New and improved accuracy findings in deception detection research

Self and other-perceived deception detection abilities are highly correlated but unassociated with objective detection ability: Examining the detection consensus effect

Subjective lying rates are often strongly and positively correlated. Called the deception consensus effect, people who lie often tend to believe others lie often, too. The present paper evaluated how this cognitive bias also extends to deception detection. Two studies (Study 1: N = 180 students; Study 2: N = 250 people from the general public) had participants make 10 veracity judgments based on videotaped interviews, and also indicate subjective detection abilities (self and other). Subjective, perceived detection abilities were significantly linked, supporting a detection consensus effect, yet they were unassociated with objective detection accuracy. More overconfident detectors-those whose subjective detection accuracy was greater than their objective detection accuracy-reported telling more white and big lies, cheated more on a behavioral task, and were more ideologically conservative than less overconfident detectors. This evidence supports and extends contextual models of deception (e.g., the COLD model), highlighting possible (a)symmetries in subjective and objective veracity assessments.

Nonverbal cues to deception: insights from a mock crime scenario in a Chinese sample

Nonverbal behaviors could play a crucial role in detecting deception, yet existing studies on deception cues have largely centered on Western populations, predominantly university students, thus neglecting the influence of cultural and sample diversity. To address this gap, our study explored deception cues within an Asian cultural setting, utilizing a mock crime paradigm. Our sample comprised Chinese participants, including both men and women with various socioeconomic status (SES) backgrounds. Our findings revealed that compared to truth tellers, liars exhibited heightened emotions and an increased cognitive load. Furthermore, liars showed a higher frequency of self-adaptors and a longer duration of gaze aversion. Our findings contribute to a more profound understanding of deception cues within Asian culture and have implications for practical fields such as criminal interrogation.

The Number of Senders and Total Judgments Matter More Than Sample Size in Deception-Detection Experiments

Hundreds of experiments have examined people's ability to distinguish truths from lies. Meta-analyses suggest that the findings from larger scale experiments converge and that findings discrepant from the meta-analytic average of 54% occur in only smaller experiments. Study size (number of data points, or total number of judgments) is a joint function of the sample size and the number of judgments per research participant. Furthermore, because senders vary more than judges, experiments involving few senders may not be replicable. A number of simulations are reported in which the sample size, the number of unique senders, and the number of judgments per research participant are varied. The findings demonstrate that stability is more a function of the number of judgments than the sample size and that experiments involving too few senders risk idiosyncratic findings that are less likely to be replicable. Implications for research design are discussed.

Sitting in Judgment: How Body Posture Influences Deception Detection and Gazing Behavior

Body postures can affect how we process and attend to information. Here, a novel effect of adopting an open or closed posture on the ability to detect deception was investigated. It was hypothesized that the posture adopted by judges would affect their social acuity, resulting in differences in the detection of nonverbal behavior (i.e., microexpression recognition) and the discrimination of deceptive and truthful statements. In Study 1, adopting an open posture produced higher accuracy for detecting naturalistic lies, but no difference was observed in the recognition of brief facial expressions as compared to adopting a closed posture; trait empathy was found to have an additive effect on posture, with more empathic judges having higher deception detection scores. In Study 2, with the use of an eye-tracker, posture effects on gazing behavior when judging both low-stakes and high-stakes lies were measured. Sitting in an open posture reduced judges’ average dwell times looking at senders, and in particular, the amount and length of time they focused on their hands. The findings suggest that simply shifting posture can impact judges’ attention to visual information and veracity judgments (M_g = 0.40, 95% CI (0.03, 0.78)).

The Limits of Conscious Deception Detection: When Reliance on False Deception Cues Contributes to Inaccurate Judgments

People are generally too trusting, which decreases their ability to detect deceit. This suggests that distrust could enhance our deception detection abilities. Yet, a state of distrust may induce deliberative conscious thought. This mode of thinking has been related to worse complex decision making. Hence, we investigate whether contextual distrust decreases the ability to detect deceit via the stronger reliance on consciously held beliefs about which cues betray deception. In two studies, participants were asked to judge videos of either deceiving or truth telling targets. Contextual distrust was manipulated by asking participants to squint their eyes (distrust) or to round their eyes (trust) while watching the videos. Participants’ judgments of targets being deceptive or truthful were measured (Studies 1 and 2) and they were asked on what basis they made these judgments (Study 2). Results showed that distrust especially hampers the detection of truth, which is partly due to more reliance on false beliefs about deception cues. These results corroborate the idea that deliberative conscious information processing may hinder truth detection, while intuitive information processing may facilitate it.

Five Reasons Why I Am Skeptical That Indirect or Unconscious Lie Detection Is Superior to Direct Deception Detection

The relative advantage of indirect and unconscious lie detection compared to direct detection is examined. Empirical evidence for the superiority of indirect and unconscious lie is unconvincing. Three empirical issues include comparisons of incommensurate outcomes, questionable results in control conditions, and evidence for improved performance of direct detection under some conditions. Two theoretical reasons for skepticism include consideration of the casual forces producing poor accuracy and the tendency for people to believe other people absent active cognitive processing. Generally speaking, in human lie detection, effortful and disciplined thought provides more accurate detection of lies than intuition or less than fully conscious cognitive processing.

Reading Lies: Nonverbal Communication and Deception

The relationship between nonverbal communication and deception continues to attract much interest, but there are many misconceptions about it. In this review, we present a scientific view on this relationship. We describe theories explaining why liars would behave differently from truth tellers, followed by research on how liars actually behave and individuals' ability to detect lies. We show that the nonverbal cues to deceit discovered to date are faint and unreliable and that people are mediocre lie catchers when they pay attention to behavior. We also discuss why individuals hold misbeliefs about the relationship between nonverbal behavior and deception-beliefs that appear very hard to debunk. We further discuss the ways in which researchers could improve the state of affairs by examining nonverbal behaviors in different ways and in different settings than they currently do.

Learning to Detect Deception from Evasive Answers and Inconsistencies across Repeated Interviews: A Study with Lay Respondents and Police Officers

Previous research has shown that inconsistencies across repeated interviews do not indicate deception because liars deliberately tend to repeat the same story. However, when a strategic interview approach that makes it difficult for liars to use the repeat strategy is used, both consistency and evasive answers differ significantly between truth tellers and liars, and statistical software (binary logistic regression analyses) can reach high classification rates (Masip et al., 2016b). Yet, if the interview procedure is to be used in applied settings the decision process will be made by humans, not statistical software. To address this issue, in the current study, 475 college students (Experiment 1) and 142 police officers (Experiment 2) were instructed to code and use consistency, evasive answers, or a combination or both before judging the veracity of Masip et al.'s (2016b) interview transcripts. Accuracy rates were high (60% to over 90%). Evasive answers yielded higher rates than consistency, and the combination of both these cues produced the highest accuracy rates in identifying both truthful and deceptive statements. Uninstructed participants performed fairly well (around 75% accuracy), apparently because they spontaneously used consistency and evasive answers. The pattern of results was the same among students, all officers, and veteran officers only, and shows that inconsistencies between interviews and evasive answers reveal deception when a strategic interview approach that hinders the repeat strategy is used.

Strategic Interviewing to Detect Deception: Cues to Deception across Repeated Interviews

Previous deception research on repeated interviews found that liars are not less consistent than truth tellers, presumably because liars use a “repeat strategy” to be consistent across interviews. The goal of this study was to design an interview procedure to overcome this strategy. Innocent participants (truth tellers) and guilty participants (liars) had to convince an interviewer that they had performed several innocent activities rather than committing a mock crime. The interview focused on the innocent activities (alibi), contained specific central and peripheral questions, and was repeated after 1 week without forewarning. Cognitive load was increased by asking participants to reply quickly. The liars’ answers in replying to both central and peripheral questions were significantly less accurate, less consistent, and more evasive than the truth tellers’ answers. Logistic regression analyses yielded classification rates ranging from around 70% (with consistency as the predictor variable), 85% (with evasive answers as the predictor variable), to over 90% (with an improved measure of consistency that incorporated evasive answers as the predictor variable, as well as with response accuracy as the predictor variable). These classification rates were higher than the interviewers’ accuracy rate (54%).