Through the forest of motor representations

The different impact of attention, movement, and sensory information on body metric representation

A growing body of research investigating the relationship between body representation and tool-use has shown that body representation is highly malleable. The nature of the body representation does not consist only of sensory attributes but also of motor action-oriented qualities, which may modulate the subjective experience of our own body. However, how these multisensory factors and integrations may specifically guide and constrain body reorientation's plasticity has been under-investigated. In this study, we used a forearm bisection task to selectively investigate the contribution of motor, sensory, and attentional aspects in guiding body representation malleability. Results show that the perceived forearm midpoint deviates from the real one. This shift is further modulated by a motor task but not by a sensory task, whereas the attentional task generates more uncertain results. Our findings provide novel insight into the individual role of movement, somatosensation, and attention in modulating body metric representation.

Perception, action, and the body model

In 1992, Goodale and Milner proposed to study the visual system based on function, thus dissociating vision for perception (ventral stream) and vision for action (dorsal stream). This became known as the Perception and Action model (PAM). Following the PAM in the visual system, a somatosensory PAM was proposed including a body representation for perception and a separate for action. This review explores the body model of the hand and how it relates to the PAM. The body model refers to the internal representation of the body that is responsible for position sense. Previous research has shown that the representation of the hand features systematic distortions: an overestimation of hand width and an underestimation of finger length. These distortions have been reported using different paradigms, different body parts, and in various settings. Thus, body model distortions appear to be a characteristic of human body representation. If the body model of the hand is distorted, how can actions like reaching and grasping be accurate? We review evidence that body model distortions may in fact provide a functional benefit to our actions, that cortical maps in the somatosensory and motor cortices reflect these distortions, and that actions rely on a distorted body model. We argue that the body model is a product of both the ventral and dorsal somatosensory streams. Further, we suggest that the body model is an example of the inextricable link between the two streams.

Same action in different spatial locations induces selective modulation of body metric representation

Recent studies have hypothesized that the stereotypical representation of the body may reflect some functional aspects of routine actions that are performed in specific peripersonal domains. For example, the lower and upper limbs tend to 'act' in different peripersonal spaces and perform different functions. The present study aims to directly investigate the relationship between body representation and the spatial context where actions are performed. By means of a modified version of the body image task, we investigated body representation before and after a sorting task training in two groups of participants who were asked to carry out the same task/actions in two different spaces: on a table or on the floor, while sitting on a chair. Findings showed that a significant recalibration of the perceived upper arms' length occurred when participants were asked to perform a motor task on the floor. These results seem to suggest that the modulation of the body representation reflects an increase action capabilities driven by the contribution of motor training, and importantly, the location in which the action occurs. Furthermore, the modulation was not limited to the body part actively involved in the action (the arms), it extended to other upper body parts (the torso) to maintain, we propose, a functionally coherent representation of the upper body.

The signing body: extensive sign language practice shapes the size of hands and face

The representation of the metrics of the hands is distorted, but is susceptible to malleability due to expert dexterity (magicians) and long-term tool use (baseball players). However, it remains unclear whether modulation leads to a stable representation of the hand that is adopted in every circumstance, or whether the modulation is closely linked to the spatial context where the expertise occurs. To this aim, a group of 10 experienced Sign Language (SL) interpreters were recruited to study the selective influence of expertise and space localisation in the metric representation of hands. Experiment 1 explored differences in hands’ size representation between the SL interpreters and 10 age-matched controls in near-reaching (Condition 1) and far-reaching space (Condition 2), using the localisation task. SL interpreters presented reduced hand size in near-reaching condition, with characteristic underestimation of finger lengths, and reduced overestimation of hands and wrists widths in comparison with controls. This difference was lost in far-reaching space, confirming the effect of expertise on hand representations is closely linked to the spatial context where an action is performed. As SL interpreters are also experts in the use of their face with communication purposes, the effects of expertise in the metrics of the face were also studied (Experiment 2). SL interpreters were more accurate than controls, with overall reduction of width overestimation. Overall, expertise modifies the representation of relevant body parts in a specific and context-dependent manner. Hence, different representations of the same body part can coexist simultaneously.

A distinction concerning vision-for-action and affordance perception

In this paper, I offer a discussion concerning the conceptual connection between the notion of vision-for-action and the one of affordance perception. I first analyze the notion of vision-for-action. I then analyze a notion usually coupled with it: the notion of affordance perception, the main insights behind which are guiding several current neuroscientific enterprises and the related philosophical speculations. Then, I argue that we should not couple these two notions with a light heart: though these two processes can be, from a theoretical point of view, related, we should be careful in inferring the actual and effective occurrence of the latter in the presence of the former. This will be done by carrying out a conceptual analysis of the experimental evidence coming from the 'Two Visual Systems Model', which is the main reference in the literature on affordance perception and vision-for-action. My point has strong philosophical implications for our view concerning the best interpretation of how vision-for-action really works, and the specific relation it actually entertains with affordance perception.

Intentions: The dynamic hierarchical model revisited

Ten years ago, one of us proposed a dynamic hierarchical model of intentions that brought together philosophical work on intentions and empirical work on motor representations and motor control (Pacherie, 2008). The model distinguished among Distal intentions, Proximal intentions, and Motor intentions operating at different levels of action control (hence the name DPM model). This model specified the representational and functional profiles of each type of intention, as well their local and global dynamics, and the ways in which they interact. A core insight of the model was that action control is the result of integrated, coordinated activity across these levels of intention. Since the proposal of the model, empirical and theoretical works in philosophy and cognitive science have emerged that would seem to support and expand on this central insight. In particular, an updated understanding of the nature of sensorimotor processing and motor representations, as well as of how the different levels of intention and control interface and interact, allows for the further specification and precisification of the original DPM model. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Psychological Capacities Psychology > Motor Skill and Performance Philosophy > Action.

When the affordances disappear: Dynamical and computational explanations of optic ataxia

Two options fuel the debate on the cognitive processes underlying the perception of affordances. On the one hand, the ecological theory of affordance fits with the methodological assumptions of the dynamical systems theory of cognition. On the other hand, it is nowadays common to conceive the perception of affordances within a computational framework. This article defends the explanatory power of a computational approach and aims to extend the concept of affordance beyond the boundaries of the dynamical systems theory of cognition. For that purpose, I consider the case of patients suffering from optic ataxia, a condition in which some aspects of visual guidance over reaching with the hand are lost following a lesion in the left parietal cortex. Etiological considerations, indeed, reveal that a computational approach to the perception of affordances allows for an explanation of ataxic behavior that is not available to the dynamical systems theory.