Why are out-of-body experiences interesting for philosophers?

Dream experiences and the neural correlates of perceptual consciousness and cognitive access

This paper approaches the debate whether perceptual consciousness requires cognitive access from the perspective of dream studies, and investigates what kind of findings could support the opposing views of this debate. Two kinds of arguments are discussed, one that claims that the hypoactivity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in rapid eye movement sleep is directly relevant, and another that proposes that locating the neural correlates of dream experiences can indirectly inform the debate. It is argued that under closer reflection, neither the classical claim about dorsolateral prefrontal cortex hypoactivity nor the more recent emphasis on general posterior hot zone activity during dreaming stand up to scrutiny. White dreaming is identified as the phenomenon that, nevertheless, holds the most promise to have an impact on the debate. Going beyond the topic if studying dreams can contribute to this debate, it is argued that cognitive access is not a monolithic phenomenon, and its neural correlates are not well understood. There seems to be a relevant form of cognitive access that can operate in the absence of activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and maybe also in the whole frontal region. If so, then exclusive posterior activation during conscious experiences might very well be compatible with the hypothesis that perceptual consciousness requires cognitive access.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

Why Is Virtual Reality Interesting for Philosophers?

This article explores promising points of contact between philosophy and the expanding field of virtual reality research. Aiming at an interdisciplinary audience, it proposes a series of new research targets by presenting a range of concrete examples characterized by high theoretical relevance and heuristic fecundity. Among these examples are conscious experience itself, “Bayesian” and social VR, amnestic re-embodiment, merging human-controlled avatars and virtual agents, virtual ego-dissolution, controlling the reality/virtuality continuum, the confluence of VR and artificial intelligence (AI) as well as of VR and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), VR-based social hallucinations and the emergence of a virtual Lebenswelt, religious faith and practical phenomenology. Hopefully, these examples can serve as first proposals for intensified future interaction and mark out some potential new directions for research.

Deliberate and spontaneous sensations of disembodiment: capacity or flaw?

INTRODUCTION

Hallucinations that involve shifts in the subjectively experienced location of the self, have been termed "out-of-body experiences" (OBEs). Early psychiatric accounts cast OBEs as a specific instance of depersonalisation and derealisation disorder (DPD-DR). However, during feelings of alienation and lack of body realism in DPD-DR the self is experienced within the physical body. Deliberate forms of "disembodiment" enable humans to imagine another's visuo-spatial perspective taking (VPT), thus, if a strong relationship between deliberate and spontaneous forms of disembodiment could be revealed, then uncontrolled OBEs could be "the other side of the coin" of a uniquely human capacity.

METHODS

We present a narrative review of behavioural and neuroimaging work emphasising methodological and theoretical aspects of OBE and VPT research and a potential relationship.

RESULTS

Results regarding a direct behavioural relationship between VPT and OBE are mixed and we discuss reasons by pointing out the importance of using realistic tasks and recruiting genuine OBEers instead of general DPD-DR patients. Furthermore, we review neuroimaging evidence showing overlapping neural substrates between VPT and OBE, providing a strong argument for a relationship between the two processes.

CONCLUSIONS

We conclude that OBE should be regarded as a necessary implication of VPT ability in humans, or even as a necessary and potentially sufficient condition for the evolution of VPT.

The myth of cognitive agency: subpersonal thinking as a cyclically recurring loss of mental autonomy

This metatheoretical paper investigates mind wandering from the perspective of philosophy of mind. It has two central claims. The first is that, on a conceptual level, mind wandering can be fruitfully described as a specific form of mental autonomy loss. The second is that, given empirical constraints, most of what we call “conscious thought” is better analyzed as a subpersonal process that more often than not lacks crucial properties traditionally taken to be the hallmark of personal-level cognition - such as mental agency, explicit, consciously experienced goal-directedness, or availability for veto control. I claim that for roughly two thirds of our conscious life-time we do not possess mental autonomy (M-autonomy) in this sense. Empirical data from research on mind wandering and nocturnal dreaming clearly show that phenomenally represented cognitive processing is mostly an automatic, non-agentive process and that personal-level cognition is an exception rather than the rule. This raises an interesting new version of the mind-body problem: How is subpersonal cognition causally related to personal-level thought? More fine-grained phenomenological descriptions for what we called “conscious thought” in the past are needed, as well as a functional decomposition of umbrella terms like “mind wandering” into different target phenomena and a better understanding of the frequent dynamic transitions between spontaneous, task-unrelated thought and meta-awareness. In an attempt to lay some very first conceptual foundations for the now burgeoning field of research on mind wandering, the third section proposes two new criteria for individuating single episodes of mind-wandering, namely, the “self-representational blink” (SRB) and a sudden shift in the phenomenological “unit of identification” (UI). I close by specifying a list of potentially innovative research goals that could serve to establish a stronger connection between mind wandering research and philosophy of mind.

Why are dreams interesting for philosophers? The example of minimal phenomenal selfhood, plus an agenda for future research

This metatheoretical paper develops a list of new research targets by exploring particularly promising interdisciplinary contact points between empirical dream research and philosophy of mind. The central example is the MPS-problem. It is constituted by the epistemic goal of conceptually isolating and empirically grounding the phenomenal property of “minimal phenomenal selfhood,” which refers to the simplest form of self-consciousness. In order to precisely describe MPS, one must focus on those conditions that are not only causally enabling, but strictly necessary to bring it into existence. This contribution argues that research on bodiless dreams, asomatic out-of-body experiences, and full-body illusions has the potential to make decisive future contributions. Further items on the proposed list of novel research targets include differentiating the concept of a “first-person perspective” on the subcognitive level; investigating relevant phenomenological and neurofunctional commonalities between mind-wandering and dreaming; comparing the functional depth of embodiment across dream and wake states; and demonstrating that the conceptual consequences of cognitive corruption and systematic rationality deficits in the dream state are much more serious for philosophical epistemology (and, perhaps, the methodology of dream research itself) than commonly assumed. The paper closes by specifying a list of potentially innovative research goals that could serve to establish a stronger connection between dream research and philosophy of mind.

The bilocated mind: new perspectives on self-localization and self-identification

Does the human mind allow for self-locating at more than one place at a time? Evidence from neurology, cognitive neuroscience, and experimental psychology suggests that mental bilocation is a complex, but genuine experience, occurring more frequently than commonly thought. In this article, we distinguish between different components of bilocated self-representation: self-localization in two different places at the same time, self-identification with another body, reduplication of first-person perspective. We argue that different forms of mental bilocation may result from the combination of these components. To illustrate this, we discuss evidence of mental bilocation in pathological conditions such as heautoscopy, during immersion in virtual environments, and in everyday life, during social interaction. Finally, we consider the conditions for mental bilocation and speculate on the possible role of mental bilocation in the context of social interaction, suggesting that self-localization at two places at the same time may prove advantageous for the construction of a shared space.

Anomalous bodily-self experiences among recreational ketamine users

INTRODUCTION

Out-of-body experiences present a unique paradigm to investigate cognitive and neural mechanisms of bodily-self processes and their disorders. Previous work on out-of-body experiences associated with sleep paralysis supported a model in which illusory movement experiences reflect disrupted bodily-self integration generating anomalous vestibular and motor sensations. Further disintegration and progression of the experience may then give rise to out-of-body feelings, which in turn may instigate out-of-body autoscopy.

METHODS

The current study assesses the disintegration model through analyses of out-of-body experiences reports from an online survey of individuals reporting recreational ketamine use (n=128) and cross-validation in a sample of nonketamine polydrug users (n=64). Path analyses using intensity and frequency measures of anomalous experiences assess the fit of seven competing models.

RESULTS

The disintegration model (illusory movement → out-of-body feelings → out-of-body autoscopy) emerged as the best fitting model overall and results support full mediation of the relation between illusory movement experiences and out-of-body autoscopy by out-of-body feelings. Moreover, lifetime measures of ketamine use predicted the frequency of illusory movement experiences.

CONCLUSIONS

The results corroborate this structural model of out-of-body phenomena and encourage a framework for future studies into aetiological mechanisms of out-of-body experiences to include neurochemical systems.

Near-Death-Like Experiences without Life-Threatening Conditions or Brain Disorders: A Hypothesis from a Case Report

Near-death experiences (NDEs) are profound psychic experiences commonly occurring in life-threatening conditions. They include feeling a sense of peace, of seeing a bright light, encountering deceased relatives or religious figures, and of transcending space and time. To explain them, it has been suggested that they stem from brain disorders and/or psychological reactions to approaching death, a sort of wishful thinking in response to the perceived threat. This is a report on a case with most of the features typical of NDEs except that it occurred entirely without any life-threatening conditions. This evidence is theoretically incompatible with either of the above hypotheses, suggesting that a broader interpretation of the phenomenon is needed.