A role for visceral feedback and interoception in feelings-of-knowing

Metacognitive Feelings: A Predictive-Processing Perspective

Metacognitive feelings are affective experiences that concern the subject's mental processes and capacities. Paradigmatic examples include the feeling of familiarity, the feeling of confidence, or the tip-of-the-tongue experience. In this article, we advance an account of metacognitive feelings based on the predictive-processing framework. The core tenet of predictive processing is that the brain is a hierarchical hypothesis-testing mechanism, predicting sensory input on the basis of prior experience and updating predictions on the basis of the incoming prediction error. According to the proposed account, metacognitive feelings arise out of a process in which visceral changes serve as cues to predict the error dynamics relating to a particular mental process. The expected rate of prediction-error reduction corresponds to the valence at the core of the emerging metacognitive feeling. Metacognitive feelings use prediction dynamics to model the agent's situation in a way that is both descriptive and directive. Thus, metacognitive feelings are not only an appraisal of ongoing cognitive performance but also a set of action policies. These action policies span predictive trajectories across bodily action, mental action, and interoceptive changes, which together transform the epistemic landscape within which metacognitive feelings unfold.

Epistemic Feelings are Affective Experiences

This paper develops the claim that epistemic feelings are affective experiences. To establish some diagnostic criteria, characteristic features of affective experiences are outlined: valence and arousal. Then, in order to pave the way for showing that epistemic feelings have said features, an initial challenge coming from introspection is addressed. Next, the paper turns to empirical findings showing that we can observe physiological and behavioural proxies for valence and arousal in epistemic tasks that typically rely on epistemic feelings. Finally, it is argued that the affective properties do not only correlate with epistemic feelings but that we, in fact, capitalise on these affective properties to perform the epistemic tasks. In other words: the affective properties in question constitute epistemic feelings.

Feeling-of-knowing experiences breed curiosity

A central tenet in theoretical work on metacognition is that retrieval experiences during memory search can exert control over behaviour. States of curiosity, which reflect motivational tendencies to seek out information, may play a critical role in this control function. We conducted two experiments to address this idea, focusing on links between feeling-of knowing (FOK) experiences, memory-search duration, and subsequent information-seeking behaviour. We administered an episodic FOK paradigm that probed memory for previously studied face-name pairs, and subsequently provided an opportunity to select limited pairs for restudy. This set-up allowed us to test whether current search duration and subsequent restudy choices are biased towards items with high FOK ratings. Results revealed a positive relationship between FOK ratings and the response times of these judgements. We observed a similar positive relationship between FOK ratings and subsequent item selection for restudy. Moreover, experimental manipulations of FOK ratings based on familiarity of the face cues also had parallel effects. Our findings suggest that metacognitive experiences during unsuccessful retrieval from episodic memory can induce states of curiosity that shape behaviour beyond the immediate retrieval context. Curiosity may act as a bond to ensure that memory gaps identified through unsuccessful retrieval adaptively guide future learning.

Recovery, Interrupted: The Zeigarnik Effect in EMDR Therapy and the Adaptive Information Processing Model

This theoretical article proposes that the Zeigarnik effect (ZE) (i.e., better memory for interrupted rather than completed tasks) explains the formation of traumatic memories as incomplete tasks. These tasks are thought to foster pathological rumination toward their completion while simultaneously stoking avoidance. After looking at the role of the ZE in the development and maintenance of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), the article examines the physiological substrates of the ZE, including brain network imbalance, excessive autonomic nervous system activation, and prospective memory acuity for incomplete events. Eye movement desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR) therapy is proposed as uniquely capable of providing closure to interrupted facets of traumatic recollection, as this treatment may facilitate greater memory reconsolidation and inhibition of Zeigarnik reminders than extinction-based models. The ZE may be implicated in the overall EMDR treatment effect, as it is activated in several EMDR phases. Specifically, the use of brief interrupted exposures during EMDR reprocessing may benefit from the ZE in resolving traumatic events. Eye movements themselves are also considered interruptions to rumination upon traumatic memory. Recommendations for the further use of the ZE are described, and suggestions are made for future research. Protocol modifications and interweaves which mobilize the preceding insights are also provided.

An Active Inference Approach to Interoceptive Psychopathology

Interoception refers to the process by which the nervous system senses and integrates signals originating from within the body, providing a momentary mapping of the body's internal landscape and its relationship to the outside world. Active inference is based on the premise that afferent sensory input to the brain is constantly shaped and modified by prior expectations. In this review we propose that interoceptive psychopathology results from two primary interoceptive dysfunctions: First, individuals have abnormally strong expectations of the situations that elicit bodily change (i.e., hyperprecise priors), and second, they have great difficulty adjusting these expectations when the environment changes (i.e., context rigidity). Here we discuss how these dysfunctions potentially manifest in mental illness and how interventions aimed at altering interoceptive processing can help the brain create a more realistic model of its internal state.