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Newton C, Feeney J, Pennycook G. On the Disposition to Think Analytically: Four Distinct Intuitive-Analytic Thinking Styles. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 2024; 50:906-923. [PMID: 36861421 PMCID: PMC11080384 DOI: 10.1177/01461672231154886] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/17/2022] [Accepted: 01/17/2023] [Indexed: 03/03/2023]
Abstract
Many measures have been developed to index intuitive versus analytic thinking. Yet it remains an open question whether people primarily vary along a single dimension or if there are genuinely different types of thinking styles. We distinguish between four distinct types of thinking styles: Actively Open-minded Thinking, Close-Minded Thinking, Preference for Intuitive Thinking, and Preference for Effortful Thinking. We discovered strong predictive validity across several outcome measures (e.g., epistemically suspect beliefs, bullshit receptivity, empathy, moral judgments), with some subscales having stronger predictive validity for some outcomes but not others. Furthermore, Actively Open-minded Thinking, in particular, strongly outperformed the Cognitive Reflection Test in predicting misperceptions about COVID-19 and the ability to discern between vaccination-related true and false news. Our results indicate that people do, in fact, differ along multiple dimensions of intuitive-analytic thinking styles and that these dimensions have consequences for understanding a wide range of beliefs and behaviors.
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Leclercq S, Szaffarczyk S, Leptourgos P, Yger P, Fakhri A, Wathelet M, Bouttier V, Denève S, Jardri R. Conspiracy beliefs and perceptual inference in times of political uncertainty. Sci Rep 2024; 14:9001. [PMID: 38637589 PMCID: PMC11026417 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-024-59434-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/11/2023] [Accepted: 04/10/2024] [Indexed: 04/20/2024] Open
Abstract
Sociopolitical crises causing uncertainty have accumulated in recent years, providing fertile ground for the emergence of conspiracy ideations. Computational models constitute valuable tools for understanding the mechanisms at play in the formation and rigidification of these unshakeable beliefs. Here, the Circular Inference model was used to capture associations between changes in perceptual inference and the dynamics of conspiracy ideations in times of uncertainty. A bistable perception task and conspiracy belief assessment focused on major sociopolitical events were administered to large populations from three polarized countries. We show that when uncertainty peaks, an overweighting of sensory information is associated with conspiracy ideations. Progressively, this exploration strategy gives way to an exploitation strategy in which increased adherence to conspiracy theories is associated with the amplification of prior information. Overall, the Circular Inference model sheds new light on the possible mechanisms underlying the progressive strengthening of conspiracy theories when individuals face highly uncertain situations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Salomé Leclercq
- INSERM U1172, CHU Lille, Lille Neuroscience and Cognition Centre, CURE Platform, Fontan Hospital, Lille University, 59000, Lille, France.
| | - Sébastien Szaffarczyk
- INSERM U1172, CHU Lille, Lille Neuroscience and Cognition Centre, CURE Platform, Fontan Hospital, Lille University, 59000, Lille, France
| | - Pantelis Leptourgos
- INSERM U1172, CHU Lille, Lille Neuroscience and Cognition Centre, CURE Platform, Fontan Hospital, Lille University, 59000, Lille, France
| | - Pierre Yger
- INSERM U1172, CHU Lille, Lille Neuroscience and Cognition Centre, CURE Platform, Fontan Hospital, Lille University, 59000, Lille, France
| | | | - Marielle Wathelet
- INSERM U1172, CHU Lille, Lille Neuroscience and Cognition Centre, CURE Platform, Fontan Hospital, Lille University, 59000, Lille, France
| | - Vincent Bouttier
- INSERM U1172, CHU Lille, Lille Neuroscience and Cognition Centre, CURE Platform, Fontan Hospital, Lille University, 59000, Lille, France
- LNC, INSERM U-960, Institut de Sciences Cognitives, École Normale Supérieure, 75005, Paris, France
| | - Sophie Denève
- LNC, INSERM U-960, Institut de Sciences Cognitives, École Normale Supérieure, 75005, Paris, France
| | - Renaud Jardri
- INSERM U1172, CHU Lille, Lille Neuroscience and Cognition Centre, CURE Platform, Fontan Hospital, Lille University, 59000, Lille, France.
- LNC, INSERM U-960, Institut de Sciences Cognitives, École Normale Supérieure, 75005, Paris, France.
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Müller P, Hartmann M. Linking paranormal and conspiracy beliefs to illusory pattern perception through signal detection theory. Sci Rep 2023; 13:9739. [PMID: 37328598 PMCID: PMC10275861 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-023-36230-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/27/2023] [Accepted: 05/31/2023] [Indexed: 06/18/2023] Open
Abstract
Previous research indicates that irrational beliefs (Paranormal beliefs & conspiracy theory endorsement) are associated with the perception of patterns in noise, but the previous findings do not conclusively describe this relationship. This study aims to disentangle the underlying parameters of this association by applying a signal detection theory approach, thus allowing to distinguish illusory pattern perception (false alarms) from perceptual sensitivity and response tendencies-while also taking base rate information into account. Results from a large sample (N = 723) indicate that paranormal beliefs relate to a more liberal response bias and a lower perceptual sensitivity, and that this relationship is driven by illusory pattern perception. Such a clear pattern could not be observed for conspiracy beliefs, for which the increase in false alarm rates was moderated by the base rate. The associations between irrational beliefs and illusory pattern perception were however less substantial compared to other sources of variance. Implications are discussed.
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Affiliation(s)
- Petra Müller
- Faculty of Psychology, UniDistance Suisse, 3900, Brig, Switzerland.
- Institute of Psychology, Universität Bern, 3012, Bern, Switzerland.
| | - Matthias Hartmann
- Faculty of Psychology, UniDistance Suisse, 3900, Brig, Switzerland
- Institute of Psychology, Universität Bern, 3012, Bern, Switzerland
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Jones C, Galbraith N, Boyda D, Martin DBH, Jackson K. A latent profile analysis of COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs: Associations with thinking styles, mistrust, socio-political control, need for closure and verbal intelligence. PERSONALITY AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 2023; 207:112155. [PMID: 36923243 PMCID: PMC9988712 DOI: 10.1016/j.paid.2023.112155] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/29/2022] [Revised: 02/19/2023] [Accepted: 03/01/2023] [Indexed: 03/09/2023]
Abstract
Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, attention has been drawn to conspiracy theories. To date, research has largely examined commonalities in conspiracy theory belief, however it is important to identify where there may be notable differences. The aim of the present research was first to distinguish between typologies of COVID-19 conspiracy belief and explore demographic, social cognitive factors associated with these beliefs. Secondly, we aimed to examine the effects of such beliefs on adherence to government health guidelines. Participants (N = 319) rated well known COVID-19 conspiracy theories, completing measures of thinking style, socio-political control, mistrust, verbal intelligence, need for closure and demographic information. Participants also rated the extent to which they followed government health guidelines. Latent profile analysis suggests three profiles of COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs with low, moderate, and high COVID conspiracy belief profiles and successively stronger endorsement on all but one of the COVID-19 conspiracy theories. Those holding stronger COVID-19 conspiracy theory beliefs are more likely to reason emotively, feel less socio-political control, mistrust others, have lower verbal ability and adhere less to COVID-19 guidelines. The social and health implications of these findings are discussed.
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Stanovich KE, Toplak ME. Actively Open-Minded Thinking and Its Measurement. J Intell 2023; 11:27. [PMID: 36826925 PMCID: PMC9966223 DOI: 10.3390/jintelligence11020027] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/03/2022] [Revised: 01/17/2023] [Accepted: 01/20/2023] [Indexed: 01/31/2023] Open
Abstract
Actively open-minded thinking (AOT) is measured by items that tap the willingness to consider alternative opinions, sensitivity to evidence contradictory to current beliefs, the willingness to postpone closure, and reflective thought. AOT scales are strong predictors of performance on heuristics and biases tasks and of the avoidance of reasoning traps such as superstitious thinking and belief in conspiracy theories. Nevertheless, AOT is most commonly measured with questionnaires rather than performance indicators. Questionnaire contamination becomes even more of a danger as the AOT concept is expanded into new areas such as the study of fake news, misinformation, ideology, and civic attitudes. We review our 25-year history of studying the AOT concept and developing our own AOT scale. We present a 13-item scale that both is brief and accommodates many previous criticisms and refinements. We include a discussion of why AOT scales are such good predictors of performance on heuristics and biases tasks. We conclude that it is because such scales tap important processes of cognitive decoupling and decontextualization that modernity increasingly requires. We conclude by discussing the paradox that although AOT scales are potent predictors of performance on most rational thinking tasks, they do not predict the avoidance of myside thinking, even though it is virtually the quintessence of the AOT concept.
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Affiliation(s)
- Keith E. Stanovich
- Department of Applied Psychology and Human Development, University of Toronto, 252 Bloor St. West, Toronto, ON M5S 1V6, Canada
| | - Maggie E. Toplak
- Department of Psychology, York University, 126 Behavioural Science Building, 4700 Keele St., Toronto, ON M3J 1P3, Canada
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