Perspective taking: motivation and impediment to shared reality

Exploring Actual and Presumed Links between Accurately Inferring Contents of Other People's Minds and Prosocial Outcomes

The term "empathic accuracy" has been applied to people's ability to infer the contents of other people's minds-that is, other people's varying feelings and/or thoughts over the course of a social interaction. However, despite the ease of intuitively linking this skill to competence in helping professions such as counseling, the "empathic" prefix in its name may have contributed to overestimating its association with prosocial traits and behaviors. Accuracy in reading others' thoughts and feelings, like many other skills, can be used toward prosocial-but also malevolent or morally neutral-ends. Prosocial intentions can direct attention towards other people's thoughts and feelings, which may, in turn, increase accuracy in inferring those thoughts and feelings, but attention to others' thoughts and feelings does not necessarily heighten prosocial intentions, let alone outcomes.

How We Understand Others: A Theory of How Social Perspective Taking Unfolds

Social perspective taking—the process through which perceivers discern the thoughts, feelings, and motivations of a target—is foundational for navigating social interactions, building relationships, maintaining mental health, promoting well-being, and a wide array of other desired outcomes. Despite its importance, little is known about how discrete social perspective taking attempts unfold. We propose a theory that the social perspective taking process consists of up to four distinguishable phases: perception of the target, motivation to engage in social perspective taking, strategy selection, and evaluation of the attempt. Scholars have emphasized two proximal outcomes of this process—social perspective taking effort and accuracy. We review the literature in support of these phases, noting the relative maturity of each area of research. In doing so, we hope this theory provides a framework for contextualizing how existing studies relate to one another across different subfields of psychology, facilitates testable predictions, prioritizes future investigations, and guides applied research designed to improve real-world social perspective taking.

The effects of perspective taking primes on the social tuning of explicit and implicit views toward gender and race

The current research aims to investigate whether perspective taking influences social tuning, or the alignment of one's self-views, explicit attitudes, and/or implicit attitudes with those of an interaction partner. In six different experiments, participants believed they would interact with a partner to complete a task. Prior to this ostensible interaction, participants were given a perspective taking mindset prime, or not, and information about their ostensible interaction partners views. Participants then completed attitude measures related to the partner's perceived views. Experiments 1a, 1b, and 2 examined whether perspective taking with an ostensible interaction partner who endorses gender traditional (or non-traditional) views align their self-views with this partner, including implicit self-views (Experiment 2). Experiments 3-5 investigated whether perspective taking leads to social tuning for egalitarian racial attitudes, including when the partner's expectations of how others will be and when the participant learns their ostensible IAT score at the beginning of the session. We predicted perspective takers would be more likely to social tune their explicit and implicit attitudes to the attitudes of their interaction partner than non-perspective takers. Across all experiments, perspective takers were more likely to social tune their self-views and explicit attitudes than non-perspective takers. However, social tuning never occurred for implicit attitudes. Thus, future research is needed to understand why perspective taking does not influence the tuning of implicit attitudes, but other motivations, like affiliative and epistemic, do.

Emotional interdependence: the key to studying extrinsic emotion regulation

The literature on extrinsic emotion regulation or the intention to modify other people’s emotions has grown in recent years, accompanied by proposals in which its definition is made more precise, the way to understand it in relation to other related processes is delimited, and the consequences of its use in the quality of close relationships are evidenced. Conceptual reviews on this topic recognize the importance of examining the affect and dyadic dynamics that arise between those who regulate each other extrinsically. This dynamic refers to emotional interdependence, the potential of the members of a dyad to shape each other’s emotions reciprocally, particularly in those who share a close bond, such as that of a romantic couple. There is little theoretical development regarding the relevance of this characteristic in relation to EER. This article has two objectives: (1) to make a narrative synthesis of the characteristics that define EER and (2) to expand and complexify the existing model by including the emotional interdependence as a vital component in the understanding of the functioning of EER. Lastly, the role of emotional interdependence in the emergence, maintenance, and satisfaction concerning couple relationships is made explicit through phenomena such as shared reality.

When Polarization Triggers Out-Group "Counter-Projection" Across the Political Divide

Although projecting one's own characteristics onto another person is pervasive, "counter-projection," or seeing the opposite of oneself in others is also sometimes found, with implications for intergroup conflict. After a focused review of previous studies finding counter-projection (often unexpectedly), we map conditions for counter-projection to an individual out-group member. Counter-projection requires identified antagonistic groups, is moderated by in-group identity, and is moderated by which information is assessed in the target person. Using political groups defined by support for former U.S. President Trump, across our Initial Experiment (N = 725) and Confirmatory Experiment (N = 618), we found counter-projection to individual political out-group targets for moral beliefs, personality traits, and everyday likes (e.g., preference for dogs vs. cats). Counter-projection was increased by in-group identification and overlapped considerably with "oppositional" out-group stereotypes, but we also found counter-projection independent of out-group stereotypes (degree of overlap with stereotyping depended on the information being projected).

Tracking multiple perspectives: Spontaneous computation of what individuals in high entitative groups see

Perspective-taking ability is crucial for supporting social interactions. It has been widely suggested that the calculation of an individual's perspective is spontaneous. Nevertheless, people typically engage with more than one individual, and computing what individuals in a crowd see is important. The current study explored whether people spontaneously compute the perspectives of individuals displayed in a crowd. The classic visual perspective-taking task was adopted, but the picture of the room was presented with four human avatars facing two walls. The results showed that if the crowd of individuals was treated as a high entitative group, when none of the perspectives of the individuals contained the same number of discs as that from the perspective of the participant, the judgment of the participant's perspective was slower than when a proportion of the perspectives of the individuals displayed in the crowd were consistent with the participant's perspective, even if the perspectives of the multiple individuals in a crowd were not explicitly noticed. This altercentric intrusion effect was not present when the crowd had low entitativity. These findings were replicated by using different methods to operationalize group entitativity. Hence, this study demonstrates that spontaneously tracking the perspectives of individuals displayed in a crowd has a boundary condition and that people can spontaneously compute what individuals in high entitative groups see.

Asymmetries in Mutual Understanding: People With Low Status, Power, and Self-Esteem Understand Better Than They Are Understood

All too often, people who develop exceptionally astute insights into others remain mysterious to these others. Evidence for such asymmetric understanding comes from several independent domains. Striking asymmetries occur among those who differ in status and power, such that individuals with low status and power understand more than they are understood. We show that this effect extends to people who merely perceive that they have low status: individuals with low self-esteem. Whereas people with low self-esteem display insight into people with high self-esteem, people with high self-esteem fail to reciprocate. Conceptual analysis suggests that asymmetries in mutual understanding may be reduced by addressing deficits in information and motivation among perceivers. Nevertheless, several interventions have been unsuccessful, indicating that the path to symmetric understanding is a steep and thorny one. Further research is needed to develop strategies for fostering understanding of those who are most misunderstood: people with low self-esteem, low status, and low power.

How Well Can We Assess Our Ability to Understand Others' Feelings? Beliefs About Taking Others' Perspectives and Actual Understanding of Others' Emotions

People vary in their beliefs about their tendency to engage in perspective taking and to understand other's feelings. Often, however, those beliefs are suggested to be poor indicators of actual skills and thus provide an inaccurate reflection of performance. Few studies, however, have examined whether people's beliefs accurately predict their performance on emotion recognition tasks using dynamic or spontaneous emotional expressions. We report six studies (N ranges from 186 to 315; N total = 1,347) testing whether individuals' report of their engagement in perspective taking, as measured by the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983), is associated with accurate emotion recognition. In Studies 1-3, emotion recognition performance was assessed using three standard tests of nonverbal emotion recognition. To provide a more naturalistic test, we then assessed performance with a new emotion recognition test in Studies 4-6, using videos of real targets that share their emotional experiences. Participants' multi-scalar ratings of the targets' emotions were compared with the targets' own emotion ratings. Across all studies, we found a modest, yet significant positive relationship: people who believe that they take the other's perspective also perform better in tests of emotion recognition (r = 0.20, p < 0.001). Beliefs about taking others' perspective thus reflect interpersonal reality, but only partially.