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Kanai R, Fujisawa I. Toward a universal theory of consciousness. Neurosci Conscious 2024; 2024:niae022. [PMID: 38826771 PMCID: PMC11141593 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niae022] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/03/2023] [Revised: 05/08/2024] [Accepted: 05/15/2024] [Indexed: 06/04/2024] Open
Abstract
While falsifiability has been broadly discussed as a desirable property of a theory of consciousness, in this paper, we introduce the meta-theoretic concept of "Universality" as an additional desirable property for a theory of consciousness. The concept of universality, often assumed in physics, posits that the fundamental laws of nature are consistent and apply equally everywhere in the universe and remain constant over time. This assumption is crucial in science, acting as a guiding principle for developing and testing theories. When applied to theories of consciousness, universality can be defined as the ability of a theory to determine whether any fully described dynamical system is conscious or non-conscious. Importantly, for a theory to be universal, the determinant of consciousness needs to be defined as an intrinsic property of a system as opposed to replying on the interpretation of the external observer. The importance of universality originates from the consideration that given that consciousness is a natural phenomenon, it could in principle manifest in any physical system that satisfies a certain set of conditions whether it is biological or non-biological. To date, apart from a few exceptions, most existing theories do not possess this property. Instead, they tend to make predictions as to the neural correlates of consciousness based on the interpretations of brain functions, which makes those theories only applicable to brain-centric systems. While current functionalist theories of consciousness tend to be heavily reliant on our interpretations of brain functions, we argue that functionalist theories could be converted to a universal theory by specifying mathematical formulations of the constituent concepts. While neurobiological and functionalist theories retain their utility in practice, we will eventually need a universal theory to fully explain why certain types of systems possess consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ryota Kanai
- President Office, Araya, Inc., Sanpo Sakuma Building, 1-11 Kanda Sakuma-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 101-0025, Japan
| | - Ippei Fujisawa
- President Office, Araya, Inc., Sanpo Sakuma Building, 1-11 Kanda Sakuma-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 101-0025, Japan
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Owen M, Huang Z, Duclos C, Lavazza A, Grasso M, Hudetz AG. Theoretical Neurobiology of Consciousness Applied to Human Cerebral Organoids. Camb Q Healthc Ethics 2023:1-21. [PMID: 37850471 DOI: 10.1017/s0963180123000543] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/19/2023]
Abstract
Organoids and specifically human cerebral organoids (HCOs) are one of the most relevant novelties in the field of biomedical research. Grown either from embryonic or induced pluripotent stem cells, HCOs can be used as in vitro three-dimensional models, mimicking the developmental process and organization of the developing human brain. Based on that, and despite their current limitations, it cannot be assumed that they will never at any stage of development manifest some rudimentary form of consciousness. In the absence of behavioral indicators of consciousness, the theoretical neurobiology of consciousness being applied to unresponsive brain-injured patients can be considered with respect to HCOs. In clinical neurology, it is difficult to discern a capacity for consciousness in unresponsive brain-injured patients who provide no behavioral indicators of consciousness. In such scenarios, a validated neurobiological theory of consciousness, which tells us what the neural mechanisms of consciousness are, could be used to identify a capacity for consciousness. Like the unresponsive patients that provide a diagnostic difficulty for neurologists, HCOs provide no behavioral indicators of consciousness. Therefore, this article discusses how three prominent neurobiological theories of consciousness apply to human cerebral organoids. From the perspective of the Temporal Circuit Hypothesis, the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory, and the Integrated Information Theory, we discuss what neuronal structures and functions might indicate that cerebral organoids have a neurobiological capacity to be conscious.
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Affiliation(s)
- Matthew Owen
- Philosophy Department, Yakima Valley College, Yakima, WA, USA
- Center for Consciousness Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
| | - Zirui Huang
- Center for Consciousness Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
- Department of Anesthesiology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
| | - Catherine Duclos
- Department of Anesthesiology and Pain Medicine, Université de Montréal, Montréal, QC, Canada
- Department of Neuroscience, Université de Montréal, Montréal, QC, Canada
- Centre for Advanced Research in Sleep Medicine, Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux (CIUSSS) du Nord-de-l'île-de-Montréal, Montréal, QC, Canada
- CIFAR Azrieli Global Scholars Program, Toronto, ON, Canada
| | - Andrea Lavazza
- Centro Universitario Internazionale, Arezzo, Italy
- University of Pavia, Pavia, Italy
| | - Matteo Grasso
- Center for Sleep and Consciousness, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI, USA
| | - Anthony G Hudetz
- Center for Consciousness Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
- Department of Anesthesiology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
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Becerra D, Calixto A, Orio P. The Conscious Nematode: Exploring Hallmarks of Minimal Phenomenal Consciousness in Caenorhabditis Elegans. Int J Psychol Res (Medellin) 2023; 16:87-104. [PMID: 38106963 PMCID: PMC10723751 DOI: 10.21500/20112084.6487] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/16/2022] [Revised: 10/21/2022] [Accepted: 03/13/2023] [Indexed: 12/19/2023] Open
Abstract
While subcellular components of cognition and affectivity that involve the interaction between experience, environment, and physiology -such as learning, trauma, or emotion- are being identified, the physical mechanisms of phenomenal consciousness remain more elusive. We are interested in exploring whether ancient, simpler organisms such as nematodes have minimal consciousness. Is there something that feels like to be a worm? Or are worms blind machines? 'Simpler' models allow us to simultaneously extract data from multiple levels such as slow and fast neural dynamics, structural connectivity, molecular dynamics, behavior, decision making, etc., and thus, to test predictions of the current frameworks in dispute. In the present critical review, we summarize the current models of consciousness in order to reassess in light of the new evidence whether Caenorhabditis elegans, a nematode with a nervous system composed of 302 neurons, has minimal consciousness. We also suggest empirical paths to further advance consciousness research using C. elegans.
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Affiliation(s)
- Diego Becerra
- Centro Interdisciplinario de Neurociencia de Valparaíso (CINV), Facultad de Ciencias, Universidad de Valparaíso, Valparaíso, Chile.Universidad de ValparaísoUniversidad de ValparaísoValparaísoChile
- Doctorado en Ciencias, mención Biofísica y Biología Computacional, Facultad de Ciencias, Universidad de Valparaíso, Valparaíso, Chile.Universidad de ValparaísoUniversidad de ValparaísoValparaísoChile
| | - Andrea Calixto
- Centro Interdisciplinario de Neurociencia de Valparaíso (CINV), Facultad de Ciencias, Universidad de Valparaíso, Valparaíso, Chile.Universidad de ValparaísoUniversidad de ValparaísoValparaísoChile
- Instituto de Neurociencia, Facultad de Ciencias, Universidad de Valparaíso, Valparaíso, Chile.Universidad de ValparaísoUniversidad de ValparaísoValparaísoChile
| | - Patricio Orio
- Centro Interdisciplinario de Neurociencia de Valparaíso (CINV), Facultad de Ciencias, Universidad de Valparaíso, Valparaíso, Chile.Universidad de ValparaísoUniversidad de ValparaísoValparaísoChile
- Instituto de Neurociencia, Facultad de Ciencias, Universidad de Valparaíso, Valparaíso, Chile.Universidad de ValparaísoUniversidad de ValparaísoValparaísoChile
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Browning H, Birch J. Animal sentience. PHILOSOPHY COMPASS 2022; 17:e12822. [PMID: 35859762 PMCID: PMC9285591 DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12822] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/25/2020] [Revised: 10/01/2021] [Accepted: 02/14/2022] [Indexed: 06/01/2023]
Abstract
'Sentience' sometimes refers to the capacity for any type of subjective experience, and sometimes to the capacity to have subjective experiences with a positive or negative valence, such as pain or pleasure. We review recent controversies regarding sentience in fish and invertebrates and consider the deep methodological challenge posed by these cases. We then present two ways of responding to the challenge. In a policy-making context, precautionary thinking can help us treat animals appropriately despite continuing uncertainty about their sentience. In a scientific context, we can draw inspiration from the science of human consciousness to disentangle conscious and unconscious perception (especially vision) in animals. Developing better ways to disentangle conscious and unconscious affect is a key priority for future research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Heather Browning
- Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social ScienceLondon School of Economics and Political ScienceLondonUK
| | - Jonathan Birch
- Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social ScienceLondon School of Economics and Political ScienceLondonUK
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Abstract
There is no agreement on whether any invertebrates are conscious and no agreement on a methodology that could settle the issue. How can the debate move forward? I distinguish three broad types of approach: theory-heavy, theory-neutral and theory-light. Theory-heavy and theory-neutral approaches face serious problems, motivating a middle path: the theory-light approach. At the core of the theory-light approach is a minimal commitment about the relation between phenomenal consciousness and cognition that is compatible with many specific theories of consciousness: the hypothesis that phenomenally conscious perception of a stimulus facilitates, relative to unconscious perception, a cluster of cognitive abilities in relation to that stimulus. This "facilitation hypothesis" can productively guide inquiry into invertebrate consciousness. What is needed? At this stage, not more theory, and not more undirected data gathering. What is needed is a systematic search for consciousness-linked cognitive abilities, their relationships to each other, and their sensitivity to masking.
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Abstract
There is growing interest in machine ethics in the question of whether and under what circumstances an artificial intelligence would deserve moral consideration. This paper explores a particular type of moral status that the author terms psychological moral patiency, focusing on the epistemological question of what sort of evidence might lead us to reasonably conclude that a given artificial system qualified as having this status. The paper surveys five possible criteria that might be applied: intuitive judgments, assessments of intelligence, the presence of desires and autonomous behavior, evidence of sentience, and behavioral equivalence. The author suggests that despite its limitations, the latter approach offers the best way forward, and defends a variant of that, termed the cognitive equivalence strategy. In short, this holds that an artificial system should be considered a psychological moral patient to the extent that it possesses cognitive mechanisms shared with other beings such as nonhuman animals whom we also consider to be psychological moral patients.
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Budaev S, Kristiansen TS, Giske J, Eliassen S. Computational animal welfare: towards cognitive architecture models of animal sentience, emotion and wellbeing. ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2020; 7:201886. [PMID: 33489298 PMCID: PMC7813262 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.201886] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/21/2020] [Accepted: 12/04/2020] [Indexed: 05/08/2023]
Abstract
To understand animal wellbeing, we need to consider subjective phenomena and sentience. This is challenging, since these properties are private and cannot be observed directly. Certain motivations, emotions and related internal states can be inferred in animals through experiments that involve choice, learning, generalization and decision-making. Yet, even though there is significant progress in elucidating the neurobiology of human consciousness, animal consciousness is still a mystery. We propose that computational animal welfare science emerges at the intersection of animal behaviour, welfare and computational cognition. By using ideas from cognitive science, we develop a functional and generic definition of subjective phenomena as any process or state of the organism that exists from the first-person perspective and cannot be isolated from the animal subject. We then outline a general cognitive architecture to model simple forms of subjective processes and sentience. This includes evolutionary adaptation which contains top-down attention modulation, predictive processing and subjective simulation by re-entrant (recursive) computations. Thereafter, we show how this approach uses major characteristics of the subjective experience: elementary self-awareness, global workspace and qualia with unity and continuity. This provides a formal framework for process-based modelling of animal needs, subjective states, sentience and wellbeing.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sergey Budaev
- Department of Biological Sciences, University of Bergen, PO Box 7803, 5020 Bergen, Norway
| | - Tore S. Kristiansen
- Research Group Animal Welfare, Institute of Marine Research, PO Box 1870, 5817 Bergen, Norway
| | - Jarl Giske
- Department of Biological Sciences, University of Bergen, PO Box 7803, 5020 Bergen, Norway
| | - Sigrunn Eliassen
- Department of Biological Sciences, University of Bergen, PO Box 7803, 5020 Bergen, Norway
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Black D. The global workspace theory, the phenomenal concept strategy, and the distribution of consciousness. Conscious Cogn 2020; 84:102992. [PMID: 32771955 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2020.102992] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/15/2019] [Revised: 05/27/2020] [Accepted: 07/13/2020] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
Abstract
Peter Carruthers argues that the global workspace theory implies there are no facts of the matter about animal consciousness. The argument is easily extended to other cognitive theories of consciousness, posing a general problem for consciousness studies. But the argument proves too much, for it also implies that there are no facts of the matter about human consciousness. A key assumption is that scientific theories of consciousness must explain away the explanatory gap. I criticize this assumption and point to an alternative strategy for defending scientific theories of consciousness, one that better reflects the ongoing scientific practice. I argue there are introspectable inferential connections from phenomenal concepts to functional concepts that scientists can use to individuate the global workspace in terms of capacities that animals and humans share.
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Affiliation(s)
- Dylan Black
- Xi'an Jiaotong University, 28 Xianning W Rd, Jiao Da Shang Ye Jie Qu, Beilin Qu, Xian Shi, Shaanxi Sheng, China.
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Fellow travellers in cognitive evolution: Co-evolution of working memory and mental time travel? Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2019; 105:94-105. [DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2019.07.016] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/01/2019] [Revised: 06/24/2019] [Accepted: 07/25/2019] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
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