On my right or on your left? Spontaneous spatial perspective taking in blind people

Seeing through the cat's eyes: evidence of a spontaneous perspective taking process using a non-human avatar

In many daily face-to-face interactions, people are able to take the perspective of others, for example, coding right and left based on point-of-view of others. In the present study, we investigated whether observers are able to take the perspective of a non-human figure such as a cat, observing the same effects obtained with human or robot avatars. In both experiments, we used a centrally presented stimulus (i.e. a cat), with its tail lateralized to the left or to the right. Participants had to respond to the side of the tail with a lateralized keypress. In Experiment 1 (spatial perspective taking task), participants were required to explicitly adopt the cat's perspective to respond, whereas in Experiment 2 (SR compatibility task), this was not explicitly required. In both experiments, faster RTs are obtained when the cat is presented back, with a greater difference between front and back views when the tail is on the right; furthermore, there is no temporal modulation of the back-front effect. These common results between the two experiments are interpreted on the basis of the spatial perspective taking processes, elicited voluntarily (Experiment 1) or spontaneously (Experiment 2).

Spatial perspective-taking: insights from sensory impairments

Information can be perceived from a multiplicity of spatial perspectives, which is central to effectively understanding and interacting with our environment and other people. Sensory impairments such as blindness are known to impact spatial representations and perspective-taking is often thought of as a visual process. However, disturbed functioning of other sensory systems (e.g., vestibular, proprioceptive and auditory) can also influence spatial perspective-taking. These lines of research remain largely separate, yet together they may shed new light on the role that each sensory modality plays in this core cognitive ability. The findings to date reveal that spatial cognitive processes may be differently affected by various types of sensory loss. The visual system may be crucial for the development of efficient allocentric (object-to-object) representation; however, the role of vision in adopting another's spatial perspective remains unclear. On the other hand, the vestibular and the proprioceptive systems likely play an important role in anchoring the perceived self to the physical body, thus facilitating imagined self-rotations required to adopt another's spatial perspective. Findings regarding the influence of disturbed auditory functioning on perspective-taking are so far inconclusive and thus await further data. This review highlights that spatial perspective-taking is a highly plastic cognitive ability, as the brain is often able to compensate in the face of different sensory loss.

Modeling the subjective perspective of consciousness and its role in the control of behaviours

Consciousness has been hypothesized to operate as a global workspace, which accesses and integrates multimodal information in a uni_ed manner, supports expectation violation monitoring and reduction, and the motivation, programming and control of action. One important yet open issue concerns how the subjective perspective at the core of consciousness, and subjective properties of manifestation of the environment in such perspective as an embodied experience, play a role in such process. We operationalised the concept of subjective perspective using the principles of the Projective Consciousness Model (PCM), based on the projective geometrical concept of Field of Consciousness. We show how these principles can account for documented relationships between appraisal and distance as an inverse distance law, yield a generative model of a_ective and epistemic drives based on purely subjective parameters, such as the apparent size of objects, and can be generalised to implement Theory of Mind, in a manner that is consistent with simulation theory. We used simulations of arti_cial agents, based on psychological rationale, to demonstrate how different model parameters could generate a variety of emergent adaptive and maladaptive behaviours that are relevant to developmental and clinical psychology: the ability to be resilient in the face of obstacles through imaginary projections, the emergence of social approach and joint attention behaviours, the ability to take advantage of false beliefs attributed to others, the emergence of avoidance behaviours as observed in social anxiety disorders, the presence of restricted interests as observed in autism spectrum disorders. The simulation of agents was applied to a speci_c robotic context, and agents' behaviours were demonstrated by controlling the corresponding robots. Our results contribute to advance the scienti_c understanding of the causal relationships between core aspects of the phenomenology of consciousness and its functions in human cybernetics.

The Integrated Information Theory of consciousness: A case of mistaken identity

Giulio Tononi's Integrated Information Theory (IIT) proposes explaining consciousness by directly identifying it with integrated information. We examine the construct validity of IIT's measure of consciousness, phi (Φ), by analyzing its formal properties, its relation to key aspects of consciousness, and its co-variation with relevant empirical circumstances. Our analysis shows that IIT's identification of consciousness with the causal efficacy with which differentiated networks accomplish global information transfer (which is what Φ in fact measures) is mistaken. This misidentification has the consequence of requiring the attribution of consciousness to a range of natural systems and artifacts that include, but are not limited to, large-scale electrical power grids, gene-regulation networks, some electronic circuit boards, and social networks. Instead of treating this consequence of the theory as a disconfirmation, IIT embraces it. By regarding these systems as bearers of consciousness ex hypothesi, IIT is led towards the orbit of panpsychist ideation. This departure from science as we know it can be avoided by recognizing the functional misattribution at the heart of IIT's identity claim. We show, for example, what function is actually performed, at least in the human case, by the cortical combination of differentiation with integration that IIT identifies with consciousness. Finally, we examine what lessons may be drawn from IIT's failure to provide a credible account of consciousness for progress in the very active field of research concerned with exploring the phenomenon from formal and neural points of view.