Déjà vecu for news events but not personal events: A dissociation between autobiographical and non-autobiographical episodic memory processing

Déjà vécu with recollective confabulation: an unusual presentation of Alzheimer's disease

A man in his 80s presented with gradual onset of a persistent and delusion-like perception that novel encounters are repetitions of previous experiences. Within 2 years of symptom onset, he had impaired verbal memory and executive dysfunction on neuropsychological assessment. Cerebrospinal fluid core Alzheimer's disease (AD) biomarkers analysis supported probable AD. Generalised and left temporal atrophy was seen on MRI of the brain. Neurological fludeoxyglucose-positron emission tomography (PET)/CT showed left temporal and bilateral frontal lobe hypometabolism. His presenting symptom is known as déjà vécu with recollective confabulation, a rare phenomenon associated with AD and other neurodegenerative disorders. While several potential mechanisms have been previously proposed, the fludeoxyglucose-PET/CT hypometabolism in the temporal and frontal lobes in this case suggests dual deficits in recognition memory and metacognition may be culprit mechanisms. Although uncommon, déjà vécu with recollective confabulation is a fascinating phenomenon that can provide a unique insight into memory and delusional processes in dementia.

Are involuntary autobiographical memory and déjà vu natural products of memory retrieval?

Involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) and déjà vu are phenomena that occur spontaneously in daily life. IAMs are recollections of the personal past, whereas déjà vu is defined as an experience in which the person feels familiarity at the same time as knowing that the familiarity is false. We present and discuss the idea that both IAMs and déjà vu can be explained as natural phenomena resulting from memory processing and, importantly, are both based on the same memory retrieval processes. Briefly, we hypothesise that both can be described as "involuntary" or spontaneous cognitions, where IAMs deliver content and déjà vu delivers only the feeling of retrieval. We map out the similarities and differences between the two, making a theoretical and neuroscientific account for their integration into models of memory retrieval and how the autobiographical memory literature can explain these quirks of daily life and unusual but meaningful phenomena. We explain the emergence of the déjà vu phenomenon by relating it to well-known mechanisms of autobiographical memory retrieval, concluding that IAMs and déjà vu lie on a continuum.

Measles, magic and misidentifications: a defence of the two-factor theory of delusions

Corlett (Corlett, P. (this issue). Factor one, familiarity and frontal cortex: A challenge to the two-factor theory of delusions. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry) provides a robust critique of the two-factor theory of delusions. The heart of his critique is two challenges he derives from a paper by Tranel and Damasio (Tranel, D., & Damasio, H. (1994). Neuroanatomical correlates of electrodermal skin conductance responses. Psychophysiology, 31(5), 427-438), who illuminate the autonomic responses and brain damage of four patients often cited in support of the two-factor theory of Capgras delusion. I defend the two-factor theory against Corlett's two key challenges, arguing that his first challenge has been previously addressed, and that his second challenge is overstated. In my view, these challenges do not negate the two-factor account. Nevertheless, two-factor theorists - and computational psychiatrists - should continue to devise and test falsifiable predictions of their respective theories.