The inhibitory spillover effect: Controlling the bladder makes better liars

Does inhibitory control spill over to eating behaviors? Two preregistered studies of inhibitory spillover effects on food intake and reactions to food stimuli

Overweight and obesity are worldwide conditions associated with detrimental medical and psychosocial outcomes. As inhibitory control deficits are thought to contribute to weight gain, they are a worthwhile target for new approaches. Previous research has shown that the execution of inhibitory control in one domain leads to a concurrent increase of inhibitory control in another domain, an effect denoted as inhibitory spillover effect (ISE). Therefore, we assumed that exertion of inhibitory control in a food-unrelated domain in overweight and normal weight individuals will decrease food intake in a simultaneous bogus taste test (BTT; study 1) as well as increase food-specific response inhibition ability in a stop signal task (SST; study 2). We assumed stronger effects in overweight individuals. In both studies ISE was induced via cognitive priming and compared to a neutral condition in a group of overweight (OW: n = 46 for study 1, n = 46 for study 2) and normal weight (NW: n = 46 for study 1, n = 46 for study 2) individuals. In the ISE condition with an inhibitory control priming task, participants had to learn and retain control-related words while simultaneously performing a BTT (study 1) or SST (study 2). In the neutral condition, participants followed the same protocol, albeit memorizing neutral (i.e., control-unrelated) words. There was no significant interaction of weight group × cognitive priming condition neither regarding food intake (study 1) nor regarding food-related response inhibition (study 2). Cognitive priming, as implemented in the present studies, does not instigate an ISE strong enough to improve inhibitory control during food intake or food-related response inhibition. Relevant practical and theoretical aspects as well as implications for future research on the ISE are discussed.

Increase in physiological inhibitory control results in better suppression of unwanted memories

Forgetting or suppressing a memory with unwanted content is just as important as remembering a desirable one. In addition to emphasizing the role of inhibitory control in memory suppression processes, neuropsychological studies have indicated that an intentional inhibition targeting a brain area may exert its inhibitory effects in seemingly unrelated areas through a common inhibitory network. In this study, we aimed to investigate whether the suppression of unwanted memories can be strengthened by recruiting an inhibitory task that can be simultaneously performed with a memory suppression task. Therefore, we manipulated the level of urinary urgency-induced inhibition of participants (N = 180) and test its effect on the suppression of unwanted memories using a Think/No-Think (T/NT) task. The results of our study indicated that individuals with high levels of urinary urgency demonstrated greater memory suppression compared to those with low urinary urgency. Findings and their implications are discussed within the context of cognitive and clinical perspectives, and recommendations are made for future research.

The Role of Cognition in Dishonest Behavior

Dishonesty has received increased attention from many professionals in recent years for its relevance in many social areas such as finance and psychology, among others. Understanding the mechanisms underlying dishonesty and the channels in which dishonesty operates could enable the detection and even prevention of dishonest behavior. However, the study of dishonesty is a challenging endeavor; dishonesty is a complex behavior because it imposes a psychological and cognitive burden. The study of this burden has fostered a new research trend that focuses on cognition’s role in dishonesty. This paper reviews the theoretical aspects of how such cognitive processes modulate dishonest behavior. We will pay special attention to executive functions such as inhibitory processes, working memory, or set-shifting that may modulate the decision to be (dis)honest. We also account for some frameworks in cognitive and social psychology that may help understand dishonesty, such as the Theory of Mind, the role of creative processes, and discourse analyses within language studies. Finally, we will discuss some specific cognitive-based models that integrate cognitive mechanisms to explain dishonesty. We show that cognition and dishonest behavior are firmly related and that there are several important milestones to reach in the future to advance the understanding of dishonesty in our society.

Increased Urination Urgency Exacerbates Sexual Risk-Taking Through Heightened Sexual Arousal

Increased urination urgency has been shown to facilitate impulse control in cognitive domains, but its effects in other areas are unknown. We examined whether inhibitory spillover effects would replicate and extend to close relationships-specifically, influencing decision making related to sexual risk-taking. Across three studies, we either measured (Studies 1 and 3) or manipulated (Study 2) participants' bladder pressure and assessed sexual self-control using a questionnaire of sexual risk-taking intentions (Study 1) or a simulated semi-behavioral sexual risk-taking (Choose Your Own Sexual Adventure) task (Studies 2 and 3). Study 1 (N = 44 men, 59 women) showed greater urination urgency was associated with greater sexual risk-taking. Study 2 (N = 65 men, 91 women) showed that increasing urination urgency led to greater sexual risk-taking, but only among men. Study 3 (N = 86 men, 183 women) showed elevated urination urgency was associated with an increase in sexual arousal, which accounted for the greater sexual risk-taking.

EXPRESS: High Bladder Pressure Reduces the Ability to Filter Out Interference From Distractors in Low Perceptual Load Condition

According to the load theory of attention, an active cognitive control mechanism is needed to ensure that behavior is controlled by target-relevant information when distractors are also perceived. Although the active cognitive control mechanism consists of working memory, cognitive flexibility, and inhibition components, predictions regarding the load effects of this mechanism were derived mostly from studies on working memory. We aimed to test whether these predictions are also valid for an inhibition component. The inhibitory load was manipulated physiologically by creating different bladder pressure and its effects on distractor interference were examined under low and high perceptual load conditions. Results indicated that the availability of inhibitory control resources was important for decreasing the interference of distractors in the low perceptual load condition and that the high perceptual load reduced the effects of distractors independently from the availability of inhibitory resources. Results were consistent with the predictions of load theory, and to the best of our knowledge, the study provided the first piece of evidence in terms of the load effect of inhibition component on distractor interference.

Defecatory urge increases cognitive control and intertemporal patience in healthy volunteers

BACKGROUND

Past research has demonstrated that moderate urge to urinate improves inhibitory control, specifically among participants with higher behavioral inhibition sensitivity (BIS). The effect was absent when the urge exceeded intolerable level. The present research examines whether rectal distension-induced urge to defecate has similar effects.

METHODS

The moderate and high defecatory urge were induced by rectal distension in healthy volunteers (n = 35), while they completed Stroop task and monetary delay discounting task. The difference of average reaction time between incongruent and congruent trials in the Stroop task (Stroop interference) and the preference for larger-later rewards in the delay discounting task were the primary outcomes.

KEY RESULTS

Participants with high BIS (n = 17) showed greater ability to inhibit their automatic response tendencies, as indexed by their Stroop interference, under moderate urge relative to no urge (128 ± 41 ms vs 202 ± 37 ms, t₆₄  = 2.07; P = 0.021, Cohen's d: 0.44), but not relative to high urge (154 ± 45 ms, t₆₄  = 1.20; P = 0.12, Cohen's d: 0.30). High BIS participants also showed a higher preference for larger-later reward in the delay discounting task under high (odds ratio = 1.51 [1.02-2.25], P = 0.039) relative to no urge, but not relative to moderate urge (odds ratio = 1.02 [0.73-1.42], P = 0.91). In contrast, rectal distension did not influence performance on either of the tasks in participants with low BIS (n = 18).

CONCLUSIONS AND INFERENCE

These findings may be interpreted as a "spill-over" effect of inhibition of the urge to defecate to volitional cognitive control among healthy participants with high BIS.

Stop in the name of lies: The cost of blocking the truth to deceive

Most researchers assume that deception involves a conflict between a predominant truth response and a deliberate deceptive response. Such a view is consistent with dual process theories that state that high-order cognition operates through fast-automatic processes that may conflict with slow-deliberate ones. In the present study, we tested whether one must inhibit the truth to deceive in light of inconsistent findings in the literature. One hundred and eighty-nine participants were tested across two Negative Priming paradigms that rest on the logic that the activation of a fast-automatic process will be hampered on a given display if it is inhibited on the previous display. Our findings suggest that truthful responses are predominant in healthy adults, which is why inhibitory control is required to activate a deliberate deceptive mode. We argue that the findings from deception studies could be best accounted for by dual process theories.

Strategic Interviewing to Detect Deception: Cues to Deception across Repeated Interviews

Previous deception research on repeated interviews found that liars are not less consistent than truth tellers, presumably because liars use a “repeat strategy” to be consistent across interviews. The goal of this study was to design an interview procedure to overcome this strategy. Innocent participants (truth tellers) and guilty participants (liars) had to convince an interviewer that they had performed several innocent activities rather than committing a mock crime. The interview focused on the innocent activities (alibi), contained specific central and peripheral questions, and was repeated after 1 week without forewarning. Cognitive load was increased by asking participants to reply quickly. The liars’ answers in replying to both central and peripheral questions were significantly less accurate, less consistent, and more evasive than the truth tellers’ answers. Logistic regression analyses yielded classification rates ranging from around 70% (with consistency as the predictor variable), 85% (with evasive answers as the predictor variable), to over 90% (with an improved measure of consistency that incorporated evasive answers as the predictor variable, as well as with response accuracy as the predictor variable). These classification rates were higher than the interviewers’ accuracy rate (54%).

An empirical test of the decision to lie component of the Activation-Decision-Construction-Action Theory (ADCAT)

Meta-analyses reveal that behavioral differences between liars and truth tellers are small. To facilitate lie detection, researchers are currently developing interviewing approaches to increase these differences. Some of these approaches assume that lying is cognitively more difficult than truth telling; however, they are not based on specific cognitive theories of lie production, which are rare. Here we examined one existing theory, Walczyk et al.'s (2014) Activation-Decision-Construction-Action Theory (ADCAT). We tested the Decision component. According to ADCAT, people decide whether to lie or tell the truth as if they were using a specific mathematical formula to calculate the motivation to lie from (a) the probability of a number of outcomes derived from lying vs. telling the truth, and (b) the costs/benefits associated with each outcome. In this study, participants read several hypothetical scenarios and indicated whether they would lie or tell the truth in each scenario (Questionnaire 1). Next, they answered several questions about the consequences of lying vs. telling the truth in each scenario, and rated the probability and valence of each consequence (Questionnaire 2). Significant associations were found between the participants' dichotomous decision to lie/tell the truth in Questionnaire 1 and their motivation to lie scores calculated from the Questionnaire 2 data. However, interestingly, whereas the expected consequences of truth telling were associated with the decision to lie vs. tell the truth, the expected consequences of lying were not. Suggestions are made to refine ADCAT, which can be a useful theoretical framework to guide deception research.