Mental time travel to the future might be reduced in sleep

Constructive episodic simulation in dreams

Memories of the past help us adaptively respond to similar situations in the future. Originally described by Schacter & Addis in 2007, the "constructive episodic simulation" hypothesis proposes that waking thought combines fragments of various past episodes into imagined simulations of events that may occur in the future. This same framework may be useful for understanding the function of dreaming. N = 48 college students were asked to identify waking life sources for a total of N = 469 dreams. Participants frequently traced dreams to at least one past or future episodic source (53.5% and 25.7% of dreams, respectively). Individual dreams were very often traced to multiple waking sources (43.9% of all dreams with content), with fragments of past memory incorporated into scenarios that anticipated future events. Waking-life dream sources are described in terms of their phenomenology and distribution across time and sleep stage, providing new evidence that dreams not only reflect the past, but also utilize memory in simulating potential futures.

The Language of Dreams: Application of Linguistics-Based Approaches for the Automated Analysis of Dream Experiences

The study of dreams represents a crucial intersection between philosophical, psychological, neuroscientific, and clinical interests. Importantly, one of the main sources of insight into dreaming activity are the (oral or written) reports provided by dreamers upon awakening from their sleep. Classically, two main types of information are commonly extracted from dream reports: structural and semantic, content-related information. Extracted structural information is typically limited to the simple count of words or sentences in a report. Instead, content analysis usually relies on quantitative scores assigned by two or more (blind) human operators through the use of predefined coding systems. Within this review, we will show that methods borrowed from the field of linguistic analysis, such as graph analysis, dictionary-based content analysis, and distributional semantics approaches, could be used to complement and, in many cases, replace classical measures and scales for the quantitative structural and semantic assessment of dream reports. Importantly, these methods allow the direct (operator-independent) extraction of quantitative information from language data, hence enabling a fully objective and reproducible analysis of conscious experiences occurring during human sleep. Most importantly, these approaches can be partially or fully automatized and may thus be easily applied to the analysis of large datasets.

How deep is the rift between conscious states in sleep and wakefulness? Spontaneous experience over the sleep-wake cycle

Whether we are awake or asleep is believed to mark a sharp divide between the types of conscious states we undergo in either behavioural state. Consciousness in sleep is often equated with dreaming and thought to be characteristically different from waking consciousness. Conversely, recent research shows that we spend a substantial amount of our waking lives mind wandering, or lost in spontaneous thoughts. Dreaming has been described as intensified mind wandering, suggesting that there is a continuum of spontaneous experience that reaches from waking into sleep. This challenges how we conceive of the behavioural states of sleep and wakefulness in relation to conscious states. I propose a conceptual framework that distinguishes different subtypes of spontaneous thoughts and experiences independently of their occurrence in sleep or waking. I apply this framework to selected findings from dream and mind-wandering research. I argue that to assess the relationship between spontaneous thoughts and experiences and the behavioural states of sleep and wakefulness, we need to look beyond dreams to consider kinds of sleep-related experience that qualify as dreamless. I conclude that if we consider the entire range of spontaneous thoughts and experiences, there appears to be variation in subtypes both within as well as across behavioural states. Whether we are sleeping or waking does not appear to strongly constrain which subtypes of spontaneous thoughts and experiences we undergo in those states. This challenges the conventional and coarse-grained distinction between sleep and waking and their putative relation to conscious states. This article is part of the theme issue 'Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation'.

A New Measure of Hallucinatory States and a Discussion of REM Sleep Dreaming as a Virtual Laboratory for the Rehearsal of Embodied Cognition

Hallucinatory states are experienced not only in connection with drugs and psychopathologies but occur naturally and spontaneously across the human circadian cycle: Our nightly dreams bring multimodal experiences in the absence of adequate external stimuli. The current study proposes a new, tighter measure of these hallucinatory states: Sleep onset, REM sleep, and non-REM sleep are shown to differ with regard to (a) motor imagery indicating interactions with a rich imaginative world, and (b) cognitive agency that could enable sleepers to recognize their hallucinatory state. Mentation reports from the different states were analysed quantitatively with regard to two grammatical-semantic constructs, motor agency and cognitive agency. The present results support earlier physiological and psychological evidence in revealing a decline in cognitive functions and an increase in simulated interactions with a hallucinatory world, en route to normal REM sleep. This leads us to introduce the hypothesis that REM sleep, which exhibits remarkably high levels of (simulated) sensorimotor processes, may have evolved to serve as a virtual laboratory for the development and rehearsal of embodied cognition. The new measure of hallucinatory states presented here may also hold implications for the study of executive functions and (meta-)cognitions, which might be interesting, for example, for the investigation of lucid dreaming.