Amnesia in an actor: Learning and re-learning of play passages despite severe autobiographical amnesia

Distinct mechanisms and functions of episodic memory

The concept of episodic memory (EM) faces significant challenges by two claims: EM might not be a distinct memory system, and EM might be an epiphenomenon of a more general capacity for mental time travel (MTT). Nevertheless, the observations leading to these arguments do not preclude the existence of a mechanically and functionally distinct EM system. First, modular systems, like cognition, can have distinct subsystems that may not be distinguishable in the system's final output. EM could be such a subsystem, even though its effects may be difficult to distinguish from those of other subsystems. Second, EM could have a distinct and consistent low-level function, which is used in diverse high-level functions such as MTT. This article introduces the scenario construction framework, proposing that EM crucially rests on memory traces containing the gist of an episodic experience. During retrieval, EM traces trigger the reconstruction of semantic representations, which were active during the remembered episode, and are further enriched with semantic information, to generate a scenario of the past experience. This conceptualization of EM is consistent with studies on the neural basis of EM and resolves the two challenges while retaining the key properties associated with EM. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

The fickleness of forgetting: When, why, and how do patient groups differ (or not)?

This commentary will review recent findings regarding forgetting rates in patient groups, including observations from some older, less cited studies. It will draw attention to studies (and reviews) indicating faster forgetting of recalled or recollected memories, relative to recognition or familiarity-based memory. Secondly, it will focus upon the variability of findings in forgetting rate studies, including variability of performance between individuals within groups, inconsistency by individuals across test sessions and/or when tested many years apart, and discordance between equivalent or near-equivalent studies. Thirdly, it will consider the distinction between studies finding early forgetting or progressive/quantitative memory loss and those suggesting a later, 'qualitative' change in forgetting rate. The latter pattern, most commonly seen in epilepsy cases, may be relatively infrequent when appropriate account has been taken of variation in controls' performance, and effect sizes can be low. There is also a need for an adequate neurobiological account of this delayed (or 'later') forgetting. Fourthly, the major contributions of Sergio Della Sala, Alan Baddeley, and their colleagues will be reviewed, drawing our attention to important factors in experimental design, such as the presence or absence of repeated practice, recall of gist versus peripheral detail, and parallel forgetting curves from different levels of initial learning. The paper concludes with a summary of the major findings in (i) healthy participants (including studies of normal ageing), (ii) memory-disordered patients arising from focal lesions, (iii) Alzheimer and MCI patients, and (iv) epilepsy patients.

Real-world statistics at two timescales and a mechanism for infant learning of object names

Infants begin learning the visual referents of nouns before their first birthday. Despite considerable empirical and theoretical effort, little is known about the statistics of the experiences that enable infants to break into object–name learning. We used wearable sensors to collect infant experiences of visual objects and their heard names for 40 early-learned categories. The analyzed data were from one context that occurs multiple times a day and includes objects with early-learned names: mealtime. The statistics reveal two distinct timescales of experience. At the timescale of many mealtime episodes (n = 87), the visual categories were pervasively present, but naming of the objects in each of those categories was very rare. At the timescale of single mealtime episodes, names and referents did cooccur, but each name–referent pair appeared in very few of the mealtime episodes. The statistics are consistent with incremental learning of visual categories across many episodes and the rapid learning of name–object mappings within individual episodes. The two timescales are also consistent with a known cortical learning mechanism for one-episode learning of associations: new information, the heard name, is incorporated into well-established memories, the seen object category, when the new information cooccurs with the reactivation of that slowly established memory.

No consolidation without representation: Correspondence between neural and psychological representations in recent and remote memory

Memory systems consolidation is often conceived as the linear, time-dependent, neurobiological shift of memory from hippocampal-cortical to cortico-cortical dependency. We argue that contrary to this unidirectional view of memory reorganization, information about events may be retained in multiple forms (e.g., event-specific sensory-near episodic memory, event-specific gist information, event-general schematic information, or abstract semantic memory). These representations can all form at the time of the event and may continue to coexist for long durations. Their relative strength, composition, and dominance of expression change with time and experience, with task demands, and through their dynamic interaction with one another. These different psychological mnemonic representations depend on distinct functional and structural neurobiological substrates such that there is a neural-psychological representation correspondence (NPRC) among them. We discuss how the dynamics of psychological memory representations are reflected in multiple levels of neurobiological markers and their interactions. By this view, there are only variations of synaptic consolidation and memory dynamics without assuming a distinct systems consolidation process.

Memory: what we think the psychiatrist should know in a forensic context

This article offers a selective review of memory and of issues relevant for a psychiatrist thinking about memory in a forensic context. It considers the development of our knowledge of memory, some of the ways in which memory can be erroneous and some evidence that this fallibility may sometimes be overstated. It concludes with a section on good practice in psychiatric assessment and in medico-legal work, looking at memory assessment, malingering/exaggeration and guidance for expert witnesses.

Anomalies of Autobiographical Memory

OBJECTIVES

In this paper, I review three 'anomalies' or disorders in autobiographical memory: neurological retrograde amnesia (RA), spontaneous confabulation, and psychogenic amnesia.

METHODS

Existing theories are reviewed, their limitations considered, some of my own empirical findings briefly described, and possible interpretations proposed and interspersed with illustrative case-reports.

RESULTS

In RA, there may be an important retrieval component to the deficit, and factors at encoding may give rise to the relative preservation of early memories (and the reminiscence bump) which manifests as a temporal gradient. Spontaneous confabulation appears to be associated with a damaged 'filter' in orbitofrontal and ventromedial frontal regions. Consistent with this, an empirical study has shown that both the initial severity of confabulation and its subsequent decline are associated with changes in the executive function (especially in cognitive estimate errors) and inversely with the quantity of accurate autobiographical memories retrieved. Psychogenic amnesia can be 'global' or 'situation-specific'. The former is associated with a precipitating stress, depressed mood, and (often) a past history of a transient neurological amnesia. In these circumstances, frontal control mechanisms can inhibit retrieval of autobiographical memories, and even the sense of 'self' (identity), while compromised medial temporal function prevents subsequent retrieval of what occurred during a 'fugue'. An empirical investigation of psychogenic amnesia and some recent imaging studies have provided findings consistent with this view.

CONCLUSIONS

Taken together, these various observations point to the importance of frontal 'control' systems (in interaction with medial temporal/hippocampal systems) in the retrieval and, more particularly, the disrupted retrieval of 'old' memories.