Sense of agency as synecdoche: Multiple neurobiological mechanisms may underlie the phenomenon summarized as sense of agency

Neural correlates of an illusionary sense of agency caused by virtual reality

Sense of agency (SoA) is the sensation that self-actions lead to ensuing perceptual consequences. The prospective mechanism emphasizes that SoA arises from motor prediction and its comparison with actual action outcomes, while the reconstructive mechanism stresses that SoA emerges from retrospective causal processing about the action outcomes. Consistent with the prospective mechanism, motor planning regions were identified by neuroimaging studies using the temporal binding (TB) effect, a behavioral measure often linked to implicit SoA. Yet, TB also occurs during passive observation of another's action, lending support to the reconstructive mechanism, but its neural correlates remain unexplored. Here, we employed virtual reality (VR) to modulate such observation-based SoA and examined it with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). After manipulating an avatar hand in VR, participants passively observed an avatar's "action" and showed a significant increase in TB. The binding effect was associated with the right angular gyrus and inferior parietal lobule, which are critical nodes for inferential and agency processing. These results suggest that the experience of controlling an avatar may potentiate inferential processing within the right inferior parietal cortex and give rise to the illusionary SoA without voluntary action.

Temporal Dynamics of Brain Activity Predicting Sense of Agency over Muscle Movements

Our muscles are the primary means through which we affect the external world, and the sense of agency (SoA) over the action through those muscles is fundamental to our self-awareness. However, SoA research to date has focused almost exclusively on agency over action outcomes rather than over the musculature itself, as it was believed that SoA over the musculature could not be manipulated directly. Drawing on methods from human-computer interaction and adaptive experimentation, we use human-in-the-loop Bayesian optimization to tune the timing of electrical muscle stimulation so as to robustly elicit a SoA over electrically actuated muscle movements in male and female human subjects. We use time-resolved decoding of subjects' EEG to estimate the time course of neural activity which predicts reported agency on a trial-by-trial basis. Like paradigms which assess SoA over action consequences, we found that the late (post-conscious) neural activity predicts SoA. Unlike typical paradigms, however, we also find patterns of early (sensorimotor) activity with distinct temporal dynamics predicts agency over muscle movements, suggesting that the "neural correlates of agency" may depend on the level of abstraction (i.e., direct sensorimotor feedback versus downstream consequences) most relevant to a given agency judgment. Moreover, fractal analysis of the EEG suggests that SoA-contingent dynamics of neural activity may modulate the sensitivity of the motor system to external input.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The sense of agency, the feeling of "I did that," when directing one's own musculature is a core feature of human experience. We show that we can robustly manipulate the sense of agency over electrically actuated muscle movements, and we investigate the time course of neural activity that predicts the sense of agency over these actuated movements. We find evidence of two distinct neural processes: a transient sequence of patterns that begins in the early sensorineural response to muscle stimulation and a later, sustained signature of agency. These results shed light on the neural mechanisms by which we experience our movements as volitional.

Understanding the neural bases of bodily self-consciousness: recent achievements and main challenges

The last two decades have seen a surge of interest in the mechanisms underpinning bodily self-consciousness (BSC). Studies showed that BSC relies on several bodily experiences (i.e., self-location, body ownership, agency, first-person perspective) and multisensory integration. The aim of this literature review is to summarize new insights and novel developments into the understanding of the neural bases of BSC, such as the contribution of the interoceptive signals to the neural mechanisms of BSC, and the overlap with the neural bases of conscious experience in general and of higher-level forms of self (i.e., the cognitive self). We also identify the main challenges and propose future perspectives that need to be conducted to progress into the understanding of the neural mechanisms of BSC. In particular, we point the lack of crosstalk and cross-fertilization between subdisciplines of integrative neuroscience to better understand BSC, especially the lack of research in animal models to decipher the neural networks and systems of neurotransmitters underpinning BSC. We highlight the need for more causal evidence that specific brain areas are instrumental in generating BSC and the need for studies tapping into interindividual differences in the phenomenal experience of BSC and their underlying mechanisms.

Metacognitive Domains Are Not Aligned along a Dimension of Internal-External Information Source

It is still debated whether metacognition, or the ability to monitor our own mental states, relies on processes that are “domain-general” (a single set of processes can account for the monitoring of any mental process) or “domain-specific” (metacognition is accomplished by a collection of multiple monitoring modules, one for each cognitive domain). It has been speculated that two broad categories of metacognitive processes may exist: those that monitor primarily externally generated versus those that monitor primarily internally generated information. To test this proposed division, we measured metacognitive performance (using m-ratio, a signal detection theoretical measure) in four tasks that could be ranked along an internal-external axis of the source of information, namely memory, motor, visuomotor, and visual tasks. We found correlations between m-ratios in visuomotor and motor tasks, but no correlations between m-ratios in visual and visuomotor tasks, or between motor and memory tasks. While we found no correlation in metacognitive ability between visual and memory tasks, and a positive correlation between visuomotor and motor tasks, we found no evidence for a correlation between motor and memory tasks. This pattern of correlations does not support the grouping of domains based on whether the source of information is primarily internal or external. We suggest that other groupings could be more reflective of the nature of metacognition and discuss the need to consider other non-domain task-features when using correlations as a way to test the underlying shared processes between domains.