The functional effects of prior motion imagery and motion perception

Deep Aphantasia: a visual brain with minimal influence from priors or inhibitory feedback?

The authors are both self-described congenital aphantasics, who feel they have never been able to have volitional imagined visual experiences during their waking lives. In addition, Loren has atypical experiences of a number of visual phenomena that involve an extrapolation or integration of visual information across space. In this perspective, we describe Loren's atypical experiences of a number of visual phenomena, and we suggest these ensue because her visual experiences are not strongly shaped by inhibitory feedback or by prior expectations. We describe Loren as having Deep Aphantasia, and Derek as shallow, as for both a paucity of feedback might prevent the generation of imagined visual experiences, but for Loren this additionally seems to disrupt activity at a sufficiently early locus to cause atypical experiences of actual visual inputs. Our purpose in describing these subjective experiences is to alert others to the possibility of there being sub-classes of congenital aphantasia, one of which-Deep Aphantasia, would be characterized by atypical experiences of actual visual inputs.

Predicting the subjective intensity of imagined experiences from electrophysiological measures of oscillatory brain activity

Most people can conjure images and sounds that they experience in their minds. There are, however, marked individual differences. Some people report that they cannot generate imagined sensory experiences at all (aphantasics) and others report that they have unusually intense imagined experiences (hyper-phantasics). These individual differences have been linked to activity in sensory brain regions, driven by feedback. We would therefore expect imagined experiences to be associated with specific frequencies of oscillatory brain activity, as these can be a hallmark of neural interactions within and across regions of the brain. Replicating a number of other studies, relative to a Resting-State we find that the act of engaging in auditory or in visual imagery is linked to reductions in the power of oscillatory brain activity across a broad range of frequencies, with prominent peaks in the alpha band (8-12 Hz). This oscillatory activity, however, did not predict individual differences in the subjective intensity of imagined experiences. For audio imagery, these were rather predicted by reductions within the theta (6-9 Hz) and gamma (33-38 Hz) bands, and by increases in beta (15-17 Hz) band activity. For visual imagery these were predicted by reductions in lower (14-16 Hz) and upper (29-32 Hz) beta band activity, and by an increase in mid-beta band (24-26 Hz) activity. Our data suggest that there is sufficient ground truth in the subjective reports people use to describe the intensity of their imagined sensory experiences to allow these to be linked to the power of distinct rhythms of brain activity. In future, we hope to combine this approach with better measures of the subjective intensity of imagined sensory experiences to provide a clearer picture of individual differences in the subjective intensity of imagined experiences, and of why these eventuate.

Different Mechanisms for Supporting Mental Imagery and Perceptual Representations: Modulation Versus Excitation

Recent research suggests imagery is functionally equivalent to a weak form of visual perception. Here we report evidence across five independent experiments on adults that perception and imagery are supported by fundamentally different mechanisms: Whereas perceptual representations are largely formed via increases in excitatory activity, imagery representations are largely supported by modulating nonimagined content. We developed two behavioral techniques that allowed us to first put the visual system into a state of adaptation and then probe the additivity of perception and imagery. If imagery drives similar excitatory visual activity to perception, pairing imagery with perceptual adapters should increase the state of adaptation. Whereas pairing weak perception with adapters increased measures of adaptation, pairing imagery reversed their effects. Further experiments demonstrated that these nonadditive effects were due to imagery weakening representations of nonimagined content. Together these data provide empirical evidence that the brain uses categorically different mechanisms to represent imagery and perception.

Memories with a blind mind: Remembering the past and imagining the future with aphantasia

Our capacity to re-experience the past and simulate the future is thought to depend heavily on visual imagery, which allows us to construct complex sensory representations in the absence of sensory stimulation. There are large individual differences in visual imagery ability, but their impact on autobiographical memory and future prospection remains poorly understood. Research in this field assumes the normative use of visual imagery as a cognitive tool to simulate the past and future, however some individuals lack the ability to visualise altogether (a condition termed "aphantasia"). Aphantasia represents a rare and naturally occurring knock-out model for examining the role of visual imagery in episodic memory recall. Here, we assessed individuals with aphantasia on an adapted form of the Autobiographical Interview, a behavioural measure of the specificity and richness of episodic details underpinning the memory of events. Aphantasic participants generated significantly fewer episodic details than controls for both past and future events. This effect was most pronounced for novel future events, driven by selective reductions in visual detail retrieval, accompanied by comparatively reduced ratings of the phenomenological richness of simulated events, and paralleled by quantitative linguistic markers of reduced perceptual language use in aphantasic participants compared to those with visual imagery. Our findings represent the first systematic evidence (using combined objective and subjective data streams) that aphantasia is associated with a diminished ability to re-experience the past and simulate the future, indicating that visual imagery is an important cognitive tool for the dynamic retrieval and recombination of episodic details during mental simulation.

The pupillary light response as a physiological index of aphantasia, sensory and phenomenological imagery strength

The pupillary light response is an important automatic physiological response which optimizes light reaching the retina. Recent work has shown that the pupil also adjusts in response to illusory brightness and a range of cognitive functions, however, it remains unclear what exactly drives these endogenous changes. Here, we show that the imagery pupillary light response correlates with objective measures of sensory imagery strength. Further, the trial-by-trial phenomenological vividness of visual imagery is tracked by the imagery pupillary light response. We also demonstrated that a group of individuals without visual imagery (aphantasia) do not show any significant evidence of an imagery pupillary light response, however they do show perceptual pupil light responses and pupil dilation with larger cognitive load. Our results provide evidence that the pupillary light response indexes the sensory strength of visual imagery. This work also provides the first physiological validation of aphantasia.

Why do imagery and perception look and feel so different?

Despite the past few decades of research providing convincing evidence of the similarities in function and neural mechanisms between imagery and perception, for most of us, the experience of the two are undeniably different, why? Here, we review and discuss the differences between imagery and perception and the possible underlying causes of these differences, from function to neural mechanisms. Specifically, we discuss the directional flow of information (top-down versus bottom-up), the differences in targeted cortical layers in primary visual cortex and possible different neural mechanisms of modulation versus excitation. For the first time in history, neuroscience is beginning to shed light on this long-held mystery of why imagery and perception look and feel so different. This article is part of the theme issue 'Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation'.

Expectations affect the perception of material properties

Many objects that we encounter have typical material qualities: spoons are hard, pillows are soft, and Jell-O dessert is wobbly. Over a lifetime of experiences, strong associations between an object and its typical material properties may be formed, and these associations not only include how glossy, rough, or pink an object is, but also how it behaves under force: we expect knocked over vases to shatter, popped bike tires to deflate, and gooey grilled cheese to hang between two slices of bread when pulled apart. Here we ask how such rich visual priors affect the visual perception of material qualities and present a particularly striking example of expectation violation. In a cue conflict design, we pair computer-rendered familiar objects with surprising material behaviors (a linen curtain shattering, a porcelain teacup wrinkling, etc.) and find that material qualities are not solely estimated from the object's kinematics (i.e., its physical [atypical] motion while shattering, wrinkling, wobbling etc.); rather, material appearance is sometimes “pulled” toward the “native” motion, shape, and optical properties that are associated with this object. Our results, in addition to patterns we find in response time data, suggest that visual priors about materials can set up high-level expectations about complex future states of an object and show how these priors modulate material appearance.

Behavioral and oculomotor evidence for visual simulation of object movement

We regularly interact with moving objects in our environment. Yet, little is known about how we extrapolate the future movements of visually perceived objects. One possibility is that movements are experienced by a mental visual simulation, allowing one to internally picture an object's upcoming motion trajectory, even as the object itself remains stationary. Here we examined this possibility by asking human participants to make judgments about the future position of a falling ball on an obstacle-filled display. We found that properties of the ball's trajectory were highly predictive of subjects' reaction times and accuracy on the task. We also found that the eye movements subjects made while attempting to ascertain where the ball might fall had significant spatiotemporal overlap with those made while actually perceiving the ball fall. These findings suggest that subjects simulated the ball's trajectory to inform their responses. Finally, we trained a convolutional neural network to see whether this problem could be solved by simple image analysis as opposed to the more intricate simulation strategy we propose. We found that while the network was able to solve our task, the model's output did not effectively or consistently predict human behavior. This implies that subjects employed a different strategy for solving our task, and bolsters the conclusion that they were engaging in visual simulation. The current study thus provides support for visual simulation of motion as a means of understanding complex visual scenes and paves the way for future investigations of this phenomenon at a neural level.

Neural activation patterns and connectivity in visual attention during Number and Non-number processing: An ERP study using the Ishihara pseudoisochromatic plates

Visual cognitive function is important to build up executive function in daily life. Perception of visual Number form (e.g., Arabic digit) and numerosity (magnitude of the Number) is of interest to cognitive neuroscientists. Neural correlates and the functional measurement of Number representations are complex occurrences when their semantic categories are assimilated with other concepts of shape and colour. Colour perception can be processed further to modulate visual cognition. The Ishihara pseudoisochromatic plates are one of the best and most common screening tools for basic red-green colour vision testing. However, there is a lack of study of visual cognitive function assessment using these pseudoisochromatic plates. We recruited 25 healthy normal trichromat volunteers and extended these studies using a 128-sensor net to record event-related EEG. Subjects were asked to respond by pressing Numbered buttons when they saw the Number and Non-number plates of the Ishihara colour vision test. Amplitudes and latencies of N100 and P300 event related potential (ERP) components were analysed from 19 electrode sites in the international 10-20 system. A brain topographic map, cortical activation patterns and Granger causation (effective connectivity) were analysed from 128 electrode sites. No major significant differences between N100 ERP components in either stimulus indicate early selective attention processing was similar for Number and Non-number plate stimuli, but Non-number plate stimuli evoked significantly higher amplitudes, longer latencies of the P300 ERP component with a slower reaction time compared to Number plate stimuli imply the allocation of attentional load was more in Non-number plate processing. A different pattern of asymmetric scalp voltage map was noticed for P300 components with a higher intensity in the left hemisphere for Number plate tasks and higher intensity in the right hemisphere for Non-number plate tasks. Asymmetric cortical activation and connectivity patterns revealed that Number recognition occurred in the occipital and left frontal areas where as the consequence was limited to the occipital area during the Non-number plate processing. Finally, the results displayed that the visual recognition of Numbers dissociates from the recognition of Non-numbers at the level of defined neural networks. Number recognition was not only a process of visual perception and attention, but it was also related to a higher level of cognitive function, that of language.