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Inarimori K, Honma S, Miyazono K. Do we have (in)compatibilist intuitions? Surveying experimental research. Front Psychol 2024; 15:1369399. [PMID: 38711751 PMCID: PMC11070465 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1369399] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/15/2024] [Accepted: 04/02/2024] [Indexed: 05/08/2024] Open
Abstract
This article critically examines the experimental philosophy of free will, particularly the interplay between ordinary individuals' compatibilist and incompatibilist intuitions. It explores key insights from research studies that propose "natural compatibilism" and "natural incompatibilism". These studies reveal a complex landscape of folk intuitions, where participants appear to exhibit both types of intuitions. Here, we examine error theories, which purport to explain the coexistence of apparently contradictory intuitions: the Affective Performance Error hypothesis, the "Free Will No Matter What" hypothesis, the Bypassing hypothesis, and the Intrusion hypothesis, and the article explores the cognitive errors that could shape individuals' inconsistent perceptions of free will. We then explore three possibilities regarding folk intuitions: most individuals may hold either compatibilist or incompatibilist intuitions, both simultaneously, or neither. Our aim is to deepen the understanding of the complex dynamics of intuitions about free will, and we close with suggestions for future studies in experimental philosophy.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kiichi Inarimori
- Laboratory of Philosophy and Ethics, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Graduate School of Humanities and Human Sciences, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan
- Center for Human Nature, Artificial Intelligence, and Neuroscience, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan
| | - Souichiro Honma
- Laboratory of Philosophy and Ethics, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Graduate School of Humanities and Human Sciences, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan
| | - Kengo Miyazono
- Laboratory of Philosophy and Ethics, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Graduate School of Humanities and Human Sciences, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan
- Center for Human Nature, Artificial Intelligence, and Neuroscience, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan
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Giraud T, Neves Leal M, Cova F. "One more time": time loops as a tool to investigate folk conceptions of moral responsibility and human agency. SYNTHESE 2023; 202:83. [PMID: 37655126 PMCID: PMC10465374 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04245-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/12/2022] [Accepted: 06/24/2023] [Indexed: 09/02/2023]
Abstract
In the past 20 years, experimental philosophers have investigated folk intuitions about free will and moral responsibility, and their compatibility with determinism. To determine whether laypeople are "natural compatibilists" or "natural incompatibilists", they have used vignettes describing agents living in deterministic universes. However, later research has suggested that participants' answers to these studies are plagued with comprehension errors: either people fail to really accept that these universes are deterministic, or they confuse determinism with something else. This had led certain experimenters to conclude that maybe folk intuitions about the compatibility of free will with determinism could not be empirically investigated. Here, we propose that we should refrain from embracing this pessimistic conclusion, as scenarios involving time loops might allow experiments to bypass most of these methodological issues. Indeed, scenarios involving time loops belong both to the philosophical literature on free will and to popular culture. As such, they might constitute a bridge between the two worlds. We present the results of five studies using time loops to investigate people's intuitions about determinism, free will and moral responsibility. The results of these studies allow us to reach two conclusions. The first is that, when people are introduced to determinism through time loops, they do seem to understand what determinism entails. The second is that, at least in the context of time loops, people do not seem to consider determinism to be incompatible with free will and moral responsibility. Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11229-023-04245-9.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Maicol Neves Leal
- Literature & Philosophy Department, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
| | - Florian Cova
- Philosophy Department & Swiss Center for Affective Sciences, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
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Starmans C, Friedman O. Why Children Believe They Are Owned. Open Mind (Camb) 2023; 7:534-549. [PMID: 37637295 PMCID: PMC10449399 DOI: 10.1162/opmi_a_00090] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/16/2023] [Accepted: 06/17/2023] [Indexed: 08/29/2023] Open
Abstract
Owners decide what happens to their property, and so adults typically view autonomous beings as non-owned. If children likewise consider autonomy when judging what is owned, this may have implications for how they view themselves. If children believe that parents have power over them, that they themselves lack autonomy, and that only the autonomous cannot be owned, this may lead them to believe that they are owned by their parents. Across three experiments, we found that 4- to 7-year-old children (N = 206) consistently affirm that children are owned by their parents. In Experiment 1, children judged that children and domesticated animals are owned, but denied this for adults and wild animals. In Experiment 2, children were more likely to see children as owned by their parents than by their teachers, and also denied that children own either kind of adult. Finally, in Experiment 3, children were less likely to view a child who makes decisions against parental authority as owned. These judgments are unlikely to mirror what children have been told. Instead, they likely result from children spontaneously using autonomy principles, and possibly other principles of ownership, in reasoning about the ownership of living entities.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Ori Friedman
- Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Canada
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Feltz A, Caton JN, Cogely Z, Engel M, Feltz S, Ilea R, Johnson LSM, Offer-Westort T. Developing an objective measure of knowledge of factory farming. PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 2022. [DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2022.2056436] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/18/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Adam Feltz
- Department of Psychology, University of Oklahoma, Psychology, Norman, Oklahoma, United States
- United State of America, Center for Applied Social Research, University of Oklahoma
| | - Jacob N. Caton
- Department of Philosophy, Arkansas State University, Jonesboro, Arkansas, United States
| | - Zac Cogely
- Department of Philosophy, Balto Software, St Louis, Missouri, United States
| | - Mylan Engel
- Department of Philosophy, Northern Illinois University, Dekalb, Illinois, United States
| | - Silke Feltz
- Department of Psychology, University of Oklahoma, Psychology, Norman, Oklahoma, United States
| | - Ramona Ilea
- Department of Philosophy, Pacific University, Forest Grove, Oregon, United States
| | - L. Syd M Johnson
- Center for Bioethics and Humanities, Upstate Medical University, Syracuse, NY, United States
| | - Tom Offer-Westort
- Department of Psychology, University of Oklahoma, Psychology, Norman, Oklahoma, United States
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Stinnett AJ, Alquist JL. Consider the tumor: Brain tumors decrease punishment via perceptions of free will. PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 2022. [DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2022.2052830] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/18/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Alec J. Stinnett
- Department of Psychology, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX, USA
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Demaree-Cotton J, Sommers R. Autonomy and the folk concept of valid consent. Cognition 2022; 224:105065. [PMID: 35240434 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105065] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/12/2021] [Revised: 01/10/2022] [Accepted: 02/10/2022] [Indexed: 11/03/2022]
Abstract
Consent governs innumerable everyday social interactions, including sex, medical exams, the use of property, and economic transactions. Yet little is known about how ordinary people reason about the validity of consent. Across the domains of sex, medicine, and police entry, Study 1 showed that when agents lack autonomous decision-making capacities, participants are less likely to view their consent as valid; however, failing to exercise this capacity and deciding in a nonautonomous way did not reduce consent judgments. Study 2 found that specific and concrete incapacities reduced judgments of valid consent, but failing to exercise these specific capacities did not, even when the consenter makes an irrational and inauthentic decision. Finally, Study 3 showed that the effect of autonomy on judgments of valid consent carries important downstream consequences for moral reasoning about the rights and obligations of third parties, even when the consented-to action is morally wrong. Overall, these findings suggest that laypeople embrace a normative, domain-general concept of valid consent that depends consistently on the possession of autonomous capacities, but not on the exercise of these capacities. Autonomous decisions and autonomous capacities thus play divergent roles in moral reasoning about consent interactions: while the former appears relevant for assessing the wrongfulness of consented-to acts, the latter plays a role in whether consent is regarded as authoritative and therefore as transforming moral rights.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Roseanna Sommers
- University of Michigan, 625 S State St, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA.
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The free will and punishment scale: Efficient measurement and predictive validity across diverse and nationally representative adult samples. Conscious Cogn 2021; 95:103215. [PMID: 34634764 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103215] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/01/2021] [Revised: 08/06/2021] [Accepted: 09/21/2021] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
Abstract
Theoretically, attitudes about freedom and punishment can shape people's decisions and cause pernicious disagreements (e.g., political policies). Several scales measure free will beliefs, partially to help understand disagreements about theoretical and practical issues. We contribute to these efforts by directly comparing existing measures and by introducing a short measure of free will related attitudes. Studies 1, 2, and 3 (Ns = 221, 225, 244) factor analyzed all items in existing scales of free will and moral responsibility, resulting in two prominent factors: Beliefs in Free Will and Beliefs in Punishment. Study 4 (N = 269) presents evidence for the 2-factor structure from a nationally representative sample. Study 5 (N = 108) gives evidence of the utility of the Free Will and Punishment scale in predicting free will relevant beliefs and attitudes. As such, the Free Will and Punishment scale is likely useful when longer instruments are not practically possible.
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Struchiner N, Almeida GDFCFD, Hannikainen IR. Legal decision-making and the abstract/concrete paradox. Cognition 2020; 205:104421. [PMID: 32891973 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104421] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/21/2019] [Revised: 07/18/2020] [Accepted: 07/27/2020] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
Abstract
Higher courts sometimes assess the constitutionality of law by working through a concrete case, other times by reasoning about the underlying question in a more abstract way. Prior research has found that the degree of concreteness or abstraction with which an issue is formulated can influence people's prescriptive views: For instance, people often endorse punishment for concrete misdeeds that they would oppose if the circumstances were described abstractly. We sought to understand whether the so-called 'abstract/concrete paradox' also jeopardizes the consistency of judicial reasoning. In a series of experiments, both lay and professional judges sometimes reached opposite conclusions when reasoning about concrete cases versus the underlying issues formulated in abstract terms. This effect emerged whether participants reasoned with broad principles, such as human dignity, or narrow rules, and was largest among individuals high in trait empathy. Finally, to understand whether people reflectively endorse the discrepancy between abstract and concrete resolutions, we examined their reactions when evaluating both, either simultaneously or sequentially. These approaches revealed no single pattern across lay and expert populations, or exploratory and confirmatory studies. Taken together, our studies suggest that empathic concern plays a greater role in guiding the judicial resolution of concrete cases than in illuminating judges' professed standards-which may result in concrete decisions in violation of their own abstract principles.
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Affiliation(s)
- Noel Struchiner
- Department of Law, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
| | - Guilherme da F C F de Almeida
- Department of Law, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Law School, Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Brazil
| | - Ivar R Hannikainen
- Department of Law, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Department of Philosophy I, University of Granada, Spain
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Hannikainen IR, Machery E, Rose D, Stich S, Olivola CY, Sousa P, Cova F, Buchtel EE, Alai M, Angelucci A, Berniûnas R, Chatterjee A, Cheon H, Cho IR, Cohnitz D, Dranseika V, Eraña Lagos Á, Ghadakpour L, Grinberg M, Hashimoto T, Horowitz A, Hristova E, Jraissati Y, Kadreva V, Karasawa K, Kim H, Kim Y, Lee M, Mauro C, Mizumoto M, Moruzzi S, Ornelas J, Osimani B, Romero C, Rosas López A, Sangoi M, Sereni A, Songhorian S, Struchiner N, Tripodi V, Usui N, Vázquez Del Mercado A, Vosgerichian HA, Zhang X, Zhu J. For Whom Does Determinism Undermine Moral Responsibility? Surveying the Conditions for Free Will Across Cultures. Front Psychol 2019; 10:2428. [PMID: 31749739 PMCID: PMC6848273 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02428] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/30/2019] [Accepted: 10/14/2019] [Indexed: 11/22/2022] Open
Abstract
Philosophers have long debated whether, if determinism is true, we should hold people morally responsible for their actions since in a deterministic universe, people are arguably not the ultimate source of their actions nor could they have done otherwise if initial conditions and the laws of nature are held fixed. To reveal how non-philosophers ordinarily reason about the conditions for free will, we conducted a cross-cultural and cross-linguistic survey (N = 5,268) spanning twenty countries and sixteen languages. Overall, participants tended to ascribe moral responsibility whether the perpetrator lacked sourcehood or alternate possibilities. However, for American, European, and Middle Eastern participants, being the ultimate source of one’s actions promoted perceptions of free will and control as well as ascriptions of blame and punishment. By contrast, being the source of one’s actions was not particularly salient to Asian participants. Finally, across cultures, participants exhibiting greater cognitive reflection were more likely to view free will as incompatible with causal determinism. We discuss these findings in light of documented cultural differences in the tendency toward dispositional versus situational attributions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ivar R Hannikainen
- Department of Law, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
| | - Edouard Machery
- Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, United States
| | - David Rose
- Department of Philosophy, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, United States
| | - Stephen Stich
- Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, United States
| | - Christopher Y Olivola
- Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, United States
| | - Paulo Sousa
- Institute of Cognition and Culture, Queen's University, Belfast, United Kingdom
| | - Florian Cova
- Department of Philosophy, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
| | - Emma E Buchtel
- Department of Psychology, The Education University of Hong Kong, Tai Po, Hong Kong
| | - Mario Alai
- Department of Pure and Applied Sciences, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Urbino, Italy
| | - Adriano Angelucci
- Department of Pure and Applied Sciences, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Urbino, Italy
| | | | - Amita Chatterjee
- School of Cognitive Science, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, India
| | - Hyundeuk Cheon
- Department of Philosophy, Seoul National University, Seoul, South Korea
| | - In-Rae Cho
- Department of Philosophy, Seoul National University, Seoul, South Korea
| | - Daniel Cohnitz
- Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Utrecht University, Utrecht, Netherlands
| | | | | | | | - Maurice Grinberg
- Department of Cognitive Science and Psychology, New Bulgarian University, Sofia, Bulgaria
| | | | - Amir Horowitz
- Department of History, Philosophy and Judaic Studies, Open University of Israel, Ra'anana, Israel
| | - Evgeniya Hristova
- Department of Cognitive Science and Psychology, New Bulgarian University, Sofia, Bulgaria
| | - Yasmina Jraissati
- Department of Philosophy, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon
| | - Veselina Kadreva
- Department of Cognitive Science and Psychology, New Bulgarian University, Sofia, Bulgaria
| | - Kaori Karasawa
- Department of Social Psychology, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan
| | - Hackjin Kim
- Department of Psychology, Korea University, Seoul, South Korea
| | - Yeonjeong Kim
- Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, United States
| | - Minwoo Lee
- Department of Psychology, Korea University, Seoul, South Korea
| | | | - Masaharu Mizumoto
- School of Knowledge Science, Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Ishikawa, Japan
| | - Sebastiano Moruzzi
- Department of Philosophy and Communication Studies, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy
| | - Jorge Ornelas
- Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí, San Luis Potosí, Mexico
| | - Barbara Osimani
- Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig Maximilians Universität, Munich, Germany
| | - Carlos Romero
- Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas-UNAM, Mexico City, Mexico
| | | | - Massimo Sangoi
- Department of Pure and Applied Sciences, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Urbino, Italy
| | - Andrea Sereni
- Faculty of Philosophy, Scuola Universitaria Superiore IUSS, Pavia, Italy
| | - Sarah Songhorian
- Faculty of Philosophy, Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan, Italy
| | - Noel Struchiner
- Department of Law, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
| | - Vera Tripodi
- Department of Philosophy and Educational Sciences, University of Turin, Turin, Italy
| | - Naoki Usui
- Department of Humanities, Mie University, Tsu, Japan
| | | | - Hrag A Vosgerichian
- Department of History, Philosophy and Judaic Studies, Open University of Israel, Ra'anana, Israel
| | - Xueyi Zhang
- School of Humanities, Southeast University, Nanjing, China
| | - Jing Zhu
- School of Information Management, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China
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Feltz A, Cokely E. Extraversion and compatibilist intuitions: a ten-year retrospective and meta-analyses. PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 2019. [DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2019.1572692] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/27/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Adam Feltz
- Department of Cognitive and Learning Sciences, Michigan Technological University, Houghton, MI, USA
| | - Edward Cokely
- Department of Psychology, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, USA
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Clark CJ, Winegard BM, Baumeister RF. Forget the Folk: Moral Responsibility Preservation Motives and Other Conditions for Compatibilism. Front Psychol 2019; 10:215. [PMID: 30792683 PMCID: PMC6374326 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00215] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/16/2018] [Accepted: 01/22/2019] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
For years, experimental philosophers have attempted to discern whether laypeople find free will compatible with a scientifically deterministic understanding of the universe, yet no consensus has emerged. The present work provides one potential explanation for these discrepant findings: People are strongly motivated to preserve free will and moral responsibility, and thus do not have stable, logically rigorous notions of free will. Seven studies support this hypothesis by demonstrating that a variety of logically irrelevant (but motivationally relevant) features influence compatibilist judgments. In Study 1, participants who were asked to consider the possibility that our universe is deterministic were more compatibilist than those not asked to consider this possibility, suggesting that determinism poses a threat to moral responsibility, which increases compatibilist responding (thus reducing the threat). In Study 2, participants who considered concrete instances of moral behavior found compatibilist free will more sufficient for moral responsibility than participants who were asked about moral responsibility more generally. In Study 3a, the order in which participants read free will and determinism descriptions influenced their compatibilist judgments-and only when the descriptions had moral significance: Participants were more likely to report that determinism was compatible with free will than that free will was compatible with determinism. In Study 3b, participants who read the free will description first (the more compatibilist group) were particularly likely to confess that their beliefs in free will and moral responsibility and their disbelief in determinism influenced their conclusion. In Study 4, participants reduced their compatibilist beliefs after reading a passage that argued that moral responsibility could be preserved even in the absence of free will. Participants also reported that immaterial souls were compatible with scientific determinism, most strongly among immaterial soul believers (Study 5), and evaluated information about the capacities of primates in a biased manner favoring the existence of human free will (Study 6). These results suggest that people do not have one intuition about whether free will is compatible with determinism. Instead, people report that free will is compatible with determinism when desiring to uphold moral responsibility. Recommendations for future work are discussed.
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Affiliation(s)
- Cory J. Clark
- Department of Psychology, Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom
| | - Bo M. Winegard
- Department of Psychology, Marietta College, Marietta, OH, United States
| | - Roy F. Baumeister
- Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, United States
- School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, St Lucia, QLD, Australia
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Feldman G, Chandrashekar SP. Laypersons' Beliefs and Intuitions About Free Will and Determinism: New Insights Linking the Social Psychology and Experimental Philosophy Paradigms. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PERSONALITY SCIENCE 2018; 9:539-549. [PMID: 30220960 PMCID: PMC6113710 DOI: 10.1177/1948550617713254] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Abstract
We linked between the social psychology and experimental philosophy paradigms for the study of folk intuitions and beliefs regarding the concept of free will to answer three questions: (1) What intuitions do people have about free will and determinism? (2) Do free will beliefs predict differences in free will and determinism intuitions? and (3) Is there more to free will and determinism than experiencing certainty or uncertainty about the nature of the universe? Overall, laypersons viewed the universe as allowing for human indeterminism, and they did so with certainty. Examining intuitions of prosociality, future orientation, learning, meaningfulness, human uniqueness, and well-being, ratings were highest in the indeterministic universe condition and lowest in the deterministic universe condition, both significantly different from the uncertain universe condition. Participants' free will beliefs had only weak impact on realism, happiness, and learning intuitions but did not reverse the general intuition favoring indeterminism and showed no impact on other intuitions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gilad Feldman
- Department of Work and Social Psychology, Maastricht University, Maastricht, the Netherlands
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Polonioli A. A plea for minimally biased naturalistic philosophy. SYNTHESE 2017; 196:3841-3867. [PMID: 31404228 PMCID: PMC6656791 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-017-1628-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/12/2017] [Accepted: 11/13/2017] [Indexed: 06/10/2023]
Abstract
Naturalistic philosophers rely on literature search and review in a number of ways and for different purposes. Yet this article shows how processes of literature search and review are likely to be affected by widespread and systematic biases. A solution to this problem is offered here. Whilst the tradition of systematic reviews of literature from scientific disciplines has been neglected in philosophy, systematic reviews are important tools that minimize bias in literature search and review and allow for greater reproducibility and transparency. If naturalistic philosophers wish to reduce bias in their research, they should then supplement their traditional tools for literature search and review by including systematic methodologies.
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Affiliation(s)
- Andrea Polonioli
- Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham, 3 Elms Road, Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT UK
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