Multisensory integration, body representation and hyperactivity of the immune system

Synchrony perception across senses: A systematic review of temporal binding window changes from infancy to adolescence in typical and atypical development

Sensory integration is increasingly acknowledged as being crucial for the development of cognitive and social abilities. However, its developmental trajectory is still little understood. This systematic review delves into the topic by investigating the literature about the developmental changes from infancy through adolescence of the Temporal Binding Window (TBW) - the epoch of time within which sensory inputs are perceived as simultaneous and therefore integrated. Following comprehensive searches across PubMed, Elsevier, and PsycInfo databases, only experimental, behavioral, English-language, peer-reviewed studies on multisensory temporal processing in 0-17-year-olds have been included. Non-behavioral, non-multisensory, and non-human studies have been excluded as those that did not directly focus on the TBW. The selection process was independently performed by two Authors. The 39 selected studies involved 2859 participants in total. Findings indicate a predisposition towards cross-modal asynchrony sensitivity and a composite, still unclear, developmental trajectory, with atypical development associated to increased asynchrony tolerance. These results highlight the need for consistent and thorough research into TBW development to inform potential interventions.

Understanding the neural bases of bodily self-consciousness: recent achievements and main challenges

The last two decades have seen a surge of interest in the mechanisms underpinning bodily self-consciousness (BSC). Studies showed that BSC relies on several bodily experiences (i.e., self-location, body ownership, agency, first-person perspective) and multisensory integration. The aim of this literature review is to summarize new insights and novel developments into the understanding of the neural bases of BSC, such as the contribution of the interoceptive signals to the neural mechanisms of BSC, and the overlap with the neural bases of conscious experience in general and of higher-level forms of self (i.e., the cognitive self). We also identify the main challenges and propose future perspectives that need to be conducted to progress into the understanding of the neural mechanisms of BSC. In particular, we point the lack of crosstalk and cross-fertilization between subdisciplines of integrative neuroscience to better understand BSC, especially the lack of research in animal models to decipher the neural networks and systems of neurotransmitters underpinning BSC. We highlight the need for more causal evidence that specific brain areas are instrumental in generating BSC and the need for studies tapping into interindividual differences in the phenomenal experience of BSC and their underlying mechanisms.

Temporal dynamics of the Rubber Hand Illusion

It is widely accepted that the representation of the body is not fixed and immutable, but rather flexible and constantly updated based on a continuous stream of multisensory information. This mechanism can be very useful to adapt to several situations, but it would not be adaptive if the body representation was too malleable or if it wasn't capable of restoring its integrity after a transient modification. Here we used the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) to investigate how quickly the body representation can be modified. Previous studies have investigated the timing of the onset and offset of the illusion, however, they did not assess a fine temporal resolution. Here, we used a potentiometer to record a moment-by-moment rating of the feeling of owning the RH for two minutes during the visuo-tactile stimulation and two minutes following the stimulation. Our results suggest that the feeling of Ownership is already established during the first 19 s of stimulation then it continues to grow, but at a much slower pace. The feeling of Ownership disappears within 66 s from the end of the stimulation. This work sheds new light on the temporal dynamics of the RHI and the malleability of the body self-consciousness.

The sensorimotor theory of pathological pain revisited

Harris (1999) proposed that pain can arise in the absence of tissue damage because changes in the cortical representation of the painful body part lead to incongruences between motor intention and sensory feedback. This idea, subsequently termed the sensorimotor theory of pain, has formed the basis for novel treatments for pathological pain. Here we review the evidence that people with pathological pain have changes to processes contributing to sensorimotor function: motor function, sensory feedback, cognitive representations of the body and its surrounding space, multisensory processing, and sensorimotor integration. Changes to sensorimotor processing are most evident in the form of motor deficits, sensory changes, and body representations distortions, and for Complex Regional Pain Syndrome (CRPS), fibromyalgia, and low back pain. Many sensorimotor changes are related to cortical processing, pain, and other clinical characteristics. However, there is very limited evidence that changes in sensorimotor processing actually lead to pain. We therefore propose that the theory is more appropriate for understanding why pain persists rather than how it arises.