A role for the anterior insular cortex in the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness

A measure centrality index for systematic empirical comparison of consciousness theories

Consciousness science is marred by disparate constructs and methodologies, making it challenging to systematically compare theories. This foundational crisis casts doubts on the scientific character of the field itself. Addressing it, we propose a framework for systematically comparing consciousness theories by introducing a novel inter-theory classification interface, the Measure Centrality Index (MCI). Recognizing its gradient distribution, the MCI assesses the degree of importance a specific empirical measure has for a given consciousness theory. We apply the MCI to probe how the empirical measures of the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNW), Integrated Information Theory (IIT), and Temporospatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) would fare within the context of the other two. We demonstrate that direct comparison of IIT, GNW, and TTC is meaningful and valid for some measures like Lempel-Ziv Complexity (LZC), Autocorrelation Window (ACW), and possibly Mutual Information (MI). In contrast, it is problematic for others like the anatomical and physiological neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) due to their MCI-based differential weightings within the structure of the theories. In sum, we introduce and provide proof-of-principle of a novel systematic method for direct inter-theory empirical comparisons, thereby addressing isolated evolution of theories and confirmatory bias issues in the state-of-the-art neuroscience of consciousness.

Theoretical Neurobiology of Consciousness Applied to Human Cerebral Organoids

Organoids and specifically human cerebral organoids (HCOs) are one of the most relevant novelties in the field of biomedical research. Grown either from embryonic or induced pluripotent stem cells, HCOs can be used as in vitro three-dimensional models, mimicking the developmental process and organization of the developing human brain. Based on that, and despite their current limitations, it cannot be assumed that they will never at any stage of development manifest some rudimentary form of consciousness. In the absence of behavioral indicators of consciousness, the theoretical neurobiology of consciousness being applied to unresponsive brain-injured patients can be considered with respect to HCOs. In clinical neurology, it is difficult to discern a capacity for consciousness in unresponsive brain-injured patients who provide no behavioral indicators of consciousness. In such scenarios, a validated neurobiological theory of consciousness, which tells us what the neural mechanisms of consciousness are, could be used to identify a capacity for consciousness. Like the unresponsive patients that provide a diagnostic difficulty for neurologists, HCOs provide no behavioral indicators of consciousness. Therefore, this article discusses how three prominent neurobiological theories of consciousness apply to human cerebral organoids. From the perspective of the Temporal Circuit Hypothesis, the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory, and the Integrated Information Theory, we discuss what neuronal structures and functions might indicate that cerebral organoids have a neurobiological capacity to be conscious.

Structural alterations of the insula in depression patients - A 7-Tesla-MRI study

INTRODUCTION

The insular cortex is part of a network of highly connected cerebral "rich club" - regions and has been implicated in the pathophysiology of various psychiatric and neurological disorders, of which major depressive disease is one of the most prevalent. "Rich club" vulnerability can be a contributing factor in disease development. High-resolution structural subfield analysis of insular volume in combination with cortical thickness measurements and psychological testing might elucidate the way in which the insula is changed in depression.

MATERIAL AND METHODS

High-resolution structural images of the brain were acquired using a 7T-MRI scanner. The mean grey matter volume and cortical thickness within the insular subfields were analysed using voxel-based morphometry (VBM) and surface analysis techniques respectively. Insular subfields were defined according to the Brainnetome Atlas for VBM - and the Destrieux-Atlas for cortical thickness - analysis. Thirty-three patients with confirmed major depressive disease, as well as thirty-one healthy controls matched for age and gender, were measured. The severity of depression in MDD patients was measured via a BDI-II score and objective clinical assessment (AMDP). Intergroup statistical analysis was performed using ANCOVA. An intragroup multivariate regression analysis of patient psychological test results was calculated. Corrections for multiple comparisons was performed using FDR.

RESULTS

Significant differences between groups were observed in the left granular dorsal insula according to VBM-analysis. AMDP-scores positively correlated with cortical thickness in the right superior segment of the circular insular sulcus.

CONCLUSIONS

The combination of differences in grey matter volume between healthy controls and patients with a positive correlation of cortical thickness with disease severity underscores the insula's role in the pathogeneses of MDD. The connectivity hub insular cortex seems vulnerable to disruption in context of affective disease.

Representational 'touch' and modulatory 'retouch'-two necessary neurobiological processes in thalamocortical interaction for conscious experience

Theories of consciousness using neurobiological data or being influenced by these data have been focused either on states of consciousness or contents of consciousness. These theories have occasionally used evidence from psychophysical phenomena where conscious experience is a dependent experimental variable. However, systematic catalog of many such relevant phenomena has not been offered in terms of these theories. In the perceptual retouch theory of thalamocortical interaction, recently developed to become a blend with the dendritic integration theory, consciousness states and contents of consciousness are explained by the same mechanism. This general-purpose mechanism has modulation of the cortical layer-5 pyramidal neurons that represent contents of consciousness as its core. As a surplus, many experimental psychophysical phenomena of conscious perception can be explained by the workings of this mechanism. Historical origins and current views inherent in this theory are presented and reviewed.

Hallucinations: A Functional Network Model of How Sensory Representations Become Selected for Conscious Awareness in Schizophrenia

Hallucinations are conscious perception-like experiences that are a common symptom of schizophrenia spectrum disorders (SSD). Current neuroscience evidence suggests several brain areas are involved in the generation of hallucinations including the sensory cortex, insula, putamen, and hippocampus. But how does activity in these regions give rise to aberrant conscious perceptions that seemingly invade ongoing conscious experience? Most existing models assume that sensory representations are sometimes spontaneously activated in the brain, and that these spontaneous activations somehow play a causal role in the generation of hallucinations. Yet, it remains unclear how these representations become selected for conscious processing. No existing theory of hallucinations has specified such a “selection mechanism.” Global Workspace (GW) theorists argue that the brain’s interconnected processors select relevant piece(s) of information for broadcasting to other brain processors, rendering the information accessible to consciousness; this process known as “ignition” is associated with synchronized activity across distributed cortical and subcortical brain regions. Yet, it remains unclear how certain information and representations become selected for conscious processing. While GW theorists maintain that attention plays an important role, they have not delineated a formal “selection mechanism.” This paper specifies a selection mechanism based upon two central hypotheses: (1) a functional network called the “salience network” plays a critical role in selecting sensory representations for conscious broadcast to the GW in normal (healthy) perception; (2) sensory representations become abnormally selected for conscious broadcast to the GW (instead of being filtered out of consciousness) in individuals with SSD that experience hallucinations.

Impact of anesthesia on static and dynamic functional connectivity in mice

A few studies have compared the static functional connectivity between awake and lightly anesthetized states in rodents by resting-state fMRI. However, impact of light anesthesia on static and dynamic fluctuations in functional connectivity has not been fully understood. Here, we developed a resting-state fMRI protocol to perform awake and anesthetized functional MRI in the same mice. Static functional connectivity showed a widespread decrease under light anesthesia, such as when under isoflurane or a mixture of isoflurane and medetomidine. Several interhemispheric and subcortical connections were key connections for anesthetized condition from awake state. Dynamic functional connectivity demonstrates the shift from frequent broad connections across the cortex, the hypothalamus, and the auditory-visual cortex to frequent local connections within the cortex only under light anesthesia compared with awake state. Fractional amplitude of low frequency fluctuation in the thalamic nuclei decreased under both anesthesia. These results indicate that typical anesthetics for functional MRI alters the spatiotemporal profile of the dynamic brain network in subcortical regions, including the thalamic nuclei and limbic system.

Patrolling the boundaries of social domains: Neural activations to violations of expectations for romantic and work relationships

According to the social domains hypothesis, we reduce the information-processing demands of complex social cues by classifying them into a limited number of domains, each with distinct sets of expectations. This requires rapid identification of violations of the boundaries between social domains. We hypothesized that these violations are likely to be associated with neural activation of the salience system. Using fMRI we compared responses of 20 adults to expected and unexpected everyday social scenarios in personal and work interactions. The vignettes exemplified different kinds of scenarios presented in the work setting, i.e., task-focused scenarios which are expected at work and scenarios with a personal focus, which are unexpected at work. The key contrast between task and personal focussed scenarios presented in the work setting was associated with fronto-insular activation. Perceived inappropriateness of the unexpected scenarios, and shorter response time to judgment of inappropriateness were also associated with fronto-insular activation, after controlling for unpleasantness. This study indicates specific neural responses to violations of expectations in different social situations. Our findings suggest that the fronto-insular region is implicated in rapid detection of behaviors that cross the boundaries of social domains, which are hypothesized to be necessary for efficient social information processing.

Anterior insula regulates brain network transitions that gate conscious access

Conscious access to sensory information is likely gated at an intermediate site between primary sensory and transmodal association cortices, but the structure responsible remains unknown. We perform functional neuroimaging to determine the neural correlates of conscious access using a volitional mental imagery task, a report paradigm not confounded by motor behavior. Titrating propofol to loss of behavioral responsiveness in healthy volunteers creates dysfunction of the anterior insular cortex (AIC) in association with an impairment of dynamic transitions of default-mode and dorsal attention networks. Candidate subcortical regions mediating sensory gating or arousal (thalamus, basal forebrain) fail to show this association. The gating role of the AIC is consistent with findings in awake participants, whose conscious access is predicted by pre-stimulus AIC activity near perceptual threshold. These data support the hypothesis that AIC, situated at an intermediate position of the cortical hierarchy, regulates brain network transitions that gate conscious access.

In a human neuroimaging study, Huang et al. manipulate the level and content of consciousness using independent experimental protocols to demonstrate that the anterior insula, situated between unimodal and transmodal cortical areas along the brain’s functional hierarchy, serves as a gate for conscious access of sensory information.

The anterior insula channels prefrontal expectancy signals during affective processing

Expectancy shapes our perception of impending events. Although such an interplay between cognitive and affective processes is often impaired in mental disorders, it is not well understood how top-down expectancy signals modulate future affect. We therefore track the information flow in the brain during cognitive and affective processing segregated in time using task-specific cross-correlations. Participants in two independent fMRI studies (N₁ = 37 & N₂ = 55) were instructed to imagine a situation with affective content as indicated by a cue, which was then followed by an emotional picture congruent with expectancy. To correct for intrinsic covariance of brain function, we calculate resting-state cross-correlations analogous to the task. First, using factorial modeling of delta cross-correlations (task-rest) of the first study, we find that the magnitude of expectancy signals in the anterior insula cortex (AIC) modulates the BOLD response to emotional pictures in the anterior cingulate and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex in opposite directions. Second, using hierarchical linear modeling of lagged connectivity, we demonstrate that expectancy signals in the AIC indeed foreshadow this opposing pattern in the prefrontal cortex. Third, we replicate the results in the second study using a higher temporal resolution, showing that our task-specific cross-correlation approach robustly uncovers the dynamics of information flow. We conclude that the AIC arbitrates the recruitment of distinct prefrontal networks during cued picture processing according to triggered expectations. Taken together, our study provides new insights into neuronal pathways channeling cognition and affect within well-defined brain networks. Better understanding of such dynamics could lead to new applications tracking aberrant information processing in mental disorders.

Altered frontal and insular functional connectivity as pivotal mechanisms for apathy in Alzheimer's disease

BACKGROUND

Apathy is a common and early symptom in Alzheimer's disease (AD) and is linked to poorer prognosis. Theoretical interpretations of apathy implicate alterations of connections amongst fronto-striatal and limbic regions.

OBJECTIVE

To test the association between presence of apathy and patterns of brain functional connectivity in patients with clinically-established AD.

METHODS

Seventy AD patients were included. Thirty-five patients experienced apathy as defined by the screening question of the Neuropsychiatric Inventory, and thirty-five did not. All patients agreed to undergo an MRI protocol inclusive of resting-state acquisitions. The hemodynamic-dependent signal was extracted bilaterally from five regions of interest: ventromedial prefrontal cortices, anterior cingulate cortices, dorsolateral prefrontal cortices, insulae and amygdalae. t tests were run to compare connectivity maps of apathetic and non-apathetic patients. Age, education, Mini Mental State Examination score, gray matter volumes and gray matter fractions served as covariates.

RESULTS

At a p_FWE < .05 threshold, apathetic patients had reduced connectivity between the left insula and right superior parietal cortex. Apathetic patients had also increased connectivity between the right dorsolateral prefrontal seed and the right superior parietal cortex. Patients with apathy were significantly more likely to experience other psychiatric symptoms.

CONCLUSION

Our findings support a role of frontal and insular connections in coordinating value-based decisions in AD. Both down-regulation and maladaptive up-regulation mechanisms appear to be at play in these regions.