Electrophysiological and phenomenological effects of short-term immersion in an altered sensory environment

Visual hallucinations induced by Ganzflicker and Ganzfeld differ in frequency, complexity, and content

Visual hallucinations can be phenomenologically divided into those of a simple or complex nature. Both simple and complex hallucinations can occur in pathological and non-pathological states, and can also be induced experimentally by visual stimulation or deprivation-for example using a high-frequency, eyes-open flicker (Ganzflicker) and perceptual deprivation (Ganzfeld). Here we leverage the differences in visual stimulation that these two techniques involve to investigate the role of bottom-up and top-down processes in shifting the complexity of visual hallucinations, and to assess whether these techniques involve a shared underlying hallucinatory mechanism despite their differences. For each technique, we measured the frequency and complexity of the hallucinations produced, utilising button presses, retrospective drawing, interviews, and questionnaires. For both experimental techniques, simple hallucinations were more common than complex hallucinations. Crucially, we found that Ganzflicker was more effective than Ganzfeld at eliciting simple hallucinations, while complex hallucinations remained equivalent across the two conditions. As a result, the likelihood that an experienced hallucination was complex was higher during Ganzfeld. Despite these differences, we found a correlation between the frequency and total time spent hallucinating in Ganzflicker and Ganzfeld conditions, suggesting some shared mechanisms between the two methodologies. We attribute the tendency to experience frequent simple hallucinations in both conditions to a shared low-level core hallucinatory mechanism, such as excitability of visual cortex, potentially amplified in Ganzflicker compared to Ganzfeld due to heightened bottom-up input. The tendency to experience complex hallucinations, in contrast, may be related to top-down processes less affected by visual stimulation.

Effects of Pulsed-Wave Chromotherapy and Guided Relaxation on the Theta-Alpha Oscillation During Arrest Reaction

The search for the best wellness practice has promoted the development of devices integrating different technologies and guided meditation. However, the final effects on the electrical activity of the brain remain relatively sparse. Here, we have analyzed of the alpha and theta electroencephalographic oscillations during the realization of the arrest reaction (AR; eyes close/eyes open transition) when a chromotherapy session performed in a dedicated room [Rebalance (RB) device], with an ergonomic bed integrating pulsed-wave light (PWL) stimulation, guided breathing, and body scan exercises. We demonstrated that the PWL induced an evoked-related potential characterized by the N2-P3 components maximally recorded on the fronto-central areas and accompanied by an event-related synchronization (ERS) of the delta–theta–alpha oscillations. The power of the alpha and theta oscillations was analyzed during repeated ARs testing realized along with the whole RB session. We showed that the power of the alpha and theta oscillations was significantly increased during the session in comparison to their values recorded before. Of the 14 participants, 11 and 6 showed a significant power increase of the alpha and theta oscillations, respectively. These increased powers were not observed in two different control groups (n = 28) who stayed passively outside or inside the RB room but without any type of stimulation. These preliminary results suggest that PWL chromotherapy and guided relaxation induce measurable electrical brain changes that could be beneficial under neuropsychiatric perspectives.

Sensitive period for the plasticity of alpha activity in humans

Visual experience is crucial for the development of neural processing. For example, alpha activity development is a vision-dependent mechanism. Indeed, studies report no alpha activity is present in blind adults. Nevertheless, studies have not investigated the developmental trajectory of this activity in infants and children with blindness. Here, we hypothesize that the difference in neural activity of blind compared to sighted subjects is: absent at birth, progressive with age, specifically occipital and linked to a gradual motor impairment. Therefore, we consider spectral power of resting-state EEG and its association with motor impairment indices, in blind subjects and in sighted controls between 0 and 11 years of age. Blind subjects show posterior alpha activity during the first three years of life, although weaker and slower maturing compared to sighted subjects. The first great differentiation between blind and sighted subjects occurs between 3 and 6 years of age. Starting in this period, reduced alpha activity increases the probability of motor impairment in blind subjects, likely because of impaired perception/interaction. These results show that visual experience mediates the neural mechanisms generating alpha oscillations during the first years of life, suggesting that it is a sensitive period for the plasticity of this process.

Are intrinsic neural timescales related to sensory processing? Evidence from abnormal behavioral states

The brain exhibits a complex temporal structure which translates into a hierarchy of distinct neural timescales. An open question is how these intrinsic timescales are related to sensory or motor information processing and whether these dynamics have common patterns in different behavioral states. We address these questions by investigating the brain's intrinsic timescales in healthy controls, motor (amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, locked-in syndrome), sensory (anesthesia, unresponsive wakefulness syndrome), and progressive reduction of sensory processing (from awake states over N1, N2, N3). We employed a combination of measures from EEG resting-state data: auto-correlation window (ACW), power spectral density (PSD), and power-law exponent (PLE). Prolonged neural timescales accompanied by a shift towards slower frequencies were observed in the conditions with sensory deficits, but not in conditions with motor deficits. Our results establish that the spontaneous activity's intrinsic neural timescale is related to the neural capacity that specifically supports sensory rather than motor information processing in the healthy brain.

Nondual Awareness and Minimal Phenomenal Experience

Minimal phenomenal experiences (MPEs) have recently gained attention in the fields of neuroscience and philosophy of mind. They can be thought of as episodes of greatly reduced or even absent phenomenal content together with a reduced level of arousal. It has also been proposed that MPEs are cases of consciousness-as-such. Here, we present a different perspective, that consciousness-as-such is first and foremost a type of awareness, that is, non-conceptual, non-propositional, and nondual, in other words, non-representational. This awareness is a unique kind and cannot be adequately specified by the two-dimensional model of consciousness as the arousal level plus the phenomenal content or by their mental representations. Thus, we suggest that to understand consciousness-as-such, and by extension consciousness in general, more accurately, we need to research it as a unique kind.

Reflections on Inner and Outer Silence and Consciousness Without Contents According to the Sphere Model of Consciousness

In the current hypothesis paper, we propose that focusing attention on silence can be used as a paradigm conceptually similar to sensory deprivation, to study consciousness without content. We briefly overview recent influential models of consciousness and consider how they assess the relationship between consciousness and contents. After discussing the strengths and weaknesses of current models, we suggest an extension based on the Sphere Model of Consciousness (SMC) and introduce new definitions for identification and self-awareness as states of consciousness. We further compare Paoletti's theoretical model for the development of self with other influential models, highlighting similarities and differences. We conclude with a discussion of how attentional focus on silence can be empirically tested.