Keeping postdiction simple

Early and late evoked brain responses differentially reflect feature encoding and perception in the flash-lag illusion

In the flash-lag illusion (FLI), the position of a flash presented ahead of a moving bar is mislocalized, so the flash appears to lag the bar. Currently, it is not clear whether this effect is due to early perceptual-related neural processes such as motion extrapolation or reentrant processing, or due to later feedback processing relating to postdiction, i.e., retroactively altered perception. We presented 17 participants with the FLI paradigm while recording EEG. A central flash occurred either 51 ms ("early") or 16 ms ("late") before the bar moving from left to right reached the screen center. Participants judged whether the flash appeared to the right ("no flash lag illusion") or to the left ("flash-lag illusion") of the bar. Using single-trial linear modeling, we examined the influence of timing ("early" vs. "late") and perception ("illusion" vs. "no illusion") on flash-evoked brain responses and estimated the cortical sources underlying the FLI. An earlier frontal and occipital component (200-276 ms) differentiated time-locked early vs. late stimulus presentation, indicating that early evoked brain responses reflect feature encoding in the FLI. Perception of the FLI was associated with a late window (368-452 ms) in the ERP, with larger deflections for illusion than no illusion trials, localized to the left inferior occipital gyrus. This suggests a postdiction-related reconstruction of ambiguous sensory stimulation involving late processes in the occipito-temporal cortex, previously associated with temporal integration phenomena. Our findings indicate that perception of the FLI relies on an interplay between ongoing stimulus encoding of the moving bar and feedback processing of the flash, which takes place at later integration stages.

The perceived present: What is it, and what is it there for?

It is proposed that the perceived present is not a moment in time, but an information structure comprising an integrated set of products of perceptual processing. All information in the perceived present carries an informational time marker identifying it as "present". This marker is exclusive to information in the perceived present. There are other kinds of time markers, such as ordinality ("this stimulus occurred before that one") and duration ("this stimulus lasted for 50 ms"). These are different from the "present" time marker and may be attached to information regardless of whether it is in the perceived present or not. It is proposed that the perceived present is a very short-term and very high-capacity holding area for perceptual information. The maximum holding time for any given piece of information is ~100 ms: This is affected by the need to balance the value of informational persistence for further processing against the problem of obsolescence of the information. The main function of the perceived present is to facilitate access by other specialized, automatic processes.