Neurology of widely embedded free will

Decoding the neural dynamics of free choice in humans

How do we choose a particular action among equally valid alternatives? Nonhuman primate findings have shown that decision-making implicates modulations in unit firing rates and local field potentials (LFPs) across frontal and parietal cortices. Yet the electrophysiological brain mechanisms that underlie free choice in humans remain ill defined. Here, we address this question using rare intracerebral electroencephalography (EEG) recordings in surgical epilepsy patients performing a delayed oculomotor decision task. We find that the temporal dynamics of high-gamma (HG, 60-140 Hz) neural activity in distinct frontal and parietal brain areas robustly discriminate free choice from instructed saccade planning at the level of single trials. Classification analysis was applied to the LFP signals to isolate decision-related activity from sensory and motor planning processes. Compared with instructed saccades, free-choice trials exhibited delayed and longer-lasting HG activity during the delay period. The temporal dynamics of the decision-specific sustained HG activity indexed the unfolding of a deliberation process, rather than memory maintenance. Taken together, these findings provide the first direct electrophysiological evidence in humans for the role of sustained high-frequency neural activation in frontoparietal cortex in mediating the intrinsically driven process of freely choosing among competing behavioral alternatives.

Free Will Emerges From a Multistage Process of Target Assignment and Body-Scheme Recruitment for Free Effector Selection

Self-intended action implies an initial stage of assigning an external entity as target of action, with subsequent recruitment of body-scheme information serving the free selection of an appropriate effector system to achieve the action aim. This plurality underscores the concept that neuronal response freedom underlying the generation of such action is not necessarily restricted to a singular cerebral event at its initiation, but that such freedom is embedded in a series of successive processing steps. In this respect, action intention initially concerns the transition of a neutral object into a target of action, while the “will” to act further crystalizes with the recruitment of one’s body scheme. The latter is a prerequisite for effector selection and indeed complements the emerging sense of agency. This temporal order of neuronal events fits a model of fronto-parietal interactions associated with volition. A concise behavioral experiment is additionally described, in which successively displayed balls represent either a recognizable object with distinct shape and color features, or a target of action. Instructions to write down the ball’s characteristics were alternated by the command ”action.” When shifting from a neutral object to an action target, the ball was placed in one of three backgrounds: empty, an outdoor goal or indoor basket. In response to the action command, subjects reported intended actions such as kicking, seizing, throwing and heading, thus implicitly referring to the foot, hand, or head as chosen effector. For the latter the parietal cortex is strongly implicated, not only concerning predefined but also free selection. Although subjects were free to choose what to do with the ball, the environmental cues of the ball strongly influenced their choices. These results illustrate the temporal order in fronto-parietal processing associated with initial target assignment, instantly followed by the embodiment of will, i.e., the recruitment of body-scheme information for possible effector selection. Such multistage neuronal processing underlying free action selection underscores that the onset of brain signals prior to the perceived sense of free will is not a valid argument to reduce free will to an illusion.

Motor Intention/Intentionality and Associationism - A conceptual review

Motor intention/intentionality (MI) has been investigated from many different angles. Some researchers focus on the purely physical and mechanical aspects of the human motor system, while others emphasize the subjectivity involved in intentionality. While bridging this seemingly dualistic gap between the two concepts ought to be the researcher's' main task, different schools of thought have instead specialized in stressing one (objective) or the other (subjective) part of this construct. Thus, we find everything from neuroscientific to phenomenologically inspired approaches to MI. The purpose of this article is to review the literature regarding these different approaches to the MI construct. In reviewing the literature, we introduce a broadened conception of associationism. In organizing our data in relation to the laws of association, a lack of methodology clearly manifests itself. Hence, 123 articles out of 143 meet the criteria of our definition of associationism. It seems that this old doctrine sneaks in to a big part of the research rather implicitly through a lack of methodology. To shed light on how this happens in the 123 articles, we develop a continuum to show to which extend associationism operates on a transcendent or substantial level in each article. We find only very few articles that seem to try to gap the bridge between motor and intention/intentionality, and thus we suggest that future MI research reintroduce methodological debates concerning the conceptual character of this construct.

Goal-Directed Movement Enhances Body Representation Updating

Body representation refers to perception, memory, and cognition related to the body and is updated continuously by sensory input. The present study examined the influence of goals on body representation updating with two experiments of the rubber hand paradigm. In the experiments, participants moved their hidden left hands forward and backward either in response to instruction to touch a virtual object or without any specific goal, while a virtual left hand was presented 250 mm above the real hand and moved in synchrony with the real hand. Participants then provided information concerning the perceived heights of their real left hands and rated their sense of agency and ownership of the virtual hand. Results of Experiment 1 showed that when participants moved their hands with the goal of touching a virtual object and received feedback indicating goal attainment, the perceived positions of their real hands shifted more toward that of the virtual hand relative to that in the condition without a goal, indicating that their body representations underwent greater modification. Furthermore, results of Experiment 2 showed that the effect of goal-directed movement occurred in the active condition, in which participants moved their own hands, but did not occur in the passive condition, in which participants’ hands were moved by the experimenter. Therefore, we concluded that the sense of agency probably contributed to the updating of body representation involving goal-directed movement.

Spectral Signatures of Saccade Target Selection

Action generation relies on a widely distributed network of brain areas. However, little is known about the spatiotemporal dynamics of neuronal activity in the network that gives rise to voluntary action in humans. Here, we used magnetoencephalography (MEG) and source analysis (n = 15, 7 female subjects) to investigate the spectral signatures of human cortical networks engaged in active and intrinsically motivated viewing behavior. We compared neuronal activity of externally cued saccades with saccades to freely chosen targets. For planning and execution of both saccade types, we found an increase in gamma band (~64-128 Hz) activity and a concurrent decrease in beta band (~12-32 Hz) activity in saccadic control areas, including the intraparietal sulcus and the frontal eye fields. Guided compared to voluntary actions were accompanied by stronger transient increases in the gamma and low frequency (<16 Hz) range immediately following the instructional cue. In contrast, action selection between competing alternatives was reflected by stronger sustained fronto-parietal gamma increases that occurred later in time and persisted until movement execution. This sustained enhancement for free target selection was accompanied by a spatially widespread reduction of lower frequency power (~8-45 Hz) in parietal and extrastriate areas. Our results suggest that neuronal population activity in the gamma frequency band in a distributed network of fronto-parietal areas reflects the intrinsically driven process of selection among competing behavioral alternatives.

Loss of agency in apraxia

The feeling of acting voluntarily is a fundamental component of human behavior and social life and is usually accompanied by a sense of agency. However, this ability can be impaired in a number of diseases and disorders. An important example is apraxia, a disturbance traditionally defined as a disorder of voluntary skillful movements that often results from frontal-parietal brain damage. The first part of this article focuses on direct evidence of some core symptoms of apraxia, emphasizing those with connections to agency and free will. The loss of agency in apraxia is reflected in the monitoring of internally driven action, in the perception of specifically self-intended movements and in the neural intention to act. The second part presents an outline of the evidences supporting the functional and anatomical link between apraxia and agency. The available structural and functional results converge to reveal that the frontal-parietal network contributes to the sense of agency and its impairment in disorders such as apraxia. The current knowledge on the generation of motor intentions and action monitoring could potentially be applied to develop therapeutic strategies for the clinical rehabilitation of voluntary action.

Timing and awareness of movement decisions: does consciousness really come too late?

Since Libet's seminal observation that a brain potential related to movement preparation occurs before participants report to be aware of their movement intention, it has been debated whether consciousness has causal influence on movement decisions. Here we review recent advances that provide new insights into the dynamics of human decision-making and question the validity of different markers used for determining the onset of neural and conscious events. Motor decisions involve multiple stages of goal evaluation, intention formation, and action execution. While the validity of the Bereitschaftspotential (BP) as index of neural movement preparation is controversial, improved neural markers are able to predict decision outcome even at early stages. Participants report being conscious of their decisions only at the time of final intention formation, just before the primary motor cortex starts executing the chosen action. However, accumulating evidence suggests that this is an artifact of Libet's clock method used for assessing consciousness. More refined methods suggest that intention consciousness does not appear instantaneously but builds up progressively. In this view, early neural markers of decision outcome are not unconscious but simply reflect conscious goal evaluation stages which are not final yet and therefore not reported with the clock method. Alternatives to the Libet clock are discussed that might allow for assessment of consciousness during decision making with improved sensitivity to early decision stages and with less influence from meta-conscious and perceptual inferences.