit feedback maintains implicit knowledge

The role of feedback was investigated with respect to conscious and unconscious knowledge acquired during artificial grammar learning (AGL). After incidental learning of training sequences, participants classified further sequences in terms of grammaticality and reported their decision strategy with or without explicit veridical feedback. Sequences that disobeyed the learning structure conformed to an alternative structure. Feedback led to an increase in the amount of reported conscious knowledge of structure (derived rules and recollections) but did not increase its accuracy. Conversely, feedback maintained the accuracy of unconscious knowledge of structure (intuition or familiarity-based responses) which otherwise degraded. Results support a dual-process account of AGL. They suggest that implicit learning of the to-be-rejected structure at test contaminates familiarity-based classifications whereas feedback allows competing familiarity signals to be contextualised, which is incompatible with theories that consider familiarity context-insensitive.

Unconscious learning processes: mental integration of verbal and pictorial instructional materials

This review aims to provide an insight into human learning processes by examining the role of cognitive and emotional unconscious processing in mentally integrating visual and verbal instructional materials. Reviewed literature shows that conscious mental integration does not happen all the time, nor does it necessarily result in optimal learning. Students of all ages and levels of experience cannot always have conscious awareness, control, and the intention to learn or promptly and continually organize perceptual, cognitive, and emotional processes of learning. This review suggests considering the role of unconscious learning processes to enhance the understanding of how students form or activate mental associations between verbal and pictorial information. The understanding would assist in presenting students with spatially-integrated verbal and pictorial instructional materials as a way of facilitating mental integration and improving teaching and learning performance.

Unconscious learning processes: mental integration of verbal and pictorial instructional materials

This review aims to provide an insight into human learning processes by examining the role of cognitive and emotional unconscious processing in mentally integrating visual and verbal instructional materials. Reviewed literature shows that conscious mental integration does not happen all the time, nor does it necessarily result in optimal learning. Students of all ages and levels of experience cannot always have conscious awareness, control, and the intention to learn or promptly and continually organize perceptual, cognitive, and emotional processes of learning. This review suggests considering the role of unconscious learning processes to enhance the understanding of how students form or activate mental associations between verbal and pictorial information. The understanding would assist in presenting students with spatially-integrated verbal and pictorial instructional materials as a way of facilitating mental integration and improving teaching and learning performance.

The speed of metacognition: taking time to get to know one's structural knowledge

The time course of different metacognitive experiences of knowledge was investigated using artificial grammar learning. Experiment 1 revealed that when participants are aware of the basis of their judgments (conscious structural knowledge) decisions are made most rapidly, followed by decisions made with conscious judgment but without conscious knowledge of underlying structure (unconscious structural knowledge), and guess responses (unconscious judgment knowledge) were made most slowly, even when controlling for differences in confidence and accuracy. In experiment 2, short response deadlines decreased the accuracy of unconscious but not conscious structural knowledge. Conversely, the deadline decreased the proportion of conscious structural knowledge in favour of guessing. Unconscious structural knowledge can be applied rapidly but becomes more reliable with additional metacognitive processing time whereas conscious structural knowledge is an all-or-nothing response that cannot always be applied rapidly. These dissociations corroborate quite separate theories of recognition (dual-process) and metacognition (higher order thought and cross-order integration).

Implicit learning of recursive context-free grammars

Context-free grammars are fundamental for the description of linguistic syntax. However, most artificial grammar learning experiments have explored learning of simpler finite-state grammars, while studies exploring context-free grammars have not assessed awareness and implicitness. This paper explores the implicit learning of context-free grammars employing features of hierarchical organization, recursive embedding and long-distance dependencies. The grammars also featured the distinction between left- and right-branching structures, as well as between centre- and tail-embedding, both distinctions found in natural languages. People acquired unconscious knowledge of relations between grammatical classes even for dependencies over long distances, in ways that went beyond learning simpler relations (e.g. n-grams) between individual words. The structural distinctions drawn from linguistics also proved important as performance was greater for tail-embedding than centre-embedding structures. The results suggest the plausibility of implicit learning of complex context-free structures, which model some features of natural languages. They support the relevance of artificial grammar learning for probing mechanisms of language learning and challenge existing theories and computational models of implicit learning.

Conscious and unconscious thought in artificial grammar learning

Unconscious Thought Theory posits that a period of distraction after information acquisition leads to unconscious processing which enhances decision making relative to conscious deliberation or immediate choice (Dijksterhuis, 2004). Support thus far has been mixed. In the present study, artificial grammar learning was used in order to produce measurable amounts of conscious and unconscious knowledge. Intermediate phases were introduced between training and testing. Participants engaged in conscious deliberation of grammar rules, were distracted for the same period of time, or progressed immediately from training to testing. No differences in accuracy were found between intermediate phase groups acting on decisions made with meta-cognitive awareness (either feeling-based intuitive responding or conscious rule- or recollection-based responding). However, the accuracy of guess responses was significantly higher after distraction relative to immediate progression or conscious deliberation. The results suggest any beneficial effects of 'unconscious thought' may not always transfer to conscious awareness.

No-loss gambling shows the speed of the unconscious

This paper investigates the time it takes unconscious vs. conscious knowledge to form by using an improved "no-loss gambling" method to measure awareness of knowing. Subjects could either bet on a transparently random process or on their grammaticality judgment in an artificial grammar learning task. A conflict in the literature is resolved concerning whether unconscious rather than conscious knowledge is especially fast or slow to form. When guessing (betting on a random process), accuracy was above chance and RTs were longer than when feeling confident (betting on the grammaticality decision). In a second experiment, short response deadlines only interfered with the quality of confident decisions (betting on grammaticality). When people are unaware of their knowledge, externally enforced decisions can be made rapidly with little decline in quality; but if given ample time, they await a metacognitive process to complete. The dissociation validates no-loss gambling as a measure of conscious awareness.

It's not what you say but the way that you say it: an fMRI study of differential lexical and non-lexical prosodic pitch processing

BACKGROUND

This study aims to identify the neural substrate involved in prosodic pitch processing. Functional magnetic resonance imaging was used to test the premise that prosody pitch processing is primarily subserved by the right cortical hemisphere.Two experimental paradigms were used, firstly pairs of spoken sentences, where the only variation was a single internal phrase pitch change, and secondly, a matched condition utilizing pitch changes within analogous tone-sequence phrases. This removed the potential confounder of lexical evaluation. fMRI images were obtained using these paradigms.

RESULTS

Activation was significantly greater within the right frontal and temporal cortices during the tone-sequence stimuli relative to the sentence stimuli.

CONCLUSION

This study showed that pitch changes, stripped of lexical information, are mainly processed by the right cerebral hemisphere, whilst the processing of analogous, matched, lexical pitch change is preferentially left sided. These findings, showing hemispherical differentiation of processing based on stimulus complexity, are in accord with a 'task dependent' hypothesis of pitch processing.