1
|
Wong CY, Cedillo AH, Morsella E. The priming of stimulus-elicited involuntary mental imagery. Acta Psychol (Amst) 2024; 246:104250. [PMID: 38615596 DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2024.104250] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/17/2023] [Revised: 03/16/2024] [Accepted: 04/08/2024] [Indexed: 04/16/2024] Open
Abstract
Percepts, urges, and even high-level cognitions often enter the conscious field involuntarily. The Reflexive Imagery Task (RIT) was designed to investigate experimentally the nature of such entry into consciousness. In the most basic version of the task, participants are instructed not to subvocalize the names of visual objects. Involuntary subvocalizations arise on the majority of the trials. Can these effects be influenced by priming? In our experiment, participants were exposed to an auditory prime 300 ms before being presented with the RIT stimuli. For example, participants heard the word "FOOD" before seeing two RIT stimuli (e.g., line drawings of BANANA and CAT, with the former being the target of the prime). The short span between prime and target allowed us to assess whether the RIT effect is strategic or automatic. Before each trial, participants were instructed to disregard what they hear, and not to think of the name of any of the objects. On an average of 83% of the trials, the participants thought (involuntarily) of the name of the object associated with the prime. This is the first study to use a priming technique within the context of the RIT. The theoretical implications of these involuntary effects are discussed.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Christina Y Wong
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States of America
| | | | - Ezequiel Morsella
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States of America; Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco, United States of America.
| |
Collapse
|
2
|
Wright-Wilson L, Elsabbagh T, Morsella E. Stimulus-elicited involuntary autobiographical memories. Acta Psychol (Amst) 2024; 245:104212. [PMID: 38492356 DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2024.104212] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/30/2023] [Revised: 02/17/2024] [Accepted: 03/07/2024] [Indexed: 03/18/2024] Open
Abstract
The reflexive imagery task (RIT) has been used to investigate stimulus-elicited involuntary mental processes. The task has been successful in eliciting involuntary perceptual experiences, urges, and even higher-order cognitions, but it has never been used to elicit autobiographical memories, even though in everyday life these memories are often activated involuntarily by external stimuli. These memories are different in interesting ways from the kinds of mental representations that have been activated involuntarily in the RIT. The memories have properties which might make them insusceptible to such a form of external influence. Perhaps substantive effects will not arise because the mental representations associated with autobiographical memories are complex, poly-sensory, and rich in terms of content. To investigate this matter, we developed a variant of the RIT in which participants were presented with external stimuli (line drawings of everyday objects) and instructed not to recall any autobiographical memories. We investigated whether the nature of the involuntary memories was influenced by the nature of the stimulus. In two experiments, the involuntary memories were associated to the stimulus on a majority of the trials (∼80%). We discuss theoretical implications of this finding and of identifying the conditions in which such involuntary effects will not arise. The boundary conditions of the RIT effect illuminate the limits of unconscious processing and also the role of conscious processing in nervous function.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Latoya Wright-Wilson
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States of America
| | - Tala Elsabbagh
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States of America
| | - Ezequiel Morsella
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States of America; Neuroscape, Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco, United States of America.
| |
Collapse
|
3
|
Elsabbagh T, Wright-Wilson L, Brauer S, Morsella E. The habituation of higher-order conscious processes: Evidence from mental arithmetic. Acta Psychol (Amst) 2023; 236:103922. [PMID: 37167660 DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2023.103922] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/01/2022] [Revised: 03/21/2023] [Accepted: 04/17/2023] [Indexed: 05/13/2023] Open
Abstract
A recurring idea in psychology is that one is conscious only of the "outputs" of mental operations, but not of the operations themselves. Often, such "entry into consciousness" occurs involuntarily. To investigate involuntary entry, some experimentalists have used the reflexive imagery task (RIT). The RIT has revealed that, under certain conditions, external stimuli (e.g., line drawings) can elicit involuntary entry of high-level cognitions. In the basic version of the task, participants are presented with visual objects and instructed not to subvocalize (i.e., say in one's head) the names of these objects. Participants cannot suppress these subvocalizations on a majority of the trials. It has been proposed that, if RIT effects resemble a reflex, then perhaps they will habituate as reflexes do. In the "habituation" variant of the RIT, the same stimulus object (e.g., CAT) is presented on ten consecutive trials (ten "instantiations"), in order to induce habituation (i.e., a weakened RIT effect). It remains unknown whether such habituation effects arise for stimulus-elicited processes that depend, not on subvocalization, but on more complex processes, such as mental arithmetic. To illuminate this issue, we conducted a conceptual replication of the "habituation" RIT that involves, on each trial, the participant trying not to add two numbers (e.g., 14 and 2). We assessed whether the habituation effects were stimulus-specific or set-specific. Understanding the boundary conditions of the RIT effect and its habituation illuminates the limits of unconscious processes and the role of conscious processing.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Tala Elsabbagh
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States of America
| | - Latoya Wright-Wilson
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States of America
| | - Sarah Brauer
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States of America
| | - Ezequiel Morsella
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States of America; Neuroscape, Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco, United States of America.
| |
Collapse
|
4
|
Velasquez AG, Yankulova JK, White NA, Gazzaley A, Morsella E. Involuntary refreshing of mental representations. Acta Psychol (Amst) 2023; 232:103819. [PMID: 36571895 DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2022.103819] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/13/2021] [Revised: 11/30/2022] [Accepted: 12/16/2022] [Indexed: 12/25/2022] Open
Abstract
Laboratory tasks have revealed that mental representations (e.g., mental imagery) can enter consciousness in a manner that is involuntary, reliable, and insuppressible. These effects illuminate the capacities of involuntary processes as well as the function of voluntary, conscious processing. The Reflexive Imagery Task was developed a decade ago to investigate these involuntary effects systematically. Can refreshing yield such involuntary effects? Refreshing is the reactivating in mind of a mental representation that was activated moments ago. It is associated with mental rehearsal and executive function. We investigated whether a mental representation (subvocalization of an object name) can arise in consciousness involuntarily after a delayed interval, when the relevant stimulus is no longer present, and in response to a cue. In Experiment 1, participants were instructed not to refresh a previously presented (6 s before) stimulus in response to a cue. Involuntary refreshing occurred on a substantive proportion (0.56) of the trials. Experiment 2 replicated and extended this finding (proportion of the trials = 0.53) with a refreshing task that was more challenging than that of Experiment 1. Our findings suggest that mental representations arising from processes such as refreshing can occur involuntarily. We discuss the theoretical implications of this conclusion.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Anthony G Velasquez
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States of America
| | - Jessica K Yankulova
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States of America
| | - Nathan A White
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States of America
| | - Adam Gazzaley
- Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco, United States of America; Departments of Psychiatry and Physiology, University of California, San Francisco, United States of America
| | - Ezequiel Morsella
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States of America; Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco, United States of America.
| |
Collapse
|
5
|
Yankulova JK, Zacher LM, Velasquez AG, Dou W, Morsella E. Insuppressible cognitions in the reflexive imagery task: Insights and future directions. Front Psychol 2022; 13:957359. [PMID: 36312094 PMCID: PMC9596936 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.957359] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/31/2022] [Accepted: 08/24/2022] [Indexed: 12/03/2022] Open
Abstract
In 1959, Neal Miller made the bold claim that the Stimulus-Response, Behaviorist models of that era were describing the way in which stimuli lead to the entry of contents into consciousness ("entry," for short). Today, researchers have begun to investigate the link between external stimuli and involuntary entry, using paradigms such as the reflexive imagery task (RIT), the focus of our review. The RIT has revealed that stimuli can elicit insuppressible entry of high-level cognitions. Knowledge of the boundary conditions of the RIT effect illuminates the limitations of involuntary processes and the role of consciousness in the regulation of behavior. We review the boundary conditions of this paradigm as well as its systematic effects. Systematic effects are unlikely to be due to experimental demand. While reviewing each effect, we consider its theoretical implications. In addition, throughout our review, we discuss future directions for the study of insuppressible entry using the RIT. Last, we discuss a theoretical development (passive frame theory) that stems from the RIT and illuminates how involuntary entry and encapsulation, though at times disadvantageous for the actor, are essential for adaptive action selection during the course of ontogeny.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Jessica K. Yankulova
- Department of Neurosurgery, Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, CA, United States
| | - Lisa Moreno Zacher
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, CA, United States
| | - Anthony G. Velasquez
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, CA, United States
| | - Wei Dou
- Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA, United States
| | - Ezequiel Morsella
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, CA, United States
- Neuroscape, Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, United States
| |
Collapse
|
6
|
Velasquez AG, Gazzaley A, Toyoda H, Ziegler DA, Morsella E. The Generation of Involuntary Mental Imagery in an Ecologically-Valid Task. Front Psychol 2021; 12:759685. [PMID: 34744937 PMCID: PMC8570302 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.759685] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/16/2021] [Accepted: 09/20/2021] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Laboratory tasks (e.g., the flanker task) reveal that incidental stimuli (e.g., distractors) can reliably trigger involuntary conscious imagery. Can such involuntary effects, involving competing representations, arise during dual-task conditions? Another concern about these laboratory tasks is whether such effects arise in highly ecologically-valid conditions. For example, do these effects arise from tasks involving dynamic stimuli (e.g., simulations of semi-automated driving experiences)? The data from our experiment suggest that the answer to our two questions is yes. Subjects were presented with video footage of the kinds of events that one would observe if one were seated in the driver's seat of a semi-automated vehicle. Before being presented with this video footage, subjects had been trained to respond to street signs according to laboratory techniques that cause stimulus-elicited involuntary imagery. After training, in the Respond condition, subjects responded to the signs; in the Suppress condition, subjects were instructed to not respond to the signs in the video footage. Subjects in the Suppress condition reported involuntary imagery on a substantive proportion of the trials. Such involuntary effects arose even under dual-task conditions (while performing the n-back task or psychomotor vigilance task). The present laboratory task has implications for semi-automated driving, because the safe interaction between driver and vehicle requires that the communicative signals from vehicle to driver be effective at activating the appropriate cognitions and behavioral inclinations. In addition, our data from the dual-task conditions provide constraints for theoretical models of cognitive resources.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Anthony G Velasquez
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, CA, United States
| | - Adam Gazzaley
- Neuroscape, Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, United States.,Departments of Psychiatry and Physiology, University of California, San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, United States
| | - Heishiro Toyoda
- Toyota Collaborative Safety Research Center, Ann Arbor, MI, United States
| | - David A Ziegler
- Neuroscape, Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, United States
| | - Ezequiel Morsella
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, CA, United States.,Neuroscape, Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, United States
| |
Collapse
|
7
|
Dou W, Allen AK, Cho H, Bhangal S, Cook AJ, Morsella E, Geisler MW. EEG Correlates of Involuntary Cognitions in the Reflexive Imagery Task. Front Psychol 2020; 11:482. [PMID: 32273863 PMCID: PMC7113402 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00482] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/20/2019] [Accepted: 03/02/2020] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
The Reflexive Imagery Task (RIT) reveals that the activation of sets can result in involuntary cognitions that are triggered by external stimuli. In the basic RIT, subjects are presented with an image of an object (e.g., CAT) and instructed to not think of the name of the object. Involuntary subvocalizations of the name (the RIT effect) arise on roughly 80% of the trials. We conducted an electroencephalography (EEG) study to explore the neural correlates of the RIT effect. Subjects were presented with one object at a time in one condition and two objects simultaneously in another condition. Five regions were defined by electrode sites: frontal (F3-F4), parietal (P3-P4), temporal (T3-T4), right hemisphere (F4-P4), and left hemisphere (F3-P3). We focused on the alpha (8-13 Hz), beta (13-30 Hz), delta (0.01-4 Hz), and theta (4-8 Hz) frequencies.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Wei Dou
- Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA, United States
| | - Allison K. Allen
- Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA, United States
| | - Hyein Cho
- Department of Psychology, The Graduate Center, The City University of New York, New York, NY, United States
- Hunter College, The City University of New York, New York, NY, United States
| | - Sabrina Bhangal
- Department of Psychological Sciences, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO, United States
| | - Alexander J. Cook
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, CA, United States
| | - Ezequiel Morsella
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, CA, United States
- Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, United States
| | - Mark W. Geisler
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, CA, United States
| |
Collapse
|
8
|
Gardner K, Walker EB, Li Y, Gazzaley A, Morsella E. Involuntary attentional shifts as a function of set and processing fluency. Acta Psychol (Amst) 2020; 203:103009. [PMID: 31982777 DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2020.103009] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/20/2019] [Revised: 12/06/2019] [Accepted: 01/08/2020] [Indexed: 11/29/2022] Open
Abstract
In laboratory tasks, involuntary cognitions of various kinds (e.g., mental imagery) have been elicited by external stimuli. These effects reveal, among other things, the capacities of involuntary processes. In most cases, these cognitions do not require, for their generation, executive functions such as a shift in selective attention. In Experiment 1, subjects were presented with a clock of 12 words in the stead of numbers and were instructed to focus on the center of the screen and to not count the number of letters of a word at a certain location. Involuntary counting of the critical word occurred on 39% of the trials. This effect requires an involuntary shift of attention. Experiment 2, involving Chinese ideographs, concerned the effect of stimulus fidelity and processing fluency. Native English speakers and a separate group of subjects who could read Chinese ideographs were presented with an array similar to that of Experiment 1 and instructed to not read any of the words. Some words were easy to read (e.g., regular Chinese words and English words), and some words were more difficult to read (e.g., Chinese "loan" words and English pseudowords). For the subjects who could read Chinese ideographs, more involuntary reading occurred for regular ideographs than for loan words. For the Native English speakers, comparable effects were found with the English stimuli. Together, these studies reveal that attentional phenomena of this kind can be influenced involuntarily and systematically through external control.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Katelyn Gardner
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States of America
| | - Erica B Walker
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States of America
| | - Yanming Li
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States of America
| | - Adam Gazzaley
- Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco, United States of America; Departments of Psychiatry and Physiology, University of California, San Francisco, United States of America
| | - Ezequiel Morsella
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States of America; Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco, United States of America.
| |
Collapse
|
9
|
Cushing D, Gazzaley A, Morsella E. Involuntary mental rotation and visuospatial imagery from external control. Conscious Cogn 2019; 75:102809. [PMID: 31522028 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2019.102809] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/21/2019] [Revised: 08/23/2019] [Accepted: 08/26/2019] [Indexed: 10/26/2022]
Abstract
The Reflexive Imagery Task (RIT) was developed to investigate the entry into consciousness of involuntary imagery. Subjects are presented with objects and instructed to not think of the names of the objects. Involuntary subvocalizations arise on many trials. RIT effects reveal the capacities of involuntary processing. These cognitions do not require symbol manipulation. Can mental rotation and visuospatial imagery, too, arise in this involuntary manner? In the mental rotation task, subjects were first taught to mentally rotate two-dimensional objects. Subjects were then instructed to not mentally rotate objects. In the chess task, subjects were taught how to move in their minds objects in specified ways, much as one could imagine how chess pieces move on a chessboard. Subjects were then instructed to not have such visuospatial imagery. For both tasks, involuntary imagery occurred on a substantial proportion of trials, revealing that symbol manipulation can be influenced involuntarily through external control.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Donish Cushing
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States
| | - Adam Gazzaley
- Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco, United States; Departments of Psychiatry and Physiology, University of California, San Francisco, United States
| | - Ezequiel Morsella
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States; Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco, United States.
| |
Collapse
|
10
|
Bhangal S, Merrick C, Cho H, Morsella E. Involuntary Entry Into Consciousness From the Activation of Sets: Object Counting and Color Naming. Front Psychol 2018; 9:1017. [PMID: 29977217 PMCID: PMC6021744 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01017] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/01/2018] [Accepted: 05/31/2018] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
High-level cognitions can enter consciousness through the activation of certain action sets and the presentation of external stimuli (“set-based entry,” for short). Set-based entry arises in a manner that is involuntary and systematic. In the Reflexive Imagery Task, for example, subjects are presented with visual objects and instructed to not think of the names of the objects. Involuntary subvocalizations arise on roughly 80% of the trials. We examined whether or not set-based entry can also occur in the case of involuntary counting. Subjects in Experiment 1A were instructed to not count the number of objects presented in an array. Involuntary counting arose on a high proportion of the trials (a mean proportion of ∼0.90) for stimulus arrays having 2–5 objects, and such counting arose less frequently across trials when the array consisted of 6–10 objects (a mean proportion of ∼0.21). The data from Experiment 1B revealed that, when people choose to perform Set X, they also experience thoughts about an unselected Set (Set Y). Subjects were trained on one set (e.g., to “color name”) and then, when presented with stimuli, were given the choice to perform the trained set or a novel set. Consistent with theories proposing that the conscious contents represent several potential action plans, subjects were equally likely to experience set-related imagery or set-unrelated imagery. Our findings regarding set-based entry are relevant to many subfields of psychology and neuroscience (e.g., the study of high-level mental processes, attention, imagery, and action control).
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Sabrina Bhangal
- Department of Psychology, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO, United States
| | - Christina Merrick
- Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, United States
| | - Hyein Cho
- Department of Psychology, The Graduate Center, City University of New York, New York, NY, United States
| | - Ezequiel Morsella
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, CA, United States.,Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, United States
| |
Collapse
|
11
|
Involuntary polymodal imagery involving olfaction, audition, touch, taste, and vision. Conscious Cogn 2018; 62:9-20. [PMID: 29709666 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2018.04.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/14/2017] [Revised: 03/09/2018] [Accepted: 04/13/2018] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
Abstract
Percepts and urges often enter consciousness involuntarily. The Reflexive Imagery Task (RIT) reveals how high-level cognitions, too, can enter consciousness involuntarily. In the task, the eliciting stimuli are visual (e.g., picture of a cat), and the involuntary imagery is verbal (e.g., the subvocalization "cat"). The generalizability of the RIT effect has been questioned because verbal imagery is an easily elicited form of imagery. Do such effects arise for other kinds of imagery? It is known that imagery is more elicitable in some senses (e.g., vision) than in other senses (e.g., olfaction). We found such differences in an RIT in which food items were presented as orthographic stimuli or as drawings. Although subjects were instructed to suppress mental imagery, involuntary imagery still arose: Olfactory (effect in ∼40% of trials), taste (∼54%), touch (∼60%), and visual/auditory (∼79%). Of theoretical import, effects were comparable when the eliciting stimuli were orthographs or visual objects.
Collapse
|
12
|
Cho H, Dou W, Reyes Z, Geisler MW, Morsella E. The reflexive imagery task: An experimental paradigm for neuroimaging. AIMS Neurosci 2018; 5:97-115. [PMID: 32341955 PMCID: PMC7181890 DOI: 10.3934/neuroscience.2018.2.97] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/17/2017] [Accepted: 02/02/2018] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
High-level cognitions can be triggered into consciousness through the presentation of external stimuli and the activation of certain action sets. These activations arise in a manner that is involuntary, systematic and nontrivial. For example, in the Reflexive Imagery Task (RIT), subjects are presented with visual objects and instructed to not think of the names of the objects. Involuntary subvocalizations arise on roughly 80% of the trials. We review the findings from this paradigm, discuss neural findings that are relevant to the RIT, and present new data that further corroborate the reliability and robustness of the RIT, a paradigm that could be coupled with neuroimaging technologies. We developed an RIT variant in which two, non-focal objects are presented simultaneously. In previous RITs, visual objects were presented only one at a time, in the center of the screen, and subjects were instructed to focus on the center of the screen, where these objects were presented. Replicating the RIT effect, involuntary subvocalizations still occurred on a high proportion of trials (M = 0.78). An RIT effect arose for both objects on a considerable proportion of the trials (M = 0.35). These findings were replicated in a second experiment having a different sample of subjects. Our findings are relevant to many subfields of neuroscience (e.g., the study of high-level mental processes, attention, imagery and action control).
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Hyein Cho
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, CA, USA
| | - Wei Dou
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, CA, USA
| | - Zaviera Reyes
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, CA, USA
| | - Mark W. Geisler
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, CA, USA
| | - Ezequiel Morsella
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, CA, USA
- Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco, CA, USA
| |
Collapse
|
13
|
Cushing D, Gazzaley A, Morsella E. Externally controlled involuntary cognitions and their relations with other representations in consciousness. Conscious Cogn 2017; 55:1-10. [PMID: 28735212 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2017.07.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/05/2016] [Revised: 07/03/2017] [Accepted: 07/09/2017] [Indexed: 10/19/2022]
Abstract
Percepts and action-related urges often enter consciousness insuppressibly. The Reflexive Imagery Task (RIT) was developed to investigate how high-level cognitions (e.g., subvocalizations), too, can enter consciousness in this manner. Limitations of the paradigm include (a) that no data have confirmed subjects' introspections about the involuntary subvocalizations, and (b) that, in everyday life, adaptive responses to involuntary cognitions often depend on the nature of the other contents in consciousness. To address a and b, we developed an RIT in which subjects were presented with visual objects and instructed to not think of the object names. If a subvocalization did arise, however, subjects responded motorically only if the subvocalization rhymed with a word held in memory and if there was a visual "go" cue. Subjects successfully (on 0.83 of the trials) emitted this complex, "multi-determined" response, which provides evidence for the occurrence of the involuntary subvocalizations and illuminates the function of consciousness.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Donish Cushing
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States
| | - Adam Gazzaley
- Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco, United States; Departments of Psychiatry and Physiology, University of California, San Francisco, United States
| | - Ezequiel Morsella
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States; Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco, United States.
| |
Collapse
|
14
|
Berger CC, Dennehy TC, Bargh JA, Morsella E. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) Revisited: The Little That We Can Know and Can Tell. SOCIAL COGNITION 2016. [DOI: 10.1521/soco.2016.34.3.167] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
|
15
|
Involuntary symbol manipulation (Pig Latin) from external control: Implications for thought suppression. Acta Psychol (Amst) 2016; 166:37-41. [PMID: 27043254 DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2016.03.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/07/2015] [Revised: 03/16/2016] [Accepted: 03/17/2016] [Indexed: 11/23/2022] Open
Abstract
In ironic processing, one is more likely to think about something (e.g., white bears) when instructed to not think about that thing. Entry into consciousness of such content may be automatic, reflecting the 'encapsulated' nature of the generation of conscious contents. Based on this research, the Reflexive Imagery Task (RIT) reveals that, following the activation of action sets, conscious contents can arise involuntarily and systematically in response to external stimuli. In the most basic version of this paradigm, participants are presented with visual objects and instructed to not think of the names of the objects, which is challenging. Here, we addressed one criticism of the RIT-that the effect arises only for automatic processes (e.g., forms of cued-memory retrieval) and not for more complex processes (e.g., symbol manipulation). Participants were first trained to perform a word-manipulation task similar to the game of Pig Latin (e.g., "CAR" becomes "AR-CAY"). Such a task involves complex symbol manipulations that are associated with processes in frontal cortex. After training, participants were instructed to not transform stimulus words in this way. The RIT effect still arose under these conditions. This striking finding is relevant to theories of cognitive control, psychopathology, and conscious/unconscious processing.
Collapse
|
16
|
Bhangal S, Allen AK, Geisler MW, Morsella E. Conscious contents as reflexive processes: Evidence from the habituation of high-level cognitions. Conscious Cogn 2016; 41:177-88. [PMID: 26946295 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2016.02.012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/04/2015] [Revised: 12/08/2015] [Accepted: 02/20/2016] [Indexed: 10/22/2022]
Abstract
Reflexes are often insuppressible, predictable, and susceptible to external control. In contrast, conscious thoughts have been regarded as whimsical, 'offline,' and shielded from external control. Recent advances suggest that conscious thoughts are more reflex-like and susceptible to external control than previously thought. In one paradigm, high-level conscious thoughts (subvocalizations) are triggered by external control, as a function of external stimuli and experimenter-induced action sets. It has been hypothesized that these conscious contents are activated involuntarily and in a reflex-like manner. If such is the case, then these activations should possess a well-known property of the reflex: habituation. Accordingly, we found that involuntary high-level cognitions (subvocalizations) habituated (i.e., were less likely to arise) after repeated stimulation. As in the case of the habituation of a reflex, this novel effect was stimulus-specific. We discuss the implications of this finding for theories about consciousness and about psychopathological phenomena involving undesired, involuntary cognitions.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Sabrina Bhangal
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States
| | - Allison K Allen
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States
| | - Mark W Geisler
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States
| | - Ezequiel Morsella
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States; Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco, United States.
| |
Collapse
|
17
|
Bhangal S, Cho H, Geisler MW, Morsella E. The Prospective Nature of Voluntary Action: Insights from the Reflexive Imagery Task. REVIEW OF GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY 2016. [DOI: 10.1037/gpr0000071] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Voluntary action is peculiar in several ways. For example, it is highly prospective in nature, requiring the activation of the representations of anticipated action-effects (e.g., a button pressed). These prospective action-effects can represent outcomes in the short-term (e.g., fingers snapping or uttering “cheers”) or in the long-term (e.g., building a house). In this review about the prospective nature of voluntary action, we first discuss in brief ideomotor theory, a theoretical approach that illuminates both the nature of the prospective representations in voluntary action and how these representations are acquired and subsequently used in the control of behavior. In this framework, prospective action-effects could be construed as ‘action options’ that, residing in consciousness, may or may not influence upcoming behavior, depending on the nature of the other prospective action-effects that happen to be coactivated at that time. In ideomotor theory, there is no homunculus that selects one prospective action-effect over another. Many of these prospective action-effects enter consciousness automatically. Second, we introduce the principle of atemporality and discuss the prospective nature of determining tendencies and mental simulation, all in the context of new findings from the Reflexive Imagery Task (RIT). The RIT reveals that, as a function of external control, prospective action-effects can enter consciousness in a reflex-like, automatic, and insuppressible manner. The RIT and its associated theoretical framework shed light on why the activation of such representations, though often undesired, is nonetheless adaptive and why not all of these prospective representations lead to overt action.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
| | - Hyein Cho
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University
| | | | - Ezequiel Morsella
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, and Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco
| |
Collapse
|
18
|
Abstract
Passive frame theory attempts to illuminate what consciousness is, in mechanistic and functional terms; it does not address the "implementation" level of analysis (how neurons instantiate conscious states), an enigma for various disciplines. However, in response to the commentaries, we discuss how our framework provides clues regarding this enigma. In the framework, consciousness is passive albeit essential. Without consciousness, there would not be adaptive skeletomotor action.
Collapse
|
19
|
Bhangal S, Merrick C, Morsella E. Ironic effects as reflexive responses: Evidence from word frequency effects on involuntary subvocalizations. Acta Psychol (Amst) 2015; 159:33-40. [PMID: 26005914 DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2015.04.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/29/2015] [Revised: 04/28/2015] [Accepted: 04/30/2015] [Indexed: 11/25/2022] Open
Abstract
In ironic processing, one is more likely to think about something (e.g., white bears) when instructed to not think about that thing. To further investigate this phenomenon involving cognitive control, in the Reflexive Imagery Task (RIT), participants are instructed to not subvocalize the names of visual objects. On the majority of the trials, participants fail to suppress such subvocalizations. This finding supports theorizing that conscious thoughts can be triggered by external stimuli in a manner that is nontrivial, involuntary, and, importantly, reflex-like. These conclusions challenge intuitions that consciousness is unpredictable, whimsical, and somewhat insulated from external control. Perhaps these thoughts arise, not in a reflex-like manner, but from experimental demand or other high-level, strategic processes. This prevalent criticism would be inconsistent with the observation that the RIT effect is influenced by a stimulus parameter such as word frequency. Regarding demand characteristics, such an artifact would require participants to have a theory regarding how word frequency should influence responses. We introduce evidence that stimuli associated with high frequency names are more likely to yield involuntary subvocalizations than stimuli associated with low frequency names. These theoretically-relevant data suggest that ironic effects in paradigms such as the RIT resemble reflex-like processes.
Collapse
|
20
|
Abstract
What is the primary function of consciousness in the nervous system? The answer to this question remains enigmatic, not so much because of a lack of relevant data, but because of the lack of a conceptual framework with which to interpret the data. To this end, we have developed Passive Frame Theory, an internally coherent framework that, from an action-based perspective, synthesizes empirically supported hypotheses from diverse fields of investigation. The theory proposes that the primary function of consciousness is well-circumscribed, serving the somatic nervous system. For this system, consciousness serves as a frame that constrains and directs skeletal muscle output, thereby yielding adaptive behavior. The mechanism by which consciousness achieves this is more counterintuitive, passive, and "low level" than the kinds of functions that theorists have previously attributed to consciousness. Passive frame theory begins to illuminate (a) what consciousness contributes to nervous function, (b) how consciousness achieves this function, and (c) the neuroanatomical substrates of conscious processes. Our untraditional, action-based perspective focuses on olfaction instead of on vision and is descriptive (describing the products of nature as they evolved to be) rather than normative (construing processes in terms of how they should function). Passive frame theory begins to isolate the neuroanatomical, cognitive-mechanistic, and representational (e.g., conscious contents) processes associated with consciousness.
Collapse
|
21
|
Merrick C, Farnia M, Jantz TK, Gazzaley A, Morsella E. External control of the stream of consciousness: Stimulus-based effects on involuntary thought sequences. Conscious Cogn 2015; 33:217-25. [PMID: 25636006 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2014.12.014] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/02/2014] [Revised: 12/08/2014] [Accepted: 12/20/2014] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
The stream of consciousness often appears whimsical and free from external control. Recent advances, however, reveal that the stream is more susceptible to external influence than previously assumed. Thoughts can be triggered by external stimuli in a manner that is involuntary, systematic, and nontrivial. Based on these advances, our experimental manipulation systematically triggered a sequence of, not one, but two involuntary thoughts. Participants were instructed to (a) not subvocalize the name of visual objects and (b) not count the number of letters comprising object names. On a substantial proportion of trials, participants experienced both kinds of involuntary thoughts. Each thought arose from distinct, high-level processes (naming versus counting). This is the first demonstration of the induction of two involuntary thoughts into the stream of consciousness. Stimulus word length influenced dependent measures systematically. Our findings are relevant to many fields associated with the study of consciousness, including attention, imagery, and action control.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Christina Merrick
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States
| | - Melika Farnia
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States
| | - Tiffany K Jantz
- Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, United States
| | - Adam Gazzaley
- Departments of Psychiatry and Physiology, University of California, San Francisco, United States; Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco, United States
| | - Ezequiel Morsella
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, United States; Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco, United States.
| |
Collapse
|
22
|
Cho H, Godwin CA, Geisler MW, Morsella E. Internally generated conscious contents: interactions between sustained mental imagery and involuntary subvocalizations. Front Psychol 2015; 5:1445. [PMID: 25566126 PMCID: PMC4269111 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01445] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/29/2014] [Accepted: 11/26/2014] [Indexed: 12/02/2022] Open
Abstract
The conscious field includes not only representations about external stimuli (e.g., percepts), but also conscious contents associated with internal states, such as action-related intentions (e.g., urges). Although understudied, the latter may provide unique insights into the nature of consciousness. To illuminate these phenomena, in a new experimental paradigm [Reflexive Imagery Task (RIT)], participants were instructed to not subvocalize the names of visually-presented objects. Each object was presented for 10 s on a screen. Participants indicated whenever they involuntarily subvocalized the object name. Research has revealed that it is difficult to suppress such subvocalizations, which occur on over 80% of the trials. Can the effect survive if one intentionally generates a competing (internally-generated) conscious content? If so, this would suggest that intentional and unintentional contents can co-exist simultaneously in consciousness in interesting ways. To investigate this possibility, in one condition, participants were instructed to reiteratively subvocalize a speech sound (“da, da, da”) throughout the trial. This internally generated content is self-generated and intentional. Involuntary subvocalizations of object names still arose on over 80% of the trials. One could hypothesize that subvocalizations occurred because of the pauses between the intended speech sounds, but this is inconsistent with the observation that comparable results arose even when participants subvocalized a continuous, unbroken hum (“daaa….”) throughout the trial. Regarding inter-content interactions, the continuous hum and object name seem to co-exist simultaneously in consciousness. This intriguing datum requires further investigation. We discuss the implications of this new paradigm for the study of internally-generated conscious contents.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Hyein Cho
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University San Francisco, CA, USA
| | | | - Mark W Geisler
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University San Francisco, CA, USA
| | - Ezequiel Morsella
- Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University San Francisco, CA, USA ; Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco San Francisco, CA, USA
| |
Collapse
|